DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: No. 50, Page 115, from Zernatto's book, on Seyss-Inquart's attitude; then, on Page 125, Document No. 54, also from Zernatto's book. It says, "Seyss-Inquart no longer retains the developments in his hands". the witness, Dr.Seuss-Inquart, and says that there were two points that Seyss-Inquart would not discuss and would not compromise on:
"The first is Austria's independence and the second, the possibility for the conservative-Catholic element to develop its own life". BY DR. STEINBAUER: speech in which you called yourself a minister, although Schuschnigg had already handed in his resignation.
A The situation was as follows: The resignation of the whole cabinet wan not accepted by the president; that is, he and I remained ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg held his farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole cabinet. He only said, "We yield to force." that I should not be expressly appointed chancellor. But the power to muster the German troops for the entry was turned ever to me. President Miklas.
A I did not see President Miklas at all until 9:00 or 10:00 in the evening, after Schuschnigg's speech on "We yield to force."
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of Schuschnigg on the 11th of March, No. 53, page 122, in whichSchuschnigg says:
"The Bundes President has commissioned me to notify the Austrian people of the fact that we yield to force. Because at any price even in this serious hour we do not intend to spill German block, we have ordered our army to withdraw without resistance and in case the march into Austria, is carried out to await the decision within the next hours." BY DR. STEINBAUER: SS units were called to the chancellor's office. What do you say about that?
A I believe it was after Schuschnigg's farewell speech, in the anteroom, I saw ten or fifteen young non in black trousers and white shirts; that is, SS. I had the impression that they Guards for State Secretary Keppler and others. In the rooms which Chancellor Schuschnigg and president Miklas were occupying, I ordered guards from the Austrian Guard Battalion. I placed them before those rooms. These were selected non who were well armed according to theAustrian point of view, and the SS men, who were at most 40 in number had only pistols. That is, fifty steps from the Chancellor' office were the barracks of the Guard Battalion, with about 100 picked and well armed men. President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg had had no other concern than what happened, in the chancellor's office and on the street in front of us, They could easily have settled the whole matter by calling out the Guard Battalion. Austria, Eigruber, which states that before you become chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the various federal offices.
A That is completely untrue. The Gauleiter of Upper Austria does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says he received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram to any Gauleiters or to anyone. I did not give oral instructions to seize the power. Later I heard from Globetehnick that he had carried out the seizure of power. He told men that in these words:
"Do you knew that I seized the power for you and got the government for you? But I did not tell you, because you would have been against it."
Q You say "you would have been against it". The entry had taken place meanwhile which the defendant Reichsmarshal Goering has described. Was the population against it, in your opinion?
A I cannot call it an invasion. It was an entry of German troops which was widely welcomed, Except for a small percentage of the Catholic population, there was no one who was not widely enthusiastic. There was no district in which it was not the desired thing.
I was in complete agreement with Dr. Schuschnigg. In 1937, he at once agreed with me, saying that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be stopped by anything except by the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I should like to refer to a document, No. 37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by Summer Welles, "The Time for Decision". It describes the conversation between him and Count Ciano. It says:
"Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome. He frankly admitted that in case of on occupation of Austria by Germany the majority of the Austrians will partake in this occupation and that the Austrians would join the Germans like a single man for the fight against Italy, if Italy should send troops to Austria in order to prevent the occupation." BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Now, witness, we will go to the 12th of March. Did you not at this time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
A Yes; I called Hitler up. That goes back to the occasion of the entry. I should like to repeat, on the day before, at about7 o'clock, activity suddenly stopped, and everything was waiting. At 7:30 State Secretary Scubl came with the report that the entry of troops had actually begun, and that border guards had reported. Reich Marshal Goering repeatedly announced it. When the entry was actually in progress, Schuschnigg made his farewell speech. The system of the Fatherland Front resigned. further the taking of the control of Austria, or the seizure of power by the National Socialists. What I did was only to negotiate, in the sense of a treaty of the 12th of February. the responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech myself, not the one which was submitted. I did not mention the provisional government, I called myself Minister of the Interior. Only at that moment did I call on the SA and the SS and the auxiliary police, and just like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no resistance to the entry.
Subsequently I was appointed chancellor, and approved. On the same night I drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid that something might happen to him through provocateurs. I asked Dr. Keppler to call up the Fuehrer and say that the entry should not be carried out. Reichsmarshal Goering spoke about that here.
