war into a world war began to stand out more and more threateningly. The United States proclaimed a neutrality law at the beginning of the war, in which they submitted in advance to fixed rules in case of a future war. The mechanism of the neutrality law was set in notion by a proclamation of the President. It designated at the same time the danger zone within which American ships could not count upon the protection of their government. the United States, the author of the Kellogg-P act, were not of the opinion that the traditional law of neutrality had in any way been modified by it. the spreading and the aggravation of the European war more and more from the original line, without the German Reich furnishing any cause for conflict with U.S.A. general opinion and consequently that of Herr von Ribbentrop was for a prevention by all means of an intervention on the part of the U. S. A. Since the quarantine speech of President Roosevelt in 1937 strong contrasts could be noticed more and more in the ideological-political train of thoughts of the world's public opinion. The situation was aggravated by the incidents of November 1938 in Germany, which were the reason for the recall of the Berlin Ambassador to Washington for reporting, from where he did not return to his post. prepared by legislative actions and became effective at the beginning of the war, the German Foreign Office and Herr von Ribbentrop could conclude that the existing differences of opinion as to the internal political form of the state would not change the neutral attitude of the United States. Because of this expectation, not only everything that could produce un-8 July M LJG 4-2 favorable effect in the United was avoided since the outbreak of the war, but we also acquiesced to quite a number of actions by the United States which were weakening Germany and were not in accordance with strict neutrality.
political aims of the neutral America and the belligerent Great Britain, when the leading men of the two states proclaimed in August 1941 the Atlantic Charter as the program of the new order of the relationships between the nations. It had an obviously hostile character against the Axis P owers and left them no doubt that the United States had sided with the other side. the evidence has shown, can be credited to the account of the material support of Great Britain by the United States. the U.S.A. took ever the protection of the most important line of communication of the then severely struggling British Empire. This was a military intervention even before the outbreak of the officially declared war. The socalled shooting order of the President brought about a dangerous situation which could result any day in the outbreak of the armed conflict. Several months before the 11 December 1941, the United States took measures which formerly were taken only during a war. The outbreak of the war was only a link in a chain of successive incidents, perhaps not even the most important. It was caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which, as the evidence has shown, was neither instigated nor could have been foreseen by Germany. declaration of war is one of the criteria for the determination of the aggressor. As I have already pointed out in connection with the spreading of the war in Europe this criterion alone without the factual background is no positive proof for an act of aggression. As reaction to the numerous neutrality violations by the Unites States, which represented actions of war, the 8 July M LJG 4-3 German Reich would have been justified for a long time to reply on her pert with military actions.
Whether this right was exercised after a preceding announcement -- that is a declaration of war -- or not is immaterial. So far, I have thrown some light upon aggressive acts as enunciated by the Prosecution, from the beginning of the Polish Campaign to the entry into the war of the United States. It remains to take up a juridical position regarding the treaties concluded by Germany, which provided for a pacific settlement of political conflicts. a party to aggressive acts, but also with his omission to release the mechanism of aforesaid treaties previous to armed conflict. From the fact that the ways for pacific settlement as provided by the treaties had not been used, the Prosecution draws the conclusion that these omissions can be attributed, in a criminal sense, to Herr von Ribbentrop. This interpretation however would be erroneous in a legal sense.
If we begin my sharing the Prosecution's point of view, we shall see that even in this case the conclusions drawn by the Prosecution cannot be upheld. Even if a single minister could be made legally responsible for the non-operating of a set of treaties, the Prosecution cannot but ask whether the minister was actually in a position to ensure a result of any legal consequence.
According to a principle embodied by nature into any system of criminal law on earth, a defendant is punishable for an omission only if he had actually been in a position and legally liable to act. I shall demonstrate at length, within the compass of my arguments concerning the conspiracy, how small, in fact, Herr von Ribbentrop's possibilities of influence have been. The decisive point at issue is the fact that he was not legally in a position to make any declarations to foreign powers binding the German Reich, other than these he was empowered to do by the head of the state. As head of the state, Hitler was the representative of the German Reich from the point of view of international law. He only was in a position to make binding declarations to foreign powers. Any other persons could legally bind the German state only if authorized by the head of the state, unless the treaty in question explicitly provided otherwise. foreign minister cannot independently enter into binding commitments towards foreign powers. It is rather a general principle of international relations that only the organ empowered to represent the state is apt to act for it. The difference between German conditions and these of democratic constitutions merely lies in the fact that in the former the foreign minister usually has a larger internal influence on the intentions of the head of thestate. The defendant, therefore, could not have obtained any legal result if he had tried, against the Fuehrer's wish, to have recourse to thepossibilities of settlement of conflicts as provided by the numerous treaties of arbitration and conciliation. No one but Hitler could have put in motion such a procedure. The defendant could have been in a position to do so by Hitler's order only. He had not even a claim on giving advice, if Hitler chose to ignore him. enumerated by the prosecution: Treaty of Arbitration of 1929 between Germany and Luxembourg. provide an obligatory settlement of political disputes.
