Q Let us take the case of the Norway action. When did you find out about the intention of the occupation of Norway and in what connection did you receive that information? I had my command, to Berlin, to the Naval Warfare Command, and on the occasion of that meeting I was instructed about the intention and my particular task. Command, which I submit to the Tribunal at Doenitz Exhibit No. 6. It is on page 8 of the first document book.
"The Commander of U-boats participates in a conference with the Chief of Staff of the naval command in Berlin.
"Contents of the conference:
"Preparation of the occupation of Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht."
Is that the meeting which you have mentioned? outbreak of the war against Poland, did you have the opportunity to examine what tactical instructions, which you had to give to your U-boats, to your submarines, led to an aggressive war or had to lead to aggressive war? I should like to ask what soldier of whatever nation, who has just received a military task, would have the right to approach his government and ask for examination or justification as to whether from his task an aggressive war could evolve. That would mean, wouldn't it, that--
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has itself to decide from a matter of law whether the war was an aggressive war. It does not want to hear from this witness, who is a professional sailor, what his view is on the question of law.
CR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I believe my question has been misunderstood. I did not ask Admiral Doenitz whether he considered the warfare as an aggressive war or not; but I asked him whether he had the possibility or the task as a soldier to examine, to check whether his orders could become means for an aggressive war. He, therefore, should state his opinion or his attitude about the task which he had as a sailor, and not the question of an aggressive war or not.
THE PRESIDENT: He is able to tell us what his task was as a matter of fact, but he is not here to argue the case to us. He can state the facts as to what he did.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Does one have to give a defendant the right to say what deliberations he had on which, especially here, are based the accusations of the Prosecution? The defendant should have the possibility to state his position according to these accusations.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to hear his comments. You will argue his case on his behalf on the evidence he gives. He is not here to argue the law before us. That is not part of the evidence.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall just ask him about his considerations. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: to the submarines or the orders which you issued before the beginning of the Norway action -- did you ever consider whether that would lead to aggressive war? had the thought uppermost in my mind to carry out that military task. Whether the leadership of the state politically made an aggressive war by doing so or Whether or not they were profylactic measures was not up to me to decide; I had nothing to do with that.
orders about U-Boat warfare?
Q Who was that? that is, the beginning of September 1939, for the conduct of submarine warfare? say, according to the London arrangement. warning? guarded either by naval vessels or planes. Furthermore, I was permitted to fire at any ship which, after the attempt to stop here sent radio messages or did not obey the order to stop. the war against merchantmen became more severe. Did you know whether that was planned, and if you do, why it was planned? development of the attitude of the enemy, to retaliate blow by blow, as it was said in the order, by more severe actions. experiences with the measures taken by the enemy which led to more severe measures? merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations at the first attempt to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages as soon as they could see a submarine on the horizon. ing in the military intelligence service. Furthermore, practically a few days after the beginning of the war, we had the experience that merchantmen were armed and used their arms.
Q To what orders on the part of Germany did these experiences lead?
A They led first to the order that merchantmen which used their radio equipment, which sent radio messages, on the occasion of being stopped, could be attacked without warning.
They led also to the order that merchantmen whose armament had been recognized beyond doubt, that is to say, whose armament one knew by British publications, could be attacked without warning. 4 October 1939, is that right? enemy merchantmen could be attacked, and why did that order come about? on the basis of a British publication which said that now the merchantmen had all been armed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the British Admiralty on the 1st of October that the merchantmen had been directed to attack German U-boats. Furthermore, as I have said before, it was clear beyond doubt that each merchantman was part of the intelligence service of the enemy, and that these radio messages at sight of a submarine were essential for the use of surface or aerial forces. because of this attitude of enemy merchantmen, submarines were put in danger and were attacked by surface or aerial forces?
A yes. I had received quite a number of reports in this connection, and since the German measures were always taken about four weeks after these facts had been recognized, I had very serious losses in the meantime, during the period when I had to keep myself bound by my one-sided obligations. merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations during the period when the ships of the enemy did not abide by them any more? approve?
