We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but all those who knew anything about the situation had considerable disquiet; they were most upset.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence, and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
THE PRESIDENT: I said that the Tribunal uphold Mr. Roberts' objection as to what the witness must, say.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am so sorry. I must say that I understood most directly and diametrically the opposite. BY DR. JAHRREISS: submitted to the Tribunal by the prosecution two days ago, PS-1808. Please, will you first of all glance through the document?
BY THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No; it is a document which the prosecution submitted during the cross examination two days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up by me during the cross examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the cross examination, PS 1808.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, please, Dr. Jahrreiss. BY DR. JAHRREISS: is your signature; is that right?
A Yes. This is a file which I started after the 20th of July, 1944, so as to record what was being done in the operational staff. I want to add in this connection that the operational staff was in no way connected with that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the archives. The corrections are partly mine, and with my signature, and partly those of my secretary. this document.
Q It is dated the 25th of July. Do you have it?
Q Did you write that?
Q Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was? notice, and we heard that the colonel general wanted to address his staff. I then received the orders that all officers who could come were to take notes so that other officers could be instructed and be given notes on the colonel general's speech. I remember clearly that I was standing when I took down a few words, so that this is not a shorthand record, because I cannot write shorthand, and it was too late to got hold of one of the stenographers. did you?
A Yes. Later, probably the following day, as well as possible, I reconstructed, what I had taken down in a few words. I am not absolutely' certain as to whether I was completely accurate in the details of the colonel general's speech, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy and short for that. And, of course, it is particularly doubtful how accurate I was regarding the actual words spoken. I can now see that there are four and a half pages, whereas that was, of course, a speech which was infinitely longer than that. It is a reconstructed representation, of course. that speech was made by the colonel general, because, after all, we do not have the record of the speech.
MR. ROBERTS: It is my respectful submission, again in the interests of saving time, that these circumstances are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler's life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes you will do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
BY DR. JAHRREISS: circumstances? his head. We were all most surprised that the consequences of that attack, considering the circumstances, should have come about so quickly. At that time we were deeply impressed by the energy and the tenure with which he approached his staff at that time; and we were impressed by the moral attitude which he had with regard to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Does the prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call my next witness, General Winter? follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full none, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the Oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Witness, did, you take pert in the beginning of the Russian campaign? Marshal von Runstedt's army group. pause between questions and answers? Would you also please generally speak more slowly? held, knew at the time about Hitler's reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union? What was the official reason? the campaign, at the time, was an attack from Soviet Russia had to be expected within a short time, and that therefore this was a preventive measure.
Q And then you experienced the first battles, did you not?
A Yes, in the South. It was with the Ukraine Army group in the south. and impressions of the opponent, did you not? official reason, of a defensive war? group, including the supreme commander in chief and the deputy under my command that the reason given for that campaign was true. We had the definite impression at the time that we had hit on offensive preparations for an offensive campaign.
Q But did you have the facts on which you could base this impression? to our conception. Hay I quote them to you? First of all, there was the strength of the troops we were fighting, which, although I cannot give you figures now, was much larger than the figures we had been given when we had our briefing. Then there was a considerable force which was massed near the frontier.
There was the unusual equipment of the armed forces, exceeding anything we had expected. And there was the comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border, which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. And then, there is one most outstanding point, that at that time we found when we captured enemy staffs during the first few days th they had been active in a great deal of German or original Austrian territory which, again, we could not really explain with purely defensive consideration Then there number of individual observations, which are not significant
Q. Mr. Witness, just now you quoted an outstanding symptom, as you call it, and you referred to this map question which you have described. Why that particularly outstanding? Why is it more outstanding than the other things you have mentioned?
A. It is particularly remarkable that these units were equipped with maps, being, as they were, on the Russian front, which went far beyond the reconnaissance areas which would be necessary to cover for a defensive camapign, even if you admit that, after the beginning of the war, such reconnaissance in certain instances might have to go across the enemy border.
Q. There has been mentioned in this Court room the fact that after marching into the Ukraine our troops had found exceptional circumstances in the case of certain Ukrainian cities, specail circumstances. Do you know what I mean?
