A I don't understand what is the bearing of the question of the honorable attorney. Does the honorable Counsel for the Defense mean the events of the Ardennes which I alluded to a while ago, or does he speak in a completely general sense? and in reference to that resistance movement, I have asked several questions, and one of these questions was whether the witness knows
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, the witness has already answered the question by saying that he cannot say how many Germans were killed by the resistance movement.
DR. BABEL: But he can affirm that Germans, more or less of them, have been killed by the resistance.
DR. BABEL: The witness will also be able to confirm that the members of the resistance are today considered heroes in Belgium.
(At this point the sound equipment failed to function)
THE PRESIDENT: Can we go on now? Will you repeat your question?
DR. BABEL: From what we have read in the papers and from what has been brought up here in part, these people who were active in the resistance movement are now considered heroes. At least I could draw that conclusion. 18 kilograms weight. What conclusion did you draw from that fact? I could not quite understand it this morning. the moral anguish which I underwent during the occupation, and, at the question of M. Faure on whether I considered this occupation compatible with the dignity of a free man, I answered No, giving the proof that as a result of this occupation and the anguish, the loss of this weight was sufficiently demonstrative. What conclusion could be drawn from that, in your opinion? (Laughter)
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Babel, we are not interested in your experiences.
DR. BABEL: Thank you, sir. That was my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Counsel wish to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure?
M. FAURE: I have no questions.
(The witness was excused)
M. FAURE: I ask the Tribunal kindly to take the presentation document and the document book constituting the end of the chapter on the seizure of sovereignty, which bears the title France. administration of occupation. There was, on the other hand, in France a diplomatic representation. Finally, it must be noted that the police administration always played an important role there, which became increasingly important and which extended particularly over the period which followed the appointment of General Oberg in 1942. I should like to limit myself to mentioning a few special features which these usurpations assumed in Franco and certain original procedures which were employed by the Germans in this country, in addition to what has already been abundantly set forth and which will be further treated by me, as concerns the consequences of German activities in France. First, the German authorities, from the beginning, assumed in France a particular character of sovereignty. I speak of the splitting up of the country into five different zones. This splitting up by the Germans compensated, to a certain extent, for the special situation which resulted for thorn from the existence of a non-occupied French territory. 22 June, which has already been placed before the Tribunal, provided for the establishment of a line of demarcation between the occupied zone and the so-called non-occupied zone.
It might have been thought at that time that this demarcation accorded chiefly with the necessity of military movements in the occupied zone. It might be concluded that the separation of the zones would be manifested only through the exercise in the occupied zone of the ordinary rights of an armed force occupation. I have already had occasion to quote before the Tribunal a document, the testimony of M. Leon Noel, which takes into account the verbal assurances given in this respect by General Keitel and by General Jodl, who are the defendants before you bearing these names. with extreme rigor and in a manner that was wholly unforeseen. We have already seen the important consequences of this from the point of view of the economic life of the country. There were also important consequences from the point of view of administration, local administration, which was continually embarrassed in its tasks, and from the point of view of the life of the population, which could only, with great difficulty, circulate between the different parts of the French territory. The Germans first obtained for themselves in this way a means of pressure over the French authorities. This means of pressure was all the more advantageous as it was constantly changing and extremely subtle. The Germans could now relax the rules of separation of the zones, now apply them with greatest severity. I present in evidence under the number 1051.
This document is a letter of 20 December 1941 by Schleier of the German Embassy to the French Delegate de Brinon, a letter concerning the giving of passes to the German Civilians who wish to enter into the nonoccupied zone.
The French authority of the de facto government had protested against the fact that the Germans obliged the French authorities to allow any person provided with German passes to enter into the nonoccupied zone where they could go about in a task, particularly of a kind that one can imagine. wish to mention only the last paragraph, is the second paragraph on page two of this Document No. 1051.
"In case the French Government should have resolved to create passes of French Nationals."
gard to the division of the country. This first division had a basis in the activity of the Armistice Convention, although the basis was contestable, and it is doubtful of the validity. On the other hand, the other divisions which I mention were purely imposed by the Germans without warning of any kind, without notice, and without the enunciation of any pretext in any sense plausible. from the rest of France the Departments of the Haut Rhin, du Bas Rhin, andof the Moselle; in connection with which I have already demonstrated they became the subject of real annexation. Pas de Calais. These departments in fact were attached to the German Military Administration of Belgium. This factor is known from the published German decrees, and is before the Tribunal in a number of Belgium decrees. Not only did this separation exist from the point of view of the German Military Administration, but it also existed from the point of view of the French Administration. This administration was not excluded in the depart ments under consideration, but its communications with the central ser-vice were extremely difficult.
simply to quote a document which will serve as an example, and which I submit as Document No. 1052. This is a letter from the Militarbefelshaber under date of 17 September 1941, which makes known its refusal to re-establish telegraphic and telephonic communications with the rest of France. I quote a single sentence of this letter giving a decision of the High Military Command.
