DR. LATERNSER: (counsel for the General Staff): I would like to point out that it was the opinion of the Tribunal that every defendant'S counsel should receive, in sufficient time beforehand, a copy of all documents which are submitted during the proceeding, and that this has not been done. It is, therefore, difficult for the defense to follow the proceedings because the documents submitted have not been submitted in a sufficient quantity.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every member of defendants' counsel.
You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal's order upon the subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the defendants' information center. If I remember correctly, it is that a certain number of criminals or Photostatic conies shall be deposited in the information center, and that a certain number of copies of the documents shall be supplied to the defendants' counsel, and that for the rest, the defendants' counsel must rely upon the fact that every document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open court and therefore comes through the earphones to defendant's counsel and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of the shorthand notes shall be suppled to defendants' counsel as soon as possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the prosecution to supply documents to the defendants' counsel.
Is that not in accordance with your recollection?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. Chairman, the American prosecution, the British prosecution, and also the French prosecution, in the course of the proceedings, have seen to it that of all documents so many copies have been given to the defendants' counsel that each defendant's counsel could hove one copy before him. I believe, in order to facilitate the work, that this could also have been done by the Soviet prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in accordance with the Tribunal's orders. The Tribunal has not made that order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone beyond the Tribunal's orders and have supplied a copy to each defendants' counsel.
However, as I say, the Tribunal has not as yet seen fit to impose that duty upon the prosecution.
I suppose you don't really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet documents have been deposited in the information center?
DR. LATERNSER: I don't know the exact number, At any rate, there were not so many that each defendant's counsel could have one copy of each document, which has been done by the other prosecutions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you no doubt understand the very great difficulties of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants' counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the prosecution the duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German, of each document, for each defendants' counsel. I can only express the hope that the soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.
DR. LATERNSER: I remember that on the occasion when the press got 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr. President, said that it should be possible to distribute 25 copies to the defendants' counsel, That was, at that time, the opinion of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Teh Tribunal's orders on this subject are in writing, and you will find them in the defendants' information center. I have stated my recollection of them; if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the document and I will withdraw my statement.
GENERAL ZORYA: May it please your Honors, it is my task to war criminals now sitting in the prisoners' dock.
This charge of the crime, mentioned in sub-paragraph "a", against it.
All Aggressive actions on the part of German Fascism The well-known formula of German imperialism, "Drang nach Osten," "If new territory is desired," wrote Hitler in his book, "Mein Kampf," in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia.
old." (Hitler, "Mein Kampf," Munich edition, 1930 - page 742 -which is before the Tribunal.)
forthcoming events. In the course of this survey he declared (the already in front of you):"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West.
It dropped out of the picture."
(Page 2 of the Russian text.)
not consider the version "West" as the most favorable version for conference, at the conference of 23 May, 1939 (USA exhibit No. 79).aims of policy, and said--I am citing now from page 4:"If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East."
The vast expanses in the East, as Hitler's conspirators thought, period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler's book, "Mein Kampf," where questions connected with the predatory attack on 1. Preparations for war in Germany itself.
2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by 3. The securing by the Fascist conspirators of the "Preparations for war in Germany itself."
Tribunal as directive number 21, "Plan Barbarossa" (the document of the American Prosecution numbered 446-PS), received its official This work may not have been governed by written orders.
The recourse to verbal orders.
And, on the other hand, many orders of project.
acquire a corresponding purpose, although outwardly they
THE PRESIDENT: General Zorya, the Tribunal observes that you case, in the case of another deposition, if the Defendant's Counsel submitted to the Defendant's Counsel for cross-examination.
GENERAL ZORYA: I am now reading an extract, that is, from the
THE PRESIDENT: That is, of course, on the supposition that I in Nurnberg.
Go on.
GENERAL ZORYA: I think it is a proper moment now to mention General Warlimont, which the President has just mentioned.
This.
deposition, which was given by Warlimont on the 30th of November, 1945, is presented as evidence under No. 263. National Defense in OKW, and later the deputy chief of the Operational Staff. before us. I ask you to turn to page No. 2 of the Russian text of this document, which is on page 20 in the bunch of documents presented by the Russian Prosecution on the question, and the answers to questions put to Warlimont:
"Personally, I first heard of this plan" -- that is "Plan Barbarossa" -"on the 29th of July, 1940. On that day Colonel-General Jodl arrived in a special train at Reichenhall station, where Department 'L' of the Operational Staff was stationed. This struck one immediately, because General Jodl had, till then, never, I believe, come to see us. Besides myself, three other officers were ordered to present themselves."