A. Yes, I quite realize what you mean. Such difficulties occurred to a tremendous extent when we approached Dnieper. I should imagine that that is the affair of the long distance Dnieper detonation, a blowing up which occurred to a very considerable extent in our fighting zone in the KievKarkov-Chaltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble and they forced us to adopt considerable counter measures at that time.
Q. Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
A. I heard that things were blown up in Odessa but I can not tell you details.
Q. Do you know the details about Karkov?
A. I know the details for certain, because there was an episode which necessitated certain security measures. On the west border of Karkov there were long and serious battles and the divisional staff -- although I can't remember the number -- was destroyed raid died because of such blowing up operations. This brought about orders for special safe-guarding and the search of any building which might be used for accommodating commanding staffs thereafter.
Q. Did you, Mr. Witness, actually handle a Russian map or see one which showed targets for such blowing up operations?
A. No, I myself can't remember having seen such a map.
Q. Earlier you said that Field Marshal von Runstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
A. General of the Infantry von Sodenstern.
Q. If I remember correctly the, Field Marshal von Runstedt at that time retired or was retired, is that right?
A. Field Marshal von Runstedt, when the attack on Rostov failed in November, 1941, and after permission to retreat with his leading units had not been granted him by the OKH, made a report to the OKH, under which he came, in which he expressed himself and said that if there was lack of confidence in his leadership, then he would have to ask the Fuehrer to nominate a new commander for that Army group. The reason I so accurately remember the episode is because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal then made a personal addition to it. The telegram was dispatched in the evening and Hitler's answer, which meant his retirement or new post, came during the same night.
Q. So that his application was granted?
A. Yes, it was, but perhaps I maytell you that there was a subsequent episode to that affair, because a few days afterwards Hitler flow to Mariopol personally so as to inform himself on the spot about the actual situation. On the flight back from there, he visited the Poltava H.Q. of Field Marshal von Runstedt and there was an oral discussion during which Hitler -- I can't tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards. I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again raised accusations against the Field Marshal to the effect that he had put that alternative question, and he told him: "I am not willing to tolerate any such applications to resign in the future. When I have made a decision, then the responsibility is transferred to me by it. I myself am not in a position to go to another superior, for instance, God Almighty, and tell him I am not going on with it because I don't want to take the responsibility." We considered that that scene at that time was of principal importance, and I may add that later orders on that question confirmed that impression.
Q. Do you know, Mr. Witness, whether Hitler, as far as that decision of his was concerned, in future would not tolerate such applications? Do you know whether he ever rescinded that decision?
A. No, he certainly did not, because, as I know, there were two occasion? when corresponding orders were issued which made an application to resign, from a supreme commander or a leading officer, giving as the reason that he couldn't assume responsibility, prohibited. That was prohibited through those orders.
Q. I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were still in the Operational Staff in the latter part of the war, were you not? Warlimont, who had fallen ill. On that date I took over the business of that position. My appointment was dated the 1st of December, 1944.
Q. Mr. Witness, were you regularly present during the "situation conferences" with the Fuehrer?
A. Yes, I was there five out of seven days during the week.
Q. There has been a great deal about these conferences in this Court room, because many an event took place during them which is important for this trial; but up to now, no proper picture has yet been constructed of what it means, "situation conference". Can you explain to us the technique of such a conference? Tell us how long they laster, how many people were there?
A. These conferences were permanently arranged for every afternoon. There was a large number present; but then there was a second conference of a similar type which were not concerned with the one which took place at 2:00 o'clock in the morning, and I want to say, with reference to the latter, that only junior General Staff officers of the OKW reported with reference to these conferences.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, in the interest of time, the defendant Jodl pave evidence as to these conferences and no one put one word of cross examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask you at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts meant that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon during cross examination can be considered proved? I am nor sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the sentence that something which has been mentioned -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need lay down any hard, and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these "situation conferences" and he was not cross examined on it. It doesn't seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you very much. BY MR. JAHRREISS:
Q. Mr. Witness, it is possible in military life that an officer might receive an order about which he is of a different opinion, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, of course he has to obey, but does he have a possibility of putting his different opinion on record?
A. In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility is impossible. An order from Hitler which came out in '38 I think, the winter of '38 or '39, cancelled such a possibility once and for all. He published an order at that time prohibiting chiefs of general staffs and commanding departments from putting their different opinions on record.
