Q. At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa, how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces were present unsually
A. The chiefs of the departments concerned, the Operational Department, the General Quartermaster, Supplies, and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief departments who participated in that tribunal.
Q. And how many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces knew of the orders end directions when they had been signed?
A. As time went by -- that is to say, I am now talking about December when the actual marching orders were dealt with -- more or less all General Staff officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many knew previously, in the indicidual periods, is something which I cannot now give an exact answer to. BY THE TRIBUNAL (General Nikitchenko):
Q. Witness, did the General Staff of the German Army work out technical questions only; was it an apparatus which, worked out technical problems in detail according to the directions from the Supreme Command, or was the General Staff an institution which in itself and by itself prepared plans and presented to the Supreme Command its own considerations?
A. According to my own conception, there was a technically executive body existing. They had the task of carrying out existing instructions.
Q. And in your opinion then, the General Staff was a technical apparatus?
A. That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army and not an executiv body.
Q. To what extent was the General Staff conscientiously carrying though the directives which it received from the Supreme Command?
A. I am afraid I didn't quite understand the first part of your question
Q. How conscientiously did the General Staff Carryout those directives which it received from the Supreme Command?
A. They carried out these instructions in their spirit.
Q. Were there any conflicts between the General Staff and the High Command?
A. That is a known fact, that certain differences of opinion did exist. I said before that I could not give that story in detail. At any rate, I know that my immediate superior had frequent differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the Army.
Q. Were there people working in the General Staff, officers, who would not agree to the policies which were carried through by the Supreme Command?
A. Political questions did not come to the surface in that connection. Political questions were generally not discussed in the circle of persons in the Supreme Command of the Army.
Q. I am not talking about this in the narrow meaning of the words "political questions." I am talking about the policy of preparation for wars, the policy of aggression, of seizure. That is what I had in mind. occupied by Germans was supposed to be turned into.
A. I never did have any knowledge in detail. My knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.
Q. What does it mean? What exploitation are you talking about?
A. I am talking about the economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing its resources one could continue to conduct the war in the West, and furthermore secure supplies in Europe in the future.
Q. And the character of the exploitation was different from the exploitation of the agricultural resources of Germany itself?
A. In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I only led that Army in Russia for three quarters of a year, and I was captured early in January 1943.
Q. Tell us what you know about the directives which were published by the government organs of Germany and also by the High Command, as to the relations between the German Army and the Soviet population.
A. I remember that instructions did appear, but I can't recollect the date at the moment.
In those instructions, the whole manner of conducting the war in the East, and certain directives were contained. I believe that this principal decree was actually contained in that so-called Green Folder, but there may have been separate and special orders. I believe it expressed the fact that no unnecessary consideration should be shown the population.
Q. What does it mean "not to pay great attention to it" -- or perhaps the translation is not quite correct.
A. That merely meant that only military necessities could be considered in conducting with all measures that were proposed. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Were there any divisions consisting entirely of SS troops under your command?
A. I had under my command no SS troops at all. During the time I led the Army, I have no recollection of any such case. Even at Stalingrad, where I had 20 German infantry and armored divisions and two Rumanian divisions, amongst them there were no SS units.
Q. I understand that the SA didn't form units, did they? The SA?
A. The SA? No. I have never heard of SA units, but of course that there were SS units is a known fact.
Q. And did you have any branches of Gestapo attached to your army?
A. No, I didn't. I didn't have those either.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any questions to ask and you said no, I take it.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT : Go on, General.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yesterday I stopped with the question connected with the relations between the Fascist aggressors and the Rumanian aggressors. It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to make public the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has at its disposal. The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the law of the Soviet Union, and the record of the testimony is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites.
I present Exhibit USSR No. 153. I consider it necessary to make public most of the testimony, beginning with the second paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It is in the document book beginning on Page 63 and 64. I quote:
"Throughout the period when I hold power in Rumania, - Ion Antonescu army.
For this purpose I met Hitler several times.
"The first meeting with Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Rumanian Government.
This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler's official residence in the presence of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Hitler's "Discussions with Hitler lasted more than four hours.
"I assured Hitler that Rumania remained true to the previously concluded agreement regarding Rumania's adherence to the 'Tripartite pact'."In answer to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler declared that the German soldiers guaranteed Rumania's frontiers.
"At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration was not "Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Rumania should "To the question put to me as to whether my conversation with Hitler could "This fact Hitler had unquestionably in mind, when developing his plans "In January, 1941, I was invited to Germany through the medium of the time, in Berchtesgaden, when the following persons were present:
Bucharest - Kellinger. Besides these, there were also present representa "At the beginning of the conversations, Hitler, in introducing Kellinger "After this, Hitler in describing the military situation in the Balkans, "Having in mind that the passage of German troops through Rumania to the "Hitler, having reminded me that, at our first meeting in November 1940, "I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through Rumania "Hitler stressed, too, that the information at his disposal showed that the "Satisfied with this declaration by Hitler, I agreed to permit the passage "Colonel General Jodl who was present at this conference, described to me "My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.
"At this meeting, at which besides ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler's personal interpreter, Schmidt, we finally reached "Hitler informed me that he had decided on a military attack on the Soviet Union.
Having prepared this attack, Hitler said, we must carry it out unexpectedly along the whole length of the Soviet Union's frontiers from the Black Sea to the Baltic.
"The unexpectedness of the attack," Hitler went on to say, "would give Germany and Rumania a chance to liquidate, within a short time, one of our most dangerous adversaries.
"On the basis of his military plans, Hitler made a suggestion that I should permit the use, of Rumanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and should be the same time participate directly in carrying out the military attack on the Soviet Union.
"Hitler stressed the point that Rumania must not remain outside this war, because, to have Bessarabia and North Bucovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to fight on Germany's side. At the same time, he pointed out that, in return for our assistance in the war, Rumania would be able to occupy and administer other Soviet territories too, up to the liver Dnieper.
"As Hitler's offer to begin the war against the USSR jointly, corresponded to my aggressive intentions, I announced that I agreed, to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Rumanian troops and at the same time to increase the deliveries of the oil and agricultural products needed by the German armies.
"Before I and Hitler took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her participation in the war. Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to take part in the war against the USSR in alliance with Germany. When exactly the Germans had agreed on this with the Hungarians, Hitler did not tell me.
"On my return from Munich to Bucarest I began active preparations for the coming war."
Ion Antonescu finishes his testimony in the following way. I refer to page 67 in the document file. I am quoting the last paragraph of the testimony.
"After the invasion of Soviet territory, the Rumanian troops Signed--Marshal Antonescu."
testimony I present now under the number Exhibit 152. I shall not Ion Antonescu.
I shall refer only to several paragraphs. Please refer to page 1 of the Russian text and paragraphs 1, 2 and 5. This "In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by Prince Struza, "During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed the agreement for Rumania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and received Hitler's promise for the subsequent reconsideration of the "This voyage of Marshal Antonescu was the first step towards against the Soviet Union."
1. The decision to send to Rumania a Military Mission of the 2. By November of the same year, Rumanian war preparations
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken until 14.00.)
GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had intended to present to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen of the German Army. However, I do not intend to do that now as the Soviet Prosecution now wishes to examine this witness here and I would request you to allow me to call the witness for examination.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?
GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, it would be convenient, in view of several technical questions.
(The witness took the stand on behalf of the Russian Prosecution)
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
THE WITNESS: Erich Buschenhagen.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me. pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(Witness repeated oath in German) DIRECT EXAMINATION BY GENERAL ZORYA:
Q Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when you were born?
Q Will you name your last military rank, please?
A I was General in the Infantry of the German Army. My last position was that of Commanding General of the 52nd Army Corps. statement in connection with a protest?
Q Are you confirming that statement now?
by Fascist Germany for attacking Russia? General Staff of the German Forces in Norway. I was called into the OKH, where the Chief of Staff, Colonel General Halder had a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Army Groups and the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference we were told that there was a directive from the 8 December, 1940. At this conference, also, we received basic information for the intended operations against the Soviet Union. take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one speech, which the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, who was there also, made. He spoke at that time about the military actions in the war between Finland and the Soviet Union. He gave us an impression of the fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops. conference with Colonel General Halder, in which I did not take part, but I assume that they were concerned with possible cooperation between the Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There existed since the Fall of 1940 a military cooperation between Germany and Finland. The German Air Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for through traffic through Northern Norway to the Finnish points. This transit traffic, in conferences at Helsinki with the OKW, was extended. It increased to a general transit traffic of the German Wehrmacht from Northern Norway to the Finnish ports. that German transport units would be brought to Petsamo. Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this route and along the railroad which led from North Finland to ports at the Finnish south coast. discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway, together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.
the Finnish General Staff about the collaboration in attacking the Soviet Union? Staff about the cooperative attack against the Soviet Union? Government and how did the negotiations take place? superior of myself and my army. In February, 1941, I receive, after the basic facts had been cleared as to the participation from Norway based on Finland, I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss these operations with them, operations based on middle and northern Finland. following days, I had conferences with the Chief of Staff, General Heinrich, his representative, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of Operations of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area of Kuusamo and Rovaniemi; also from the area of Petsamo, Northern Finland. These conferences led to an agreement. Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to middle and northern Finland, to see the areas of Kuusamo, Rovaniemi and Petsamo; to study the possibilities for deployment and supply and for operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on the 28 of February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border, and in a short conference results were laid down about the planned operation from the area of Kuusamo and another operation from the area of Rovaniemi. The operations from Petsamo would have considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.
High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from these areas. That plan was presented to the OKW for approval. That is where I heard, through the High Command of Norway, the name of "Blaufuchs." Heinrich, who had been invited to the Fuehrer's headquarters at Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of that section, a discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg. Marshal Keitel, Jodl on the one side and on the other, General Heinrich and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic plans for cooperation between German and Finnish troops were laid down. Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economy and Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force about the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force and its material. Colonel General Halder, in which I did not participate. In my statement of the 26th of December I said that this conference took place at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of fact it took place on the 2nd of June. Tapola, the details of this collaboration were brought out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization and there it was pointed out that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the border patrols and military field exercises. Furthermore, it was agreed as to the deployment and organization of the German-Finnish forces; that the main Finnish forces should be under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south, together with the German Army Group "North", coming from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and further east.
Falkenhorst at the River Sulujoki. For this army of Colonel General von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo against the Murmansk Railroad; the middle group east of Kemijaervi through Salla on Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk. details discussed about exchange of information, about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air Forces about questions of air warfare and about the use of Finnish airports by the German Air Force. of these discussions. Then again, on the 12th or 13th of July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with Colonel General Erfurt, who was the German Liaison Officer. We met General Heinrich at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum, minutes of the points which we had agreed upon in previous conferences. He agreed to these points, except for a minor detail. Then I turned over my duties as Liaison Officer to Colonel General Erfurt, to resume my activities as Chief of General Staff of the Army in Lapland. character were these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff? In particular, was the question of defense taken into consideration? as its sole purpose the participation of the Finnish Army with the German troops on Finnish territory, participation in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. that all these measures had only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was, from the very beginning, no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union and all the agreements pointed in that same direction -- the agreements for readiness for attack. Nobody ever expected the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland at that time.
ten days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, there were certain measures taken as to security during the deployment of troops but the entire organization of the troops, the entire state of readiness of the troops was one of planning for offense and not defense. I believe you can see from that sufficiently the character of the preparations for attack.
GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the French prosecutors desire to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTION: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTION: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): the purpose of declaring them criminals. Members of this group, to state it shortly, are all the high commanders of the Wehrmacht. against the Soviet Union that an order came out according to which the captured Commissars had to be executed? spoken to General von Falkenhorst?
Q What opinion did General von Falkenhorst and yourself have? your army, this order was carried out?
Q For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because the commands and his chief were of the opinion that this order could not be carried out or should not be carried out or because it would not have been practical because, as it is known, the Soviet Commissars fought until the last and in case they were captured, their papers, which showed them as Commissars, had been destroyed before?
For what reason was this order, as you say, not carried out in your army? not in agreement with that order and we let it known to our troops. We found a lot of understanding amongst our commanding generals and second, for the reason that you have mentioned. As a matter of fact, as far as I can remember, there was no Commissar who was captured by us. order, had the same attitude as you did? to others? other armies that I had no opportunity to speak to any others.
Q Aren't you of the opinion that the greatest majority of high commanders had the same attitude concerning this order as you? the others.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?
General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?
GENERAL ZORYA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.
GENERAL ZORYA: I now have a document which I wish to present to the Tribunal under Number USSR 154, which sets forth in detail the preparations of Rumania for war. I ask you, respectfully, to accept this as evidence. You will find it on page 71 of the document book. I shall now read this document, which is of interest to us.
Pantazi testified:
"Rumania's preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in November 1940, when, in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Antonescu regarding Rumania's adherence to the "Tripartite Pact", there arrived in Bucharest the German military missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors, those for the army headed by Colonel-General Hansen, and those for the air force - by major General Speidel.
"With the arrival of the German military missions in Rumania, the chief of General Staff of the Rumanian Army, General Joanitiu issued an order to the army, on direction of Marshal Antonescu, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganising and retraining the Rumanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the German Army.
"At the same time, on Marshal Antonescu's orders, all reserve officers of the Rumanian army were called up for two month's retraining, and underwent instruction under German direction.
"During the period of the re-training of reserve officers, the General Staff of the Rumanian Army developed a plan for calling up into the army, of 12 age groups subject to mobilisation, in case of war, training of all those groups to be done in accordance with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army, and to be completed by the 1st July 1941. The personnel of the Supreme and Senior commands of the Rumanian armies underwent similar re-training in their respective branches of service.
"In this way, under the leadership of the Germans, at the beginning of Rumania's and Germany's war against the Soviet Union, the whole of the Rumanian Army and Air Force were reorganised and re-trained on the German pattern" the second paragraph, which you will find on page 72 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could omit these details of the preparations made in Rumania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on the Russian frontier.
GENERAL ZORYA: This question is of importance.
I refer to page 74 in the document book. This paragraph commences:
"In this connection, the following units which were already mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union, were in February 1941 directed to the frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia on Marshal Antonescu's orders: the 4th Alpine Rifle Division, the 7th, 8th and 21st Infantry Divisions; the Infantry Guards Division, the Cavalry Corps, and another infantry division, whose name I do not recall at present. Besides these, three German divisions selected from the 21 German divisions which were moving to Greece across Rumania, were sent to the USSR frontier ...
I am skipping several paragraphs. On page 73 of your book of documents there is a place marked in pencil:
"In accordance with instructions of Marshal Antonescu in May, 1941, the following were in addition sent to the frontier: the Frontier Division, the Third and First Alpine Rifle Divisions, the Thirteenth Division and an armored division. Simultaneously with these divisionsthe Germans transferred to the USSR frontier seven German infantry divisions. Thus, at the beginning of the Rumanian and German attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the Rumanian frontier with the USSR twelve Rumanian and ten German divisions, totalling 600,000 men. grounds for stating that on the directions from the staff of the Fascist conspirators, Rumania's preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union had begun long before they found their expression on paper in "Plan Barbarossa." gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On the 27 of July, 1941, Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing his gratitude to the latter and to his army. Antonescu, as Exhibit USSR-237. In it Hitler writes -- page one of the Russian translation of the letter, paragraph three, page 74 in your book of documents :
"Congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success -- for me as great a pleasure as it is a satisfaction. The return of Bessarabia will be the best reward for you and your armies."
February, 1942, between Atonescu and Ribbentrop. This conversation is Document USSR-233. I shall now refer to the third paragraph from the top which you will find on page 61 of the book of documents. The following entry will be found there:
"I reminded Herr Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him in Berlin, he raised his glass to a Great Rumania, to which I replied that we entered into an alliance with the Axis in order to create a Great Rumania".
What, then, was this "Great Rumania" to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop raised his glass? This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as USSR Exhibit No. 242. This document is one of Antonescu's letters to Hitler, dated the 17th of August, 1941. I request you to accept this document as evidence, and will read paragraphs two and four of the paper, page two of the Russian translation and in the book of documents, which is in your possession, the corresponding text is at page 68. I quote paragraph two:
"In compliance with the wish of your Excellency, I take upon myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the Rivers Dniester andDnieper, for maintaining order there, and for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delimit.
"In order to secure order and to direct the economic exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of war, I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be established.
"I therefore beg your Excellency to give precise instructions defining my rights and my responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding of whole territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for the maintenance of order there and for its security.
"I beg you, your Excellency, to accept my best assurances from your devoted General Antonescu." of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of "Transistrian" regions. governor, George Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army. Alexianu, giving details on his nomination, testifies, page two, paragraph two of the Russian text, page 79 in the book of documents, which is in your possession:
"Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he offered to annex to Rumania the Soviet territories captured by the German troops and extending from the Dniester to the Dnieper, and to establish there their own occupation authorities." Russian text of the testimonial, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was present at the Rumanian Ministers' Council, at which :
"Marshal Antonescu, referring to the German and Rumanian military successes, stated, 'It is now evident how well I acted when, as early as November, 1940, I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint aggression against the Soviet Union.' territories away, right and left, to his vassals, noticeably diminished in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.
In front of me lies Hitler's letter to Ion Antonescu, dated the 25th of October, 1943, which I respectfully beg the Tribunal to accept as an Exhibit under USSR-240. Something like two years and three months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Rumanian satrap on seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been tormented by the question of organizing a unified administration in Zadniestrovye.