Russian divisions weren't yet ready. When, on the other hand, we had reached the demarcation line two days later and had to cross it because we were pursuing the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow at 2 o'clock in the morning, to the effect that at 4 o'clock in the morning the Soviet Russian divisions would be present along the entire front. That was carried out most punctually. And I then drafted an order to the effect that our German troops, wherever they were taking up contact with Soviet troops and had made arrangements with Soviet troops, would then have to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
Q Can you possibly remember what the date of these arrangements was?
A I can't tell you exactly when the arrival took place, the arrival on that line, but I would say it was on or about the 14th or 15th of September.
THE PRESIDENT: All that the Defendant has been telling us simply seems to be a waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I don't know. close contact with the Fuehrer to attack quite a number of neutral states. Is that true?
A That is not true. I remember that a witness here was talking about what an uncanny influence I had with him and my incredible closeness to the Fuehrer. At any rate, he mentioned something -- something sinister. But my influence on the Fuehrer was unfortunately nowhere nearly as great as it really ought to have been, according to the position I held -- in fact, as it ought to have been. The reason is the tremendous personality of this man of power who couldn't suffer advisers very easily. invasion of Norway? At any rate, some time after Grand Admiral Raeder had talked to him about it for the first time. That first conference which I think took place on the 10th of October was reported to me and the Fuehrer didn't informme. But he talked to me in the middle of November. The details I didn't learn until the report of the Supreme Commander of the Navy which took place on the 12th of November and when I was present.
which is on page 46 of the Document Book, but I do not need to read it. It is the first volume, page 46. What was the Fuehrer's point of view? incidentally is available in writing, that he wasn't in any way interested in extending the theatres of war, but if the danger really arose, that Norway might be occupied by Great Britain, in that event the situation would be different.
Q Was anything ordered at that time?
A Nothing was ordered at all. He merely instructed me to think about that problem generally. The preparations, as proved by documents, were begun on the 27th of January, 1940.
DR. EXNER: That, Mr. President, can be seen from Document C-63, USA-8
Q Were you of the opinion at the time that Hitler's assurances during December and October, 1939, namely that Norwegian neutrality would be respected was given to allow Norway some safety assurances, as has been stated by the Prosecution. which I shallgive you. These political assurances were made by the Fuehrer or the Reich Government on the 2nd of September and the 6th of October. On the 9th of October the Fuehrer read that famous memorandum and signed it, which is known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that that is a memorandum written by the Fuehrer personally.
DR. EXNER: This is Document L-52, USA-540, and it is contained on page 48 of Volume 1 of my Document Book.
Q Who was the memorandum prepared for?
A I think the document shows it. It went to the three commanders-in chief and the head of the OKW only. Every word of it was dictated by the Fuehrer personally, and it was completed during two nights.
Q I shall read the second paragraph on page 48:
"The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even if the war is of long duration." the Fuehrer could have mentioned anything other than his true intentions at that particular moment. But then that is all the more understandable, as only one day later, that is to say, on the 10th of October, Grand Admiral Raeder mentioned such worries to the Fuehrer for the first time.
A It was a tremendous decision. To be brief, it meant risking the entire German Fleet. It meant that we had to defend a coast of more than 3,000 kilometers; and that meant that at least 300,000 men would be taken up with the task. That is why the decision was subject to really reliable information, and that meant that there really was danger for Norway. That is the reason why nodefinite date was fixed for that operational plan. And that is the reason why I later made the proposal that the forces for the Operation Norway, should it become necessary to attack in the West, be kept separate. every detail?
A The reasons are quite open and quite clear. They are contained in the directive of the 1st of March,1940, which is Document C-174 -
THE PRESIDENT: Is that 174-PS or what?
