the test is the knowledge or assumed knowledge, that a very large segment did not and probably could not have had knowledge that would be relevant not only for the purposes of evidence but for the purposes of definition?
MR. NUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think you have at least two ideas in the question of what must be dealt with separately. The first is conscription and knowledge, to my way of thinking, presents a very different problem. to condition its judgment not to apply to conscripted members of any organization, I shall have no quarrel with it. I have always conceded, we didn't seek to reach conscripted men -- if the overwhelming power of the State puts them in that position, I don't think we should pursue them for it. was conscripted, that raises a question of fact.
MR. BIDDLE: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it raises a question of fact that we would be three weeks trying, and that is what I want to avoid, because there were Waffen SS's and other Waffen SS's, and there were different periods of time, and there were different conditions; and we get into a great deal of difficulty if we undertake to apply the principle that the conscript is not to be punished; and that, it seems to me, is what is properly left to the future course, the question as to whether an individual or a number of individuals come within that principle; in other words, I think this Court should lay down principles and not undertake what I call "police court administration" of those principles as applied to individuals.
MR. BIDDLE: May I interrupt you for a moment on the first point? I take it, then, that you would think it appropriate to express a general limitation with respect to conscription in the declaration but not to designate to whom that applies?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would have no objection to such a designation as far as I am concerned. Now, the other question is a question of knowledge this is infinitely more difficult. We don't want to set up a trap for innocent people. We are not so hard up for somebody to try so that we have to seek and to catch people who had no criminal purpose in their hearts; but there can be no doubt that every person affiliated with this movement at any point knew that it was aimed at war and aggressive war. There can be no doubt that they knew that these formations under the Nazi Party were maintaining concentration camps to beat down the political opposition and to imprison Jews, and the terrible things that were going on in these camps.
To ask us to prove individual knowledge or to ask us to accept the man's own statement of his state of mind is to say that there can be no conviction, of course. It seems to me that the scale of this crime and the universality of it, going on all over Germany, concentration camps dotting the landscape and the vast population, is sufficient to charge with knowledge that the principal organizations of the Nazi Party were responsible for those things. The test that I think which applies as to knowledge is not what some member now on the witness stand may say, that he knew or didn't know, but what in the light of the conditions of the times ought to have known what he is chargeable with.
MR. BIDDLE: Wouldn't it follow from that, that there was no taking of any evidence on what was generally known?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think the proof of what was going on establishes the point as to chargeability with knowledge.
MR. BIDDLE: Do you claim that the defendants should not be permitted to give any evidence as to what was generally known with respect to what was going on?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To what was generally known, I don't think the defendant's denial that he knew what was going on has any materiality.
MR. BIDDLE: That wans't my question. My question was, whether a witness could be permitted to testify that the acts of the particular organizations were not generally known to its members. Would you exclude that evidence?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I would, I would, I certainly would, and if I heard it I wouldn't believe it; but perhaps my -
MR. BIDDLE: Excuse me. Although on your test of knowledge, you wouldn' permit the defendants to neat that test?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should say that that is just exactly the situation, that the Court would take judicial notice from the evidence that is in, that this was a thing that must have been known in Germany, and I would not think that it would be permissible for a citizen of the United States to testify that he didn't know the United States was at war, a fact of which he is chargeable with knowledge, and it seems to me that the magnitude of these things is so established and the repeated daily connection between the organizations of this criminal program is so clear.
THE PRESIDENT : The German translation doesn't seem to be coming through.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sorry.
MR. BIDDLE: Did you finish? Mr. Jackson, I only have two or three more questions. One is directed to the General Staff. Does the particular date when an individual accused -- I beg your pardon -- when an individual assumed one of the commands, listed in Appendix B of the Indictment, have any bearing on whether he is a member of the organization? Now, I am going to bring that question down to the General Staff.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Perhaps I would warn you of this. I am not a military man. I have not specialized on that subject and I shall want to refer your question to someone whose knowledge is more reliable than mine.