A No, I did not protest against them. On the contrary, I considered these regulations correct, because, as I have said before, otherwise I would have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and caused serious losses to me.
merchantmen, such as firing on armed merchantmen, and then the order to attack all merchantmen, was that a forcible development which had to come?
A. This development, as I have said before, had to come. As soon as merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and send messages and thereby immediately call for protection, then they force the submarine to submerge and attack without warning. the case with the British submarines, and in exactly the same manner with American and Russian submarines.
Q. If, on one side, a merchantman sends a message first, and on the other side a submarine, for that reason, attacks without previous warning, which side has the advantage according to your experience, the side of the merchantman or the side of the submarine?
A. In an area, where there is no constant patrolling by the enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by planes, that is to say, close to the coast, the submarine ship becomes the bearer of the main weapons against the submarine, and the submarine is therefore compelled to consider that surface ship just like a battleship or naval warship. It is forced to submerge; it loses its speed. Therefore, in all ovean areas, with the exception of the areas right in front of the coast, which can be constantly patrolled, the advantage of arming of merchatmen is on the side of the merchantmen.
Q. Are you of the opinion that the orders of the Naval Warfare Command remained within the framework of that which was necessary against the enemy from a military point of view, or did these orders go beyond military necessity
A. They certainly remained within the scope of that which was necessary. I have explained already that the actions were taken slowly and after careful study may have been for the reason that politically all increasingly severe measures in the West should be avoided.
Q. Great Admiral, these orders which we have mentioned were based on that time only on German experiences and without thorough knowledge of orders which had been issued on the British side. Now, I should like to put to you these orders, the knowledge of which we have now based a ruling of the Tribunal and I should like to ask you whether these individual orders of with your experience, whether there is a difference? I submit the orders of the British Admiralty as Exhibit Doenitz 67. It is on page 168 in document book No. 3.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the document begins on page 163, not on page 168. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. As you know, we are confronted with the Handbook of the British Navy of 1938 and I put to you, from page 164, the paragraph about the reports, enemy reports.
A. There is no pagination here.
Q. It is DMS-3155, the paragraph about reports. The heading is "Enemy Reports."
A. Yes.
Q. I read the paragraph to you: "As soon as the captain of a merchant marine boat sights an enemy boat or plane, his first and most important duty is to report via wireless, on the type and position of the enemy. Such a report may, if submitted quickly, perhaps not only save the boat but also many others. This might give a chance -- which perhaps will never return -to destroy the steamer with one of our battle ships or planes." Then there are some more details which I do not care to read, about the manner in which these reports are to be given. Is this order according to your experience?
A. Yes. In this order, there is not only a directive to send wireless signals. If you are stopped by a U-boat, that alone would, according to international law, justify that the U-boat by force of arms proceed against the ship but beyond that, it is stated that as soon as an enemy boat is in sight that report is to be made.
Q. Yes, Admiral.
A. Through the purpose --
Q. So this order is in accord with the experiences which your boats reported?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I put to you the paragraph DMS 2 VII, on page 165. That is the paragraph about, for opening fire, prerequisites for opening fire.
"(a) Against hostile actions in accordance with International Law. -Since armament is intended only for the purpose of self-defense it can only be used against an enemy who is obviously trying to capture or sink the mercha marine vessel. Upon the outbreak of war it must be assumed that the enemy will act according to international law, and therefore, first must not be opened as long as it is not evident that the enemy is attempting to capture the boat. As sson as it is clear that resistance has to be made in order to avoid capture, fire is to be opened.
"(b) Against actions of the enemy violating International Law. -If, while the war goes on it should unfortunately be found, that the enemy has gone over to the policy of attacking boats without warning in violation of international law, it will be permissible to open fire against enemy boats, submarines and planes, even if those have not attacked or asked for surrender, if such an action is apt to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantageous position for an attack." In this order in accord, that is to say, the order "a" and "b", with the experiences made.
A. In practive, between "a" and "b", one cannot find any difference. I should like to emphasize in this connection --- DMS 3 III, page 167, isn't it -- under 4, that is the last paragraph of "b" of that point.