Q. So that there are not any difficulties in the translation, will you please explain the word "Aktenkundig"? Diary kept in any command staff to contain a note to the effect that the Chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.
That possibility existed before, but since 1938 it no longer existed. It was prohibited.
Q. General, I am now going to have a document shown to you. D-606, another document which the prosecution has submitted during cross examination. I am afraid I don't know the exhibit number at the moment. Perhaps Mr. Roberts might know it.
MR. ROBERTS: Exhibit 492, My Lord, and I put it in separately in cross examination. It is in no book.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. BY MR. JAHRREISS:
Q. Witness, do you know this document?
A. I am acquainted with the document. It has got my file reference on it.
Q. Did you write it yourself?
A. No, Colonel General Jodl personally wrote it, but I c an see a gap, on the other under, under Figure 11. I am not sure whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained in the one I have before me, but I can see that this is the file copy from my Quartermaster's Department, and that must have been together under the same file heading. the question of leaving the Geneva convention, and there was the question of dealing with this in my staff, and the decis ion we had was that all points of view should be underlines which would prevent the Fuehrer from coming to such a decision, that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. From the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy and on our own troops, this document was carefully worked out. I myself did it. me. He had this document, the details of which I have not carefully examined now, and he told me that he was perfectly agreeable to this negative attitude but that he had felt obliged to complete all points even more clearly and to tally it with the information he had from the Navy and also to formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with the Fuehrer, because it could not be allowed to happen that he might put his thoughts into practice.
DR. JAHRRIESS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have not further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Defendant's Counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President, may I have your permission to ask whether the questions of not being allowed to put questions applies to this witness, and I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not.
You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternse, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nurnberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q. Y ou have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their non-aggression pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
A. May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the Spuremem Command and Army Group--the one that was stationed in the Ukraine, did receive that reaons from our senior officer.
Q. Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided in July 1940 to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940-- it is page 53 of Book 7--that on 18 December, Hitler stated that the Wehrmacht must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single rapid campaign. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It dies not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russian breaking the non-aggression pact--the Soviet Union, rather.
(No response). BY THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle):
Q. Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?
A. We did not use reprisals, as far as the troops were concerned in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection of any such instances.
Q. What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?
A. During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, a resistance of the population in the operational zone in the Ukraine was not apparent. Only in rear areas were there fights at that time with occasional troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occure, as far as I know, until later when the operational zone had already been limited, in the rear in the use of political commissioners.
Q. You were not there at that time?
A. The command staff to which I belinged was, in the early days of February 1943, taken back from the front.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
_____________
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, finally, I have only two interrgatories which I have to submit to the Tribunal. I want to read a few lines from one of them, something which was forgotten. to the Tribunal, and I beg the tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents, and then there is AJ-6, an interrogatory of Brudemueller, with reference to which I wish to rake a similar request. berg's statement, I should like to quote the important part. It is questions concerning the attack against Jugoslavia and the question of whether, after the Simovitch Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken a position against us. This is the third volume of the document book on page 211. The Simovitch Putsch was over, and the question not was whether there appeared to be an immediate threat from Jugoslavia at the time.
"Questions: Is it a fact that Jugoslvia, immediately after the coup d'etat of the army, started to deploy her armies on all her borders?
"Answer: I know only the from which was opposite the German 12th Army, located at the Bulgarian border.
Here the Jugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
"Question: Is it a fact that the army unit of which you were the commander at the time, had the order before the coup d'etat in Jugoslavia to respect strictly the neutrality of Jugoslavia during the pending attacks against Greece and that not even replacement trains should be despatched through Jugoslavian territory?
"Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given to respect Jugoslavia's neutrality.
"Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?
"Answer: No". have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know, and at this moment I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case at this stage.
THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
(The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June at 1000 hours).
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart) Your Lordship, gentlemen of the High Military Tribunal.
I open the case with the last words spoke by Dr. Schuschnigg when he, on the 11th of March of 1938, retired as Austrian Chancellor. He spoke the words: "God protect Austria." There is a connection in history. At the foreign ministers, on the basis of similar events, are preparing peace treaties May I ask, therefore, that you would be good enough to allow me to be a little more lengthy than I had originally intended when I present my documents? the stand.
_________________
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath) BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, when and where were you born? in Moravia. Moravia at that time was a crown county of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
And that former other island, Olmitz, where German was also spoken, also in Moravia--there I lived until I was 16. Then, together with my parents, I moved near Vienna, where I passed through secondary school, and I then joined the legal faculty of the Viennese University . In August of 1914, I joined the army.
Q Were you in the army during the entire war?
A Yes. I served with the Imperial Chasseurs. I served in the war in Russia, Roumania, and in Italy. obtained my Doctor's degree.
I was wounded once. I was decorated several times; three times because of bravery. youth? nationality fight in Moravia, which occurred between the Germans and the Czechs. The Germans, in those days, presented the joint Austro-German idea, while the Czechs were making a predominantly national policy. However, I believe it is significant that there was a coordination of languages at that time in Moravia.
Q Wnd what were the impressions you took away from the war? I remember most is the discussion, at the end of the war, about the fourteen points of President Wilson. peoples, did it not?
A Yes. It was clear to us that the realization of those fourteen points would mean the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. ination the original territories would be allowed to return to the union of the German Reich which they had left less than 50 years ago, in 1866. That is of importance. Those countries, in the creation of the Reich and in the thousand years of their existence, had been integral parts of Germany. That is for 950 years.
Q What did you do after the war, when you returned from the front?
A I devoted myself to my work as a lawyer. In 1921 I opened my own practice, and as time went by I acquired a very good clientele.
Q What about your political attitude? Were you a member of any political party? to tie myself down politically speaking. I had very good friends in every party, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties. However, the programs of these parties appeared too one-sided to me. They appeared to be much too much adapted to certain individual groups.
Q. Were you a member of any political club, say, for instance, the Austro-German People's Union?
A. I was a member of the board of the Austro-German National Union, because the only political idea to which I adhered in 1918 was Austria's Anschluss with the German Reich on the 11th. I experienced the 11th of November, 1918, when the provisional national assembly decided that Austria should be a part of the German republic. Furthermore, there was the constitutional meeting six months later which repeated the same decision. The dictates of St. German forbade the Anschluss.
The various districts attempted to vote. Salzburg and the Tyrol, with 98% of the voters, voted for joining the Reich. Dr. Schuschnigg describes it in the book "Three Times Austria". neighbors: but they could not agree.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, at this point may I submit several documents to the Tribunal, or may I quickly refer to them as they appear in my document book? The first document is the one to which I have given the number SJ-1. It appears on Page 2 of the document book, and it contains the proclamation of the Austrian members of parliament after the collapse of the Austrian monarchy on the 21st of October, 1918. There it ways in the second sentence:
"The German-Austrian state claims the territorial jurisdiction over the entire territory of German settlement, especially also in the Sudetan territories. The German-Austrian state will fight any annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited by German farmers, workers, and citizens".
Then, as Exhibit No. 2, I should like to present on Page 4 of the document the resolution which the witness has already mentioned, passed by the provisional national assembly on the 12th of November, 1918, which says:
"German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public powers are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the German republic."
The leader of the greatest party of that state, Dr. Karl Renner, stated on the 12th of November something which appears on Page 6 as Exhibit No. 3:
"Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which loves other peoples is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and perhaps also tempting to settle one's account separately and perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy's cunning, in this hour our people in all provinces wishes to know: We are one family and one people living under a common fate".
Then I come to Exhibit No. 4, which is on Page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: It is Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg you pardon; Page 8. 145,302 voted for the Anschluss and some 18,000 against it. On the 18th of May, 1921, there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss at Salzburg, and 877 votes against it. is my point of view that there are three component parts which led to the Anschluss: first of all, the economic emergency which runs through the entire history of the case like a red thread; secondly, that this unity amongst the democratic parties, which resulted from hunger; and thirdly, there was the attitude of the rest of the world, particularly the larger powers, towards war. Those thoughts are contained in my document book. exhibit Prelate Hauser's speech. Prelate Hauser was the president of the Austrian Parliament. He made a speech on the 6th of September, 1919, and it appears on Page 14 of my document book. He suggests the acceptance of the peace treaty of St. Germain, and he gives the following reason:
"The national assembly has no choice. Country and people need final peace which opens again the world to them morrally and economically and which can once again procure work for our people's masses at home and abroad."