remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the defendants said last week "a tendentious account."
Nevertheless, even without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime against international law for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215. Conference between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the president of Czechoslovakia Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakia foreign minister Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancery on 15 March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours. Others present were General Field Marshal Goering, General Keitel, Secretary of the State von Weissacher, Minister of the State Meissner, Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counsellor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory -- even humble, though the president of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer's hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the president. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the president, could be of great advantage to his country because, and I quote "It was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene." I quote now from the top of page three of the English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said "Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him."
"If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian Mountains.
He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don't you think you ought to read the last sentence on page two?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page was: "For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia."
(Continuing) "Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him." Then I had read down to --"But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benes's tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. (He often bragged of his patience). The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total positive.
(Sounds like a continental expression to me). At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities, and, further, the protests for national groups which could no longer endure life as it was." cance of that language of Adolph Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign state and its prime minister. Having in his presence General Field Marshal Goering, the commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And continuing the quote:
"This it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country. We were not confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He belives in the honesty and straightforwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.
"At six o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form (supportable). In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy, and a certain national liberty.
"We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded,***" I suppose that is a bad translation for "had not yielded. "***the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him***" that is, Hitler, "***because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was readying the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: 'The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.'
"That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory to the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just mentioned suggestions.
"That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the blood shed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.
"The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him ***"that is, Adolf Hitler advise Paul Hacha, "***now to retire with Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done." German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in the four hours left to him, before the German Army crossed the Czech Border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will remember that the Defendants, Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. of the German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is next to the last paragraph on page four.
"The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen***" that is, including Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, ***"whether they shared his opinion which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech army was by the German army." official British War Blue Book, at page 24 and I offer it as Exhibit USA 119. This is an official document of the British Government, of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of the Charter.
The part from which I read is a Dispatch from the British Ambassador, from Neville Henderson, describing a conversation with the Defendant Goering, in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth.
"From: Neville Henderson. To: Viscount Halifax. Berlin, May 28, 1939. My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Goering at Karinhall yesterday." Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with paragraph four. I am sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs.
"Field Marshal Goering, who had obviously just been talking to someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything German and particularly in respect of the gold held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however, I had had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his return did not revert to this specific question. He complained, instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he described as the war party in England, etc.
"I told the Field Marshal, that before speaking of British hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew quite well the basis of all the discussions between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his 'wild men' and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich agreement rested.
"At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told Field Marshal Goering that it was not possible to talk of free will when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign.
The Field Marshall did not deny the fact but explained how the point had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first been prepared to sign everything but had said that constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed, while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that, if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the story that the advance occupation of Witkowitz had been effected solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first opportunity." notice of the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the French Official Yellow Book, at page 7 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS. appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be given an identifying number Exhibit USA 114. This is a Dispatch from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book. I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all of these matters. chancellory, he was in such a state of exhuastion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in three hours at six in the morning -
THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!
MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded him that in three hours at six in the morning, the Defendant would cross the border. The Defendant Goering boasted of what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Goering said, his Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in two hours and that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. and air, the aged President of Czechoslovakia at four-thirty in the morning, signed the Document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which they had already had prepared. This Document is TC 49, the declaration of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented by the British Prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption it will subsequently be introduced.
"The President of the Czechoslovakian State entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich" -- really a rendezvous with destiny. the representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas already crossed the Czech Border. British Blue Book, of which I ask the Court to take Judicial notice. This is a speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from which I quote one passage. This is Document 2860 PS, which I have already offered and had identified.
"It is to be observed -- and the fact is surely not without significance -- that the towns of Maehrisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice were actually occupied by German S.S. detachments on the evening of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before any discussion had taken place."
from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the armed forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly "Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist." Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German Reich under the name of "The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia." The Decree is Document TC 51, another of the Documents which the British delegation will present to the Tribunal later in this week. It was signed in Prague on 16th March 1939, by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendants Frick and von Ribbentrop. "The Bohemian and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the Lebensraum "living space" of the German people." The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia henceforth was subjected to Germany. A German Protector was to be appointed by the German Fuehrer for the so-called "Procectorate", the Defendant von Neurath. God deliver us from such protectors!! The German Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs and of their excises. It was specified that German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi insistence, had done so much to undermine the Czech State found that the independence of their week-old State was itself in effect qualified. not offer that. I think it is a decree in the Reichsgesetzblatt, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is identified as our Document 1439 PS. It appears at page 606, 1939, Reichsgesetzblatt, part two.
Minister of Foreign Affairs; and then there is a heading 'Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia."
"The German Government and the Slovakian Government have agreed, after the Slovakian State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose, the undersigned representatives of the two Governments have agreed on the following provisions:
"Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and integrity of its territory.
"Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its Western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians, and the Javernik Mountains." Then I skip. "The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces. I also offer in evidence Document 2793-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't that be a convenient time to break off. I understand, too, that it would be for the convenience of the Defense Counsel if the Tribunal adjourn for an hour and a quarter rather than for an hour at midday, and accordingly, the Tribunal will retire at 12:45 and sit again at 2:00.
(Whereupon a short recess was called at 1130 hours).
MR ALDERMAN: (continuing): May it please the Tribunal, this secret protocal between Germany and Slovakia provided for close economic and financial collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and sub-soil rights were placed at the disposal of the German Government.
I offer in evidence Document 2793-PS, Exhibit U.S.A. 120, and from it I read Paragraph 3:
"Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that, inso far as they are not needed to meet Slovakia's own requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany's disposal. The entire soil research" -- Bodenforschung is the German word -- "will be placed under the Reichagency for soil-research." That is the Reichsstelle fuer Bodenforschung. "The government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation to determine whether the present owners of concessions andprivileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been neglected." evidence that they considered Slovakia a mere puppet state--in effect a German possession.