Q. One moment, do you mean "b-V"?
A. It says here ---V---"Ships with defensive armament should open fire..
Q. That is "b-IV."
A. Yes, --"... should open fire to keep the enemy at a distance, if in your opinion, he intends dapture and if he comes near enough to endanger any attempt for flight." That is to say, that means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, of which he has to assume during war that it isn't there for no reason, but wants to capture, he, for his own defense, will open fire as soon as he comes within range?
for his guns; that is to say, the submarine, until the submarine has come within range of his guns, the steamer, if he wants to use his guns offensively, cannot act any different.
Q. Grand Admiral, did the armed merchant men act in the manner in which your have described; that is, did they really fire as soon as the submarine came within range?
A. Yes. According to my recollection, the first report came from a U-boat about that on the 6th of September 1939.
Q. With this order, we find a supplement under AMS 1 118, on page 165, and here we read: "With reference to D.M.S. Part 1 article 53, it is now considered a fact that the enemy has gone over to the policy of attacking merchant marine vessels without warning as part of submarine and plane operations. The instructions in the second paragraph (b) of this article are therefore to be considered as being valid." That means that the order which we have read before, "b", now, from the 13th of June 1940, had to be considered valid. Do you mean to say that in fact before that, from the very beginning, one acted according to the order "b"?
A. I have already stated that between an aggressive and defensive use of arms on the part of the steamer captain, the surface ship against a submarine, there is practically no difference at all. This is purely theoretical differentiation but even if one differentiates between them, then beyond doubt which said -- and that was not according to facts --- that we were conducting unlimited submarine warfare. That report was designated to inform the steamer captains that now the case "b" was valid, part "b".
Q. I put to you now a directive about the handling of depth charges on merchant ships, That is on page 168, the reference list, and the date is the 14th of Spetember 1939.
A. What page.
Q. Page 168.
A. Yes.
Q. I read: "The following instructions have been sent out to all W.P.S.'s. "It has now been decided to provide all merchant ships of 12 knots or greater speed which are armed with protective weapons, with a single depth charge chute with hand release and 3 charges." Then there are some more detail: and at the end, a remark about the instructions, the training of the crews in the use of underwater bombs. The distribution list shows several naval officers. Is this use of depth charges by merchant men according to the experience of your submarines?
A. Yes, repeatedly.
Q. Speaking of a ship of 12 knot speed or more, can one say that a depth charge attack against the U-boat is a defensive measure?
A. No. Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely and absolutely an aggressive measure, an offensive measure, for the submarine dives is harmless underwater and the surface vessel which wants to carry out the depth charge attack, the attack approaches as closely as possible to the position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop as precisely as possible the depth charge on top of the U-boat. A torpedo boat, that is a warship, does not attack a submarine any different way.
Q. With this attitude on the part of enemy merchantmen, you want to justify the manner in which you attacked enemy ships. However, neutral ships also have suffered, and the prosecution accuses the command of the German U-boat arm for this. What do you have to say to that?
A. Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the orders of the situation during the sea warfare, were only attacked without warning under such circumstances as when they were found in operation zones which had been definitely designated as such zones; or else, as a matter of course, they were attacked only when they did not act as neutrals should act, but acted like ships which were participating in the war.
Q. The prosecution has offered a document in evidence, according to which, in certain ocean areas, attack without warning against neutrals was authorized, beginning January, 1940.
I am referring to Document G.B. 194. I will read to you the sentence which is held against you.
THE PRESIDENTL What page did you say?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 30, sir. It is in the British document book of the prosecution, page 30. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. I will read you the sentence which is held against you:
"In the Bristol Channel, attack against all ships without warning has been authorized, where it is possible to claim that mine hits had taken place." warned against using this shipping lane?
A. Germany had advised the neutrals on the 24th of November, 1939. The advice came through a note, and neutrals had been warned in this note against using these lanes. The neutrals had been given the recommendation to use the methods of the United States. These methods were that America had forbidden its ships to enter the waters around England, to avoid any incidents.
Q. I will present to you the note of which you speak, and I will at the same time submit it to the Tribunal as Doenitz Document 73, to be found on Page 206 of the Document book.
It is in Document Book 4, Page 206. November 24, 1939. It has the following text:
"To the missions, according to enclosed list.
"Telegram.
"Supplement to wire release of 22 October.