"It is impossible now to honor the request for the establishment of the two Departments of the North."
zone a so-called forbidden zone. The conception of this forbidden zone certainly corresponded to the future projects of the Germans as to annexation of certainly a more and extensive portion of France. In this connection I produced documents at the beginning of my presentation. This forbidden zone did not have any special rules of administration, but it required special authorization to enter or to leave it. The return to this zone by persons who had left it in order to seek refuge in other regions was possible only progressively, and with great difficulty. The administrative relation, like the economic relation between the forbidden zone and the other zone, was constantly limited. This fact was unknown. document under No. 1053. It is a letter from the Militarbefelshaber, dated 22 November 1941, addressed to the French Delegation. I shall simply summarize this document by saying that the German command accepted the authorization of the approval of the Minister of the de facto government in order to go into the occupied zone, but refused its authorization to go into the forbidden zone. zones which I have just explained, I have joined to the Document Book a map of France indicating these separations. This map of France was numbered 1054, but I think it is not necessary for me to produce it as a document properly speaking.
It is intended to enable the Tribunal to follow this extreme splitting up on the one hand of the annexed departments, and, on the other hand the North and the Pas de Calais, and the limits of this department being indicated on the map, annexed to the forbidden zone, which is indicated by the first line; and, finally, the line of demarcation with the unoccupied zone.
This is, by the way, a reproduction of the map which was sold in France and sold in Paris during the occupation. Tribunal that on 11 November 1942, the German Army force invaded the socalled non-occupied zone. The German authorities declared at that time that they didn't intend to establish a military occupation of this zone, and that there would simply be what was called a zone of operation. ception that they had imagined. They had not respected the rules of the law of the occupation, and the proof of this violation of law in the socalled operational zone has already been presented under a number of circumstances, and later will be brought up again in the last party of this presentation. the population, although the area is not enormous for a country whose life is highly centralized. I shall now tell of the second seizure of the power, which consisted in the control by the Germans of the legislative acts of the de facto government. doctrine, never ceased itself to exercise by its own ordinances, the real legislative power in regard to France, On the other hand -- and it is the fact which I am dealing with now in respect to the French Government power -its Sovereignty, the Germans recognized; but in recognizing they exercised a vertible legislative censorship. I shallproduce, however, documents by way of example, and proof of this fact.
First, I shallsubmit under No. 1055 the letter of the Commander-inchief of the Military Affairs in France to the Delegate General of the French Government; Letter dated 29 December 1941. We can observe that the signature on this letter is that of Dr. Best, of whom I spoke this morning In con-nection with Denmark, where he went subsequently and where he was given functions that were both diplomatic and political.
I think it is unnecessary for me to read the text of this letter. I shall simply read the sub-paragraph of the law concerning the French budget of 1942, and the new French law of finances. to occupy themselves with the establishment of a budget of the French de facto government, to which facts they had no relation as to the necessities for their military occupation. Not only did theGermans check the contents of the law prepared by these de facto governments, but they made imperative suggestions. I shall quote no document on this point at this moment, but I shall produce only two in connection with the propaganda and the other in connection with the regime imposed upon the Jews. was seized in the intervention of German authority in the treatment and confinement of officials. According to the method which I have already followed, I present by way of an example, documents on this point. The first is a document which will be number 1056, a letter 23 September 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief- von Steuelpnagel to de Brinon.
This letter puts forth a variety of considerations, the reading of which is not indispensable, on the sabotage of harvests, and the difficulties of food supplies I read the last paragraph, page 2, of document 1056.
"Consequently, I demand insistently that a single direction assure the food supplies of the population which does not seem to me possible of realization except under the control of an energetic and competent man who will take in hand the two ministries." tion of a ministry, of an authority that was up to then apparently a governmental authority as concerns the approval of appointments. November 1941. I shall simply summarize this document by indicating that the German authorities objected to the appointment of the president of liaison committee of the manufacture of beet sugar. You see how far we are here from military necessities. Command. It is brief and I shall read it.