MR. BIDDLE: I shall ask the question directed to you as a lawyer and not an expert in military matters. Assume that one of these individuals became an army group commander after the wars of aggression had been planned, proposed, initiated, roughly, that would be after 1942, let us say, after Pearl Harbor, and had reached the stage when German was on the defensive, is his acceptance of a command at that date sufficient to make him a member of the organization?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should think it would.
MR. BIDDLE: The reason I asked you that, Mr. Jackson, is that I thought you had rather indicated in your opening address that the starting of the war was the essence of the crime rather than the waging of war, and I was wondering whether in that case there would be any difference which we should consider?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think when one joins, he ratifies what has gone before and it would seem to me that when he came into the picture at that point, it was a ratification of all that had gone before on the ordinary principles of conspiracy. any prior connection with the Nazi Party. If you take the example of a man who disapproved all that the Nazi Party had done, who never became a member of it, who stood out against it, and publicly his position was clear, and he took no part in the way until the day his country was being invaded and he said "I don't care what happened before; my country is being invaded and I shall now go to its defense", I would have difficulty convicting that man. I don't know such a man.
MR. BIDDLE: Mr. Jackson, there is only one more question I should like to address to Law No. 10. I am a little puzzled myself' on Law No. 10, the Control Council Law of December 20. I think that was the date. You spoke of one reason for declaring the organizations criminal, and bringing persons into the Control Council for screening, I take it, they can do that easily without any help on our part.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right.
MR. BIDDLE: Now, you said something very interesting. You said the Act would not have been so if you would have drafted it. How would you have drafted it, if that is not a proper question?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think I would not have made these penalties of this Act apply to all of the crimes. You have one lumping of a whole list of crimes which, to my mind, range from the very serious to the very minor.
Then you have applicable to all of these penalties from death down to deprivation of the right to vote in the next election.
MR. BIDDLE: And you would not have made the death penalty to the members of the SA who resigned in 1922?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I would not have, and I think in that way I would have been more exclusive.
to try to make the penalty or the punishment fit the crime, rather than leave it wide open.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Mr. Jackson, what defenses do you think are permitted under the Control Counsel Law? We have to assume that the members of the Tribunal will permit certain defenses of any defense expressly permitted.
JUSTICE JACKSON: No, no defenses expressly permitted. I take it any defense which goes to the genuineness of the membership is at the volition of the individual; duress, fraud - and by duress I mean the legal definition of duress - I don't think that the fact that he has had good business, and the fact that man is to contend that the customers may leave him if he does not join the party, that is not duress, or anything that goes to the genuineness of his membership.
MR. BIDDLE: One more question. If the Tribunal were of the view that a declaration of criminality of the organization is an essential legislative matter, as suggested by some of the defense lawyers, rather than a judicial one; if we were of that view would it be appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the legislative authority of the Control Counsel to make such a declaration, which undoubtedly they could do in exercising that discretion, which is conferred on us under Article 9 of the Charter?
JUSTICE JACKSON: I would not think so, Your Honor. I think that this Tribunal was constituted by the power to determine, and for the purposes of determining on the record such facts after hearing of the evidence, and, after knowing the facts, determining what organizations were of such a character that the members ought to be put to trial for such membership. not constituted as this might be, either administratively or some other way, to reach that same result, I don't think this is proper consideration. Of course, you could punish these members without anything, we have them in our power and in our camps. But the Governments have decided they want themselves to decide any issues after a full consideration of the record, and, in this matter I think that -
MR. BIDDLE: But you have no doubt of the power of the Control Counsel to do it, irrespective of what they do to you.
JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't know of any limitations on the power of the Control Counsel. There is no constitution. It is a case of the victor and the vanquished, and I think that is one reason why, however, we should be very careful to observe the request of our nation to proceed in this way. We are in the position where there is no restraint in the power except from physical power, and mighty little of that today. They are voluntarily submitted to this process of trial and hearing, and it seems to me that nothing should be done by us as members of the legal profession to discredit that process, or to avoid it.
MR. BIDDLE: That is all the questions I have to ask.