The next morning I called up again. I not the Fuehrer at the airport at Linz. Since the entry was in full progress, I tried to see whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the German Reich, so that symbolically, at least, equal rights would be maintained. The Fuehrer agreed, and actually Austrian troops entered Munich, Berlin, and so on, in Austrian uniform.
the further development of the situation? of a coalition government could not be realized. I saw that a National Socialist government, with a very strong Catholic tendency, would be in charge, but not in theform of an immediate Anschluss, but in carrying out corresponding elections, plebescites, with an economic and possible military union with the German Reich.
R. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit an extremely important document. It is quite new. It shows how the Anschluss came into being. It is the testimony under oath of the former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckhardt, who is imprisoned here. I submit this to the Court and I should like to note the following from this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: That is not in the document book because I received it only later. I will read only briefly to establish the connection. I have submitted the original to the Court. The witness says the following -
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: No. 92. The witness says that probably Hitler would become president of Austria. He says thathe was told by Frick to work out such a law. He was ordered to Linz -
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter, a few affidavits are missing which have just come in. Perhaps it would be exedient to read these documents when they have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, they have it.
If I may continue. He says that he was given the assignment in Linz, to his surprise, to direct a total Anschluss. Austria was to become a province of the German Reich, such as Bavaria and the other German provinces. He worked out this law as he had been instructed to do. He flew to Vienna and submitted it to the assembled ministers there for acceptance.
The impression of theAnschluss on the population I should like to prove through three documents.
First, No. 30. This is the welcoming celebration for theFuehrer on the Heldenplatz in Vienna by the Vienna population. On this occasion, on the15th of March, the witness welcomes the Fuehrer and said the following: "The goal for which centuries of German history had struggled, for which untold millions of the best Germans bled and died, the last aim of hot fights, the last consolation in the bitterest hours -today it has been accomplished. Austria has come home." Now Hitler ordered that this Anschluss be sanctioned by the Austrian population by a plebescite. The other documents have shown theresults of this plebescite to the Court. I should like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic bishop. This is document No. 32, page 73; Dr. Karl Renner, who was President at that time, document 33, page 76. As for the attitude of the other powers in the surrounding world to theAnschluss question, I shall question the witness Schmidt, who was Foreign Minister. I should like to submit only one document. That is Document 38, page 89. This is the speech by Chamberlain, who was then Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on the Anschluss. He says the following: "Nothing would have stopped Germany's action unless we and the others had been ready to use force in order to prevent it." BY DR. STEINBAUER: Reich, Syess-Inquart was Chancelor. I ask you, did you remain Chancelor? Did you receive other State functions after the seizure of power? the occasion to discuss three questions with the Fuehrer. That was not easy. The Fuehrer was quite excited. First, I asked if theAustrian Party would return to relative independence under an Austrian as the provincial leader; second, that Austria as a state might receive a certain degree of independence. To the first request the Fuehrer said, it was possible. To the second he said, yes, that Austria would receive a governor of her own. At this time I stood up and asked theFuehrer to be allowed to return to private practice as a Lawyer. Third, I asked thatthe unjust relationship of two schillings to one mark be changedto one to one fifty. The Fuehrer agreed to do this.
On the 15th of March, on the occasion of the demonstration which has already been mentioned here, the Fuehrer told the radio announcer to announce that Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart was going to speak.
That was the first I had heard that I was Reichs Governor. I became Reich Governor and remained so until the end of April, 1939.
Q Who was the real leader of Austrian politics? Party and to do thepreliminary work for the plebescite. The instructions of Buerckel and his co-workers was a plan somewhat foreign to Austria. I had occasion, on the 8th of April, in Buerckel's presence, to call the Fuehrer's attention to this type of coordination and the Fuehrer said: "Buerckel, you must not do that. If you do, the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss would evaporate." A few weeks later he was made Reich Commissioner for the Reunion. He handled all politics and propaganda, including church policies, and he had the right to give instructions to me in State matters.
policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss. The first charge is that in the Jewish question you participated in this unfortunate treatment of the Jewish population, that you were responsible for it.
what have you to say about this?
