There was nothing left for them to do, and this suggestion was put by Jodl frequently, that one would have to try, by the supplying of arguments, of data and facts and counter arguments, and through the presentation of attitudes of agencies and officers who were concerned with this -- that that material should be gathered end, in a quiet and favorable hour, approach the Fuehrer on this matter once more and try to dissuade him from his extravagant and exorbitant demand. At the outset, this resulted in a rather lengthy exchange of letters, and the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, everything with the idea of delaying the matter as much as possible and, if possible, shelving the matter completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror flyers was concerned, was this, that in this case we succeeded absolutely, even though the Fuehrer again and again had his attention called to this question through reports and wanted the decree to be carried through.
Q Did not a decree like that come through ? decree like that actually was never issued ? August of 1944, when, after an air attack on Munich, Fegelein, in a rather drastic manner, described low level attacks to him and reported to him that in the flack resistance two Allied aviators had parachuted and had been captured by one of the flack people. And Fegelein said that he had called this man to account and asked him why he had not shot the flyers, and this man said he had not done so because he hadn't had an order to that effeckt. At that moment I interpolated on my own account that there actually was no such order; and then the Fuehrer accused me in the strongest manner that the leading officers of the Wehrmacht had not issued a decree like that, and then he again demanded the issuing and execution of that order.
Q Did it actually take place then ? of the campaign in the West where burning questions were in the foreground, and these questions avershadowed the problem of the treatment of terror flyers; this problem was shelved in favor of the burning question of the West.
1940, which allegedly took place in the Reichschancellery, where the Fuehrer again bemoaned the fackt that despite his demand this decree had not been issued? lem, in a very heated manner, to General Koller, who was the then Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. I was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Fuehrer say approximately the following: that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Wehrmacht and espaecially the attitude taken by the Luftwaffe, it had not beenpossible for him to counteract the terror of the allied flyers over Germany through a counter terror.
Q Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, we have a document which we want to submit. It is an interrogatory to be found in the document book, Volume 2, Page 173, which is the testimony of General Koller, Chief of the Luftwaffe. This testimony, under Figure 4, which is on Page 130 of the document book, shows all the details of interest, and it shows this discussion in Berlin, which is of tremendous importance. This conversation took place in the main room and the other part took plane in the ante-rooms; and there was also a conversation with Goering telephonically. I should like to have the permission of the High Tribunal, in order to save time, to present this matter in toto, even through the witness on the stand wan present for only a part of this conversation, as the last sentence shows Jodl is deeplyconcerned in this whole document. And I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may deal with this matter in toto now and present it now.
which is to be found on page 179. Here the witness was asked:
"How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe?"
The answer is on the next page and is:
"From 1 September 1943 until 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the air Force Operational Staff, from 23 November 194 chief of the General Staff of the Air Force."
Question 5, and that is the question which concerns us, is on page 179:
"Do you recall that about March 1945 in the bunker of the Reich Chanceller the Fuehrer reproached you and the Luftwaffe because such an order was not given?
Answer, page 180?
"Yes, I remember quite exactly that about the beginning to the middle of March 1945, during the situation report a notice taken from the Allied Press Reporter Survey was laid before the Fuehrer by Bormann. It read somewhat to this effect:
"Am American combat aviation crew shot down over Germany a short time previously was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were mis handled by indignant persons of the population, had been threatened with death and probably would have been killed, if German soldiers had not delivered then and taken them under their protection.
"Bormann further pointed out to the Fuehrer in a few words that this confirmed that, soldiers in such cases step in against the population.
"Hitler, rather angry, turned to me and said excitedly:
"I have already once ordered that bailing-out bomber crews are not to be protected against the population. Those people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect these murderers against their own population which is acting from justified hate. Why were my orders not carried out?'
"Surprised by this attack I replied somewhat like this:
"'I know of no such order, moreover it would be a practical impossibility "Hitler, turning toward me expressed himself, very loudly and sharply, "'The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Luftwaffe, because the gentlemen of the Luftwaffe are cowards and are afraid that something might also happen to them.
The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly agreement between the Luftwaffe and the British and American fliers.'
"Hitler turned then also to Kaltenbrunner who happened to be present in the background, and speaking to him while partly looking at me continued:
"'I hereby order that all bomber crews bailed-out in the last few months and also all bomber crews bailing-out in future are to be turned over by the Luftwaffe to the SD and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone who does not carry out my orders or who takes action against the population will be punish with death and is himself to be shot.'" "Hitler then further expressed in a general way his indignation and his conception.
The assembled officers made a general impression of surprise and disapproval.
"After the Fuehrer's entourage had passed on, I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passage way. Essential points:
"Keller: It is impossible to carry out these orders. The Luftwaffe wil have no more to do with it. I, under no circumstances, and I can say as muc for the Reich Marshal. It Is entirely out of the question that the Luftwaffe outs its hand to it in anyway.
"Kaltenbrunner: The Fuehrer has completely wrong ideas. Also, the duti of the SD are continually misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover no German soldier would do what the Fuehrer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners; if individual fanatical party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier interferes. The Fuehrer has a completely false picture of the attitude of o* soldiers. Moreover, I will also do nothing in the matter myself. It would not occur to me at all. We must only see how we can get out of it, otherwi* he will have a few of us transferred among the first. We must gain time. It one way or the other, I am going to leave Berlin immediately for a fairly long time.
"Keller: Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is propitious. But we must have another way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is possible that he may come back to his order tomorrow.
Later on, if it gets worse and worse, we will have to see how to prevent the business, or what is going to happen to us.
"It was decided at my suggestion that no order alone the lines commanded by the Fuehrer will be given to the Luftwaffe and the SD. None was given to the SD. In case the Fuehrer should revert to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind:
"All previously captured prisoners belonging to flying crews must not be handed over to the Luftwaffe, but scattered everywhere around under the contr of the Replacement Away Commander (BdE); time of capture not to be centrally known. Therefore, the establishment of a number of air personnel captured during the last months would be very difficult and time-consuming. Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crows go automatically to interrogation center. Those are in a state of moving, owing to operations. Liaison is bad.
"Therefore, detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. of the Luftwaffe (Ic des OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner, who, however, would first have to be appointed.
"After the Fuehrer's entourage, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel in the entrance of the air raid shelter and said:
"'The Fuehrer's order is insane (Keitel remarked in between: "One can certainly call it that"). The Luftwaffe shall keep her escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convnced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order and moreover with such a thr* of punishment, only verbally. To an order of this kind he has to sign his own name. Whether or not it will then be carried out is an open question, in any case not by the Luftwaffe. Nor by the SD, either, I have spoken with Kaltenbrunrer.
"Field Marshal Keitel: He will not sign such orders then, and the OKW always has to endorse everything. But I will be damned if I issue such an order."
"Koller: The Luftwaffe cannot join in this under any circumstances. We will never assume such a responsibility."
"Field Marshal Keitel: You are right. I neither. I must think over what I can do about it and how.
"The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Fuehrer's order.
"After refreshments in a corner of the air raid shelter I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to go to the cloakroom and the way out. H itler by chance came out of the room, gave an order to an orderl and called me as I was passing by. The door to the conference room was open, "Hitler said to me;"'I came back to my order once more.
All of you must help me, it cannot go on like this any longer. The Luftwaffe, or at least the Reich defense has failed.
What am I to do against the frightful bombing terrorism which is only murdering German women and children" "KOLLER: The Air defense and our crows do what they can and what is humanly possible. The neglect of air armament by us, the momentary technical and numerical superiority of the enemy, cannot be eliminated or altered overnight When the searchlight-units finally become stronger, the air situation over Germany will improve for us." "HITLER: I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible before the German pepple for the continuation of this air situation. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think it over before flying here." "KOLLER: It certainly will not improve the air situation, but on the contr make it worse." "HITLER: No, what the Japanese have done is the right thing. In contrast to his behaviour at the gathering, Hitler was quiet again. He displayed an affable manner. From experience, one could talk with him better alone, then in presence of other people. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and declared:
"'If I am permitted to express my point of view, it is that this will not do. Such measures are in such brutal opposition to the education, feelings and thinking of ail soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot fill soldiers with the articles of war and docent conduct and then order actions which go against everybody's grain. You must not forge' my fuehrer, that the enemy fliers also carry out orders and do their duty just as ours. If they are shot down or make crash landings, they are just defenseless and unarmed prisoners. How would we stand before the world? And the first measures of the enemy would be to treat our flying crews the same way. That is something we cannot answer for to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would colla at one blew.'" "Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me.
After he had a first looked at me, he turned his look away, and seemed to be lost in his thoughts. But he had been listening and interrupted me here, and said quietly and in an earnest manner:
"And so the Luftwaffe is still afraid. That is indeed quite all right, but I am responsible for the protection of the German people, and have no other means except this" "Hitler turned around and went book into the conference room.
"After my arrival at the Luftwaffe Headquarters (Kurfuerst) I informed Colonel von Brauchitsch of the events and ordered him to report to the Reich Marshal about it as soon as possible. I myself could not reach the Field Marshal at that moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed a disapproving attitude towards the Fuehrer's order.
"Some one or two hours later the Field Marshal called me and began his conversation with the following words:
"'Tell me, has he finally gone completely mad?'" "It was very clear who was meant.
I personally reported once more to theReich Marshal about the principle happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner and added:
"'I will not carry out this order or any activity connected with it. I will take pains to handle the situation so as to gain time first of all, in any case, and do everything possible to prevent any of us from falling under the wheels. Perhaps after the last conference the Fuehrer will not come back to his order any more. If he does, however, it will be very hard, and you will have to go to the Fuehrer youself. What the Fuehrer ha ordered must not be allowed to happen in any case."
The Reich Marshal expressed himself as very much opposed to Hitler's attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as had been suggested, to inform him immediately at the proper time, and ended his conversation with these words:
" This is all insane and cannot he carried out."
"h) Measures against Allied fliers on the basis of the above-mentioned Fuehrer's order have been adopted neither by the Luftwaffe nor by the SD. This order has not been made known in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (B d E), or their offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting and the order has not been passed on by the Army High Command (OKW).
"Hitler did nit refer back to his order later, either with the Reich Marshal, or with myself or my representative; nor, I think, with Kaltenbrunner either. To be sure, I have never sp to the Latter again about this matter.
" Whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop, or wheth he forgot about it under the pressure of events, I was unable t judge.
"i) Perhaps two or three weeks later there came to my knowledge a directive of the OKW -- I think a teletype -- in which, as I recall, mention was made of the eye-witness report that had given occasion to it. In it was disclosed that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had acted against their people. " He mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order. If I remember correctly, the order was signed by Keitel and is to be regarded as anything else than an attempt to cover himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. In my opinion, General Jod had nothing to do with the entire-affair." was that picture presented by General Roller correct?
A I remember the following matters: In the Luftwaffe the * is based on a mutual assurance, and that was the sentence which I remember strongly. DR JAHRREISS: Thak you very much. I need not ask you any fur question on this point. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjour now.
( A recess was taken.)
Q Mr. Witness, I assume that you can still recollect the equipment, the furnishings in the offices of the fuehrer's headquarters.
A Yes, I can still remember them. Q In these offices of the Fuehrer and the Field Marshal, the Colonel General, and your own, were there maps on the wall? A Yes, both in East Prussia, particularly the Headquarters, the Fuehrer had a physiographic map of Germany and then a poli* map of Europe, and in the various other rooms there were similar maps. Q Were maps hung up also of Germany? A Yes. Q And the bordering territory, on which concentration camps a penal institutions were indicated, say, for instance, with a blue ring? A No, neither in the Fuehrer's Headquarters in East Prussia in the Reichschancellery in Berlin nor at the Berghof in Berch gaden have I seen such a map at any time. Q On the 11th of May, 1946, the Munich radio -- at 12:30 midday broadcast a letter from a painter who had alleged that I had seen maps in the Fuehrer's Headquarter which could not be anything else but maps showing the location of concentration camps. Is that possible? A That is quite out of the question. Q Was there any detailed statement about that? THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of broadcast from Munich. DR JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I didn't ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to tell him how the public has come to that knowledge, that there were such maps. But I have a further questions? THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that i ought not to be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you a* that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
BY DR STAHMER ( Counsel for the Defendant Goering):
Q Major Buechs, during the time you were a commanding officer attached to Fuehrer Headquarters were you present at the daily discussions of the situation? A Yes, I participated in the daily military discussions. Q Have you any recollection whether you were present during that conference on the 27th of January, 1945, during which the question was discussed as to what was to happen to the flyi personnel -- the RAF officers -- confined at SAgan? A I can remember something like this: The question of clearing that camp on the approach of Russian troops must have been reported to Fegelein. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp, to be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether in the course of clearing Silesia they wanted to be transported away as well. As far as I remember, th decided on the latter, that is to say, to join a transport upon was in what manner that transport was to be carried out. Q Can you still remember the suggestions that were made rega* that transport and who made them? A I believe at that time the Fuehrer only said generally that these imprisoned officers could not be treated any better than our own people. The evacuation of Silesia in our own transports did not permit even the transport of our own population by near of railway trains or large columns, and even in the winter the population had to use the road. And I think I remember that at that time the Fuehrer said that if these officers wished to be taken along on a transport then they would have to march just like the German civilian population.
DR STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement refer to an erronerous part of the record. During the cross examination of Defendant Goering on the 20th of March 1946, Document PS-3786, Exhibit USA787 was presented. In the German record, page 5250, there ismention of how they were to be transported away, and then it says that the Fuehrer said they would have to go even if they walked in Greek, but in fact it says in the original minutes, "The y have got to fo, even if they have to trek to join a column." That is something quite different. One says, Greek, d-r-e-c-k, and one says trek, t-r-e-k. a completely different and quite erroneous impression should be rectified. As the witness has just said, the Fuehrer said, "They have got to go even if they have to march in a trek"-- that is a column -- "on foot".
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Now, the Tribunal thinks that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: Yes. I merely wanted to state my point of view. BY DR. STAHMER: that conference, while transports were being mentioned, that the prisoners were to take off their boots when walking in the snow.
Do you remember who made that remark?
A No, I can't remember, and I consider that that is quite out of the question.
Q D on't you remember at all that such a remark wasmade? Who might have made it? some connection or ether; I don't know. made that remark.
A I consider that out of the question. May I, perhaps, in this connection mention that the stenographic,record, the taking down of minutes, presented a great deal of difficulty. During these conferences four to six people would talk at the same time, and very fast indeed, so that the stenographers could only write what they heard.
They could neither look up nor check who had actually said the words they were taking down. There was a table around which there sat or stood some 30 people, and that, of course, made the work of the stenograhers most difficult.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President, at this point of the trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I have a number of important questions which I ought to put to this witness, which I am not in a position to do because of the resolution passed by the Tribunal and announced today.
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, please may I complete my statement. a position to pose my questions, and that, of course, I submit to that decision of the Tribunal. I wish to stae, however, that with -
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions to the witness now, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is therefore not in a position to collect itsimmediate evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the defense having first been heard.
DR. LOEFFLER(Counsel for the SA): I wish to add something to the statement of my colleague Laternser. I wish to emphasize another -
THE PRESIDENT:(Interposing) On what point, Dr. Loeffler?
DR. LOEFFLER: On the point that the witnesses who have been called today cannot be asked questions by the defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is a disadvantage to the defnense because in practice we lose these witnesses altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Loeffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and head. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, has had brought to Nurnberg a very large number of witnesses and has set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this court.
The Tribunal has given the matter full considerationand it doesn't desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, we respect the reasons of the Tribunal, but we feel obliged to point out that from tie point of view of the defense these reasons are justified in theory, but that in practice they mean the loss of that witness, and I beg your permission to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose the benefit of those witnesses.
You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission, but they cannot he heard before the Commission.
THE PESIDENT: The Tribunal, as I havetold you, has already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don't desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
DR. LOEFFLER: May I permit myself to make a suggestion to you, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOEFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Your memory of that conference doesn't appear to be at all clear.
A May I ask you which conference? ion of the prisonersof Sagan. correct.
Q Well, but you say that you don't remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.
Q And you know that it is -- I can't find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to -- but you know that that is in the actual stenographer's notes, do you not?
Q Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unlesss it was said?
Q But you didn't hear the remark; therefore you don't know we said it?
A Yes, that's right.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of becoming Hitler's brother-in-law, when Hitler got married? found brother-in-law?
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Ihave no further question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness PROFESSOR DR. SCHRAMM.
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withold and add nothing.
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Mr. Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operational Staff during this war?
A Yes. From March of 1943 I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff.
Q Until the end?
A Yes, until the end; that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
Q What position did you have? was writing the war diary of that Staff.
Q Was there a special reason why you received that task? I was a professor of history in civilian life, at the University of Goettingen. At that time an expert was looked for who would, guarantee the right quality for dealing with that task. At the suggestion of the Deputy Chief, Colonel-General Jodl then appointed me to that position. was correct, you would have to have an insight into all the events with reference to that staff, would you not?
A Yes, up to a point. I did not take part in the Fuehrer situation discussions, and I did not take part in the internal conferences. However, I participated daily in the situation conferences of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, and all important documents passed through my office during those two years.
Q Mr. Witness, considering that you, more than anyone, had insight into the activities of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, I should like you to tell us h here what you know regarding the extent of Colonel-General Jodl's activities,
A The Colonel-General's activities could not be considered large enough; and I shall give you proof.
In 1944 alone, in the telprint department of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, according to information I had from the officer in question, 60,000 teleprint messages went through their hands, after that there was a considerable correspondence, which, of course, was even larger. Then there was the internal work which went on between the individual departments. The bulk of that written work came across the desk of the Colonel-General at one time or an ther. four theaters of wars North, Finland and Norway; best, Holland, Belgium, France; Southwest, down to Africa and Italy; and then Southeast.
A It was the Colonel-General's task not only to keep himself informed currently on the strength of information which was coning in, but also, in consequence, as the operational advisor of the Fuehrer, to carry out that task. mentioned were the so-called OKW theaters of war?
A Just, as the Hast was under the General Staff of the Army. That meant that the Colonel-General was only partly concerned with it, as there were continuous difficulties in coordinating the interests of the various theaters of war, and coordinating them to the interests of the Eastern Front, too.
print messages?
A Yes, 60,000. I remember the figure because my secretary worked out that 120 volumes of files passed through our office, which were that [indicating] thick. Therefore, anything which came through my office could bemeasured in meters -- 12,000. Now, that is hundreds of thousands of sheets of paper. repeatedly touched upon here but which has never been answered exactly. generals from resigning?
A Yes; I remember that very exactly, in great detail. That was an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, and which came out, at that time, in very severe wording. It mentioned that before my time -- during 1940 or 1941 -- there had been an order of that type. That order consisted of about one and a half typewritten pages . It used dynamic words and its contents are still clearly before my eyes because several comrades of mine and I discussed it afterwards. under him would have the right to mention any objections he might have to measures of his leaders, but that he would then have to carry out the order unconditionally if it came from above; that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. commander to declare his resignation. The reason given at the time was that the NCO'S in the trenches couldn't tell their company commanders that they wanted to resign when they didn't like the company commander's orders. a great deal, because, beginning from that moment, there was even less of a possibility for the supreme commanders to evade an order coming from above.
Q Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a tiny' bit more slowly?
This order -- the contents of which you have just now described to us, and to which you have given, today, its final version -- did that order apply to a man like Colonel-General Jodl?
to Colonel-General Jodl all the more.
Q Another question. Colonel-General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian, and, what is more, a professor, and you, therefore, have the qualifications to express your views to such a statement. Also, you are able to state facts to this Tribunal which will make it possible for the Tribunal to pass a judgment upon thatpoint. Can you give us facts which might serve as proof, pro or contra, for such a judgement? general, then I will answer most emphatically "no." Whether themembers of his staff were Party members or not was utterly immaterial to the ColonelGeneral. Although I belonged to that staff for two years, I personally could not tell you whether, and who, of the members of the offices were Party members or not, because it was s o utterly unimportant. General exercised political influence -- in that connection I draw your attention to the tremendous output that he was responsible for. Therefore he could not have had time, and I can only tell you, judging from my documents, that I haveno recollection from which you could draw such a conclusion. seen, ran into the thousands. Also, he always entirely confined himself to military matters. He was carefully observing the dividing line between that and politics. To be more exact, I cannot remember ever having seen a document of a political nature which might have been written by order of the Chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff; not one, during the two years, did I see such a document in my files. he wrote something like that which was outside of the files?
A I can answer that question of yours with a strict "no", because I know from his entourage, and from conversations that I had with him, that the entire diplomatic goings-on were consideredunpleasant by him, and that he didn't like them because he felt that he was a soldier and did not want to have any contact with such matters.
Apart from that, he was much too busy.
I didn't notice any ambitions either, because if the ColonelGeneral had been ambitious, he would not have chosen a position which was the least suitable for such a purpose because it exposed him to criticism from below, frompeople who didn't knew the deeper reasons. That meant that he was constantly criticized from below, and he was criticized from above, too. He was not getting the recognition he deserved. the time Adolf Hitler died, did not have more German decorations than I myself, who was simply a major in the reserve. Whether he had foreign decorations I do not know because I never saw them with my own eyes. appeared to me. by the Colonel-General during the winter of 1943-1944, which he made before Gauleiters. I don't know whether you know of that.
Q What do you remember exactly? exactly is because I received the script for the lectures. After it was no longerneeded I was given it for my war diary, and it was very thick. That was a speech for which the material was collected in the various departments, and an enormous map was needed, for it which was difficult to manufacture because it was larger than the rooms in which we were working. That was the speech on the 8th or 9th of November, on the occasion of that annual meeting in Munich. outside the usual military circle was this.
In September of 1943, through Italy's dropping out of the war, the front in the South had been extended to a length of 4,000 kilometers from Marseilles to Athens.