THE TRIBUNAL (M. de VaBres): I would like to ask Mr. Jackson a few details on the consequences of a declaration of criminality of an organization. Suppose that you belonged to one of the organizations classified as criminal, for instance, a SS, or a member of the Gestapo, is brought before the jurisdiction - the military jurisdiction of an occupying authority. In consequence of what has been said so far, he might be able to justify himself by proving that his membership in the group was a false membership. He was not a volunteer; if I understood correctly, he would also be able to justify himself by establishing that he never know of the criminal capacitie* of the association. That fact is, at least, the interpretation which has been consecrated by our ministry, and which we consider exact; however better to suppose that the Court just being considered at the moment is a different nation. I suppose that it designates from the condemnation that the individual himself was a member of the criminal organization, or, which is new a bigotry organization, and that an automatic condemnation definitely does less, is that the interpretation which has been defined by Mr. Jackson This interpretation is written in no text, and does not find itself in the statute. In consequence of which by virtue of what text would the Tribunal, itself being considered, be obliged to conform to the interpretation?
JUSTICE JACKSON: The control of the future Tribunal is the control of the effect of the declaration on this Tribunal.
This Tribunal's effect when brought before a subsequent tribunal is defined by the Charter, and this is only the effect that the issue has as to whether the organization as is criminal cannot be retried. That there would be no such thing as automatic condemnation, because the authority given in the Charter is to bring a person to trial for a membership. It would, of course, be incumbent on the prosecutio on an ordinary principle of jurisprudence to prove membership. I think proof that one had joined would be sufficient to discharge that burden, but then the question might be raised by the defense that he had defenses, such as duress, force against his person. Such threats of force would be raisable, and would have to be tried, but the Charter does authorize any use of the declaration by this Tribunal except as a basis for bringing, the members to trial.
M. de Vabres: I understand well this authority of the Military Court of the International Tribunal which would be imposed in the particular jurisdiction of the States, and oblige them to consecrate the interpretation it would have to consider. But in that case in concluding with your thought, Mr. Jackson, the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, the judgment which we will deliver, will have to contain some precise definition on this topic. Mr. Jackson said, however, a few moments ago, and I am in agreement with Mr. Biddle, that the statute permits us to define a criminal organization. That would be in our opinion not only a determination of the group which We consider criminal, but also a definition of a criminal organization, and from that in some manner there would be a precise definition concerning the cases of responsibility of false membership, and precise definition which the particular court of the States would be forced to respect. Do I understand Mr. Jackson's thought correctly.
In that case the question which I ask is the following: and is similar to that of Mr. Biddle: It is not always granted to consider our judgment a certain legislative character, we are not an ordinary court since we are consecrated to give a decision, such as a decision of a criminal organization, which generally includes this law, and at the same to use a decision which contains a disposition that limits the cases for individual responsibility.
That is to say in brief we are to a certain extent legislative as indeed we so heard from you yesterday.
JUSTICE JACKSON: This is something in the nature of legislative, but under the nature of the Indictment you may treat either analogy, and I don't see anything about that, if I understand it, which is a complicated problem. In the United States we have a strict separation of legislative from the judicial power, and nothing in that power which controls this Tribunal, and whether you treat the analogy, as to the Indictment, which you be accusing by your finding in your declaration, or, whether you treat the analogy as legislative, it would be in all sense of the word as an act of the four powers, since they are not required to withhold any power from the Tribunal.