Slovakia and Belgium, concluded in connection with the Locarno treaty, the additional point applies - quite aside from the legal argument just mentiones - that they and the Western pact form a political unit. Even externally, this is expressed in the fact that these agreements and the Locarno pact are all of them annexes to the general final protocol of the powers participating in the Locarno conference.
The question could, therefore, be asked whether the arbitration treaties share the fate of the principal treaty i.e., the Western Pact. in these treaties had finally led, in case of non-settlement, before the League of Nations Council, wherein, at the time of the Western Pact, the 4 participating great powers had, or - as was the case for Germany - were to have permanent seats. The withdrawal of Italy and Germany from this political body deeply affected the principle of the political base which supported the settlement treaties. Moreover, the grouping of the powers had shifted so much that a part of the Locarno great powers,for example, Great Britain and France, had in theyear 1939, gone into binding agreements with Poland, so as to take sides beforehand in the event of a possible conflict. and the Netherlands of 1926, I may be allowed to point out that the proceedings provided therein could not be applied at all, as there were no conflicts between Germany and aforesaid countries; quite to the contrary. Germany took steps which were aimed at the enemy belligerents, which were meant to be preceded in the occupation of these countries. Hitler to countries with which Germany subsequently waged war. As Herr von Ribbentrop did not give such assurances in person, his participation could form a point of argument only if he had given advice to Hitler in this respect. No evidence has been produced to sustain such a suggestion. A large part of these assurance is contained in speeches made by Hitler before a German public, either in mass meetings or at the Reichstag. It is doubtful indeed whether such declarations, addressed in the first place to the German public, could have any binding results in the field of international law.
Whereas up to now K have spoken about the actions that led 8 July M LJG 5-1 to the outbreak of the war and its spreading, I shall now proceed to the second large complex of the indictment, which deals with crimes committed during the war.
laws or customs of war to be punishable. This conception is illustrated by a number of examples much as deportation, shooting of hostages, etc. But these examples do not limit this conception. We are therefore obliged--in the same way as with Article 6a -- to propose to the Court a qualification which it can use as a base for its decisions. by the French prosecution. They declared that they would be free to give a more explicit definition of punishable offences which had not been fully defined by the charter.
The use of the expression "Laws and Usages of war", as well as the enumeration of examples, forces one to believe that the Charter aims at violations of the classical "jus in bello". I therefore qualify war-crimes as offences against the law established between belligerants by agreement, or against prescriptive law, binding and recognized generally without special agreement. The several cases which come under the collective conception of war crimes must, therefore, each be examined as to whether they are to be regarded as such according to the traditional rules applying to armed conflicts between states. Whereas, in general, classical international law holds responsible the state as a unit only, there always existed in the usage of war the exception that also acting individuals were liable to be held responsible. Whether this responsibility of the individual person can be followed up in a punishing prosecution after the warhas been the subject of many discussions. One will be able to ascertain that in the ruling practice of states, the belligerant who was violated by a war-crime may also, after the war, call to account the offender.
If several states which 8 July M LJG 5-2 have fought shoulder to shoulder in the war form a common court against the war-criminals of the conquered adversary, this court has the collective competency of all the states that form the court or have joined its charter.
for crimes committed during the war against the adversary, who thereafter sits in judgment upon him, one would be thinking in the first place of former members of the combatting forces. Already at Versailles there were difficulties in answering the question to what degree military chiefs were to be made responsible. The idea to have a minister of a cabinet (Ressortminister) hold responsible under criminal law, so far, never has appeared. Also in Versailles the War-Criminals Committee was occupied with the question of making responsible non-military personalities from only political points of view. This committee discriminated clearly between war-criminals, which were to be judged by the allied court, and the guilt with regard to the outbreak of war for the examination and judging of which a special political international court was to be created.
