I shall submit them as soon as they have been translated then.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I am concluding my case.
THE PRESIDENT: How, Counsel for the Defendant Jodl.
DR. EXNER: My Lords Justice, with your kind permission I should like to present my case in the following manner: First of all, to call the defendant Jodl to the stand. And as far as my documents are concerned, all except one will be used during his testimony in chief, on which occasion I shall submit them to the high Tribunal. I have throe document books which are in uniform order, U-1, U-2, 3, in continuous order; and I shallquote the page in each case, which in the case of the translation is found in the upper left-hand corner of the translation, and that is the page of the original. I am sorry to say that the documents are not contained in the order in which I shall read them, and this is due to the fact that they were received too late, and for other reasons as well. lacking and I hope that I shall be able to make up for this lack. I was granted the use of five witnesses but I shall forego the testimony of one of these witnesses. The four remining witnesses will take up but little time in their testimony. the Defendant Jodl to the witness box.
ALFRED JODL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name?
Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
BY DR. EXNER: sixty years old. That is a mistake. You attained the age of 56 the other day, for you were born when? of old Bavarian stock; you are a professional soldier; and what was the chief reason for your choice?
AA great grandfather of mine was an officer; my father was an officer; an uncle was an officer; my brother was officer; my father-in-law was an officer; and then I can say that the profession of a soldier was in my blood. attitude and conviction. Which of the political parties which existed in Germany before 1933 were you closest to spiritually? I was an officer, and especially in the offshoots of the post-war period as the parties existed then, if I took at the background from which I came, the attitude and convictions of my parents, I can say that I would be closest to the National Liberal Partyand their convictions and opinions. In any event, my parents never voted any other ticket except the National Liberal one. Weimar Republic. without reservation; and if I could not have done that I would have asked for my resignation. And at any rate, we southern Germans were interested in a democratic regime and in a constitution. This regime was nothing strange to us spiritually, for even our monarchies were democratic.
Q And such was your relationship to von Hindenburg?
A I knew von Hindenburg. I had been assigned to him after his first election to the vice-presidency when he spent his first leave in die tramszell. Then again, I was together with the leaders and Field Marshal von Mannstein. I was with the Hindenburg family for one day on their Estate Neudeck.
I can say briefly that I admired him; and when he was elected vicepresident for the first time, I considered that the first symptom of the second rise of the German people.
Q What was your connection with the National Socialist Party? before the Munich Putsch. On the occasion of this Putsch, the Reichswehr was per force drawn into this inner political development. At that time, with few exceptions, it met the test of obedience. And after this Putsch, there was a certain dissension in the attitude of the officer corps. There were various opinions about the worth or non-worth of Hitler. Before and after, I was very, very sceptical, completely sceptical, reserved and rejectant. I was pacified only when at that time Hitler, at the Leipzig law suit, gave the assurance that any differentiation of the Reichswehr would be rejected by him.
Q Did you attend meetings where Hitler spoke?
Q Can you tell us, please, which leaders of the party you knew? That is, before 1933.
A I knew only those who had previously been officers: for example, Epp, Huehnlein and Roehm. But I had no connection, or anything like that, with then after they had left the Reichswehr. I had lost touch with them.
Q Before the assumption of power, had you read the book "Mein Kampf"?
Q Did you read it later?
Q That was your opinion on the Jewish question?
A I was not anti-semitic. I am of the opinion that no party, no state, no people, and no race, not even cannibals, per se are good or bad in themselves, but only the single individual. Of course, I knew that Jewry, after the war and in the symptoms of moral disintegration that appeared after the first world war, appeared in a very provoking manner in Germany.
And that was not anti-semitic propaganda; those were facts, and those facts which were regretted very much by Jews themselves. It is like that. Any means of outcasting them and any excesses, any of these measures taken by the state were rejected very intensely by me.
Q The prosecution asserts that all the defendants have cried, "Germany awake. Death to Jewry."