M. de Vabres: Yes, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (M. DeVabres): Yes. The question which I have just asked seems to have only theoretical interest. This is, however, the practical consequence which I would be tempted to consider, and on which I would like to hear your opinion: incrimination and admit causes of responsibility or excuses, does this absolutely exclude our limiting at the same time the punishment. Earlier, Mr. Biddle and Mr. Jackson were considering Article 10, and Mr. Jackson expressed some criticism concerning the sanctions, which are not individual sanctions, since they can extend as far as the death penalty. against humanity. But isn't it too much, if we consider the manner of a crime, which in France would be considered purely material, such as the crime of belonging to a criminal organization--would it not be too much for us to foresee the death penalty, and in that case the International Military Tribunal might be forced to reduce to some extent the notion of a criminal organization, merely because we consider the possibility of this penalty being too severe? Does this include our being able to formulate a penalty, or at least a maximum penalty, which might be applied for the crime of belonging to a criminal organization?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should not think that it was within the proper sphere of the Tribunal to deal with the question of penalties, for the reason that no power to sentence anyone is given to this Tribunal other than the Defendants on trial; I mean, no power to sentence for membership in the organizations. Therefore, I think no incidental power to control penalties is given, but the power to declare an organization criminal does, incidentally confer power to determine what that organization is, and I have not been disposed to question the power of the Tribunal to carry that definition to great detail, although I would question the wisdom of it.
conferred upon the Tribunal, and I would think that that would be a rather drastic expansion of its powers.
THE TRIBUNAL (M. DeVabres): I would like to thank Mr. Jackson for his answers to my questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
(Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe approached the lectern).
THE PRESIDENT: Did you want to add a reply or did you come in order that we might ask you some questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL*FYFE: First, if the Tribunal will allow me, there are three or four points on which I should like to add a word.
The first point that Dr. Kubuschok made was that the procedure of asking for a declaration against the Organizations was objectionable for two reasons: 1, because if was founded on the limited phenomenon in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that a corporation may be convicted in certain limited spheres; and secondly, that the Organizations were in fact dissolved some time ago. which underlies this portion of the Charter, It is really based, in my submission, on a doctrine found in most systems of law, either res adjudicata or the concept of the judgment in rem as opposed to the judgment in personam. That is, that it is in the general and public interest that litigation on a particular point should not be interminable, and that if the apporpriate Tribunal has come to a decision on a point of general interest and importance, that point should not htereafter be litigated many times. had the advantage of evidence dealing with the whole period and functioning of the Nazi conspiracy, is the appropriate and indeed the only suitable tribunal for deciding the question of criminality. It is a prospect which would be quite impracticable and beggars the imagination as to time, to consider that every military government or military court should decide one after the other the question of criminality of great organizations like these. And therefore we have in the Charter adopted the procedure that that preliminary question will be decided once and for all by this Tribunal. irrelevant. what is important is, what was the nature of the Organizations when they did function? And that is the issue which the Tribunal has to determine. we submit that it is a clear implication, if not indeed expressly within the wrods of Article Nine, that it must be at the brow of the individual defendants that the question of this criminality should be decided, and we say that apart from considerations of practicality that the wording of Article Nine is a clear guide against separation of these issues as suggested by two or three of the Defense Counsel.
No. 10. Dr. Kubuschok made the point that this procedure really acted entirely against the individual. There are at least two answers. The first I have endeavored to give as to the legal concept behind the idea of a declaration; second, the one which has been canvassed before the Tribunal, as to the rights of Defense. May I say that, in my submission, membership in a organization is a question of fact and therefore these decenses of duress, fraud or mistake -to take three examples -- must clearly be permissible and good defenses on that question of fact. The third is that every document such as the Charter -- the same would apply to every piece of legislation -- contemplates intelligent and reasonable administration in carrying out its requirements, and it would be, in my submission, idle to take the view that where you have a permissive enactment like Law No. 10 -- and it is clearly permissive as to prosecution -- that intelligent administration should prosecute every one who could be prosecuted under the Act. in my submission -- to decide or interpret on an extremely unlikely hard case. estingly put forward by Dr. Servatius and mentioned a few moments ago by the learned French Judge. soever. There is a clearly judicial function, and I want to make it clear: I do not qualify it by "quasi-judicial" or any qualification at all. It is a simple judicial duty. The first portion of that duty is to define what is criminal. In my submission, as Jr. Justice Jacson argued yesterday, that presents no difficulties. It occurs in Article Nine, three articles after Article Six, and "criminal" in that context means an organization whose aims, objects, methods or activities involved the committing of the crimes set out in Article Six.