"Please inform the government there of the following:
"Since the warning issued, etc, etc, etc.
(Copy in document Doenitz 73, ending with "recommendations and warnings".)This is the note to which you referred?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, according to your opinion, these sinkings beginning on 1 January were authorized in the Bristol Channel?
A. Yes; these ovean areas were clearly limited areas in which war actions took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war area, they had to run the risk of coming into danger of being damaged.
the war. decision, in order to avoid complications with neutral countries. in your opinion, if this war measure was a legal one? role propaganda could play. Therefore, I think it might have been possible that our political leaders, for this reason, may have caused them to phrase this order in the manner in which they did. these political reasons? the U-boats, one for the fighting of enemy ships, and another for the purpose of the investigation of neutral ships. Were these orders actually executed? That was your responsibility, was it not? refuse to execute it. Of course, considering the large number of war actions, which ran into several thousands within the five and a half years of war, very few individual cases have occurred in which, by a mistake, an order of this sort was not followed.
Q How could such a mistake occur? occur at sea, not only during a war, but also during peace-times. These are caused by weather conditions, and other factors. of operational areas, although they were already outside of these limits? sailor knows, after a number of days of bad weather, some inaccuracy in the clearing of the position of a boat may occur. This may be caused by the submarine, but also by the steamer in question, the steamer commander possib believing that he was outside of the operational area when he was torpedoed.
It is very difficult to clarify such cases. to have done when you heard of such a case, a case in which a submarine exceeded its orders, even by a mistake? through education. They were told to be thorough, and to probe quietly and carefully before the commander took action.
This education had been carried through during peace-time. In our U-boat organization we had the motto, "We are a rock-bound firm." leaving port and after returning from a mission, had to report to me personally. That is, before leaving port he had to be briefed by me.
Q I beg your pardon. That was not at the time when you were still supreme commander, was it? commander. However, even then we did it once in a while. In any case, this was a rule with us during my time as commander of the submarine fleet. Therefore, a mission of a commander was considered completed and satisfactory, only then, after he had reported to me in full detail. If, after such a happening, I could find that a neglect had occurred, then I made my decision according to the situation of each case, and I decided whether disciplinary action or a court martial had to take place. at page 230, in Book 4 -- which I would like to read to you. This is the War Diary of the Commander of the U-boat Forces.
I read the remark of the 25th of September, 1942:
"U-512 reports that Monte Gorbea has been recognized as neutral ship before having been torpedoed. Assumed suspicions for being camouflaged English ship insufficient and do not justify sinking. The Commandant will have to stand court martial for his conduct. All boats at sea will be informed." read:
"Radiogram to all:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly ordered anew that all U-boat commanders are to comply exactly with the orders concerning the treatments of neutral ships. Violations of these orders will have incalculable political consequences.
"This order is to be disseminated at once to all commanders." you ordered in this document? return he would have to be responsible, before a court martial, because of the sinkings. The Commander did not return from this mission with his boat, and therefore no court martial took place. court martials affected the difficult tasks of the U-boat Commanders after you had ordered such a court martial?
A Yes. I remember one case against Captain-Lieutenant Kraemer, who had to be acquitted by the court martial because it was proven that, before firing the shot, it was known to be a breaker of the German blockade. He had read once more the warning of the ship and, in spite of that, was of the opinion that it was a different ship, an enemy ship, and that he, therefore, was authorized to sink it. In other words, it was not a case of neglect, and therefore he was acquitted. do you have the impression today that everything was done to cause the U-boat commanders to follow your orders explicitly, or did the U-boat commanders not follow you in keeping your orders?
A I don't think it is necessary to discuss this question; the sober facts speak for themselves. caused by submarines. The number of incidents is extremely low, and I know that this result can be traced to the unique leadership of all submarine commanders, coming from one office, and also to their proper training and their responsibility.