AAs far as I am concerned, that assertion is wrong. At every period of my life I associated with Jews individually.
THE PRESIDENT: You can go on now. BY DR. EXNER:
A I was a guest of Jews,and some Jews had entry into my home. But these were the Jews who knew and recognized their fatherland. They were Jews whose human value was indisputable.
Q Did you on occasion use your influence for Jews on behalf of Jews? the government, and that they could sort of redeem themselves in that way?
A I knew that well; for at about that time, when I came to Berlin, in the later operational division, I did not find any preparations for war; but I found preparations for the use of the Reichswehr in the interior of the country. And that use of the Reichswehr was to be against the extreme leftists as well as the extreme rightists. But there were maneuvers of some sort which took place in this connection, maneuvers in which I myself participated. chancellor in the year 1933? surprise to me. And the next evening, when I was returning home with a comrade, through the rather excited crowd, I said to my friend, "This is more than a change of government; it is a revolution. Just how far it will lead us we do not know."
and the names of such men as von Papen, von Neurath, Schwerin Krosigk exerted a soothing influence on me and gave me a certain guarantee that there would be no revolutionary extremes.
DR. EXNER: At this point, I should like to read a part of the testimony put down by General von Vormann. This is page 208 of the third volume of my document book. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the page number quoted by me is to be found in the upper left hand corner, "Page 208 of the original"; and I should like to submit this document in the original.
This document deals with 1933. At that time Jodl was in the Group Command, and Vormann was a member of his unit (Gruppe). Under Figure 2, I shall read:
"Jodl, at that time Major with the General Staff, was my Group leader in 1933. He finally followed in the tracks of the then Chief of the Army Command, General von Hammerstein, and rejected Hitler and the Party altogether."
I shall now skip a few lines; they are not relevant. Then in the center of the page, I shall continue;
"When on 30 January 1933 Hitler was called as Reich Chancellor, Jodl was dismayed and astonished. I clearly recall that on the 30th or 31st of January, upon his request, I had to calltogether the officers of his unit (Gruppe) for a conference. At this conference he explained; Hitler has been called to the head of the Reich according to the existing constitution and the laws in effect. It is not for us to bring criticism concerning this,particularly criticism of the behaviour of the Reich President and Field Marshal von Hindenburg. We must obey and do our duty as soldiers. Criticisms in the former manner of the new measures of the new chancellor are not to be made in the future, for they are inconsistent with his and our own position.
"His entire speech showed great worry and apprehension for the coning development of the situation"; and so forth.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, this would be a convenient time to break of (A recess was taken until 1400 hours). (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 3 June 1946)
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Sir David, you were going to show these applications.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, No. 1, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with because he will deal with another one, and if I might deal with the ones with which I am dealing?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross examine three witnesses whose affidavits were used by the prosecution. The first is Tiefenbach, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second, Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Strupp, dealt with the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Strupp as SS and Politzei Fuehrer in Warsaw. The prosecution submits that in these cases cross examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I don't knew if-
THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the case of -- in all three.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: We will have no objection to cress interrogatories so long as they are not brought here as witnesses. Neurath to use M. Francois Poncet as a witness. The prosecution will be grateful if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and they have not got a reply yet. I don't think it will prejudice the Defendant von Neurath's case. It will be time for a reply before there is any difficulty as to time. Defendant von Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Volcano. The affidavit is twelve pages long and is a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the Adolf Hitler schools. The prosecution feels that thematter has been thoroughly covered by the Defendant von Schirach himself and also by his witnesses, Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit would be cumulative and repetitive.
