These facts seemed to the world to be convincing proof that Hitler had no "revisionist" aims which would threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious to put an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his professions were, as embodied in the Treaty and as contained in these declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal of the Drang nach Osten, as it had been called, and was thereby going to contribute to the peace and stability of Europe. That was what the people were led to think. We shall have occasion enough to see how little truth these pacific professions in fact contained. clearly that the Germans used this Treaty, as they used other Treaties, merely as an instrument of policy for furthering their aggressive aims. It is clear from the documents which will be presented to the Tribunal that these five years fall into two distinct phases in the realisation of the aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. There was first the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of 1937. That was the preparatory period. During that time there occurred the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the reoccupation and remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and all these other necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal. into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant Goering and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the non-agression *act. In 1935 Goering was saying that "the pact was not planned for a period of ten years but for ever; there need not be the slightest fear that it would not be continued." Even though Germany was steadily building up the greatest **r machine that Europe had ever known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was so strong and so secure that in spite of the Treaty breaches which it involved Hitler could openly refer to his strong army, he took pains, at the same time, to say--and again I quote--that "by a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere.
I merely recall the agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides."
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home, "guns before butter." from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two documents in particular which mark that change.
The first of these was called "Directive for unified preparation for War", issued in June 1937--June 29, 1937--by the Reich Minister for war, who, was then von Blomberg, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. That document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.
"The general political position," von Blomberg stated--I am quoting from the document--"justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of States, and of Russia in particular."
It is true, he added: "The intention of unleashing a European war is held just as little by Germany." And it may be that that phrase was carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a general European conflict.
But von Blomberg went on: "The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any time"--yet he had just said that there was no fear of any attack--"and (b)"--and I invite the Tribunal again to notice this phrase--"to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur."
war. It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an instrument of policy--the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the Pact with Poland, and by innumerable other Treaties. a possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1930. It is evidence at least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had in mind to use the military strength which they were building up for aggressive purposes. "No reason", they say, "to anticipate attack from any side...there is a lack of desire for war." Yet they prepare to "exploit militarily favorable opportunities." aggression Commander in Chief of the Army, C**ri**, Commander in Chief dence.
I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages ive war.
You will remember that the burden of Hitler's territory in Europe.
Austria and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged.
But Hitler realized that the precess He was prepared to take the risk.
You remember the passage:
"The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire by breaking resistance and takeing risks.
Even setbacks are unavoidable:
neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner.
The attacker always comes up against the proprietor.
The question for Germany is where the great value in Hitler's eyes was that of keeping Poland quiet until That view is confirmed by the events which followed.
At the OKW.
Its first fruits were the bullying of Schuschnigg absorption of Austria in march.
Thereafter, the Green Plan my American colleagues have already dealt.
But it is obvious against Poland.
And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising against Czechoslovakia herself -- you remember, "I give you my word of honour," the Defendant Goering said.
Just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps surprising that continued assurances should have been given during 1938 to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the Nazi aggression on Poland's neighbors. Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact, permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag -- and I quote: ". . . and so a way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere friendly co-operation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task ahead of us - Peace." Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September, 1938. He then said: "The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy, but a man: and with him I succeeded, in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other.
A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding then had to be found, and it will be further extended.
Certainly things were hard in this area. But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples within the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva." newed flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia The realities behind these outward expressions of goodwill are clearly revealed in the documents relating to the Fall Gruen, which are already before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was a risk of Poland, England, and France being involved in war to prevent the German annexation of Czechoslovakia, and that this risk, although it was realized, was also accepted. On the 25 August of 1938 top secret orders to the German Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the event of an "unprovoked" attack, it would take a day or two for France and England, and I suppose the lawyers to decide whether legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and subsequently, a blitzkrieg accomplishing its aims before there could be any effective intervention by France or England was the object to be aimed at. issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown as part of Germany, and preparations for expanding the Air Force, and I quote, "as the Reich grows in area", as well as dispositions for a two-front war against France and Russia were discussed. And on the following day Von Ribbentrop was being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the Czechoslovak problem. I quote: "The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech question it will be generally assumed that Poland will be next in turn" is reconized, but it stated, "The later this assumption sinks in, the better." the Tribunal to remind itself of what the evidence of documents and historical facts shows up to that day. It has made undeniable both the fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and actual aggression.
