The circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now wrote:
"My next request concerns the question of the utilization of Transistria, unhampered and unrestricted by any formal juridical or economic considerations, as the rear area for the Southern Army Group and for Army Group A. And further, I ask you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the whole network of Transistrian railways."
As a very poor consolation Hitler added:
"All these measures have as their aim in the long run, to preserve Transistria for Rumania". his faithfulness, could not endure. On the 15th of November, 1943, he wrote a long reply to Hitler. Without shame Antonescu wrote of how he accomplished the will of his master for the sake of his country.
I present Antonescu's letter to Hitler as Document USSR-239. His letter is dated Bucharest, 14th of November, 1943. I quote, beginning with the second paragraph of the letter, at the end of the sixth page of the Russian text. It is on page 82 of the book of documents:
"As to the regime in the Transdnestrie we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in minor details the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, etc.
"I would like to begin by explaining the cause of my anxiety. I do not know whether tire truth about the Rumanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told to you -- that this war has cost Rumania 300 billions of leis, that during this period we gave Germany more than 9 million tons of oil, thus threatening our national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves, that we are incurring heavy expenses to support the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle.
"Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transdnestrian territory,is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Rumania. Our only desire is that this take place in good order and be utilized in the most advantageous manner possible.
"As regards the transfer of the Transdniestrian railways into German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion, this transfer is not indispensable.
"Transdniestrian railways from 1941 to the present day worked well under the Rumanian administration. They always satisfied German demands and their management was always highly appreciated."
I request you to turn one page in the book of documents. I shall now read from page 90 in the book:
"If the traffic capacity of Transdniestrian railways could not still be increased pursuant to the established plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for that. Here, too, we kept our obligations." stated:
"I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the measures necessary in order to improve the railway transport and to increase the traffic capacity.
Inasmuch as I personally was in charge of the organization of the administration and economics of this district, it would have been a great vexation to me if the administration of the railways were to pass to the Germans, as one could justly say that our incapacity in this respect was the reason of the measure." the former harmony, which had as its source the seizure of land and riches of other nations, gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the greater financial responsibility for the losses suffered as the result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners. This is evidenced by the following document, which I intend to submit, and which was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu. I submit it under No. USSR-245. I want to take quite a fair amount from this document, but what I want to read is very important to enable one to realize the relationship of Fascist Germany with its satellites. This document is called, "General Hansen's Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on the 7th July 1943." in Rumania. I shall read excerpts from this document, underlined in red pencil, pages 92, 93, in the book of documents -
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be possible for you to summarize these documents with reference to Rumania? Because you have already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to Rumania's participation, General Antonescu's statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation --in Document USSR-294. What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the Rumanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the case at all.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: I shall put this document before you in a few phrases, and then I shall pass on to the next document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: The sense of this conversation with Marshal Antonescu is absolutely -- is like a trade that went on between two traitors. In the discussion the subject of money was brought in, and war material and human lives. Antonescu, who felt rather uncomfortable - as he had no kind of agreement with Germany - insisted that all the relations of monetary nature and other relations should be accompanied by agreements. He demanded from Germany either ammunitions of war or money and when General Hansen stated that "We have no lei," Antonescu said, "Give us the ammunitions of war." taken in pumping various resources from its satellites. in dealing with its satellites. I should like to take up the document which relates to Transylvania. managed to obtain subservience from their Hungarian and Rumanian vassals. formerely Colonel-General of the Hungarian Army. Foreign Ministry. Subsequently but prior to September, 1942, he commanded an army corps, following which he bacame Deputy War Minister of Hungary. to the Rumanian question. The part which I want to quote is at the end of page three and the beginning of page four of the Russian text, which corresponds to pages 102 and 103 in book of documents:
"The second Vienna arbitration has assumed the form of a decision of little profit to Hungary. For Rumania, there was reserved the district of Medvesh-Kasharmash, where natural gas could be obtained. In the Hungarian political circles this was interpreted as Hitler's desire to insure himself an alliance with Rumania in the war with Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Rumania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would most certainly need Rumania's southern wing which faces the Black Sea."
of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me on the subject the following:
"The second Vienna arbitration has aroused a bitter envy of Rumania in Hungary and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler." Tribunal, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:
"In November 1941 Hitler told me that by the Vienna arbitration, the last word had not been spoken, thereby giving me to understand that Rumania could still count upon a revision of the solution previously adopted as regards Transylvania." expressed an entirely opposite point of view. I will present to the Tribunal three documents concerning the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering under these circumstances. conversation between Antonescu and Hitler, which, took place on April 3, 1942. This is on page 1516 of the book of documents. I will quote some excerpts from this document, page threw of the Russian translation, page 113 in the book of documents.
"I (Antonescu) reminded him (Hitler) that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press (after Ribbentrop's visit to Budapest) that should they intervene (that is, should they send their troops) Transylvania would belong to Hungary. These rumors circulate, and they greatly demoralized the Rumanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor, that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, that this did not correspond to the actual facts."
(A recess was taken.)
which concerns the Transylvanian question, and the defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of conversation which took place between Antonescu and Von Doernberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry, and which took place on February 10, 1942, on the frontier. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. The origin of this document is the personal archives of Marshall Antonescu, which was received by a unit of the Red Army during their offensive. I do not think it is necessary to read this whole document. However, if required I shall limit myself to only several excerpts. Will you please open your document book on page 116, where there is a record of the conversation that took place on 10 February 1942. I quote:
"Von Doernberg introduced the subject of the order of "Charles I" which Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various German Official channels in our country, as well as through the Rumanian offices accredited to the German Government."
I skip to the next page, page 117 of the Document Book. I quote:
"I told Herr von Doernberg that I would not be able, to grant this award until Herr von Ribbentrop at the first opportunity would make a public declaration to Rumania (about the Transylvanian problem) which would bolster the faith of the Rumanian people, in its struggle for the cause of justice, and its legitimate claims in Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that this would be made public only after such a declaration had been made by him.
"Herr con Doernberg asked for time to consider the matter. Next day, before leaving the railroad car, he asked me to hand him this decoration, telling me that von Ribbentrop wanted it, and requesting me not to tellRibbentrop about our conversations he had promised to make the award public only upon the fulfilment of my conditions. Upon this condition, I gave him the decoration, without however, handing him the corresponding certificate."
And so Ribbentrop (interruption in procedure) was ready to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Rumanian Order. and Goering. If the Tribunal will refer to page 118 in the Document Book.
Unfortunately, of this document discovered together with other documents in Antonescu's personal archive, already mentioned by me, there is no date. We are submitting this document the same as it was. I am submitting it as USSR-238, and I am quoting only one excerpt. I quote: "During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshall Goering was very reticent to discuss the problem of Transylvania. On the way there in a car, he said to the Marshall", that is, to Antonescu, "After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania, which in itself essentially is more German than either Rumanian or Hungarian." Unquote. viewpoint of the Fascist Conspirators on the Transylvania problem with a sufficient degree of truthfulness. At present with a view to concluding the clarification of German's mutual relations with her vassal, Rumania, I should like to pause on the subject of crude oil. Now Rumania in this field was one of Germany's principal suppliers. That even during the war the Hitlerites had pumped crude oil out of Rumania by all possible means. Antonescu refers to this in one of the letters that have already been quoted. on what it meant to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves, as USSR Exhibit No. 224; and I submit here an urgent telegram from the defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonezcu, and receive by the latter on October 31, 1942. I shall not mention it in detail. That this document also was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu, the same as the next one. I make this telegram public in that I ask you to admit it as evidence. "Urgent telegram transmitted via the German Mission". On page 119 of the Document Book.
"To Marshall Antonescu.
their military operations in the Mediterranean. Due to the absence quantity of fuel to Italy.
It is for the exclusive use of the Devoted to you, Keitel, Fieldmarshal."
I want to submit to the Tribunal Antonescu's reply-wire to Keitel and I submit this document as Exhibit USSR 244-A. Please refer to page 120 of the Document Book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to quote this document here?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: I can summarize it in two sentences, the contents of that wire, to increase to the maximum the quantity of crude oil to Italy, which was Antonescu's reply in his wire addressed to Keitel; that the pledges of fuel or everything that was asked by Germany's order was given, and nothing else can be given to Germans but what was in question. If something can be accepted from the internal market, then perhaps in some way Rumania will be able to help German allies, and in general she asked General Keitel to accept his expression of loyalty and full respect in giving of any crude oil, and he signed, "Marshal Antonescu." were the months when Rommel's fate was being decided in North Africa, and, when the Red Army was barring the Germans way to the Grozny and the Baku oil on the frontiers of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans did not have sufficient crude oil. February 12, 1942, as a conversation between Antonescu and the defendant Ribbentrop, and has not as yet been quoted. The record of this conversation had been previously submitted to the Tribunal as USSR-233. I ask you to refer to the end of page 61 and page 62 of the Document File, which corresponds to page 4 of the Russian text, or document, with the following lines which are in this document, in reply to Ribbentrop's mention of the crude oil question, Antonescu stated:
"Regarding crude oil, Rumania contributed the maximum which it was in her power to contribute. She can do no more. The only way out of the situation will have to be the seizure of the territories rich in oil." One should note here that Antonescu was not original in his desires for the seizure of other people's territories rich in oil.
I am asking Your Honor to refer to page 129 of the Document Book. There is one document which is from the personal office of the defendant Rosenberg, which I quote, as formulating the German opinion on this subject. I submit this document to the Tribunal as USSR-58, and I ask for it to be submitted as evidence. In July 1941, the defendant Rosenberg in the following way formulated the German opinion this question, page 122 in the Document Book:
"Germany's interests consist in creating a stable position in the i.e. securing for themselves the link with the Near East.
It is future.
The aim of German Policy is to control the Caucasus, and the adjoining lands to the south, both politically and militarily."
Unquote 4 of the Russian Text document. The same idea is formulated there by defendant Rosenberg with extreme clarity: "The German Reich must take all petroleum in its hands." mutual relationship between Germany, the fascist conspirators, and their other satellites, inasmuch as the witness, Mr. Buschenhagen gave conclusive testimony on this question, and that the Tribunal probably already has certain ideas on this question, I just want to remain the Tribunal that in accord with Article 3 of the second variant of the Plan Barbarossa: "Finland will have to cover the advance of the German landing group 'North' (Units of the XXI group) which is due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. It will also be Finland's task to liquidate the (Russian) forces at Hango." Exhibit C-39, in regard to the Barbarossa time schedule, on the question of participation of Finland in the war is mentioned in section 2, where I have mentioned already it was stressed, as on page 57 of the document book, the preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since May 25th; and on page 57, at the beginning, I would like to call your attention, if you will permit, to the following paragraph out of the same documents:
"It is envisaged to transport from the Fatherland to Norway the 10th Finland 1 reinforced infantry division with army corps units.
Out SS combat 'North' are designated for the case 'Silver Fox'.the attach on Hangoe."
of negotiations with the Finnish General Staff; that is, on May 25, 1941, mentioned in the time table Barbarossa, is not the exact date to furnish. It is incorrect as the exact late far the purpose to confuse the true nature of this preparation for aggression, to present it under the guise of the preparation for so-called "Preventive War." Buschenhagen which was given to the Tribunal, I shall now present the original under USSR. No. 229, the deposition of the former Colonel of the German Army Kitchmann. I ask that the original be accepted as in evidence.
Kitchman held the office of military attache' in the German Embassy at Helsinki since October 1941. Here is what he testified to an the question, if interested, and you can find this clause on page 130 in the Document File Book It is a very short quotation:
"A long time before the 22nd June 1941, the German Government and the High Command of the German Armed Forces carried out secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General Staff of the Finnish Army and made join preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the following circumstances. On my arrival at Helsinki in October, 1941, as Deputy of the German military attache!."
I had numerous conversations with Major von Albedill who is aide to the German Military Attache and was formerly on duty in the Military Attache's Service in the General Staff of the German Army, and he acquainted me with the background on Finland, since Major-General Rossing the Military Attache was seriously ill and receiving treatment at the Miron resort in Tyrol.
"In the course of these conversations von Albedill told me that already in September 1940, Major-General Rossing, acting on an order of Hitler and the German General Staff, arranged a visit of Major-General Talwel, the Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Fuehrer's Headquarters in Berlin where he reached agreement with the German and the Finnish General Staffs concerning joint preparations for aggression and for war against the Soviet Union.
"In this connection, I remember that in November 1941 when I visited General Talwell at his headquarters in the neighborhood of Aunosa, he informed me that acting on Marshal Mannerheim's personal order, even as far back as September 1940, he established the first liaison with the German High Command on the subject of the joint preparation for the German and the Finnish attack on the Soviet Union." lating to the relationship between Germany and her satellite, Finland, Inasmuch as I repeat, Buschenhagen's testimony, this testimony of Buschenhagen before the Tribunal has been covered, so I do not have to cover it again.
Buschenhagen's statement disposes of all attempts to assort that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was dissociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Finland's entry into the war had been envisaged by the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers. to acquire entire regions and republics of the Soviet Union. Hitler spoke at the conference of 16 July 1941, of the Finnish claims to Eastern Carelia and the Leningrad region.
Rumania and Finland were the two German satellites directly and with full detail mentioned in the plan "Barbarossa". determined not only by the desire to utilize their war-potential, which without doubt bore its proper weight, but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union.
that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for aggression against the USSR was carefully concealed by the fascist conspirators, just as all the preparations in connection with case Barbarossa were. in plan Barbarossa. Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators. he testified this afternoon before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You aren't going to give us Paulus' affidavit over again, are you, because we have already had Paulus' evidence in full.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, his testimony was given by Colonel Pekrovski under USSR 182. That is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be presented to the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on page 143 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual evidence.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, but I really need one particular paragraph out of his testimony in order to show connection of the subsequent documents relative to Hungary in connection with the rest of my presentation. It is just a few lines.
THE PRESIDENT: It must surely be cumulative, is it not?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: What was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in my can words in two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus already said?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yes. Pardon me! They tell me now this has been already presented by Colonel Pokrovski and I will make a variation.
I shall not present it now, and I go on further. I have in mind those paragraphs of the affidavit of Paulus, where he mentioned that Hungary had aims for aggression towards helping Germany and, on the other hand, I want to draw your attention that Paulus said that Hitler, in disclosing his plans, was much more reticent about Hungary than his other satellites, because he considered Hungarians too talkative. Of course, Paulus adds that the essential reason for this was Hitler's desire not to give Hungary a chance to seize the oil lands of Drogobych. Later on, after the start of the military operations, the OKH gave orders to seize this oil district by Germany before the Hungarians could come in. Further, Paulus discloses the scope. That has already been presented by Colonel Pokrovski, so I want to refer to the fact that the testimony of Paulus gives the position and somewhere revealed the relations between Hungarian and German aggression. the deposition by Ruediger which has been presented to the Tribunal under Document USSR 294. Ruszkiciay-Ruediger testified on page 2, paragraph 3 of the Russian text. The deposition can be found on page 101 in the document book. I cite;
"....This had taken place....not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It seemed then as if economic advantages and the escape from the restrictions of the Trianon Treaty were for Hungary the objectives of the occupations.
"But from the time when the region of Carpatho-Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia...this region which we had occupied began to take on a different significance for us.
"It was clear to us, the higher officers, that the political leadership of both Germany and Hungary considered this region also stragegically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia." place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Warts, outlined the objectives for the war with Yugoslavia.
Among other objectives Warta blankly pointed to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a probable ally of the Soviet Union.
ship, which intended the preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major-General Stephen Ujszaszy. Intelligence Service of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years he had inside information on the secrecy which shrouded this preparation. ment which I offer in evidence as exhibit USSR-155. I ask you to accept this document as evidence.
I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's statement which may clarify the question at iss ue. I am beginning from page 2 of the Russian Text. This corresponds to page 149 of the document book. That is part 2, Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War Against Soviet Russia. Paragraph 1 of this statement, I quote:
"In November 1940, the German Military Attache in Budapest, Colonel Guenther KRAPPE of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Colonel-General Henry Wert. KRAPPE came with a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Colonel-General Halder.
"In that letter Holder informed Wert that in the spring of 1941, Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, by force if necessary, to adopt a definite position in order to forestall at a later date, the throat of a Russian attack from the rear.
"In this preventive war, possible against Yugoslavia, and certain against Russia, Hungary will have to take port in her own interests.
"Wert replied that he agreed with Halder but added that the Hungarian army was insufficiently armed and at that moment wasnot ready for war against Soviet Russia, Simultaneously, he asked Germany to supplement Hungary's armaments.
"Regarding Halder's letter and this answer I was informed by Colonel General Wert.
"After that, a Hungarian armament commission was invited to go to Berlin. It consisted of loading specialists, officers from the Ordnance Department of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Honved) and left for Berlin in December 1940.
The Hungarian requests were as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: General, couldn't you pass on to December, 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to conic to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yes, I am referring to this: Wilhelm KEITEL, invited the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Carl Barta, to come to Berlin in order
a) to discuss personally the problem of armament;
b) to elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of 1941. military attache in Berlin, Colonel Alexander Homlok of the General Staff, Chief of the Foreign Section of the "Abwehr" of the OKW. I omit Ujseascy's long list of the persons who accompanied Barth on his trip and read further 51 in the document book.
"... an agreement was reached on the following: clear, the threat of an attack by Soviet forces from the rear will be removed. For this purpose, the Hungarian Konved army will be supplied with field howitzers, modern tanks and armoured cars for equipping one mechanized brigade.
Far the war against Russia, Hungary must put at Germany's disposal 15 strategic units including 3 mechanized, one cavalry and one tank units; she must also complete by 1 June, 1941 the erection of fortification in CarpathoRussia, assist the advance of the German Troops in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers end secure the bringing up of supplies through Hungary. The details for the preparation of operations will be worked out later by representatives of the German General Staff to be sent to Hungary. will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Russia, the ancient princedom of Galitz, and the foothills of the Carpathian mountains as far as the river Dniestr. visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements for the attack on Yugoslavia.
This is what Ujszaszy has to say in this connection. Page 5 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the bottom. Page 152 in the document book.
"Colonel Kintzel arrived in Budapest in March 1941, bringing with him a letter from Colonel-General Halder to Colonel General Wert. In this letter there was an insistent demanded by Germany that Hungary was to participate in the probable war against Yugoslavia by the mobilization of the following army corps, First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Army Corps; and in the war against Soviet Russia by the mobilizing of fifteen strategic units, including two cavalry divisions, two mechanized brigades, and one infantry brigade.
"The letter also announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of the German General Staff mission, headed by Lieutenant-General Paulus, which was to discuss the combined operations and the movement of German troops to Yugoslavia through Hungary.
"Replying to this letter, Colonel-General Wert invited the German mission to Budapest, promised consent to the participation of Hungary in the war against Yugoslavia, and to produce, for this purpose, three Army Corps; that is, the First, Fourth, and Fifth.