DR. EXNER: It isn't in print here, before me. He is referring to a document which the British Prosecution have submitted under GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, mustn't it? The Defendant said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS (British Prosecution): And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
something which has already been mentioned here. What might that mean? You yourself must know. diary but into my little note book, "Tocarry out such a decision, I require absolutely reliable information with which i can really justify it before the world, and, if necessary, prove it." I can not say that; I only heard that from Quisling. That is why he was particularly trying to get counter-intelligence at that time to supply him continually with information regarding all these movements and changes. one to draw conclusions about England's plans. Have you anything to add to that? about all we knew. There is, though, one more thing which I do remember, which is down in my little note book. It is that particular pressure was quite openly applied in the French press for cutting off Germany from Swedish ore supplies, and then there was the mine laying operation in the Norwegian territorial waters, and the case of the Altmark, which according to my investigation, was a flagrant breach of internation law regarding the righ ts and duties of neutral states in naval warfare. Article I and II.
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I want to draw your attention to document 1809-PS, which is the diary, GB 88, page 53 of the first volume of my document bock. On 30 March there is an entryin the diary about the negotiations of Finland and Russia:
"The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very favorable, from a political point of view. The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to out Germany off from the Swedish ore."
Then the entry of 25 March:
"The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them." BY DR. EXNER:
Q What was the cause of the decision for the attack?
A The final decision of the Fuehrer was made on 2 April. Two bits of information were the cause.
First reports from the navy regarding the repeated shotsfired on merchant beats in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. The second report came from Canaris, saying that in the Northern part of the British east coast, British troops and transport ships had been readied for transport operations. there first?
A I can refer to Admiral Raeder's testimony in that connection, and I need add only that Norway in British hands would have meant that half of the war would have been lost fo us. Strategically, we would have been surrounded in the North, and we would have been incapable, because of our small fleet, of ever putting that right again.
Q Was there definite proof later on that the British plan existed? in Namsos and elsewhere, and we surprisingly captured the British war correspondent Rommilly. He expected everything there except German ships. Otherwise, he would have been able to escape being taken prisoner, To the question of what he was doing trying to report about a war in peaceful Narvik, he could not give us any information at all. Later on we captured all the files of the French general Staff. which have been in part presented by Admiral Raeder's Defense Counsel. the British officers and NCO's whom we captured in Norway were carrying on them. They proved at least one thing. That was that all these troops had already been shipped and, at the moment when our German fleet was advancing towards Norway, had been put back ashore.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I want to refer to two entries in the diary, page 54, first volume of my document book, the entry of 24 and 26 June--I beg your pardon--26 April. There it says:
"Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign Office."
I then draw your attention to Soltman's interrogatory, which is document AJ, Number 4, which I now present. It is on page 173 of the second volume, but I need not read it. I merely draw your attention to Soltman's answers to questions(4) and (5). BY DR. EXNER:
Q Now, one last question about the Norwegian affair. The Prosecutor has stated that honor of the soldiers who were attacking Norway was in doubt. problem. They have put it on the level of soldierly or manly honor. Up to now, that has not been the custom in this world, I can only say that I have neither attacked in Norway nor have I used lies or excuses, but I have used all my strength to contribute to the successful outcome of that operation, which I considered absolutely necessary in order to anticipate a similar British action. my contention will become clear, but, even if I have been wrong, then the honesty of my own subjective opinion of that time cannot be changed in any say.
Q We are now talking about the war in the West. After the Polish campaign, were operational plans for an attack in the West in existence? On the contrary, there was a wide-spread opinion, particularly in the army, that the war would die down on its own, if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the C. in C. of the army even moved mobile infantry divisions and made them into fortress divisions; that is to say, he took away from them all their means of mobility.
Q Did you learn during the Polish campaign about the Fuehrer's intentions as far as the Western Countries were concerned? He could not find a plausible explanation about the complete lack of action on the part of the British and Fre nch forces stationed in France. It was only by means of their war reports that they were conducting a sort of sham war, whereas in reality not a single shot was being fired at the front.
Toward the end of September, however, the Fu ehrer became clear, if I remember rightly, that once England had got into a war, she would fight such a war to the bitter end.
Q. As a General Staff man, you must be able to answer the following question: Speaking purely strategically, could we behave purely defensively as far as the western powers were concerned?