Not only does that conference of 1937 show Hitler and his associates deliberately considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary by war, but the first of the operations had been carried through in March of 1938, and a large part of the second, under threat of war, a threat as we now see which was much more than a bluff - a threat of actual and real war, although without the actual need for its initiation, secured, as I said, a large part of the second objective in September of 1938. And more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his adherence to the old doctrines of "Mein Kampf" long regarded as the bible of the Nazi Party we shall draw attention in certain particular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly to not only his associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in pursuit of "Lebensraum" and that he means to secure it by threat of force, or if threat of force fails, by actual force - by aggressive war. the lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice - call it what you will - of the Democratic Powers, but after Munich the question which filled the minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was "where will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as he declared himself to be? or is his pursuit of lebensraum going to lead to future aggressions, even if he has to embark on open, aggressive war to secure it?" that the answer to these questions was to be given. So far, up to the time of the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been made. The two documents from which I have just quoted, show of course, that high officers of the Defendant Goering's Air Staff had already re the extension of the Reich and, it would seem, the destruction and absorption of Poland, as a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating, indeed, the last stage of Hitler's policy as expounded in "Mein Kampf" - war to destroy France and to secure lebensraum in Russia. And the writer of the Minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more impressive than these two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at the conference of November 5 of 1937 war with Poland, if she should dare to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been quite coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders were ready to take the risk.
So also had the risk of war with England and France under the same circumstances been consid ered and accepted. As I indicated, such a war would, of course, have been aggressive war on Germany's part, and they were contemplating aggressive warfare to force one state to take up arms to defend another state against aggression, in other words, to fulfill its treaty obligations to initiate aggressive warfare against the first state. But in spite of thos plans, in spite of these intentions behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich the decision for direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive war had apparently not yet been taken by Hitler and his associates. It is to the transition from the intention and preparation of initiating aggressive war evident in regard to Czechoslovakia to the actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that I now pass. That transition occupies the eleven months from October 1 of 1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of September 1939. leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On the 14th March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the "Rump" of Czechoslovakia Hacha and his foreign minister were summoned to Berlin. At a meeting held between one o'clock and two-fifteen in the small hours of the 15th of March in the presence of Hitler, of the defendants Ribbentrop, Goering and Keitel, they were bullied and threatened and even bluntly told that Hitler had issued the orders for the German troops to move into Czechoslovakia and for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. would be crushed "by force of arms with all available means", and it was thus that the Protector age of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though nominally an independant sate. By their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had no shadow of validity, without discussion with the governments of any other country, without mediation, and in direct contradiction of the sense and spirit of the Munich agreement, the Germans acquired for themselves that for which they had been planning in September of the previous year, and indeed much earlier, but which at that time they had felt themselves unable completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of their aggressive intentions.
Aggression achieved whetted the appetite for aggression to come. There were protests. England and France sent diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis had clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into theReich persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now for the first time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German territory and nonGerman people had been seized. This acquisition of the whole of Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of Memel Land on the 22nd of March 1939 resulted in an immense strengthening of the German positions both politically and strategically, as Hitler had anticipated it would when he discussed the matter at that conference in November of 1937. aggression against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make demands upon Poland. The Munich settlement achieved on the 25th of October 1938, that is to say, within less than a month of Hitler's reassuring speech about Poland which I have already referred to and within, of course, a month of the Munich agreement, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported to M. Beck, the Polish foreign minister, that at a luncheon at Berchtesgaden the day before, that is to say, on October 24, 1938, the Defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze, that is the province which the Germans called the Corridor. From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had made it plain, as they did during a visit of the Defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw in January, 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig to German sovereignty negotiations on these German demands continued.
And even after Ribbentrop's return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler thought it worthwhile in his Reichstag Speech on the 30th of January 1939 to say: "We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe." Poland, and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place, and Germany had also occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed.
were further pressed. And in view of the fate which had overtaken Government took alarm at the developments.
Nor were they alone.
1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His Majesty's Government had given an assurance to help it vital to resist.
On the 6th of April, 1939, an Anglo-Polish present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's democratic powers was not difficult to find.
With the evidence later--"was not the subject of the dispute at all."
The Nazi Would that be a convenient point to stop?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon at 12.55 hours the Hearing of the Tribunal adjourned, to reconvene at 14.
00 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his opening statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state the proposed new time of sitting for the immediate future. They think it would be more convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 1:00 o'clock, with a break of ten minutes in the middle of the morning; and that the Tribunal should sit in the afternoon from 2:00 o'clock until 5:00 o'clock, with a break for ten minutes in the middle of the afternoon; and that there should be no open sitting of the Tribunal on Saturday morning as the Tribunal has a very large number of applications by the Defendants' counsel for witnesses and documents and other matters of that sort which it has to consider.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when we broke off I had been saying that the Nazi Government was intent upon aggression, and all that had been taking place in regard to Danzig, the negotiations, the demands that were being made, was really no more than a cover, a pretext, and excuse for further domination. Poland, England and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was telling the world that the German people wanted peace and that, having solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial problems in Europe, the staffs of his armed forces were already preparing their plans. On the 26th of September 1938 he had stated:
"We have given guarantees to the States in the West. We have assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned.