A I can't deny it. Certainly, in my field of activities as Chief of the Civilian administration I issued orders along that line. But as to treatment of the Jewish question as such, Buerckel claimed that as his field. In a document which has been submitted here, he called the Jewish question a matter connected with the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One is Document No. 64, page 154. It is a decree of the Fuehrer concerning the appointment of Buerckel as Reich Commissioner for too Reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I point out especially Article 4, which expressly gives Buerckel the right to issue orders to the witness.
The second document is No. 67, pare 163. The Court already has it It is 2237. In this long document, I only want to point out that the execute of the Jewish question, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with which the defendant had nothing to do. an affidavit which came to me from Australia unsolicited. This is Document 70, page 175. I know the point of view of the court, that the circumstances that one defendant or another submits letters from Jews is not a very weighty proof according to the proverb, "One swallow doesn't make a summer". The reason I submit this document is Paragraph 12 on page 4. It is from the witness Dr. Walter Stricker, who comes from a respected Jewish family in Linz, and who says the following:
"After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews, and that in May 1938, when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he protested to Gauleiter Buerckel." by the defendant.
BY DR. STEINBAUER: placing a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you after the Anschluss?
A I know that this charge is made against me. The radical circles of the Party made the sane accusation. I will admit openly that I can understand why this accusation is made. I attempted to bring two groups together which as history shows, could not be brought together. It is clear that the radic elements of both groups, since this realization was impossible, had to come toe the opinion that the man who attempted this was not honest in his attempt.
The more important point is something else. The solution which the Austrian question received was not my solution. It was the solution of the radical elements in the Party. I myself, from the 11th of March at 8 in the evening, participated in this solution. As a result, it is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and prepared for it , but that is not true. At 8 in the evening, alter Schuschnigg and the Fatherland System resignation, I took this point of view, because another one was impossible in reality. There was no other political power in Austria except the National Socialist one or civil war. my co-workers. On the 13th of march, of course I welcomed the moment, and included answer to the question of whether I had misgivings about the execution of the matter, I considered the question and I did not need to have any misgivings included regard to foreign politics. As for internal politics, there was never so muc enthusiasm in Austria. I was aware that no Austrian statesman, no responsibl Austrian, ever had the whole population behind him to such a high degree as I had. But it was good and useful, and it was better to have the responsibility outwardly. supervised by Heydrich very closely.
A The circles which distrusted us included Heydrich. At the end of 1937, Heydrich issued a, secret report which I received later. In this report he said that the solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was unavoidable; the only obstacle could be the policy of Staatsrat Seyss-Inquar who would be in a position to call for something like an Austrian National Socialism.
no other task than to issue constant reports to Heydrich on what I was doing. of Security my telephone conversations were listened to. reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an estate or a sum of money or anything?
A No, there was no question of any such thing. My reward was the knowledge of having cooperated in the formation of the greater Germany.
Q Did you over receive anything?
A Gruppenfuehrer of the SS. On the 15th of March, I was appointed Gruppenfuehrer of the SS as an honorary title. I did not try to obtain it. I took no examination.
In general, honorary rank in the SS was not Membership in the SS. One has no power to issue orders, no disciplinary powers. I learned that myself when I complained to Himmler about Buerckel. The letter has been submitted here. I demanded proceedings. Himmler told me that he had no disciplinary, power over Buerckel; it was only an honorary rank.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
THE WITNESS: Heydrich issued a secret report against me -- pardon me.
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about Austria,and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the policy of Seyss-Inquart.
That was the substance of it, wasn't it? And after that, I understood you to say you received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
WITNESS: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to me to accompany me as a sort of guard. These guards had orders to report what I did to Heydrich. BY MR. STEINBAUER: Gruppenfuehrer you received no award with the exception of the consent that you would become Reichs Minister?
A This was said at the end of April, 1936. I refer to a question. in the cross examination of the Reichsmarshall. Before the 13th of March, 1936, I did not have any contacts in the Reich or anything. I had no obligation to anyone in the Reich. choslovakian question briefly. You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter to the Fuehrer, that you took an active part in the Anschluss of Czechoslovakia. Governor in Austria. I received refugees from the border areas, and lodged and fed then in Austria. Henlein and a few other leaders I know personally without mingling in their politics, or without knowing their relations to the Reich.