Excerpt from the war diary of the Naval War Command 1939 (KTB Skl, Part C, Issue VIII, 1939) To the missions, according to enclosed list. Supplement to wire release of 22 October. Please inform the government there of the following:
Since the warning issued on (date to be inserted here) regarding the use of English and French ships, the following two new facts are to be recorded: a) The United States has forbidden its ships to sail in a definitely defined b) Numerous enemy merchant ships have been armed. It is known that these armed ships have instructions to use their weapons aggressively and to ram U-boats. its warming, that in view of the increasingly frequent engagements, waged with all means of modern war technique, in waters around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast, the safety of neutral ships in this area cou no longer be taken for granted. south and cast of the German-proclaimed danger zone, when crossing the North S. order to avoid losses of life and property for the neutrals, the German Cabinet furthermore feels obliged to recommend urgently legislative measures following the pattern of the U.S. Government, which in apprehension of the dangers of modern naval warfare forbade its ships to sail in an exactly defined area, in which according to the words of the President of the United States the traffic of American ships may seem imperiled by belligerent action. consequences brought about by disregarding recommendations and warnings.
to try to attack without being signted, and to act as though mine hits had taken place. Doesn't that indicate a bad conscience?
A No. During a war, there are no basic obligations to inform the enemy by what means one intends to do his fighting. In other words, this is not a question of legality, but a question of military or political usefulness. fighting she intended to employ or did employ; and I know how many headaches this caused me when I was supreme commander of the navy in order to employ the small means we had in the most economical manner. act as if mine hits had taken place. I considered this as military useful, because Intelligence had been in doubt whether mine sweepers or U-Boat defense means should be employed.
THE PRESIDENT: If the defendant is speaking so slowly because of the interpreter, I think he can go a little bit faster.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q The Prosecution has offered a document, G. B. 195 on page 32 of the Prosecution's document book. In this document there is an entry of the Order of the Fuehrer from the 18-7-1941 and it reads as follows:
"In the original operation area which equals the fighting area for the U.S.A. and which is not touched by ourselves, the attack upon boats in American or British escorts which involve U. S. merchantmen is authorized." cynical and opportunistic. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what the meaning of this order actually is? Beginning with the attack without warning within this operation area, or from this attack without warning, American ships expressly were excepted because, as we assumed, the political leadership wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with the United States of America, I said the political leadership. The Prosecution regarding the treatment and attitude or the different attitude towards the neutrals, the Prosecution has accused me of having a masterful agility in adapting myself which was guided by my alleged cynicism and opportunism. It is obviously clear that my attitude towards neutrals is a purely political affair, and that particularly when one nation is at war this relation has to be decided exclusively by the political leadership. formation of this question. political leadership believed they should have to teat this neutral or that neutral. Regarding this particular case, knowing those orders which I received through the Chief of the Naval War Command from the political leadership, I would like to say the following: incident on the water with the United States. First, I have already stated that it was forbidden to the submarines to even stop American boats. Second -
Q One second, Mr. Admiral. To stop them where? Within the operation area, your outside the operation area?
A At first, everywhere. Secondly, that the American 300-mile safety zone was granted by Germany although according to the existing international law only a 3-mile zone was authorized.
Third -
THE PRESIDENT: An interesting distinction which may be drawn between the United States and other neutrals is net relevant to this trial, is it? What difference does it make?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Following the document which I submitted, G. B. 195, the Prosecution has made the accusation that Admiral Doenitz ran his U-boat campaign cynically and opportunistically; that is, in the matter that he treated one neutral well and the other one badly. This accusation has been made distinctly and I want to give opportunity to Admiral Doenitz to make his explanation to this accusation. He has already said that he had nothing to do with the formulation of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: What more can he say than that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, according to the charge, a soldier is about made responsible for the orders which he merely executed. For this reason it is my opinion he must now have a chance to state whether he on his side had the impression he received cynical and opportunistic orders or whether to the contrary he had the impression that everything was done to avoid a conflict and that those orders which were given actually were necessary and legal.
THE PRESIDENT: You have dealt with this order about the United States ships, now.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am almost finished.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Did you want to say anything more about the third point?
(The Tribunal conferred).
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, but we hope that you will deal, with this point shortly. It appears to be very unimportant to them.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS: For instance, I had suggested that the port at Halifax or the British port of Nova Scotia, both of which ports are very important for warships and merchantmen, -- I had suggested to lay mine fields around these ports. The Fuehrer rejected this because he wanted to avoid every friction with the United States.