But of course it is an affidavit; it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feels that they ought to have it, the prosecution does not wish to press their objection unreasonably.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English -- I have read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has been translated into theother languages. and Frank to put an interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite shortly, that raises the same point as the application, on the 2nd of May, 1946, for Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department, and the objection of theprosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are cross examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer and should not, in the opinion of the prosecution, be allowed to call evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the relationship between the Witness Gisevius and the United Stales Office of Strategic Services. approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The prosecution has no objection to the application. They reserve the right to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the trial. the Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. for the use of a decree of Hitler of the 20th of July, 1944, and the prosecution has no objection to that. which my friend, General Rudenko, will deal with, the application of the Defendant Goering.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Members of the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution has several times expressed its view respecting the application of Defense Cou nsel to call witnesses in regard to the mass shooting by Fascist criminals of Polish officers in the forests of Katyn. Our position is that this episode of the criminal activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication of the Special Extraordinary Stave Commission investigating the circumstances of the mass shooting by Hitler Fascist aggressors in the Katyn forests of Polish officers prisoners of war. This document was presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Number 54 on 14 October 1945, and it was admitted by the Tribunal and, as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, is not subject to argument. calling of three supplementary witnesses -- a psychiatrist, Stockert, a former adjutant of the Pioneer Engineers Corps, and a special expert of the staff of the Army Group Conner. following reasons: as absolutely unreasonable since the Tribunal cannot be interested in the question of in what manner the conclusion of the commission was drawn -- a conclusion which was published in the Hitler Whitebook. No matter in what way this conclusion was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting by Germans in the Katyn forest has been absolutely established by the Extraordinary State Commission. trist who was a member of the Hitler Commission, not on the basis of his competence as far as medical science is concerned, but as a representative of the German Fascist military high command. Katyn forest, having been a member of the Pioneer Engineers Unit which carried out the executions, and since he is an interested party, he cannot give any objective evidence on this matter.
cannot be admitted as a witness because he, in general, did not know anything at all about the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and Eichhorn in general could not have known that all the facts pertaining to the matter were. The same reasons apply to his potential testimony on the fact that the Germans have never perpetrated any mass shooting of the Polish people in the region of Katyn. Moreover, Eichhorn cannot be considered as an objective witness. Prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the special, authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went into all the details, and the result of this investigation has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by Germans and that they really are only one link in the chain of many bestial crimes which were perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have previously been submitted to the Tribunal. insists on the denial of the application of the Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories, which the Prosecution do not object to?
DR. KAUFMANN (Counsel for Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have no objections to questionnaires, but then I would ask that those witnesses be heard in my presence outside of this Courtroom, and then, on the basis of this questioning, the questionnaire can later be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here?
DR. KAUFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories ,and you now ask for crossinterrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not involve bringing the witnesses here at all.
The cross-interrogatories will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further application, you can always do so.
DR. KAUFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it, that I have the right to cross examine in this room, if the Prosecution submit, affidavits of those witnesses here. That has so far been the ruling of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we -- he have never made any general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought here for cross examination if the matter is of importance, but in the matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently/directed that there should be cross interrogatories.
DR. KAUFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Again, in your application, you say that three interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that the deponents would be subject to cross interrogation. That means, I suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross examination; it says cross interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for cross examination?
DR. KAUFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, said it would save time if I were allowed to be present at the questioning of the witnesses outside of this room.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kaufmann, and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFMANN: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for defendant Goering): May I make a brief statement on General Rudenko's statements? referring to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this regulation would oppose an application. It is true that government reports are evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that that Article does not prevent the calling of witnesses, but General Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not witnesses who ought to be called.
He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the minutes submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of those polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counter evidence--mentors of the same staff-- to prove that in the whole time that this staff was stationed there, no killing of Polish officers occurred. I believe that it is pertinent evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. In the first place, this is not a settled question,and it is not mentioned in the Protocol. by saying that he committed the deed. That is what is to be proved by the evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German Commission?
DR. STHAMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. At that time he was present, and he ascertained from the corpses that the shooting must have been carried out at a time before the occupation by the Germans.