Q What can be said about Czechoslovakia? the old Austrian monarchy. I had relatives in Bratislava. The Slovaks and the Germans knew each other well. We knew the complaints of the Slovaks that the promise of Pittsburgh was not kept, and that they had not received full automny in Czechoslovakia, but later Pater Hlinka advocated complete automny and he is honored like a Saint in Czechoslovakia. The great majority of the Czechoslovakian people were behind him. He maintained independence of the parliament. After March 1936, or rather, after September 1936, I met a few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr.Tisor, Dr.Churchansky, and perhaps one or two ethers. vakian conditions, and this I assigned to two of my co-workers to get this information. I assigned this to people who had very good personal relations.
there. In March, 1939, I talked to Sidor and Dr.Tisor, because they wanted to talk to me about possible Berlin-Prague developments and about the results for Slovakia.
That is what my co-workers who invited me said. In these discussions, the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash was mentioned, and the concern about the Slovakian territories, because there was danger that the Hungarians and the Polish might take advantage of the opportunity to occupy Slovakian territory. to do, and how they could preserve their country from harm. I spoke very openly to the gentlemen. I did not challenge them to declare their intentions, I had to leave this decision to the Slovakian gentlemen, but in discussing the conditions, there were differences between Slovakian and German interests and in ascertaining if that was not the case.
Q In this connection I should like to refer to two documents. One is No.71, Page 181. This is reference to the proposed treaty, and the second document is No.72, Page 183, submitted by the Prosecution as USA-112 as proof that the Defendant was in illegal contact with the Slovakians. I submit this document to you. It is an account of Viscount Halifax of 13 March 1941. He was in Bratislava at that time. Were you there?
in order to ask certain questions of the Slovakian Government. Buerckel and I refused to take over such a task. That was one of the few cases when I agreed with Buerckel. As Territorial Administrative Chief, it was my task to prepare for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Buerckel and I accompanied Keppler. No generals of the Wehrmacht had any part in it. The document says that five German Generals were present. That is false. fact that the Slovakian Minister Sidor and the later President Tiso both declared that they negotiated only with Buerckel. The name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all. Then, to sum up, I can ask, was there any activity on your part in regard to Czechoslovakia in the sense in which the Prosecution alleges? in such cases. I did not.... Representing German interests of the German Reich, I did not overstep the limits justified in representing legal interests. without Portfolio, is that true? of the Secret Defense Counsel of the Cabinet? to be attacked? opinion on the matter to Hitler? I hope that this letter is in my Vienna files. I wrote a copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents quite well.
I called Hitler's attention to the fact that German people were not enthusiastic, On the contrary, there was most serious concern that it would be a life and death struggle. I expressed my opinion that the war would not have a military solution, but that it would have to be solved by means of politics, and on the basis for a political solution was the alliance with the Soviets, which should be extended to a military alliance if possible. Consideration would have to be given to the fact that the Soviets would never give up their interests in the Balkans any more than in Czarist Russia, and that Pan-Slavism would play a role in the results, and in the Czechoslovakian and polish question, Russia would have to be counted on as an equal. states. Then the war on the Western Front would stop of its own accord. The Italian policy could not be charged against Germany, and an agreement would have to be reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated by air or by submarine, and a Mediterranean position would have to be attained in order to make peace. to Hitler? made a remark which showed clearly that he had received the letter. We said, "I do not want to destroy the British Empire," whereby he made it clear that he misunderstood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I am of the opinion, if the Court agrees, that it is time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken) (The Tribunal reconvened, at 1400 hours, 10 June 1946.)
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, you last spoke about your attitude with regard to Czechoslovakia. You talked about your activities as Reich Governor in Vienna and you talked about your relationship to Buerckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to Poland. What functions did you carry out in Poland? Poland, which actually come within the organization of the Armed Forces. The administration, however, was never really established. The Government Genera, was created at once and I became the deputy of the Governor General. The sphere of influence is contained in a law but depends, of course, upon the question of the cases in which the Governor General uses my office, my job. On the 19th of January, 1940, he stated that, in a conference. which is an extract from Dr. Frank's diary, where on page 14 he describes the functions of Seyss-Inquart, and then on page 30 he states something which he has told me personally, that he assumes responsibility for what has happened there. Minister you were actually higher, and you actually exercised certain function there. Under PS-2278 a report has been held against you which you yourself have written. You are accused of certain indivual action, and I want you to speak about this report.