I offer in evidence Document R-100 as Exhibit U.S.A. 121. This document is a memorandum of information given by Hitler to von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939. Much of it deals with problems arising from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. I quote beginning at the sixth paragraph:
"Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.
"Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.
"Czech Protectorate:
"H. Gr."--the translator's note indicates that that probably means army groups, but I can't vouch for it--"shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the threat of severe penalties.
"We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February, though, shall be paid for. Bohemia and Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech army." of the Munich agreement, was the occasion for formal protest by the British and French Governments. These documents, No. TC 52 and TC 53, dated 17 March, 1939, will be presented to the Tribunal by the British Prosecutor.
State of the United States Government issued a statement, which I will offer in evidence and I invite the Court to take judcial notice of the entire volume, Document 2862-PS--as Exhibit U.S.A. 122, which is an excerpt from the official volume entitled "Peace and War:
United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941," issued under the seal of the Department of State of the United States of America. Incidentally, this volume which happens to be my own copy-- and I hope I can get another one-- I am placing in evidence, because I am quite certain that in its study of the background of this whole case the Court will be very much interested in this volume, which is a detailed chronological history of all the diplomatic events leading up to and through the Second World War of 1941. But what I am actually offering in evidence at the moment appears on pages 454 and 455 of the volume, a statement by the Acting Secretary of State Wells, dated 17 March 1939:
"The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions stated its conviction that only through international support of a program of order based upon law can world peace be assured.
"This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country's condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and independant people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close and friendly relations.
"The position of the Government of the United States has been made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression.
"It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening the world peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past three days."
accomplished the program they had set themselves in the meeting in Berlin on 5 November 1937. You will recall that this program of conquest was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserves, and to place them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of aggression. I less than a year and a half this program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders, and at that point I would again invite the Court's attention to the large chart on the wall. I think it is no mere figure of speech to make reference to the wolf's head, what is known in Anglo-American law as caput lupinum. the first chart - 12 March 1938. Czechoslovakia thereby was encircled, and the next step was the absorption of the mountainous part, the Sudetenland, indicated on the second chart in red. On 1 October 1938 Czechoslovakia was further encircled and its defences weakened, and then the jaws clamped in, or the pincers, as I believe General Keitel or General Jodl called them -- I believe it was General Jodl's diary and you see what they do to Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939 the borders were shortened, new bases were acquired, and then Czechoslovakia was destroyed. Bohemia and Moravia are in black and Slovakia in what might be called light tan. But I have read to you the documents which showed in what condition Slovakia was left; and with the German military installations in Slovakia, you see how completely the southern border of Poland was flanked, as well as the Western border, the stage being set for the next aggression, which the British Prosecutor will describe to you. aware of the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession by Germany of Czechoslovakia.
file, and we offer particularly Item 10 of the document, at page 25 of the English translation. I offer it as Exhibit U.S.A. 123, Page 25 of the English translation contained the Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering in the Luftwaffe Ministry, the Air Ministry. The meeting which was held on 14 October 1938, just two weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland, was devoted to the discussion of economic problems. As of that date, the Defendant Goering's remarks were somewhat prophetic. I quote from the third paragraph, from the bottom of page 26 of the English translation:
"The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler." Moravia into the German Reich, Defendant Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi leaders in Czech economic potential.
I offer in evidence Document R-133, as Exhibit U.S.A. 124. This document is a minute, dated Berlin
THE PRESIDENT: 133, isn't it?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, R-133, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, signed by Muller, of a conference between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German Government, concerned with war production. This meeting had been hold two days previously, on 25 July. I read, the first part of the account of this meeting.
"In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German War potential, by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics - S 10 402/39 of 10 July 1939 - as well as a letter with similar meaning to the Junkers firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate are contary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should he done only with his consent.
In any case, he insists, (that is defendant Goering insists) in agreement with the tion as soon as possible."
pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-1939. Those minutes are U.S.A. 109.
You will recall the best sentence of those minutes, a statement of Defendant Goering's gonclusions.
I quote this sentence again.
"Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East."
I now offer in evidence Document 1874 PS, as Exhibit U.S.A. 125. This progress of German preparations for war.
He compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and France.
Not unnaturally, he mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, in this connection.
I read two para
THE PRESIDENT: Which document is this?
MR. ALDERMAN: It is 1874 PS.
"However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how conflict.
Because of German action, the situation of both Axis countries of Czechoslovakia.
That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of "Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of bigger conflict.
This too, is benefit."
Then on page 5, paragraph 2 of the German version:
"The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an Axis powers.
Germany could then attack this country from two flanks and proximity to the border."
border. And that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on the four segment of the German aggression.
More than that, it demonstrates what I might call, Document L-79, Exhibit Number U.S.A.27.
I quote from it.
"The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good use.
aims."
evidence as Exhibit U.S.A.34; on page 8 of the German text:
"The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 this is our Document 789-PS, Exhibit U.S.A.23.
I quote one passage from the second paragraph:
"The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign.
First of all, the western fortifica tions had to be finished.
It was not possible to reach to goal in one effort the Sudeten German territory.
That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made.
Then followed the erection of the too late to be included in our Document Book.
It reached me Saturday, late in the afternoon or late at night.
This is an official document, again from which I had previously offered in evidence.
I now offer it, identified as Document 3061-PS, as Exhibit U.S.A.126.
with an English translation, which didn't seem to us quite adequate and we up, I believe, to the Tribunal.
. That mimeographed translation should be appended to our Document Book "0".I shall not read the reports it is about twelve pages long.
The Court will take judicial notice of it, under the provisions of the Charter.
I merely summarize.
This document gives confirmation and corroboration to the other evidence which I Presented to the Tribunal.
In particular, it offers support to the following allegations: