BY DR STAHMER ( Counsel for the Defendant Goering):
Q Major Buechs, during the time you were a commanding officer attached to Fuehrer Headquarters were you present at the daily discussions of the situation? A Yes, I participated in the daily military discussions. Q Have you any recollection whether you were present during that conference on the 27th of January, 1945, during which the question was discussed as to what was to happen to the flyi personnel -- the RAF officers -- confined at SAgan? A I can remember something like this: The question of clearing that camp on the approach of Russian troops must have been reported to Fegelein. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp, to be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether in the course of clearing Silesia they wanted to be transported away as well. As far as I remember, th decided on the latter, that is to say, to join a transport upon was in what manner that transport was to be carried out. Q Can you still remember the suggestions that were made rega* that transport and who made them? A I believe at that time the Fuehrer only said generally that these imprisoned officers could not be treated any better than our own people. The evacuation of Silesia in our own transports did not permit even the transport of our own population by near of railway trains or large columns, and even in the winter the population had to use the road. And I think I remember that at that time the Fuehrer said that if these officers wished to be taken along on a transport then they would have to march just like the German civilian population.
DR STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement refer to an erronerous part of the record. During the cross examination of Defendant Goering on the 20th of March 1946, Document PS-3786, Exhibit USA787 was presented. In the German record, page 5250, there ismention of how they were to be transported away, and then it says that the Fuehrer said they would have to go even if they walked in Greek, but in fact it says in the original minutes, "The y have got to fo, even if they have to trek to join a column." That is something quite different. One says, Greek, d-r-e-c-k, and one says trek, t-r-e-k. a completely different and quite erroneous impression should be rectified. As the witness has just said, the Fuehrer said, "They have got to go even if they have to march in a trek"-- that is a column -- "on foot".
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Now, the Tribunal thinks that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: Yes. I merely wanted to state my point of view. BY DR. STAHMER: that conference, while transports were being mentioned, that the prisoners were to take off their boots when walking in the snow.
Do you remember who made that remark?
A No, I can't remember, and I consider that that is quite out of the question.
Q D on't you remember at all that such a remark wasmade? Who might have made it? some connection or ether; I don't know. made that remark.
A I consider that out of the question. May I, perhaps, in this connection mention that the stenographic,record, the taking down of minutes, presented a great deal of difficulty. During these conferences four to six people would talk at the same time, and very fast indeed, so that the stenographers could only write what they heard.
They could neither look up nor check who had actually said the words they were taking down. There was a table around which there sat or stood some 30 people, and that, of course, made the work of the stenograhers most difficult.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President, at this point of the trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I have a number of important questions which I ought to put to this witness, which I am not in a position to do because of the resolution passed by the Tribunal and announced today.
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, please may I complete my statement. a position to pose my questions, and that, of course, I submit to that decision of the Tribunal. I wish to stae, however, that with -
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions to the witness now, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is therefore not in a position to collect itsimmediate evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the defense having first been heard.
DR. LOEFFLER(Counsel for the SA): I wish to add something to the statement of my colleague Laternser. I wish to emphasize another -
THE PRESIDENT:(Interposing) On what point, Dr. Loeffler?
DR. LOEFFLER: On the point that the witnesses who have been called today cannot be asked questions by the defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is a disadvantage to the defnense because in practice we lose these witnesses altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Loeffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and head. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, has had brought to Nurnberg a very large number of witnesses and has set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this court.
The Tribunal has given the matter full considerationand it doesn't desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, we respect the reasons of the Tribunal, but we feel obliged to point out that from tie point of view of the defense these reasons are justified in theory, but that in practice they mean the loss of that witness, and I beg your permission to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose the benefit of those witnesses.
You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission, but they cannot he heard before the Commission.
THE PESIDENT: The Tribunal, as I havetold you, has already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don't desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
DR. LOEFFLER: May I permit myself to make a suggestion to you, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOEFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Your memory of that conference doesn't appear to be at all clear.
A May I ask you which conference? ion of the prisonersof Sagan. correct.
Q Well, but you say that you don't remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.
Q And you know that it is -- I can't find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to -- but you know that that is in the actual stenographer's notes, do you not?
Q Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unlesss it was said?
Q But you didn't hear the remark; therefore you don't know we said it?
A Yes, that's right.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of becoming Hitler's brother-in-law, when Hitler got married? found brother-in-law?
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Ihave no further question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness PROFESSOR DR. SCHRAMM.
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withold and add nothing.
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Mr. Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operational Staff during this war?
A Yes. From March of 1943 I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff.
Q Until the end?
A Yes, until the end; that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
Q What position did you have? was writing the war diary of that Staff.
Q Was there a special reason why you received that task? I was a professor of history in civilian life, at the University of Goettingen. At that time an expert was looked for who would, guarantee the right quality for dealing with that task. At the suggestion of the Deputy Chief, Colonel-General Jodl then appointed me to that position. was correct, you would have to have an insight into all the events with reference to that staff, would you not?
A Yes, up to a point. I did not take part in the Fuehrer situation discussions, and I did not take part in the internal conferences. However, I participated daily in the situation conferences of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, and all important documents passed through my office during those two years.
Q Mr. Witness, considering that you, more than anyone, had insight into the activities of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, I should like you to tell us h here what you know regarding the extent of Colonel-General Jodl's activities,
A The Colonel-General's activities could not be considered large enough; and I shall give you proof.
In 1944 alone, in the telprint department of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, according to information I had from the officer in question, 60,000 teleprint messages went through their hands, after that there was a considerable correspondence, which, of course, was even larger. Then there was the internal work which went on between the individual departments. The bulk of that written work came across the desk of the Colonel-General at one time or an ther. four theaters of wars North, Finland and Norway; best, Holland, Belgium, France; Southwest, down to Africa and Italy; and then Southeast.
A It was the Colonel-General's task not only to keep himself informed currently on the strength of information which was coning in, but also, in consequence, as the operational advisor of the Fuehrer, to carry out that task. mentioned were the so-called OKW theaters of war?
A Just, as the Hast was under the General Staff of the Army. That meant that the Colonel-General was only partly concerned with it, as there were continuous difficulties in coordinating the interests of the various theaters of war, and coordinating them to the interests of the Eastern Front, too.
print messages?
A Yes, 60,000. I remember the figure because my secretary worked out that 120 volumes of files passed through our office, which were that [indicating] thick. Therefore, anything which came through my office could bemeasured in meters -- 12,000. Now, that is hundreds of thousands of sheets of paper. repeatedly touched upon here but which has never been answered exactly. generals from resigning?
A Yes; I remember that very exactly, in great detail. That was an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, and which came out, at that time, in very severe wording. It mentioned that before my time -- during 1940 or 1941 -- there had been an order of that type. That order consisted of about one and a half typewritten pages . It used dynamic words and its contents are still clearly before my eyes because several comrades of mine and I discussed it afterwards. under him would have the right to mention any objections he might have to measures of his leaders, but that he would then have to carry out the order unconditionally if it came from above; that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. commander to declare his resignation. The reason given at the time was that the NCO'S in the trenches couldn't tell their company commanders that they wanted to resign when they didn't like the company commander's orders. a great deal, because, beginning from that moment, there was even less of a possibility for the supreme commanders to evade an order coming from above.
Q Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a tiny' bit more slowly?
This order -- the contents of which you have just now described to us, and to which you have given, today, its final version -- did that order apply to a man like Colonel-General Jodl?
to Colonel-General Jodl all the more.
Q Another question. Colonel-General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian, and, what is more, a professor, and you, therefore, have the qualifications to express your views to such a statement. Also, you are able to state facts to this Tribunal which will make it possible for the Tribunal to pass a judgment upon thatpoint. Can you give us facts which might serve as proof, pro or contra, for such a judgement? general, then I will answer most emphatically "no." Whether themembers of his staff were Party members or not was utterly immaterial to the ColonelGeneral. Although I belonged to that staff for two years, I personally could not tell you whether, and who, of the members of the offices were Party members or not, because it was s o utterly unimportant. General exercised political influence -- in that connection I draw your attention to the tremendous output that he was responsible for. Therefore he could not have had time, and I can only tell you, judging from my documents, that I haveno recollection from which you could draw such a conclusion. seen, ran into the thousands. Also, he always entirely confined himself to military matters. He was carefully observing the dividing line between that and politics. To be more exact, I cannot remember ever having seen a document of a political nature which might have been written by order of the Chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff; not one, during the two years, did I see such a document in my files. he wrote something like that which was outside of the files?
A I can answer that question of yours with a strict "no", because I know from his entourage, and from conversations that I had with him, that the entire diplomatic goings-on were consideredunpleasant by him, and that he didn't like them because he felt that he was a soldier and did not want to have any contact with such matters.
Apart from that, he was much too busy.
I didn't notice any ambitions either, because if the ColonelGeneral had been ambitious, he would not have chosen a position which was the least suitable for such a purpose because it exposed him to criticism from below, frompeople who didn't knew the deeper reasons. That meant that he was constantly criticized from below, and he was criticized from above, too. He was not getting the recognition he deserved. the time Adolf Hitler died, did not have more German decorations than I myself, who was simply a major in the reserve. Whether he had foreign decorations I do not know because I never saw them with my own eyes. appeared to me. by the Colonel-General during the winter of 1943-1944, which he made before Gauleiters. I don't know whether you know of that.
Q What do you remember exactly? exactly is because I received the script for the lectures. After it was no longerneeded I was given it for my war diary, and it was very thick. That was a speech for which the material was collected in the various departments, and an enormous map was needed, for it which was difficult to manufacture because it was larger than the rooms in which we were working. That was the speech on the 8th or 9th of November, on the occasion of that annual meeting in Munich. outside the usual military circle was this.
In September of 1943, through Italy's dropping out of the war, the front in the South had been extended to a length of 4,000 kilometers from Marseilles to Athens.
We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but all those who knew anything about the situation had considerable disquiet; they were most upset.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence, and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
THE PRESIDENT: I said that the Tribunal uphold Mr. Roberts' objection as to what the witness must, say.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am so sorry. I must say that I understood most directly and diametrically the opposite. BY DR. JAHRREISS: submitted to the Tribunal by the prosecution two days ago, PS-1808. Please, will you first of all glance through the document?
BY THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No; it is a document which the prosecution submitted during the cross examination two days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up by me during the cross examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the cross examination, PS 1808.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, please, Dr. Jahrreiss. BY DR. JAHRREISS: is your signature; is that right?
A Yes. This is a file which I started after the 20th of July, 1944, so as to record what was being done in the operational staff. I want to add in this connection that the operational staff was in no way connected with that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the archives. The corrections are partly mine, and with my signature, and partly those of my secretary. this document.
Q It is dated the 25th of July. Do you have it?
Q Did you write that?
Q Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was? notice, and we heard that the colonel general wanted to address his staff. I then received the orders that all officers who could come were to take notes so that other officers could be instructed and be given notes on the colonel general's speech. I remember clearly that I was standing when I took down a few words, so that this is not a shorthand record, because I cannot write shorthand, and it was too late to got hold of one of the stenographers. did you?
A Yes. Later, probably the following day, as well as possible, I reconstructed, what I had taken down in a few words. I am not absolutely' certain as to whether I was completely accurate in the details of the colonel general's speech, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy and short for that. And, of course, it is particularly doubtful how accurate I was regarding the actual words spoken. I can now see that there are four and a half pages, whereas that was, of course, a speech which was infinitely longer than that. It is a reconstructed representation, of course. that speech was made by the colonel general, because, after all, we do not have the record of the speech.
MR. ROBERTS: It is my respectful submission, again in the interests of saving time, that these circumstances are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler's life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes you will do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
BY DR. JAHRREISS: circumstances? his head. We were all most surprised that the consequences of that attack, considering the circumstances, should have come about so quickly. At that time we were deeply impressed by the energy and the tenure with which he approached his staff at that time; and we were impressed by the moral attitude which he had with regard to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Does the prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call my next witness, General Winter? follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full none, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the Oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Witness, did, you take pert in the beginning of the Russian campaign? Marshal von Runstedt's army group. pause between questions and answers? Would you also please generally speak more slowly? held, knew at the time about Hitler's reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union? What was the official reason? the campaign, at the time, was an attack from Soviet Russia had to be expected within a short time, and that therefore this was a preventive measure.
Q And then you experienced the first battles, did you not?
A Yes, in the South. It was with the Ukraine Army group in the south. and impressions of the opponent, did you not? official reason, of a defensive war? group, including the supreme commander in chief and the deputy under my command that the reason given for that campaign was true. We had the definite impression at the time that we had hit on offensive preparations for an offensive campaign.
Q But did you have the facts on which you could base this impression? to our conception. Hay I quote them to you? First of all, there was the strength of the troops we were fighting, which, although I cannot give you figures now, was much larger than the figures we had been given when we had our briefing. Then there was a considerable force which was massed near the frontier.
There was the unusual equipment of the armed forces, exceeding anything we had expected. And there was the comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border, which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. And then, there is one most outstanding point, that at that time we found when we captured enemy staffs during the first few days th they had been active in a great deal of German or original Austrian territory which, again, we could not really explain with purely defensive consideration Then there number of individual observations, which are not significant
Q. Mr. Witness, just now you quoted an outstanding symptom, as you call it, and you referred to this map question which you have described. Why that particularly outstanding? Why is it more outstanding than the other things you have mentioned?
A. It is particularly remarkable that these units were equipped with maps, being, as they were, on the Russian front, which went far beyond the reconnaissance areas which would be necessary to cover for a defensive camapign, even if you admit that, after the beginning of the war, such reconnaissance in certain instances might have to go across the enemy border.
Q. There has been mentioned in this Court room the fact that after marching into the Ukraine our troops had found exceptional circumstances in the case of certain Ukrainian cities, specail circumstances. Do you know what I mean?
A. Yes, I quite realize what you mean. Such difficulties occurred to a tremendous extent when we approached Dnieper. I should imagine that that is the affair of the long distance Dnieper detonation, a blowing up which occurred to a very considerable extent in our fighting zone in the KievKarkov-Chaltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble and they forced us to adopt considerable counter measures at that time.
Q. Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
A. I heard that things were blown up in Odessa but I can not tell you details.
Q. Do you know the details about Karkov?
A. I know the details for certain, because there was an episode which necessitated certain security measures. On the west border of Karkov there were long and serious battles and the divisional staff -- although I can't remember the number -- was destroyed raid died because of such blowing up operations. This brought about orders for special safe-guarding and the search of any building which might be used for accommodating commanding staffs thereafter.
Q. Did you, Mr. Witness, actually handle a Russian map or see one which showed targets for such blowing up operations?
A. No, I myself can't remember having seen such a map.
Q. Earlier you said that Field Marshal von Runstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
A. General of the Infantry von Sodenstern.
Q. If I remember correctly the, Field Marshal von Runstedt at that time retired or was retired, is that right?
A. Field Marshal von Runstedt, when the attack on Rostov failed in November, 1941, and after permission to retreat with his leading units had not been granted him by the OKH, made a report to the OKH, under which he came, in which he expressed himself and said that if there was lack of confidence in his leadership, then he would have to ask the Fuehrer to nominate a new commander for that Army group. The reason I so accurately remember the episode is because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal then made a personal addition to it. The telegram was dispatched in the evening and Hitler's answer, which meant his retirement or new post, came during the same night.
Q. So that his application was granted?
A. Yes, it was, but perhaps I maytell you that there was a subsequent episode to that affair, because a few days afterwards Hitler flow to Mariopol personally so as to inform himself on the spot about the actual situation. On the flight back from there, he visited the Poltava H.Q. of Field Marshal von Runstedt and there was an oral discussion during which Hitler -- I can't tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards. I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again raised accusations against the Field Marshal to the effect that he had put that alternative question, and he told him: "I am not willing to tolerate any such applications to resign in the future. When I have made a decision, then the responsibility is transferred to me by it. I myself am not in a position to go to another superior, for instance, God Almighty, and tell him I am not going on with it because I don't want to take the responsibility." We considered that that scene at that time was of principal importance, and I may add that later orders on that question confirmed that impression.
Q. Do you know, Mr. Witness, whether Hitler, as far as that decision of his was concerned, in future would not tolerate such applications? Do you know whether he ever rescinded that decision?
A. No, he certainly did not, because, as I know, there were two occasion? when corresponding orders were issued which made an application to resign, from a supreme commander or a leading officer, giving as the reason that he couldn't assume responsibility, prohibited. That was prohibited through those orders.
Q. I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were still in the Operational Staff in the latter part of the war, were you not? Warlimont, who had fallen ill. On that date I took over the business of that position. My appointment was dated the 1st of December, 1944.
Q. Mr. Witness, were you regularly present during the "situation conferences" with the Fuehrer?
A. Yes, I was there five out of seven days during the week.
Q. There has been a great deal about these conferences in this Court room, because many an event took place during them which is important for this trial; but up to now, no proper picture has yet been constructed of what it means, "situation conference". Can you explain to us the technique of such a conference? Tell us how long they laster, how many people were there?
A. These conferences were permanently arranged for every afternoon. There was a large number present; but then there was a second conference of a similar type which were not concerned with the one which took place at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, and I want to say, with reference to the latter, that only junior General Staff officers of the OKW reported with reference to these conferences.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, in the interest of time, the defendant Jodl pave evidence as to these conferences and no one put one word of cross examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask you at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts meant that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon during cross examination can be considered proved? I am nor sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the sentence that something which has been mentioned -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need lay down any hard, and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these "situation conferences" and he was not cross examined on it. It doesn't seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you very much. BY MR. JAHRREISS:
Q. Mr. Witness, it is possible in military life that an officer might receive an order about which he is of a different opinion, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, of course he has to obey, but does he have a possibility of putting his different opinion on record?
A. In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility is impossible. An order from Hitler which came out in '38 I think, the winter of '38 or '39, cancelled such a possibility once and for all. He published an order at that time prohibiting chiefs of general staffs and commanding departments from putting their different opinions on record.
Q. So that there are not any difficulties in the translation, will you please explain the word "Aktenkundig"? Diary kept in any command staff to contain a note to the effect that the Chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.