By means of the traditional conception a Minister (Ressortminister) cannot therefore be hold responsible for violations of the "jus in bello". The prosecution can reach this success only by going the roundabout way via a conspiracy. If we follow the interpretation given to this conception, the Foreign Minister of the Reich would, for example, have to be responsible for the destruction of the village of Ouradur. He would have to stand up for actions which have nothing in the least to do with the Reich's foreign policy and are only single actions of some odd offices. Minister was not only not competent for the conduct of war, but had in fact not the slightest possibility of influencing military measures either in a curbing or furthering way. (Fachminister) as a community of conspirators also with regard to war crimes, it would have to be proved that the mili tary, competent to conduct the war, acted in agreement with 8 July M LJG 5-3 subsequent construction of the prosecution.
The unity, which worked, has but now been drawn up as a conception.
It is self the German side.
Such a responsibility for the results would be outright grotesque.
He could, on the contrary, only be according to testimony of General Lahousen, he issued "direc tives" to Admiral Canaris to have Ukranian villages set afire, and to beat the Jews living there to death.
First I wish to directives of any sort to a military agency.
Furthermore, it for the setting afire of Ukranian villages.
Ukranians supported the German fight against the Poles.
Thus, hardly anyone will destruction of his own ally.
My client further insists that to questions of humanity.
As was proven beyond doubt by the prisoners of war through vigorous, personal intervention.
As 8 July M LJG 5-4 I will further show, within the framework of the conspiracy, he was instrumental in the unshackling of British prisoners of war and he used his influence for the preservation of the rules of the Geneva Convention.
He was opposed to the branding of Russian prisoners of war. decision with respect to questions of humanity. appropriately gauge the remaining attitude of the accused, as concerns questions of humanity. Further, his attitude in the question of treatment of terror-aviators is charged as a war crime to Herr von Ribbentrop. the conference at Schloss Klossheim, mentioned in document 735-PS, ever took place. I should like to emphasize that General Warliment, who made these notes, did not personally participate in the conference. Furthermore, the expression of opinion attributed, according to the document, to Herr von Ribbentrop, stands in contradiction to his usual demeanor in this question. Under Secretary Steengracht deposed here that Herr von Ribbentrop, after the publication of the notorious article about lynch, justice in the Reich, at once vigorously protested against it. through examination of the witnesses Colonel-General Jodl and Fieldmarshal Keitel, proves that not only the Foreign Office but Herr von Ribbentrop personally had pledged themselves in principle for the preservation of the Geneva Convention.
and that Herr von Ribbentrop and other leading personalities took pains to assure the retention of at least the basic human principles even in Hitler's most radical period. In spite of all that happened, it must be pronounced as a success that, in consequence of these steps the Geneva Convention was not abrogated. Hereby it must never be overlooked that especially in cases of terror fliers, where so-called terror-attacks in the form of air bombardments were involved -- which were characterised by an indiscriminate attack upon cities without attacking military and armament objectives, such attacks then undeniably constituted a war crime in themselves. It must be taken in account in the reaction throughout Germany towards the conduct of air warfare of the western powers, that, according to established and traditional conceptions of an armed conflict between nations, the attack on the civilian population is prohibited. This thought is not only expressed in the Hague Convention on land warfare but constitutes a stipulation by contract of general International Law, binding for all, which is valid not only in the theater of operations on land. Acknowledging this, the Hague rules of air warfare, although permitting air attacks of military objectives in undefended cities, do not permit the bombing of dwellings of the civilian population. Although the Hague rules were not ratified, they were in practic followed by all belligerents, and acknowledged as common law. These measures became especially acute after complete air superiority had been achieved by the Allies and the resulting constant low level attacks with weapons on board on the civilian population took place. These particular events led for the first time to the discussion whether, in the face of a warfare which was undeniably violating International Law, it was still of any use to uphold the Geneva Convention in its substance. These considerations and corresponding reflections led to the drafting of documents which have become the object of evidence in the proceedings and which constituted -as shown by the evidence- drafts but not decisions in this question. They can therefore not form the basis of a judgment, as certainly a state is entitled to have appropriate agencies express their opinion on this question. Ribbentrop before the war, at its outbreak, and for its duration.