"By way of example, I beg you to take the necessary measures in order that the Sub-prefect of St. Quentin, Mr. Planacassagne, be recalled from his functions and replaced as soon as possible by a competent official. Planacassagne is not capable of carrying out his duties."
I shall now quote a text of a more general scope. I produce document 1059, which is a secret circular of 10 May 1942, addressed by the Military Command of the Administrative Staff of all the Chief Commandantures. We find here again the signature of Dr. Best.
"Control of French policy of personnel in the occupied territories.
"The reshuffling of the French Government presents certain possibilities for the exercise of a positive influence on the French personnel policy in the occupied territories, I, therefore, beg you to designate those of the French officials who from the German point of view appear particularly usable whose names may be submitted to the French Government when the question of naming holders of important posts arises."
usurpation. I now produce document 1060. This document is an interragatory of Otto Abetz, who had the function of German ambassador in France. This interrogatory took place on 17 November 1945 before the Commissioners Berge et Saulas at the General Four Bureau in Paris. This document confirms the German interferences in French administration and it, likewise, gives details on the double control between that of the Militaerbefehlshaber and that of the Gestapo. I quotes:
"The Militaerbefehlshaber in Frankreich, basing itself on the various conventions of Internation Law", -- this is Otto Abetz who is speaking and it is not necessary to say that we in no way accept his conception of International Law -- "considered itself responsible and supreme judge of the maintenance of order and of public security in the occupied zone. On this ground it demanded the right of giving its approval to the appointment or the maintenance of all French officials designated to occupy posts in the occupied zone. That is concerned the officials residing in the free zone who were obliged by reason of their functions to exercise them subsequently in the occupied zone. The Militaerbefehlshaber also stressed the necessity for his approval of their designation. In practice the Militaerbefehlshaber made use of the right thus defined and claimed only at the time of the designation of high officials and solely in the sense of a veto right. That is to say, that it did not intervene in the choice of officials to be designated and contented itself with making observations on certain name proposed. These observations were based on information which the Militaerbefehlshaber received from its regional and local Commandantures from its different administrative and economic officers in Paris and by the police and the Gestapo, which at that time were still under the authority of the Militaerbefehlshaber.
"From 11 November 1942 on this state of things changed because of the occupation of the free zone. The German military authorities in this zone demand. ed their right to give their opinion in regard to the designation of officials in all the cases in which the security of the German Army might be thereby effected. The Gestapo authorities for its part acquired in the two zones an independence in fact with regard to the regional and local military chiefs end with regard to the Militaerbefehlshaber.
It claimed the right to intervene in connection with any appointment which might effect the interests of the carry ing out of their police tasks.
"Having been recalled to Germany from November 1942 to December 1943, I was not myself, a witness of the conflicts which resulted from this state of things and which was to come to the highest degree, the so-called sovereignty of the Vicy Government. The situation was considerably aggravated since the Gestapo demanded in the occupied as well as in the unoccupied zone the right to make the designation of prefects subject to its consent. It even went so far as to propose itself the officials to be designated by the French Government. Seconded by me, the Militaerbefehlshaber continued or took up again the struggle against these abusive demands and succeeded in part in restoring the situation in effect before November 1942." consideration which I wished to submit to the Tribunal. I wished by this consideration to insist on the juxtaposition and the collaboration of the various agents of usurpation, that is to say, the military command, the embassy, and the police. For the latter I shall return later to x in the last part of my brief. before the Tribunal document 1061. This document was in my brief as a judiciary translation of the original. It appears that it constitutes a part of the American documentation No. 3094-PS. It has not, however, as yet been presented to the Tribunal. This involves the official designation of Otto Abetz as ambassador. I should like to read this document 1061.
"Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 August 1940.
"In answer to a question of the General Quartermaster, addressed to the High Command of the armed forces and transmitted by the latter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fuehrer has named Abetz, up to now minister, as ambassador and in accord with my report has decreed the following:
"I Embassador Abetz has the following functions in France:
"1. To advise the military agencies in political matters.
"2. To maintain a permanent contact with the Government of Vichy "3. To bring to a way of thinking favorable to us the important "4. To guide from the political point of view the press, the "5. To concern himself with the German, French and Belgian "6. To advise the secret military police and the secret police "7. To put in safety all the treasures, public art treasures, and "Two:
The Fuehrer has expressly ordered that only Ambassador Abetz shall be responsible for all the political questions in occupied and non-occupied France. Insofar as his functions concern military interests, Ambassador Abetz shall act only in accord with the military command in France.