A. I will be very brief because such problems are not directly connected with this trial. I only want to say that it would have been the greatest strategic error because our superiority of that time would diminish proportionate ly with the hesitation of using attack. Britain was currectly bringing further divisions to France, and the same applied to the French who brought them from their colonies. I believe I need say no more about that. volume of my document book, on page 56, but I need not read from it again. This contains directives for warfare, and again, these are the basic thoughts which we have just heard.
A. But there is one thing, I think, which I ought to add. The danger that we might not preserve our superiority for any length of time was being taken so seriously by the Fuehrer that he actually wanted to attack during winter, although every soldier who was available advised him against it.
Q. In that connection, I ought to draw your attention to our document in Volume 1, page 48-49, which is the Fuehrer's memorandum. That is Document L-52, USA-540. It contains a list of reasons. neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?
A. It wasn't an unimportant matter for the Fuehrer to create new enemies amounting to 400,000 or 500,000 men, which was the strength, of course, of the Dutch and Belgian forces.
We started the attack in the West with inferior forces. We had 110 divisions, and the enemy had approximately 135, and except for an emergency, no military commander would do that.
Q. But what were the reasons?
A. We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained, that is, the part between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vogesen mountains were added to it.
The Maginot Line couldn't be penetrated at those points. We lacked heavy artillery for that. But that wouldn't be a moral reason; it would, in fact, be an immoral one. all the mobile British and French forces would go through Belgium and Holland and hit us from the rear. They were ready for just that task. It was the decisive factor for the Fuehrer, but we also, the military men, were under the definite impression from the reports which we were receiving that the Belgian and Dutch neutrality would finally be only a bogus one and a deceptive one.
Q. How did you arrive at that conclusion?
A. The reports individually are of no interest, but there was an endless flow of reports coming from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed through letters we received from the Duce. But the certain fact which was quite evident, something which I could see on the maps every day, was the nightly flights of the British Air Foce, quite unconcerned by neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. That had to bring us to the conclusion that even if those two states wanted to -- and I think at the beginning they did want to -- they could not possibly remain permanently neutral.
Q. What danger would an Anglo-French occupation of Holland have meant to us
A. Those dangers were quite clearly stated by the Fuehrer, firstly in his memorandum L-52, which has already been repeatedly quoted from. There, on page 48 of the document book, at the lower portion of the page, there is a reference to the tremendous importance of the Ruhr, of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today. Document 180-PS, USA-23, on page 59 of the document book, he says once more how tremendously that danger would be for the Ruhr,if, surprisingly, one day British and French forces would stand outside that territory. There he refers to it as the Achilles heel of Germany, and that it was indeed.
Q. It says on page 59 of my document book:
"We have one Achilles heel, the Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger."
A. Of course, at that time I could not judge the absolute truth of the information we received from Canaris. I couldn't have sworn to it at that time, but the material we captured War Council in London on the 17th of November 1939 -- generally speaking confirmed the correctness of these intelligence reports.
Q Presumably, you didn't have my reason at that time to doubt Canaris' honesty, did you?
A No, there wasn't the slightest cause at that time. the Fuehrer postponed it again and again. I think there are 17 orders which postpone that attack again and again.
A It isn't quite correct that the Fuehrer had ordered the attack for the middle of November. He wanted to attack at the moment when the meteorologists would predict clear, frosty weather for about six or seven days. But the meteorologists let him down. Sometimes they thought they were expecting such a weather situation, and then all preparations for the attack were made. Then, they canceled their forecasts and contradicted them, and the final preparations for the attack would be discontinued. and then at the last moment refrained. Canaris, a certain formation of the French Army had crossed the Belgian frontier at a certain point. Whether or not that is true, I cannot say. and then failing upon them. What have you to say to that?
A The same thing applies as I have stated before. I was not a politician, nor was I the supreme commander of the armed forces militarily. I wan under the impression -- the impression which I can prove -- that the neutrality of these two states was in fact not being respected any more. And as far as the code of honor of my actions is concerned, I must say that there was obedience, that is, the ethical basis of the soldier's life. Far be it from me to extend it without limits. As far as slave-like obedience is concerned, I think that the testimony which I have given up to now will leave no doubt as far an that is concerned. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that particularly in such operational matters there is nothing else for the soldier but obedience.
at all, then they only owe it to that ethical principle of obedience of their brave soldiers.