A My secretary wrote that report. I certainly read it -Governor of Lublin had made the suggestion that the Jews were to be transferred from Lublin to the district of Kirov and then to reduce them in numbers. The Prosecution themselves have stated that this is a remark made by the writer.
Actually, this was not an official report of a meeting. The settlement area of a group of German nationals was concerned, and the employment of Jews in that area, could hardly bring suspicion from me, that Jews were to been exterminated in that district. I knew, however, that the fairly large Jewish population of Lublin was to be taken out of the town by the Governor. Any specific intention regarding the word "decimating", which might have meant exterminating, never occurred to me. The Governor of Radom reported to me that criminals had been shot and it is true that he had told me that. I was under the impression that that had been done through the means of the police courts-martial which still existed at the time. But several sources are mentioned -- or rather, there are several passages in that same report where I point out that German courts had to be introduced and that no sentenc were to be pronounced or carried out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I must have said the same thing at the time I was at Radom only it isn't contained in that report. salt, or wanting to monopolize them. In the economic chaos we found in Pola that was quite natural. we had to come to a natural economic system, for the agricultural population who had to be supplied with certain products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town populations. In that connection I want to point out that I urged the re-establishing of the Polish self-administration under the old departmental heads from the old Polish time and that I pressed for 9,000,000 of zloty to be placed at the disposal of that scheme, just as I wanted vehicles, motor-cars set aside. I also wanted compulsory work to be replaced by normal employment as soon as possible.
Q The so-called "AB Action" plays a considerable part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for "extraordinary pacification action". Since that might still have happened at the time you were active there, I wan to ask you if you know anything about it? Poland, with the beginning of the Norwegian campaign and increased through the campaign in the West.
The resistance movement in Poland became extremely active. The Security Police demanded severe measures. Buehler's objection, which he has talked about when he was here as a witness, was in fact raised. But I also understood the Governor General's words to mean exactly the same as Buehler wanted them to be understood. But Buehler was perfectly entitled to point out what these facts were, because the police might have considered these words to mean much greater powers than the Governor General intended to give them.
Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these police courtsmartial and he appointed an investigating committee, of which I was the chairman as long as I was in, and sometimes we cancelled as much as 50 per cent of the sentences imposed.
Q How long were you actually the deputy when Dr. Frank was prevented from acting? you introduce any measures which were in the interests of the Polish population I intervened with Secretary of State Backe myself, and, for instance, on one occasion I obtained six thousand tons of grain for the large cities.
I approached Reichsmarshal Goering and the Fuehrer and I intervened on behalf of the Town of Lodz, which was to be left inside the Government General. The same applies to the cool district, West of Krakew. that is the question of your activities in the Netherlands.
My first question is this; How did you happen to become Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands?
Q And where were you at the time?
A I was on a duty journey in the Government General, and Dr. Lammers called me to the headquarters.
Q So you didn't apply for this job, did you?
A No, I didn't think of it. At that time I had asked the Fuehrer for permission to be called to the armed forces.
Q But weren't you incapacitated because of a wound in the last war? nominated you? prosecution, the number being 997-PS, which gives a fair picture of them. framework, had to look after the interests of the Reich. Apart from that I had a political task, which was, under the maintenance of Dutch independence, to try and achieve it so that the Netherlands would change their pro-British attitude and become pre-German, and to create a particularly close economic collaboration.
I want to draw your attention to paragraph 3 of this document. There I point to the difficulties connected with those two tasks and the difficulties connected with coordinating them. I was pointing out that one could not coordinate the two so easily.
on the part of the Dutch, and the question of forming a political will and political attitude would be subject to having such freedom not limited; and I said that the final outcome for the Dutch would be to have them make a decision of their own. particularly political will.
Q Was this order of the Fuehrer ever changed or altered later on?
Q How did you carry out that task from the political point of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to cooperate? parties to remain, and I gave them the possibility to remain active, as far as that was in the interest of the occupying forces. I particularly promoted the National Socialist Party. speeches you often represented the facts differently from the functions you carried out.
I refer to PS-3430, USA 708. It is stated there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the Dutch. This is document 76, at page 197 of my document book. which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not carried out in practice, or could be carried out. However, it may be possible that the Dutch had the impression that I was trying to force National Socialism upon them because, after all, I had only admitted NationalSocialist parties, whereas I had to prohibit the others.