"Three: Ambassador Abetz shall be attached as my delegate to the military command in France. His domicile shall remain in Paris as up to now. He shall receive from me the instructions for the accomplishment of his tasks and shall be responsible exclusively to me. I shall greatly appreciate the fact that the supreme command of the armed forces, the OKW -- I shall appreciate this command giving the necessary orders to the military agencies involved as soon as possible. (Signed) Ribbentrop." between the military administration and the administration of foreign affairs.
a collaboration about which I have already said, on several occasions, that it was one of the determining elements of the responsibility in this trial, a collaboration of which I shall give a little later, examples having a criminal character. the following document which was numbered 1062, although I am personally certain of the value of this document which comes from a French judicial dossier. I did not the original German text and because of this, the translation might create difficulties, and it is naturally necessary for each document produced to present absolute guarantees as to their authenticity. I shall therefore pass directly to the last document, which I wish to present and which I present under No. 1063.
This is a detailed dossier on this problem, on the collaboration of the German administrations, but sometimes detailed documents of a formal nature may present some interest. This has to do with a note found in the German Archives in Paris, a note of 5 November 1943, which gives the numbering of the dossiers in the German Embassy. I shall simply read the first three lines of this note: The dossiers in conformity with the division adopted by the military administration in France are distributed into ten chief groups. There follows the enumeration of these methods and groups, utilized for the classification of dossiers or files. I simply wish to point out that in their narrow collaboration and in their close collaboration, the German Embassy, a civil service depending on the foreign affairs and the military command, had adopted systems of classifications that were such that the indications of all their files were established in a corresponding fashion. examination of this seizure of sovereignty in the occupied territories, and I should like to point out that these files hive been established with the collaboration of my assistant, M. Monneray, a collaboration which has for that matter extended to the whole brief which I present to the Tribunal. devoted to the spiritual Germanization, that is, to propaganda. economic pillage, I had said that the Germans had made exactions of available manpower, goods, and raw materials in the occupied countries. They drained these countries of their reserves and just as the Germans proceeded with regard to the accululated intellectual, the Germans proceed in the same way with regard to the accumulated intellectual and moral resources. They wished to seize and eliminate the mental reserves. This expression "mental reserves" which is extremely significant, was not selected by the Prosecution. I borrow it from the Germans themselves. I quote on this point, to the Tribunal, a new extract from a work which was introduced into evidence under No. 5 of the French documentation. This was a book published in Berlin, edited by the Nazi Party. The author was Dr. Friedrich Didier. This work has a preface by the Defendant Sauckel and it is entitled "Working For Europe."
The quotation which I would like to make appears in the document book under No. 100, which is simply the number of its order, because the book itself has already been presented and submitted. The book includes a chapter entitled "Spiritual Orientation and Social Assistance." The author is concerned with the spiritual orientation of the foreign workers who, in numbers of millions, were taken by force and brought into the Reich. This is concerned with the spiritual organization with regard to an element as important, as the occupation of the occupied countries is already notable and remarkable in itself, but it is, on the other hand, obvious that this preoccupation is general with regard to all the inhabitants of the occupied countries, the author in this case having simply limited himself to his subject. I have chosen this quotation to being my chapter, because its drafting seems to me to be particularly happy for us to get an idea of the German plan in regard to propaganda, the German conception of progaganda.
The quotation, page 79 of the work, that has been introduced in evidence;
"The method of spiritual orientation of foreign workers is not so simple as that used in regard to his German comrade. The elimination, for instance, in the foreign worker of mental reserves is of the greatest importance. The foreigner must accustom himself to a working atmosphere which is unknown to him. His ideas as to the world must be expurgated. The conception of the nationals of X-enemy States must be actively fought, as this manifestation of foreign conceptions." reserves and to expurgate each man of his ideas as to the world in order to substitute for them the Nazi conception. Such was the object of the propaganda. This propaganda had already been exercised in Germany and it continued there unceasingly. We have seen from the article just quoted that there is also a preoccupation with the intellectual reorientation of the German worker, though this problem is there considered as "more simple." When we speak today of Nazi propaganda we are often tempted to minimize the importance of this undertaking, and their reason for this and these reasons are false. On the one hand, when we consider works and theses of propaganda, we are struck most often by their crudeness, these of an obviously mendacious character, which they assume their intellectual or artistic poverty.
But we must not forget that the Nazi propaganda utilized all means, the most crude on the one hand and at the same time, means which were more subtle and often skillful. From another point of view, the crudest affirmations are those that carry most weight on simple minds. these films which we find ridiculous, would have constituted in the future our chief and very soon our sole spiritual affair. only very feeble results. Indeed, these results are quite insignificant, especially if one takes into account the scope of the means which this propaganda had at its disposal. The enslaved peoples did not listen to the news and to the exhortations of the Germans. They threw themselves into the resistance. But there also it must be considered that the war continued, but the broadcasts from the countries which had remained free were engaged in magnificent counter-propaganda, and that finally the Germans rather quickly underwent military reverses. long run, have brought about, on the part of more important elements of the population, a consent, an acquiescence, which would have been worse that the oppression itself. It is fortunate that only a very small minority in the different countries were corrupted by the Nazi propaganda, but however weak and small this minority may have been, it is for us a matter of sadness and of just complaint. ridiculous when we consider the few wretches who, because of this, enrolled in a legion or in the Waffen SS to fight against their countries and against humanity. The deaths of certain ones of these men in the dishonoring combat or after their condemnation has punished their crimes, but the Nazi propaganda is responsible for each one of these deaths and for each one of these crimes. the Nazi propaganda. We are not sure that we are able to measure the whole harm which they have done to us. The nations count their visible wounds, but propaganda is a poison which dissolves in the mental organism and leaves traces that cannot be discerned.
There are still men in the world who, because of the propaganda which they have undergone, believe, perhaps obscurely, that they have the right to despise or to eliminate another man because he was born a Jew or because he became a Communist. The men who believe this have remained accessories to and, at the same time, victims of Naziism. peoples was severely tried. Their moral health appears more robust, but it must still be anxiously watched for a certain time in the future. room in this accusation for the chapter on the spiritual Germanization and propaganda. The propaganda is an enterprise which is, in itself, criminal. It is an enterprise against the spiritual condition, according to the definition of M. Menthon, but it is also a moons and an aggravating circumstance of the whole of the criminal enterprises of the Nazis since it prepared their successes and because it was to maintain these successes. It was considered by the Germans themselves, as numerous texts show, as one of the most reliable seapons of total war. It is more particularly a means and an aspect of the Germanization which we are studying at this moment.
forms. We have therefore only to define some principal features and performed important functions.
But this Ministry and its department were not the only ones responsible for questions of propaganda.
We Department of Foreign Affairs is equally involved.
We shall were very active.
This fact must be added to all those which one negative aspect and one positive aspect:
the negative or, in a liberties, certain intellectual possibilities which existed before; lies.
This duality of the restrictive propaganda and of the by the Germans as concerns meetings and associations.
The authorities meeting or of association in the occupied countries.
The subject thought.
In France; an ordinance of 21 August 1940, which appeared hostile to them, or even those whose object was political.
They influence which was not directly subordinated to them.
On this line No. 1101, which is a letter from the Militaerbefehlshaber of 13 Government.
This deals with the youth groups. Even with regard to "The General Secretariat of Youth has notified us in its decomposition which threatens it.
The creation of these social by the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France.
Before teaching and education of these your people."
I shall now produce document 11*2. This document is a-
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Faure, could you tell us how long you think you will be on this subject of propaganda?
M. FAURE: I expect to speak for about two hours or two and a half hours.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the program after you have done with this subject of propaganda?
M. FAURE: M. President, as I indicated at the beginninf of my presentation, it includes four chapters. The chapter of propaganda, of which I am speaking now, constitutes Chapter 3. The fourth chapter is devoted to the administrative organization of the criminal action. It corresponds, more exactly, to the second heading under Count 4 of the Indictment relative to the persecution of the Jews in the occupied countries of the West. the program of the French prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we would like to know.
M. FAURE: M. Mounier will treat the analytical brief, and the recapitulation of the individual accusations of the prosecution. Then I think that M. Gerthofer is to speak rather briefly about the artistic pilfering which has not been dealt with in the French Prosecution's Brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn new.
M. FAURE: Mr. President, I beg your pardon. I should like to ask the Tribunal if it is convenient for it to see tomorrow, in the course of my propaganda chapter, a few projections on the screen of documents which relate to this chapter.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. Certainly.
DR. BABEL: (Counsel for SS and SD): The reasons for the questions which I posed to the witness seem to have been misunderstood. I spoke about the resistance movement. I wanted only to prove that
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) One moment. You are going too fast.
DR. BABEL: I wanted only to prove that deeds which are said to have been committed by the German troops in many cases were caused by the attitude of the civilian population, and that actions against International Law, against Germans, have not been judged in the same way as these actions committed by members of the German Wehrmacht.