Q We now turn to the Balkans. In your diary, PS-1809, on the 19th of March you made an entry saying that the Balkans must and shall remain quiet. That is on page 61 of the first volume of my book, GB-88, PS-1809, the entry of the 19th of March:
"Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce bearing with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony.
"Balkans should and must remain quiet."
What does it mean?
A Professor, I shall have to correct you. This isn't my diary.
Q Well, I went to interpose a question. Your diary is always being talked about, your diaries. Will you explain just what we are concerned with. One is an actual diary, isn't it, and the other isn't? 1938, a diary in which I used to make entries every evening.
Q Now, what is this diary, PS-1809?
A There isn't a diary of mine during the war at all, but of course I had dozens of little notebooks which I filled, and when such a notebook was full, then I would take important passages and underline them in red or make red marks in the margin, and later on my woman secretary would take them out red write them down because they were interesting for war historians and for the official, diary of the Army Command Staff.
Q Did you see it again?
A No, I no longer did. I no longer saw it. It fell/into the hands of the Prosecution. That is the diary of the Army command staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?
THE WITNESS: No. I didn't know where these extracts from my notebook had got to and the Prosecution must have captured it somewhere. Everything else was part extracts from the official diary of theArmy command staff. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Who made the entries in the official diary of the Army command staff? It wasn't you, was it?
A No. It was always done by a highly qualified expert whom I nominate
Q Did you check it?
Q Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or didn't you?
A I didn't usually have time. I had General Scherf read through it and if he found anything in particular in it he would draw my attention to it.
Q I ask leave to clarify the situation. We now return to the question of the Balkans. In your so-called diary it says it must remain quiet. What do you mean by that, or what was meant by it? that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini regarding the fact that the Balkans must remain quiet.
Q Didn't we try really to keep the Balkan situation as quiet as possible
A Yes. That attempt was being made continuously, constantly. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was so careful as to already assume it. That went as far as the fact that during the preparation of the Greek campaign the Fuehrer even refused application iron the General Quartermaster of the Army that field trains, replacement trains, should be sent through Yugoslavia, something which from the point of view of international law would have been permissible.
Furthermore, we visited our influence on Bulgaria to the effect that she should not participate in the imminent war against Greece, particularly so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Italian free war the Fuehrer was hoping again and again that the conflict, the direct military conflict between Germany and Greece, might be avoided. on page 66 of Volume I of the document book. It is an extract from PS 444, Exhibit GB 116. There in the last but one paragraph we find that the preparatory measures as exercised for the prosecution of the war were to be maee along the following lines. It is in the last but one paragraph of that page. It says:
"It will not be possible to count on the railway loading through Yugoslavia for moving these forces into position."
Q What forced us to abandon that program? the part of Italy, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grand Admiral have already spoken. I have really got to make one brief addition: As usual, the Italians were beat, and they were now sending calls for help -- they were sending the Chief of the Operational Command to come and see me. In spite of that emergency the Fuehrer did not interfere in the fight with Albania. He did not send a single German solder there, even if there had been talk about it. All he did was to order for the following spring there should be an action on Bulgaria -- there should be preparations for an action from Bulgaria, in Greece. And even if that failed to serve thepurpose for the time being, to occupy the Saloniki Plain, by meansof which the pressure or the Italians would have been relieved. Only for the case, which of course was one we were afraid of, that through the insanity on Italy's part some British divisions might appear in the Balkans, only in that case was there a plan in the entire country of Greece where it was to be thought best, because we could not possibly allow a base or bases for the British airport to be established immediately next door to the Rumanian oil fields. This difference of opinion becomes particularly clear from the order which has been offered to the Tribunal under the number PS 1541, GB 117, and found on page 63 of the document book, and on page 64.