evidence to decide whether there is evidence of these crimes committed by the organization or being the aim or object of the organization as I have stated. But I respectfully ask the Tribunal to hesitate long before it accepts the argument of Dr. Servatius that this Tribunal should decide the interpretation of criminal on its own a priori basis, to use Dr. Servatius' own words, of politics and ethics. That would be introducing a new, dangerous, and unchartered factor into the trial. There is, in my submission, a clear line of guidance for the judicial approach, and nothing in the Charter to support the prima facie unexpected idea that it should delegate to itself legislative powers. Dr. Kubuschok drew on the question of criminality as a ground for deciding the relevance of evidence, his first conclusion was that the organization in question, according to its constitution or charter, did or did not have a criminal aim or purpose. the limitation to charter or constitution. The criminal aim or purpose may be shown by the declarations or publications of the leaders of the organization, and also, as I submitted, by the course of conduct in method and action. I agree with Dr. Kubuschok that aim or purpose is the first test, but I do not agree with his limitation as to gathering it. within or in connection with the organization or were not committed continuously over a period. The first part of that would seem fairly clear, that if the crimes were not committed within or in connection with the organization, the organization is obviously not in a very favorable position. But I first answer the second part by saying that it does not come into the picture of this case that there is any instance of isolated crimes with regard to every organization. The crimes alleged are, in fact, spread over the period alleged in the indictment, but I suggest that the adoption of such a criterion does not really help. One comes back to the first point of Dr. Kubuschok, that aims or purposes as disclosed by declarations, methods, or activities, is the primary and most important test.
The, the third point that Dr. Kubuschok makes is that an appreciable number of members had no knowledge of the criminal aims or of the continuous commission of crimes.
I endeavored to stress, as did Mr. Justiced Jackson, that the Prosecution's test is constructive knowledge. That is: Ought a reasonable person in the position of a member to have known of these crimes? And that really is the answer, in my respectful submission, to the relevance of individual knowledge of one particular member. large number of people bade a habit of sticking their heads in the sand and endeavoring to abstain from acquiring knowledge of things that were unpleasant. In my respectful submission, that sort of conduct on the part of a member wouldn't help him at all, and the only answer to that is to adopt the test which we have suggested: Ought a person in that position reasonably to have known of the commission of the crimes?
Dr. Kubuschok's fourth point is that an appreciable number of members or certain independent groups joined the organization under compulsion or illusion or superior orders. Shortly we answer that by saying that that is only relevant to the defense of an individual member in the subsequent proceedings, and, of course, it is only a defense where he can show that he has taken no personal part in the criminal acts. Then, the last point which Dr. Kubuschok made was that an appreciable number of members were honorary members. Again we say that that is only relevant to the defense of the individual member, and it does not really alter or increase the defenses open to him.
The only ether point of Dr. Kubuschok's which I do think requires mention is that in considering how evidence could be presented, he said that certain rights of defense ore universal. The first of these which he claimed was. direct oral testimony, and he said that each individual defendant should have this right. He then admitted that that was practically impossible and suggested as a solution that we must typify, that is, that representatives of groups in the various camps should make affidavits showing what percentage took part in criminal actions or knew about them.
the Charter that members of the organization are entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard, but the Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application.
As a point of construction no less than of sense, there would have been no point in giving the Tribunal the power to reject the application if it were illicit that everyone should have the right to be heard. what line and what course shall be taken to procure the evidence. The Prosecution, through Mr. Justice Jackson, has indicated that it makes no objection to any reasonable form of collecting relevant evidence. What the Prosecution objects to is evidence being tendered on the issue before the Tribunal which is only relevant to the question of individual innocence or guilt of the member. number of points raised by the other counsel for the defense. I hope they won't think that it is any disrespect to their arguments that I have not dealt with them, but I know that the Tribunal wishes to ask certain questions, and I don't want to trespass in that time. I only want to deal with one point because it kills two birds with one stone that have been flown against our argument in this case.