That is no mere phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples." International cooperation is utterly impossible unless one can assume good faith in the leaders of the various States and honesty in the public utterances that they make. But, in fact, within two months of that solemn and considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To recognize these assurances, those pledges, these diplomatic moves as the empty frauds that they were, one must go back to inquire what was happening within the inner councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement. on the Reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading "Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England", this is stated:
"1. If, according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas, in fact, against half to one-third of the world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success"--and it was not moral justification which was being looked for in this document--"It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean."
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at what evidence.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, sir, my colleagues, my American and my British colleagues, were proposing to follow up my own address by putting these documents in. The first series of documents, which will be put in by my noted colleague, Sir David-Maxwell Fyfe, will be the Treaties.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to be read again.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations as far as I possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish it to be quoted again so as to get it on the record when the document is actually put into evidence. But I think it will appear, when the documents themselves are produced, that there will be a good deal more in most of them than I am actually citing now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare against England is something which is both significant and new.
Until this date the documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against Poland, England and France, purporting on the face of them at least to be defensive measures to ward off attacks which might result from the intervention of those states in the preparatory German aggressions in Central Europe. Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England and France has been contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, in this document for the first time we find a war of conquest by Germany against France and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least of the German Navy. previous order of the Fuehrer. In that appendix were set out the future tasks for the armed forces and the preparation for the conduct of the war which would result from those tasks:
"The Fuehrer has ordered"--and I quote--"that besides the three eventualities mentioned in the previous Directive preparations are also to be made for the surprise occupation by German troops of the Free State of Danzig.
"For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in mind. The primary assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a favorable political situation and not war with Poland. Troops same time for the seizure of Memel-land, so that both operations can take place simultaneously should such necessity arise." has shown, final preparations for the invasion of Poland were taking place. On the 3rd of April 1939, three days before the issue of the Anglo Polish communique, Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed Forces a Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the armed forces in 1939-1940 was being re-issued and that part relating to Danzig would be out in April. The basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous Directive. Attached to this document were the orders "Fall Weiss", the code name for the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparations for that invasion were to be made, it was stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any time from the 1st September 1939 onwards.
preparation of the war by the armed forces, 1939-40, and in it he said:
"I shall lay down in a later Directive future tasks of the armed forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war. Until that Directive comes into force the armed forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:
"1. Safeguarding of the frontiers.
"2. 'Fall Weiss'.
"3. The annexation of Danzig.
Then in an annex to that document, which bore the heading "Political Hypotheses and Aims" it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. But, should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated into the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered possible at that time with the internal crisis in France and resulting British restraint. of it--doesn't involve the intention of immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack "if Poland changes her policy and adopts a threatening attitude". But the picture of Poland, with her wholly inadequate armaments threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the sentence--and I quote: "The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the requirements of defence"--a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs of any magnitude. But even at that stage the evidence doesn't suffice to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the necessary action was being proceeded with in case that decision should be reached. Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he repeated the demand which had already been made upon Poland, and proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934.
Leaving aside for the moment the warlike preparations for aggression, which Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had attached such importance.
In the first place, of course, Hitler's denunciation was per se ineffectual. The text of the Agreement made no provision for its denunciation by either party until a period of ten years had come to an end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of 1934, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, more than five years too soon.
In the second place, Hitler's actual attack upon Poland when it came on September 1, was made before the expiration of the six months period after denunciation required by the Agreement before any denunciation could be operative. And in the third place, the grounds for the denunciation stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag are entirely specious. However one reads its terms it is impossible to take the view that the Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could render the GermanPolish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to suggest. If that had been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances, then certainly the Pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler himself with Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty with Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of course, that the text of the German-Polish Agreement text of the assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention that the German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with. pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible answer but that, the Agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he chose for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany with some kind of justification, at least for the German People, for the aggression on which the German leaders were intent. decent excuse, since nothing happened, and nothing seemed likely to happen from the Polish side to provide him with any kind of pretext for invading Poland. So far he had made demands upon his Treaty partner which Poland as a sovereign State had every right to refuse. If dissatisfied with that refusal Hitler was bound, under the terms of the agreement itself, to seek a settlement -- I will read the words in the pact, "To see a settlement through other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a case in the other agreements between them that are in force." And that presumably was with reference to the German-Polish Arbitration Treaty signed at Locarno in 1925.