THE PRESIDENT: But he doesn't actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the Military Commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not believe that he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment nearby.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we'll consider your argument. stand over? Is counsel for von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we'11 consider that. answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: (Counsel far the defendant Keitel): My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the defendant von Schirach. opinion of the defendant von Schirach, the witness von Wakano who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Mr. von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the court to examine this affidavit to that end, as to whether there are not individual points important for the defense of von Schirach, and then to decide on admitting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. SEIDL: I have nothing to add to the argument which I have already made on the application. My first application, to get information from the War Department, was decided upon. It has not yet been decided, however, to submit a questionnaire to Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to theother three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler became the head of the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the skate in 1934.
A. The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. when we lost Hindenburg, we lost a man in the Wehrmacht, and the whole German people loved the Field Marshal. But what we received with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the popular election was so overshelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not exist. Then, we soldiers had every right to take the oath to Adolf Hitler.
Q. The Prosecution speaks of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
A. I was presented to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel, in the command train on the 3rd of September 1939 when we were going to the Polish eastern front. On that day I spoke my first word to him.
A. Two days after the outbreak or war?
A. Two days after the beginning of war, yes.
Q. Did the Fuehrer have confidence in you?
A. That came about very slowly. The Fuehrer had a certain distrust of all general staff officers, especially of the Army. In this years, he was, in general, quite skeptical towards the Wehrmacht.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was overheard:
"I have a reactionary army, a Christian" -- sometimes he said "an imperial" -- "navy, and a National socialist air force."
The relationship between him and me was very varied. Until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased until August 1942.
Then, the crisis arose and his relationship to me was decisively unfriendly. That lasted until the 30th of January 1943. Then, the relationship improved and was especially good, especially trusting after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been wardef off. The last years was characterized by numerous altercations. tentions?
A Only to the extent that we needed to know then for our military work. Of course, for the military work of the thief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, a little more was necessary than for a battalian commander, for politics is part of strategy.
Q Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you? One example is especially characteristic, when I reported to the Fuehrer in September 1943 that Facism was dead in Italy, the streets were full of Party insignia in Rome, he said, and I quote; "Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer, one sees that generals don't understand politics." That after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight, can be readily understood.
Q Were political and military questions kept sharply separated?
Q And were you consulted on military matters or not? at the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if he was clear in his mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.
Q The system of secrecy of ten has been discussed here. Were you also included in this secrecy?
this trial. All of the events and occurrences at the beginning of the war when the other countries had made efforts to prevent this war, Hitler informed us of these events only to the extent that they were in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the party and in an entirely different manner from the Wehrmacht, to the SS differently again than to the Wehrmacht and to the politicians. Secrecy about the destruction of the Jews, about the events in the concentration camps was a masterpiece of secrecy, and it was a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers photographs especially about these things and told us stories about the gardens and plantations on Dachau; about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, and gave us soldiers the impression that they were highly humane arrangements.
Q Did not news reach the higher headquarters from outside?
A The Fuehrer's headquarters was a mixture between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were no wire fences and no barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it and this was called Sperrkreis I. Constant passes to enter this Sperrkreis I were not even given to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to stop each officer whom he did not know. Into this holy of holies, aside from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated.
Q But what about foreign papers and radio reports? American and English papers gave us vary good information on new weapons. The foreign news itself was received by the civilian press at headquarters and cons red. I received only what was of military interest. To all internal polotical police, all reports on the situation were forbidden.
Q How did your cooperation with the Fuehrer take place?
A Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. It was established at one time that I took part in 119 talks or conferences. I took part in far mere than five thousand. These discussions of the situation and reports on the military situation was at the same time as the issuing of orders, and on the basis of the reports or events, the Fuehrer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in such a manner that when my report was finished I went into the next room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the report on the situation was still going on I read these drafts of these messages to the Fuehrer for his approval. General Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
Q Were you also present in political talks? discussed in these reports on the situation I did not hear. The same is true of Field Marshall Keitel who worked in a similar manner. situation and to what extent were you present in discussions of a political nature? extent that they were necessary for cur military work. On occasions when politics and the conduct of the war conincided, the Reich Foreign Minister was present and problems were discussed which lay on the border of politics and the conduct of the war. At the exclusively political talks with foreign neutral or allied politicians or with the Reich Foreign Minister I did not take part. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, on armament and administration of the occupied territories, but the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted up until six or eight hours a day. The time I had left then I really needed for my work. contradidt the Fuehrer, did you have any success with objections? him. Many, many times I contradicted him strongly, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. In many cases I induced the Fuehrer to desist from many things to which I objected.
Q Can you give an example? interest the Court, but in the field which interests the Court, there was, for example, the violation of the Geneva Convention. I prevented that. I objected to that.
something, which according to my convictions I had to prevent, there was still the means I often took, the means of delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychological moment to bring the matter before Hitler again. This procedure was often successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the commando order.
Q We will speak about these things later. The witness Gisevius said, in answer to questions of the Prosecution, that Jodl had a key position with Hitler. Do you know this witness by sight, or have you heard of him in any other way?
A I do not have this honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here and I saw him here in the Court for the first time.
Q In what way could you influence Hitler? events.
Q What do you mean in your explanation to make sudden decisions? be that the witness meant that he was mistaken, but if he meant that he kept from the Fuehrer atrocities committed by cur own Wehrmacht or atrocities committed by the SS, that is false.
How would that witness know about it? On the contrary, any report of that kind, I immediately reported to the Fuehrer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples:
An affidavit was read here by Rittmeister Scheldt. He testified that Obergruppenfuehrer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Guderian, and Jodl of atrocities of the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Fuehrer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this Brigade. when I heard from the American Radio through my press chief of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmedy, immediately on my own initiative through the Commander-in-Chief I had an investigation started, then to report the result to the Fuehrer. When unimagineable horrors of the Ustascha company in Croatia came to my knowledge I reported this, too, to the Fuehrer immediately.
Q I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary PS-1807, you write, on the 12th of June, 1942 -- page 119, Second Document Book: "The German field police disarmed and arrested an Ustascha company in Eastern Bosnia." I should like to add that this is noteworthy, since this Ustascha company was something like an SS group in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities the German field police arrested this Ustascha company. "The Fuehrer did not approve of this order of the commander 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustascha on which the whole Creation State was founded. This was bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population created by the atrocities." This was the incident of which you were thinking just now?
Q Have you another example? lations of international law by the enemy to the Fuehrer only when he would have heard of them by other means. Cases of commando under takings, capture of commandos, I reported only when I had to assume with certainty that he would hear it by other means, in another way.
In this connection I did try to put a bar up against new spontaned decisions.
A I can only say, unfortunately not. There were many ways in which the Fuehrer could learn about military matters, as well as others. Everybody and every agency could report to the adjutant directly. The photographer sent out by the Fuehrer to take pictures at the front found it expedient on this occasion to reports to the Fuehrer on military matters. When I objected to this, the Fuehrer answered, "I don't care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is that I hear it." just the opposite; and unfortunately, in many ways hostile to the Wehrmacht, reports against the correct and chivalrous attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Fuehrer. It was these reports which brought about these decisions for brutal proceedings. Much damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had been in a position to keep this information from the Fuehrer.
Q What role did Canaris play in this connection?
A Canaris saw the Fuehrer dozens of times. Canaris could report to him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seem to no that he knew much more than I, who was concerned exclusively with the operational conduct of the war. But he never said one w He never said one word to me, and it is quite clear why. This witness, this man who is now dead, had the very best understanding w Himmler and with Heydrich -- and he needed that, so that they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators. intentions. Did you know anything about that? tions. considered a putsch possible?
A The witness spoke of putsches as washing one's hands That proves to me that he never had any serious thought about it, that he never thought about it seriously.