I now skip several paragraphs and go to page 3, page 21 in the documents:
"I cannot repeat word by word his expressions. The text was as follows: Jodl said that the Fuehrer has decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Fuehrer based this on the fact that war had to come in one way or another, so that it would be better to prosecute this war in connection with the one already being fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations for it." dealing with:
At a later date I talked with Hitler. He had intended to commence the war against the Russian Union already in the Autumn of 1940, but he gave up this idea. The cause of this was that the strategic position of the troops at that time was not favorable for this purpose. The supplies to Poland were not good enough; railways and bridges were not prepared; the communication lines and airdromes were not organized. Therefore, an order was given to secure the whole transport and preparations to prepare for such an attack which will eventually be made.
August 1941, called "Aufbau Ost", Warlimont replied:
"Yes, this order was prepared by the staff in accordance with instructions of General Jodl. In General Jodl's opinion, the concentration could take place only after all the preparations indicated in this order had been made." which was called "Fritz" to start with, was presented to Hitler on the 5th of December 1940, after which it was edited and saw the light of day on the 18th of December. field marshal of the German army, who took the most direct part both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan Barbarossa, can give considerable help in the investigation of questions connected with the history of the preparation of this plan. in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked USSR 156, and request that it be accepted as evidence.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): I just wanted to remark that I do not possess a copy of this document. It seems as if it would be the same statement which could not yet be given to the defendant's counsel. If the Soviet prosecution could give me this copy of the statement now, I would be able to see if I wanted to protest in the way in which I did in the beginning of this session.
(Whereupon copies of the document above referred to were handed to Dr. Nelte.)
DR. NELTE: According to the original which I now see before me, this is the same kind of a statement by Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus, in a letter to the Government of the Soviet Union, has expressed his opinion. The Soviet delegation has reproduced that letter and presented it in the original. This photostat does not contain an official authorization by the Soviet authorities, nor is it an affidavit which could be admitted as proof. mentioned at the beginning of this session, and to make a decision in order that the Soviet prosecution in the future may treat similar statements according to the wishes of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has said?
GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I do. decision that the originals of all the documents of the Soviet Union or certified copies mil be presented. Apart from this, as to evidence of some importance and interest which has been given us by some of the witnesses, and which will be brought out by us, if the defense desires to cross examine the witnesses subsequently everything possible will be done to bring them to Nurnberg and enable them to give verbal depositions. The same thing applies to Paulus, to whose statement I shall refer. That testimony can be checked, as the representative of the defense just asked, after Paulus has been brought here.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I understood from what you said, General, that as far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus ' statement is concerned, a certificate will be furnished -- as we indicated the Tribunal wished -that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and as far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned, Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants' counsel to cross examine.
That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: The principle of this question appears there, in that official authorization should be given that the documents submitted represent the realintention of those who have made those statements. Statements are always merely a doubtful substitute for the examination of the witness himself. Prosecution may have in bringing in witnesses. The defense realizes that and appreciates it, but in those cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of several questions is in the foreground, the personal questioning of the witnesses should be preferred. Wherever this is impossible, for reasons which we cannot judge, it would be desirable at any rate that these people who have made these statements should make their statements in the form of an affidavit.
statements are the original ones. That, however, would be no strengthening of the statement. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are at the disposal of the Soviet delegation. The defense is not so much interested in those formal statements but in the possibility of material proof. extremely grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You can go on, General.
GENERAL ZORYA: I think the testimony of Paulus can be of great help to us. I shall now read that part of Paulus' testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa. Request you to read page 27, the portions which are underlined in red pencil, which I intend to read now.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, General, since it is now 12:45, you had better to begin this document before the adjournment.
GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, sir.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
MAJ. GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, following the statement made by the Russian Delegation, I will ask for permission to cross-examine the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Paulus, who will be cross-examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.
(The witness took his place in the box) BY THE PRESIDENTS:
Q Will you please tell me your name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me? "I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing?"
(The witness repeated the oath)
Would you like to sit down? BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q Your name is Friedrich Paulus?
Q You were born in 1890?
Q You were born in the village of Breitenau, in Kassel?
Q By nationality you are a German?
Q You are a former Field Marshal of the German Army? Leningrad?
to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?
Q You are confirming such statement? by the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.
A Fran personal experience, I can state the following: the General Staff. I was a General Quartermaster and as such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and in addition carried out the instructions of an operational nature which he delegated to me. other things, a still uncompleted operational plan which concerned itself with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational work or scheme had been carried through by the then General Major, Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose temporarily had been taken over to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of the Army, Halder, gave the development of this plan into my hands and on the following basis: Soviet Union, covering the territory, or terrain, the strength of the attack, the manpower to be needed, and so forth. For this purpose there was also mentioned that about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. In addition, from the beginning we were to keep in mind taking Roumania into consideration as far as this operation was concerned. The north wing was to include Finland, but this was problematical and was not included in the general plan. the intention of the OKW -- the purpose of this operation was to be first the destruction of the Russian Army in the West, Russia, and to prevent them from getting into Russia Proper.
could not effectively attack Germany. the beginning of November through two attacks with which I was concerned. The officers of the General Staff entrusted with this work, as a basis for the attacks, assumed that to the south one army was to be redeployed from the South of Poland and from Roumania, with the idea of reaching the Dnieper River. To the north of this area there was to be one army group and the strongest around Warsaw; and to the north, to reach Minsk, Smolensk and later to push through to Moscow. from the area of East Prussia to push through the Baltic regions toward Leningrad. Dnieper was to be reached and Smolensk and Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried on according to developments, and to plan accordingly. of all victories, there were to be several conferences through the General Staff Chief of the Army, that of the Army Groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, through the Chief of that time, Colonel Kinsel, there was a speech about Russia, describing the geographic and economic situation, about the Red Army, and so forth. And the significant point of this speech was that some preparations for an attack by Russia was not known. With these maneuvers and conferences as I have just described there were theoretical discussions and plans for this offensive and after the conclusion of these conferences, the scheme of the attack was considered concluded and ready. Commander gave our Directive No. 20, and this directive as issued was the basis for all military and economic preparations. And these directions or instructions were to be carried out in such a way that deployment of troops was made ready and developed. These first directives for the deployment of troops in February, 1941, were confirmed by Hitler and they concerned themselves with all these measures and were made known to the troops.
Then several supplementary directives were issued. period of time which would make it possible to carry large movements of troops in Russia, and all preparations were concluded. Then at the end of March Hitler decided to make a change because of his desire to attack Yugoslavia. Then orders as of the 1st of April were set after that time -
THE PRESIDENT : I am afraid you are a little too fast.
THE WITNESS: Where shall I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you better begin where you said that at the end Hitler made a change in the plan.
A (continuing): Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date for the beginning of the attack had to be changed by about five weeks. That meant postponement to the last half of June. And indeed, this attack actually took place on the 22nd of June, as planned. this attack on the Soviet Union which actually took place on the 22nd of June had been prepared.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared? BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward? and my observations refer back to that point. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: aggression on Soviet Russia ushered in by the participation of Roumania?
A From personal observation, I can say the following: operational workings or preparations for the attack on Russia, and from the beginning, the using of Roumania was envisaged for the marching in, that is the right or south wing of the German Army and that was taken into consideration right from the beginning.
Then a military mission at that time headed by Cavalry Leader Hansen was sent to Roumania. Then a whole Panzer Division, the Thirteenth, was transferred to Roumania. For those who knew about the future plans it was obvious that this step could only serve to make ready the future partner in the war for the future plans and steps which we had to take now regarding Hungary. Army at Zossen, to the headquarters of the Chief of the Hungarian Operational Group. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. changing over its units into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized groups such as Panzer groups. The chief of the Organization and myself advised Colonel Laslow at the same time because several Hungarian commissions were in Berlin. The Hungarian Minister of War was also present at the same time, and we discussed the exchange of supplies or the sending of supplies -- German supplies -- to Hungary. these measures with regard to supplying arms to other armies was only possible at that time when these armies could be used for war, for Germany.
Regarding Hungary, there is a further point I should like to ention: With the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler at the end of March, 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On the 27th or 28th of March I was called to the Reichschancellery in Berlin where at that time there was going on a conference between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl and on which the Chief of the Army had been active. This conference had just been concluded. When I arrived I was advised by the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and for once to eliminat a flanking movement from the direction of Greece, because there was a rail line leading to the South, and to get this rail line, and then also for the future -- for the case "Barbarossa" t keep the right flank clear for this plan, for the carrying out of this plan.
officers to go to Vienna to give certain orders to the appropriate officers and then after that to travel on to Budapest to the Hungarian General Staff and to carry out the same mission there and to agree with them on the deployment of German troops in Austrian territory and the participating of Hungarian troops in the attack against Yugoslavia. a conference with General Wert, then with the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laslow. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly and the desired result was achieved. The result was then written down on a card, and on the card that I received from the General Staff of Hungary was contained the deployment against Yugoslavia, the deployment as Yugoslavia as envisaged, and also the manpower in the Carpathian sector was discussed. This was to protect the rear against the Soviet Union and the fact was a sign that even on the side of Hungary the realization was that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union. preparation of these plans and later on into the carrying out of these plans as far as that is concerned at that time I received the attitude of Hitler and it was as follows: the areas which she had lost in the First World War. And in addition, they were afraid that Roumania, which was an Ally of Germany and might push them into the background. As far as this attitude was concerned, Hitler thought Hungary in line with his ideas. But he was, as we could see from various examples, very cautions toward Hungary, and for two reasons: For one, he did not believe Hungary; and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many promises at too early a stage, and I can cite one example: The question of the oil regions. Later when the attack was begun that is the attack against Russia, the Seventeenth Army which was fighting at that point had the emphatic order at all costs to take this before the arrival of the Hungarians.
of Hitler was such that as far as certain participation was concerned he counted on it and sent armaments and help but he was not certain when he went to make all his plans and did not set a certain time when to initiate Hungary into his plans.
Then we come to the Finnish question. In December, 1940, the first visit of the Finnish General Staff Chief took place at Zossen. General Heinrichs had a conference with the General Chief of the Army, but I can't remember the contents of the speech out of this conference. But he did make a speech about the Finno-Russian War of 1939-1940. He gave this speech before the officers of the General Staff of the Army and told his officers who were present at the time -- that is in connection with the discussion of the Eastern plans -- this speech before these officers had quite a significance at that time, because it coincided in time with the directive issued in December. were made clear and a judgment of the Finnish troops -- that is, for future plans by the Germans -- could be made known. That was at Zossen at the headquarters, and it was perhaps in the second half of March, 1941. The Chief of Staff of Finland arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The contents of these conferences with the Chief of Staff was the cooperation of the Southern Finnish Manpower with the Operation Barbarossa, and working together with the Army Group North which was to come from East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops were to be determined according to the pushing forward of the German Army Group North and the later command pushing forward toward Leningrad. That was to depend on later agreements according to the development of events.
and the drawing together of the analysis into a common action. under the High Command?
A Will you please repeat the question. I did not quite get it. USSR carried out, the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite government and the High Command of the German Army? had been prepared much in advance and had been prepared very carefully. The troops involved in this attack had been assembled, and only on special instructions were they taken group by group into the line of future deployment and then, on this whole long front, from Rumania to Eastern Prussia, they were to be ready. Of course, Finland was excluded from this. and the operational plan on a large scale, as I described in the beginning, was tried out mentally, so to speak. Then, the deployment, and marching up of troops in detail, in groups, corps, divisions, was discussed in detail and was put in order in the smallest detail, much before the beginning of the war. Everything was ready. of France. The purpose of a landing in England in June 1941 was to be pretended, and attention was to be diverted from the East through this pretense.
Not only the operational carrying out, but the tactical surprise was planned well in advance. For instance, the prohibition of the boundaries before the beginning of the war meant possible losse and the loss was to be a sacrifice for the element of surprise. On the other hand, the element of surprise across the boundary from the enemy was not expected.
Q. In what way did you determine the aims which were pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?
A. The purpose of attacking the Volga Line, which was far beyond German strength, is characteristic of the boundless ambition of Hitler and of the nationalist regime. As far as strategy is concerned, the reaching of these aim would have been the destruction of the manpower of the Soviet Union, the fighting forces of the Soviet Union. with the winning of this line there would have been conquered the chief areas of Soviet Russia, with the capital, Moscow, and the political and economic center, the focal point of the Soviet Union! It would have meant the possession of the most important nutritional areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production of Russia, and also the communications not of Russia, that is, European Russia.
Hitler was very strong on the winning of economic aims in this war. Just how strongly he felt on this point I can cite through a personal axample that I describe. In June of 1943, the first of June, at a conference regarding the army group south in Poltawa, Hitler declared:
"If I do not get the oil of Maikob and Prosnia, then I must quit this war. conquered, economic and administrative organs had been envisaged before the beginning of the war, and everything had been placed in readiness. the aims as mentioned meant the conquering, for the purpose of colonization, o Russian areas and territories, and through their use and spoliation, and through the means gained therefrom, the war in the West was to be concluded win the setting up of German domination of Europe.