crime presented here. The notion "conspiracy" is being used for motivating this common liability. each defense counsel would have to deal with all details presented by the prosecution. The obvious impossibility to use up so much time of the tribunal shows how questionable the basis of the accusation is. conspiracy from the viewpoint of the actual and legal position of the foreign minister in the third Reich. a sort or form of participation in a punishable act. This kind of offence was until now, unknown to German and continental legal thinking. It existed only in the Anglosaxon law. In this legal sphere conspiracy means participation in a punishable act which requires, as a minimum symptom, an agreement to commit a crime. of a definite punishable offence. claring punishable all offences stated in Paragraph 6, assuming the existence of a conspiracy or a common plan, as a special form of participation in these crimes. The Charter then stipulates, in Paragraph 6a, another special form of conspiracy declaring punishable the participation in a common plan of conspiracy to carry out offensive wars or wars violating international treaties.
Under the conception "mutual plan" ythe Charter and the Indictment obviously understand something that reaches beyond the sphere of conspiracy. Mr. Justice Jackson himself admitted that the application of the conspiracy as an offence, according to Anglosaxon law, was exceeded and a conception created which is not yet juridically determinable. ted by a n y o n e person carrying out both these forms of conspiracy. ticipants in this alleged conspiracy appear as a whole.
The conspirators are all on board of a pirate ship which, contrary to law and justice of all nations, engages in robbery and therefore is outlawed anyone who punishes the crew helps to restore justice.
At first glance this picture appears to be attractive. However, on closer inspection, it becomes obvious that it is only a matter of a catchwor which tries to apply the community of the ship's crew, united with the ship for better or worse, to the place of the -- by no means a comparison more complicated conditions of a modern state organization. The ships of all nations are according to established, commonly recognized and uncontested conceptions, authorized to combat piracy on the high seas upon encountering a pirate. The criminal jurisdiction of almost all nations knows explicit regulations for combatting them. The peculiarity of this offence in distinction from o t h e r acts punishable in every country, whether committed again own or foreign nationals -for example white slavery traffic acts, acts of forging coins, and so forth- is the circumstance that the jurisdiction is carried out on the high seas. Therefore, the mistaken idea may arise that a crime in the sphere of international law is concerned. This however, is not the case. Piracy is a common offence, the prosecution of which is, by international law, permitted not only, in coastal waters but also on the high seas belonging to all nations. The basis for this conception was laid in the United States in the beginning of the last century by decisions rendered by Chief Justice Marshal. a time during which the German Reich and its opponents confronted one another first in peace and then in war, on the stage of international relations. An example taken from the sphere of international conception of a conspiracy of an entire state apparatus. Besides, the arrow hits the archer himself. In the first place, the idea of the statem which according to the conception of the traditional international law is the only carrier of rights and duties, is being destroyed so that the persons standing behind it and acting on its behalf nay separately be made liable to criminal prosecution.
As usually only few persons acted directly as participants in the acts charged, the multitude of these people is then again compressed into an artificial whole, in order to hold them responsible also for these acts which were not committed by them.
Here the criticism of the jurist had to set in. According to our perception of law and also to the perception of law of all civilized nations, the criminal responsibility is tied only to a few basic rules showing but few divergences. According to continental law only such persons can be held responsible for a punishable act who deliberately or negligently contribute to a definite act. By unanimous conception the perpetrator, therefore, is supposed to know the plan to which he allegedly contributed; to foresee and approve of the acts committed in executing it. offense only to a limited legal circle. Therefore it is familiar only in a part of the legal systems of these nations who carry on or have joined in the present proceedings. It was completely unknown to the German Idea of Law and therefore to Herr von Ribbentrop at the time of his political activity. Conspiracy as a form of complicity marks a much wider range of actions as criminal than Herr von Ribbentrop could have anticipated at the time of his activities in the field of foreign policy. findings according to the charter, neither the official position as Reich Foreign minister, hold by Herr von Ribbentrop nor theindividual acts committed by him in this capacity made him liable of becoming a member of a conspiracy. duction of the concept of a conspiracy, responsibilities are getting interlocked, which have nothing whatever to do with each other, if we take into account the official position and authority as well as the personal attitude of the individual conspirators. an unity artifically, and subsequently created a number of actions and individuals , chosen at random, which do not form any natural amity and of which most of them had nothing to do with each other at all.