It will be remembered that when I dealt with the SA yesterday, Dr. Seidl -and I am sorry he is not here -- raised the question that the defendant Frank was not a member of the SA; and Dr. Leoffler, in dealing with the SA today, raised the question that its activities no doubt did not really extend after 1939, and not importantly after the purge in 1934. Archiv, for April 1942, and as it is very short and deals with these point I venture to read it to the Tribunal so that it may appear on the record. At page 54 it says:
"SA Unit, General Government.
"At the order of the Chief of Staff of the SA, there took place the foundation of the SA Unit, General Government, whose command General Governor SA Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Frank took over." dence shows, that with regard to the SA, no less than any other of the organizations, the prosecution have provided evidence of crimes reaching over the period which they have stated. because I don't want to shorten unduly the time, if the Tribunal wishes to ask me any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I think there is only one question that I should like to ask you. As I understand it, you say that the prosecution have proved facts from which one must conclude that every reasonable person who joined any of these organizations would know that they were criminal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You would agree, would you not, that proof of any fact which went to contradict the facts from which you have presumed knowledge of criminality could be proved by the defense?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. If the defense wought to prove, to take an extreme example, that the conduct of the SS with regard to, first of all, concentration camps, and secondly, killing Jews and political commissars on the Russian front, despite the vast territory over which these crimes have been proved to have been carried on, was done in such a way that nobody know about it -- if there was relevant evidence on that point, then they could call it, on the general point that it wasn't a matter of imparted constructive knowledge, but of memory.
THE PRESIDENT: I only asked you that question because there were certain observations of Mr. Justice Jackson which did not seem altogether to accord with the answer which you have just given.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that as I understood MR. Justice Jackson, he was saying that it might not be relevant to prove that one member did not know of the crimes, and I thought that our two approaches really did fit in with each other.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): I take it then, Sir David, that you would say that evidence with respect to general knowledge by any very substantial segment of an organization would be relevant, would it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it would be relevant if it were not absurd. I mean, a dis claimer of knowledge of certain acts may be so absurd that the Tribunal should not take the time of inquiring into it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): But my point was this. You have said that evidence with respect to general knowledge over a whole organization would clearly be relevant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): And now I ask you whether that would not be true with respect to any substantial segment of an organization such as the Waffen SS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE: I am trying to relate it to the practical position. That is where I find it very difficult.
Now to take your example, it is difficult to imagine -- let's take four divisions that were very well known: The Totenkopf, the Polizei, Das Reich, or the 12th Panzer Division. I should have thought that, as a matter of discretion, if it were sought to show that these divisions, about which there is so much evidence as to their participation in crime, did not know of the crimes, the Tribunal would be right in rejecting that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): Well, the question would come up more whether the acts of the members of certain divisions were know generally throughout the whole Waffen SS, would it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: with the greatest respect, I find it very difficult to see how the knowledge or absence of knowledge of a particular division in the Waffen SS could affect the question of criminality of the SS as a whole.
THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): Well again, I am not asking you as to knowledge in a particular division; I am asking you as to general knowledge, throughout the entire Waffen SS, of the acts of a particular unit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if some one is prepared to say, "I knew every division of the Waffen SS, and in my opinion no one in the Waffen SS had any knowledge or had any opportunity of knowing of the crimes", then the evidence would be admissible. Its weight would be so negligible that I should submit it would not detain the Tribunal long. for his evidence, to say "I can speak; I Seidl-- and I am sorry he is not here--raised the question that the defendant Frank was not a member of the SA; and Dr. Loeffler, in dealing with the SA today, raised the question that its activities no doubt did not really extend after 1939, and not importantly after the purge in 1934.
Das Archiv, for April 1942, and as it is very short and deals with these points I venture to read it to the tribunal so that it may appear on the record. At page 54 it says:
"SA Unit, General Government.
"At the order of the Chief of Staff of the SA, there took place the foundation of the SA Unit, General Government, whose command General Governor SA, Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Frank took over." evidence shows, that with regard to the SA, no less than any other of the organizations, the prosecution have provided evidence of crimes reaching over the Period which they have stated. because I don't want to shorten unduly the time, if the Tribunal wishes to ask me any questions.