"Concerning war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in principle, promising at least to mobilize the Sight Army Corps, Kopitze, as well as the mechanized operational units demanded by Halder.
"Regarding this correspondence, I was informed personally by the Colonel of the German General Staff, Kinzel."
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I can't see that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to put one army corps or two army corps or three army corps against the Russians. It is absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany's disposal, for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units? It doesn't add anything in the least to what you have already given us, and it seems to me that you could go on to the next document, which is USSR 150. Everyghing up to there is simply the negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.
GENERAL ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the evidence could be limited so far as the discussion is concerned. But the document which I am reading into the record now, document 155--there is certain information contained in this document, and this information pertains not only to the number of mechanical units which Hungary pledged to give Germany in case of war with Russia, but there is also some indication as to what methods, in the preparationfor war, were bring used by the fascist clique in Hungary when they were conspiring with Hitler's conspirators.
I thought it was necessary to pause on those methods, and that is the reason why I would like to have permission to quote certain passages out of this document.
mention of how much the Soviet Union was supposedly against Hungary. 8 of the Russian text, where Major-General Ujzaszi says:
"Major-General Laszlo, as the chief of the operational group and my immediate superior, ordered the second section of the General Staff to prepare a report that would confirm the presence and maintain, on the Hungarian border, that there are concentrated fourteen Soviet operational units, including eight motorized. This report was prepared by Colonel Cornell Ridai of the personnel Unit.
"I want to note the fact that the intelligence operations of the second section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff established the presence on the Hungarian border of actually only four Soviet operational units. This circumstance I duly and factually reported to Colonel-General Wert and Major-General Laszlo, but the latter ordered my truthful and factual report to be altered to get what he desired." clique in Hungary, the fulfillment of which involved the creation of an incident for an attack on the Soviet Union. page 157 in the Document Book:
"These plans emanated from Lieutenant-General Fuetterer and his assistant Lieutenant-General Frimond, and Major-General Laszlo. They proposed that, if necessary, the German aircraft, camouflaged as Russian aircraft, should bomb the eastern border districts of Hungary with bombs of Russian origin." the Soviet Union. That is page 11 of the document, page 158 in the Document Book. I am quoting from the middle of page 61 -- that is for the interpreters.
"On 24 June 1941, as far as I remember at 12:30 noon, I was informed that the Soviet planes were bombing Raho in Carpathian Russia, and they were strafing, with machine-guns, trains in its vicinity.
That same day, after midday, the news came in that Soviet aircraft were bombing Koschitze. The Crown Council, the Regent presiding, met the same evening, and, 'on the basis of Soviet Russia's provocation', decided to declare war on that country.
"I am convinced that those were German planes with Russian markings and insignia. My conclusions are based on the following:
"Lieutenant-General Fuetterer and the German propaganda publicized this bombing too widely and too much.
"Major-General Laszlo immediately gave me orders, through Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to get photographs of the found fragments of the 'Soviet bombs' and to publish those photographs in the press of the fascist countries.
"Lieutenant-General Fuetterer, Major-General Laszlo, and LieutenantColonel Arimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that Slovakian pilots who were in the Russian Service bombed Kosice, and successful hits must be explained by the fact that these pilots know the terrain well."
That is as it was entioned on the 24th of June, 1941, at 12:30 p.m. participation of Hungary against Soviet Union was decided. This is a document presented to the Tribunal, which is the deposition of Ruskiscai Ruediger, giving the reasons for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that Tuediger's viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still, as the testimony of the Vice Minister of War, naturally this statement is of great value. approximately at the end of Kay 1941, he received an order to supply, first of all, the troops which were located and concentrated in the Carpathian Ukraine; and two days afterwards a secret meeting took place, a meeting of the Army Corps Commanders, at the headquartersof Colonel-General Wert, Chief of the General Staff, The commanders were informed then about the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union.