If we followed the charter and the indictment, there would appear as result the fact - wholly alien to any actual and legal thought - that Herr von Ribbentrop, while personally and actually, as thoroughly proven by evidence, completely eliminated from any influence on the occupied Eastern territories, would have to bear the responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed there, whereas, for instance, the defendant Streicher although he headedhis special department, would be answerable for the foreign policy.
crimes against humanity would practically result in making Herr von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office responsible for such crimes, whereas evidence has shown that this very office has always tried to observe the rules of warfare, according to international law, and to adhere to the Geneva Convention even if this involved a severe struggle with Hitler. refer to actual offenses against rules of war, either individual actions, as e.g. the execution of escaped British Air Force officers, or certain measures incompatible with the adopted rules of war. At any rate, the unity of conspirators ought to refer to a specific action or specific groups of action of the same nature. It is impossible to hold a defendant responsible for actions not approved by him, or which he has tried to prevent. I think the prosecution will agree, that there simply cannot, exist any conspiracy to commit crimes against the usages and customs of war. This concept is so controversial and is so undetermined inpractice of the states and in the theory of international law, that individual acts, which, in the course of a war, may be considered as war crimes could not form a part of the plans of the conspirators. It must also be considered that the development of means and methods of war modifies also the contents of the concept of war crimes. Therefore, there cannot be but a conspiracy to commit specific or war crimes or war crimes of the same kind. Therefore, any one of the so-called conspirators cannot be held responsible for each and every action which an objective judgment must define afterwards as a war crime. Particularly, it would not meet the purpose of the guilty, if the defendant would be punished, according to the general and artificial concept of conspiracy exclusively, even for such war crimes which they tried to prevent with all their efforts.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now.
(A recess was taken).
DR. HORN: With permission of the Tribunal, I shallcontinue on Page 79 of my final plea. Not only did the military conduct of war not belong to this sphere, but he was, as was proven by evidence, expressly excluded from it by a repeated order of Hitler.
His department had only insofar to do with war crimes as they led to negotiations with foreign powers. Moreover, the fact, for instance, that after the terrible air raid bombardment of Dresden, the execution of 10,000 allied prisoners of war, was prevented on Herr von Ribbentrop's initiative with Hitler, proves that he has done, when informed of imminent war crimes, what was in his power to do and within his influence. These arguments and the result of evidence show how unjust it would be to share the point of view held by the prosecution, e.g. to hold a Foreign Minister with reduced authority responsible for crimes against usages of war and humanity, the more so, as it has been conclusively proven that he was excluded from any influence on the conduct of war.
With the court's permission, I shall now deal with the alleged conspiracy for planning and preparation of aggressive wars and of violation of treaties. Within the frame of such a conspiracy, the defendant is apparently to be held responsible in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs and the office formerly held by him in the diplomatic service. have any connection with war, its preparation, outbreak and course. Any individual act within this enormous complex of concepts is irrelevant in itself from the point of view of criminal law, and has had, until now, never been conceived as a crime called "outbreak of war." This kind of conspiracy does not contain any facts which come under the crimes, so far known by any system of criminal law in the world. of von Ribbentrop's ministerial position and his relation to the German Reich which waged the various wars. of a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Reich. As shown by the evidence, Herr von Ribbentrop was called to his office at a time when the actual leadership of foreign policy had already passed to Hitler in his double capacity of Reich Chancellor and head of the state. I have submitted/a document Hitler's speech of July 19th 1940, held atthe Kroll opera house, whore he emphasized that Herr von Ribbentrop had had to handle for years foreign policy according to Hitler's political directives. Herr von Ribbentrop, there fore, did not possess the position of a minister, as customary in modern constitutions.
As shown in above-mentioned speech, he did not possess it either in fact or in law. This is shown by an examination of the public law of the Third Reich. in the course of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century, the department of the Minister of Foreign Affairs belongs to the executive functions. conducting foreign policy with the Prime Minister. This involves in a parliamentary democracy, responsibility to the representatives of the people; in a monarchical or presidential constitution to the head of the state. This responsibility is actually of political importance only, and infers the resigning of a minister from his office when he does not enjoy any longer the confidence of parliament or of the head of the state. Most constitutions make provisions for indicting a minister by the representatives of the people in case of violation of official duties. But even when convicted by a constitutional court in a kind of criminal procedure, the minister is not punished, but his actions are merely declared to have been illicit. German constitution of the Weimar republic. By the way, the possibility of indicting a minister has never been made use of. affairs. A short time after Hitler had come to power, parliament was asked, with reference to existing internal difficulties to give its consent of an "Enabling Act" (Ermaechtigungsgesetz). The German people and its representatives expected at the time that this authorization was to be used temporarily, and merely for the removal of actual distress. This law became, however, the foundation of a complete transformation of the constitution. exist. It changed into the responsibility towards the Fuehrer and ReichChancellor, in whose person the authority given up by parlaiment now rested. Now there remained but one responsibility: that towards the head of the state. Starting from this parliamentary authorization all functions, derived from the power of the state, concentrated more and more in Hitler personally. The traditional division of power, the result of more than a century old struggle for constitutional rights became an empty shell by joining together all means of power and thereby obsolete.
The power was concentrated in the hand of the Fuehrer, who had it applied by his plenipotentiaries separately. The theory of the state-law of the Third Reich designated this as change from the actual to the functional division of power. any longer under his own responsibility but only by the order (Auftrag) he had received from the head of the state. What applied to the individual, also applied to the former Reich-Cabinet. It had no influence any longer on stateleadership but was a common conception for various branches of administration technically separated. As the political tasks no longer existed with which normally the Ministers as a group had to deal with -- and so to the cabinet -the tasks of the council of the Ministers were done automatically by the weight of the facts. Therefore, as the hearing of witnesses has shown, it never met during von Ribbentrop's period of office.
Even the title "Minister" did not signify any longer the head of a department of administration (Reichsressort) but became a mere title expressing a rank. also did not have any longer the right to set down the directives of foreign policy. The hearing of evidence has shown this fact also in the form of speeches and utterances of Hitler, in which he, e.g. after the Rhineland occupation and the "Anschluss" of Austria said, that he brought about these, as he called them "great decisions" against the will of his advisers by his own decision and referring to his responsibility towards the German people and history. Seen from the state-law point of view this means that no minister had the possibility of preventing the decisions. Also from the state-law point of view he was not authorized to examine the legality of the Fuehrer's decisions. Because from the just-described concentration of all functions of state power in Hitler's person followed that he was authorized to carry out legislative and executive functions. A special form of the act of legislation was no longer provided for in the Third Reich. Also there was no measure by which from the contents of the Fuehrer's decisions one could draw conclusions, whether he acted in his capacity as law-giver or as head of the executive.
The conception of material law, laid down in Germany as in all continental states till the assumption of power (Machtuebernahme) completely lost its meaning; also individual directives were given in the form of laws. are forbidden to examine the contents of these laws. This is even valid for jurisdiction, how much more for agencies of administration. The application of a law that was made in the correct way, provided for by the constitution must not be refused by any office in the state. The action of examining even by the law courts is limited to the question whether the way laid down by the constitution has been followed. This is also the case in Great Britain and the United States, wherein decrees issued by the executive may be subject to examining with regard to their contents but not laws passed by parliament. all expressions of will of the state; the Fuehrer. It often could not be found out on account of the dissolution of the conceptions of state law in which capacity he acted. The doctrine of state law of the Third Reich therefore was debased to a theology of revelations of the Fuehrer. The old discriminations ceased to exist in the thinking of the Ministers. The only question that could arise in state law of the Third Reich was, whether the will of the Fuehrer was expressed in a clear enough way as to contain the will of the state. having transferred the pseudo-military way of thinking to the sphere of politics. The conceptions obedience and discipline were transferred onto a department in which they did not belong. division of power we must point to a fact, which is just as characteristic for this despotia sui generis as it speaks against the existence of a conspiracy or a common plan. agency to the head of the state. Neither the cabinet nor the Reich- defensecouncil nor any other advisory committee had any influence on Hitler's decisions.
of Hitler before an increasing audience. All, that has the appearance of a council, is in reality reception of orders. The hearing of evidence has shown it to be certain, that efforts to influence Hitler could at the most lead to reactions not to be precalculated. had considerable power in their own sphere which did not interest Hitler. They were, however, completely denied to participation in the great decisions on war or peace, armistice, peace offers etc. an independent personality could not be tolerated. Herr von Ribbentrop was aware of this as Under Secretary of State von Steengracht has testified here. He stated: Hitler could have use for an Under Secretary for foreign affairs but not for a Minister of foreign politics. be reconciled with the thought of a common plan and conspiracy. The conspiracy demands, as we have seen, a combination and agreement in aims at which the participants form their will freely. The political practice of the Third Reich only knew the acclamation.