Two passages from that I would like to quote. They are brief passages. First, on page 63, Figure 2, paragraph B. There it says:
"Operation Marita. My plan therefore is: After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, andif necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland."
Then I quote from page 64, figure 4, at paragraph A:
"The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and by the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth." occupation of Greece was only intended for the case that the appearance of British troops would force us to do so, something which to that time had not yet occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. EXNER:
Q You said that we had the plan to leave Yugoslavia neutral. The Simovitsch Putsch, apparently, changed that. Why did this event change our policy toward Yugoslavia? after Yugoslavia had joined the tripartite pact, had to be anti-German. We were about to begin the campaigns against all of Greece; English divisions had landdedthere in the meantime. This campaign could be waged only with a Yugoslavia that would be certain to remain neutral.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants --defendants Goering and Keitel--have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about, it seems to be entirely cumulative. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Do you have anything new to say? ration for an attack on Yugoslavia, I suggested to him, or at least I mentioned, that we should first issue an ultimatum to clear up the political situation. He refused to do so; he said that would not do any good. Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
Q That was on the 27th?
A Yes. May I give some proof of this?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary if the defendant Keitel said it and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: One thing seems important to me.
THE WITNESS: A document was submitted, PS-1745 GB-120, which is at page 70 of the document book. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Page 71? with the sentence on page 69 of the document book, there appears to be a difference. Page 69 contains the instructions signed by the Fuehrer, beginning with this sentence, which I shall quote;"The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia must in spite of her protestations of layalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible."
that the whole matter was a surprise. I worked that whole night in the Reich Chancellery. General Rintelen -- the liaison officer with the Italian High Command -- this Aide Memoir, which I shall quote. Here I wrote:
"In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention", and so on. I must admit that I ventured a little into the field of politics in this instance, but I thought if Germany did not clear up the political situation, Italy might do so.
Q. The next document is evidence of the suddenness of this decision. That appears on page 73 of the first volume. It is the instructions issued by the OKH on the basis of this order. It is R-95, GB-127. As I said, it is on page 73 of the first volume. "As a result of a change in the political situation", and so on. The last paragraph states: "For camouflaging purposes, the operation shall be called 'Action 25'."
What can we conclude from this?
A. The order was issued on the 30th of March.
Q. "The operation shall be called 'Action 25'."
A. It was issued three days after the Putsch, and not until that time was a name ordered for this action. This proves that it was not planned in the year 1937, as was stated here once.
Q. Now a last question on this subject of the Balkans. the attack of the German Air Force on the territory of Crete was permitted? 24th of March 1941. As I just stated, this order permitted air attacks on Crete. Now, whom about Greek neutrality from the 24th of March, 1941?
A. It did not exist at that time from the point of view of international law.
The English had, in the meantime, landed on Crete and on the Pyreus. We learned about that on the 5th of 6th of March. The order fulfills all the principles of international law. which is made here by the prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia originated in Jodl's office, has not been proved by anything and cannot be proved by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? The 24th of March, 1941? You said "360", which did not indicate anything to us
DR. EXNER: That is C-60, AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76 of the first volume. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Now we come to the question of the Soviet Union. How many troops did you have in the East during the campaign in the West?
AAt first it was 10 divisions. In the course of the Russian campaign they were reduced to six or five divisions.
Q Why did we send troops to the East after the West campaign? these weak forces he could not keep Poland quiet across the line of demarcation page 83, you write, on the 24th of May "Position in the East threatened by Russian advance against Bessarabia." That is on the 24th of May, 1940. You wrote that. Why did you do that? Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the concern which I wrote down originated with me or was a part of the Fuehrer's attitude, I cannot say today regrouping should not give the impression of offensive preparations. How should we understand this? the proposed attack on Russia. It is Page 78 of the first volume, PS 1229, USA 130. It is an order signed by Jodl to the Foreign counter-intelligence: "It is in the Eastern territory that demands will be stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October, the statue indicated on the enclosed map will be reached." in the next paragraph, which is important for the understanding of the documents It ways "For the work of our own intelligence service, as well as for the answers to the questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply."