Q Did you give orders as to surfacing? considering the weather, considering the part of the sea they were in, and considering whether it was day or night. The order was different according to these factors. There were changes, too; if we had experiences showing that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced during the day But then after that we might have the impression that it was better to surface during the day, because then one could at least see the attacking aircraft, so we changed. air cover became so heavy that -- I quote your own words. You say: "Two months later there were no submarines at all who came in the situation to get up." That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult in view of the heavy nature of allied air attacks; is that right?
A Yes, they didn't have a chance to come to the surface in certain parts of the sea without being attacked forthwith, at once; that is just the point. But this is the difference in that connection: the submarines were alarmed, a general alarm, when otherwise we weren't and even when they had been alarmed completely there were still these losses and these difficulties which occurred.
Q Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the page after the one I referred you to in Volume 2 of your document book, paragraph 1: "The percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 per cent; in the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 per cent; in the last quarter of 1942 to 57 per cent; in January, 1943, to about 65 per cent; in February to 70 per cent; and in March to 80 per cent." Your worst period was the first three-quarters of 1942, isn't that so. That appears from your own figures.
A Which "worst period"? I don't understand.
A Yes, but how do you mean, "worst period"? 1941 amounted to 40 per cent
A You mean merchant ships?
Q Yes. I am reading your own War Diary, or rather the S.K.L. War Diary.
"In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 per cent --"
A From convoys?
Q Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you had was the first three-quarters of 1942?
A No. In 1942, as I have said when I described the entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the ports, such as Trinidad and the like. But we aren't mentioning this in this connection - we are only mentioning in this list the sinkings carried out by those boats which were fighting against convoys in the Atlantic. was the first three-quarters of 1942? It must have been around 30 per cent.
A No, no, no. My most successful period was the year of 1942. year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys is only 30 per cent, whereas in January and February and March, 1943, it got up to 65, 70 and 80 per cent?
A Right. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30 per cent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger than, forinstance, in the year of 1943 when 65 and 70 per cent were sunk; and that is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer sit outside a pert like New York, for instance. This is only mentioning percentages of sinkings in the Atlantic from convoys. percentage of convoys was low, when you had had that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect of getting these submarine commanders who wanted to destroy the crews of the ships. In 1943 your U-boats weren't surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone up, and there wasn't any reason to make your order more explicit. That is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant.
A This is the point, that was the situation that we said. Beginning in the summer of 1942 we had the experience of the suddenly increasing danger from the air.
This danger was having its effect everywhere, on the sea --
and that includes these parts of the sea where submarines were not fighting convoys.
Q Now I just want you to help me on one other point. Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday that Kaditaenleutnant Eck said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have objected or been angry with him for shooting up the crew of the Pileus. You said you know that Eck was carrying this order of yours in your locker when he did shoot up the crew of the Pileus?
A Yes, but I also know that this order didn't have the slightest effect regarding his decision as Eck is expressly saying his decision to shoot the crew had quite a different aim. His aim was to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat just as for other boats which would have gone to pieces otherwise in this particular part of the sea. He stated emphatically and expressly that any connection in his thoughts with the order which he had aboard quite accidentally, referred to the "Laconia", and this condition did not exist. "Noreen Mary" and the "Antonico ", which are on pages 47 and 52 of the prosecutions document book, where witnesses give specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they are, in one case, on wreckage, and, in the other case, in the lifeboat. Will you look at the "Noreen Mary" on page 47 of the document book? The statement of the survivor is on page 49 and 50. He deals with this point, he says in the fourth paragraph -page 85 of theGerman book, page 50 of the English one; I have got the English document; "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our life-beat which was upside down and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst fromthe machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing, and submerged, after which I climbed back to the bottom of the boat."
The statement by the Brazilian gentleman -- which you will find on page 52.
Do you have it?
A Yes, I've got it.
Q Fifteen lines from the foot, he says: "The enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat." Assuming -- of course one has to assume -- assume that Mr. McAlister and Signor De Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat officers were acting on their own?
A. It is possible. I can believe that subjectively they managed that; but I want to point out this night battle of the "Antonico", which lasted twenty minutes. It was quite possible that shots might have been assumed or shots directed against the ship could hit a rescuing vessel. At any rate, if during a night attack, during twenty minutes, some one is making a report that it is subjective -- and everyone know how different these reports are and everyone who know them will know how many errors will creep into them -- if, during such a night battle, the U-boat had wanted to destroy these people, then it wouldn't have left after twenty minutes as is stated in the report, particularly since the person is stating that he could hardly see the submarine in the darkness. These are all very vague statements.
In the case of the "Noreen Mary", it is quite similar. A large number of statements are made which are certainly not true; for instance, that the submarine was supposed to have a swastika on its tower. Not a single submarine was painted in that way when it went to sea. And, if some one is near some wreckage or a lifeboat and shots are happening nearby, then he will always feel that he is being shot at. It was for that very reason that a number of cases of the Anglo-American side have been raised by us; not because we wanted to raise an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very sceptical one has to be regarding these reports. half years of war and considering the large number of attacks.
Q. Yes, and for, of course, the two and a half of these years that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you're not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other point -
A. Commanders of submarines, with the exception of the case Eck, did in no case shoot down shipwrecked persons -- in no case.
Q. That's what you say.
A. That's not true. It's not true. There's no case proved. To the contrary, with great devotion did we rescue. Never has there been an inclination amongst the submarine personnel that shipwrecked personnel should be proceeded against, with the exception of the case Eck, for certain clear-cut reasons.
Q. Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the log of the Athenia was faked, after she came in?
A. No, it wasn't faked. There was a clear order that the case of the Athenia should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a result, the log had to be altered.
Q. I see. You don't like the word "faked". Well, I'll use the word "changed"; that a page was cut out of the log and a false page had been put in. Did you know about that?
A. I can't tell you that to-day. It's possible. Probably Captain Lemm, either from me or my staff, received the order that the case is to be kept a secret; and that order he certainly must have received. And following that, he or the flotilla would have taken the log, which went to ten departments of the navy, and altered it correspondingly. What else could he do; he had no choice. If for political reasons -
Q. I want to know, was it your order and with your knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you answer it?
A. Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it hadn't been done, then I would have ordered it because the political instructions existed that it was to be kept secret. The fighting men had no other choice, therefore, but to alter the document. Afterwards, after the case happened, commanders of the U-boats had orders to make any false entries. Especially in the case such as the Athenia, it was ordered afterwards that it was to be kept secret and nothing must appear in the log.
Q. Well, now, I have only one other point to deal with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were a firm adherent of ideological education for service personnel, were you not?
A. Yes, and I can explain my reasons.
Q. Well, I just want to get this, and then you can explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it consense that a soldier should have no politics, didn't you? If you want to -
A. But, of course, yes. The soldier had nothing to do with politics, but, on the other hand, he had to stand behind his home state during the war.
Q. And you wanted your commanders to indoctrinate the navy with Nazi ideology, didn't you?
A. I wished that commanders should tell the units that the German nation was the source of strength for our warfare, and that, since we were the beneficiaries of this unity, we should take care of that unity; that that source should remain in existence. respect. That disintegration of the nation would have had its effect on the troops at once; that is quite clear.
Q. Look at page 7 in the English document book. I think it puts it almost exactly as in my question.
A. Seven?
Q. Yes, seven. The last sentence from the very start.
"The whole of the officers' corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist state in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state. The idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense. " That's you view, isn't it?
A. I had written that. I have said that, but you've also got to read the first sentence, which says that our discipline and our strength is as high as a tower and it's above that of 1918. The reason is because the nation is behind us.
If that hadn't been the case, then our troops would have fallen apart; that's the reason why I said that again and again, the same principle.
Q. Tell me, how many men were you attempting to apply this to or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of February, 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to effect. How many? A quarter of a million?
A. More, 600,000 or 700,000.
Q. Now, I would just like you to turn to the next page, page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on Heroes' Day, the 12th of March, 1944. You say this?
"What would have become of our country today if the Fuehrer had not united as under National Socialism, split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and letting as a defense our present uncompromising world outlook? We would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and be subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaires."
What did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"
Q. I wanted to say that we were living in a very large community and that this represented strength.
Q. No, that's not what I asked.
A. That all forces should serve that community.
Q. I'm asking you, what did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"? It's your phrase, and you tell us what you meant by it.
A. I could imagine that, considering the considerable burden of bombing attacks, the holding out of the population in the towns would be more difficult if such an influence was taking place; that's what I wanted to say.
Q. Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"
A. It means that the strength to hold out of the people, in which I was interested as a soldier in the battle of the nations for life and death; that that might have had a disintegrating effect.
Q. Well, now, that's what I want to know. You were the supreme commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in the party politics? Why was that? what was it that you objected to Jews; that made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany?
A. That statement was made during my speech on Heroes' Day. It just show that I was of the opinion that the strength of holding out of the nation could be preserved better than if there were Jewish component parts in the nation.
Q. This sort of talk, "spreading poison of Jewry" produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the Jews?
A. Yes, of course, I'm saying that. I didn't know anything at all about it. If such a statement was made, then that doesn't furnish evidence that I knew about any methods which were used against Jewry.
Q. No, but I'm putting -
A. This happened in '43.
Q. Well, what I'm putting to you is that you are joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt. to you -- page 76.
A. Nobody amongst my men was thinking of employing force against Jews, not a single one, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence.
Q. Well, now, just look at page 76. This where you're dealing with the promotion of under-officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You, first of all, say:
"I declare that the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them should interest themselves more in the promotion of these under-officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, by energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their gifts of personalities, they are capable of taking right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility.
"An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser CORMORAU in Australia, a petty officer, acting as camp senior officer, had all Communists, who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps, systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice, This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution and, after his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown he is fitted to be a leader."
navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way that wouldn't be found out by the guard?
A. No, that's different. It had been reported to me that there was a spy who was to be put amongst new crews and who should listen to them, and then pass information on to the enemy. It would have been the result of that, based on that information, that submarines would now have been lost; and it was then that the senior man, an uncommissioned officer in that camp, decided to remove that man as a traitor, That is what was reported to me; something which I shall prove by means of a witness. In my opinion, and every nation will recognize that, that has been acted upon under great responsibility and in a very difficult situation.
Q. Why didn't you say that, defendant? If you had stated that this man had killed a spy who had endangered the spreading of information, I wouldn't have put this to you. But what you say is that it was Communists who made themselves noticeable and this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put Communists in your order if you mean a spy?
A. I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told, and that's a fact, that it was a spy, and it's something that a witness will prove. What reasons there were -- perhaps reasons of counter-intelligence, not to divulge that. I never entered into it.
Q. Where you -
A. I am responsible for it.
Q. Are you putting the responsibility for this order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your junior officers who put the order out like this? It wasn't what you meant at all; is that what you are saying?
A. I have merely said how the order came about; how it happened to be like this. I have never yet refused the responsibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross examination?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions to sak of the defendant Doenitz. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: to the armed forces in connection with Hitler's death were composed by you on the 30th of April 1945, isn't taht so?
Q In these documents you informed the people that Hitler's successor appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, isn't it? you? and I came to the conclusion that after tje Reichsmarshal had been removed, I was the senior officer of an independant branch of the armed forces, and that that was the reason. nuation of military operations, and all those who were opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, isn't that so? unconditionally, isn't that right?
A Yes. I said clearly in the first order that I would like to fight in the East until troops and refugees could be rescues from the East to the West, and that I would not fight one moment longer. That was my intention, and that is clearly expressed in that order.
Q By the way, it isn't clearly stated in this order, but it is not so important -- do you agree that on the 30th of April -
Q First listen to my question. Do you agree with the fact that on the 30th of April also, right on the day when you published both documents that we are talking about now, it was absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely valueless and useless?
Do you understand my question? I had to continue fighting in the East in order to cover the refugees who were moving to the West. That is clearly stated. I said that we would continue to fil in the East until hundreds and thousands of families from the German eastern are could be transferred to the West.
Q Still, you didn't answer my question, did you, even though it was very clearly put. I can repeat it once again so that you can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on the 30th of April it was absolutely clear that Germany had no further prospects, and that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely useless? Do you agree with that?
A No, that was not clear. From the military point of view the war was absolutely lost, and there was only the problem then of saving as many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to keep up our resistance in the East, be that is why that resistance in the East had a purpose.
Q Very well, I understood you, but will you deny that your address which called to continue war, led to further bloodshed?
Q One moment, please. One moment please, will you wait, Doenitz. Don't try and make any comparisons. First answer and them explain. This is the order that we are going under. First yes or no and then an explanation, please. You unterstood me?
A Of course; in the course of the fighting during the few days losses did occur but they were necessary in order to save hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Q You didn't answer my question. I repeat it for the third time.
THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said "yes, that bloodshed would be cause. That is an answer to your question.
COLONEL POKROVSKY. Thank you. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: upon yourself, first and foremost, as a politician or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who disobeyed direct orders of his own superiors without any analysis of of political meaning and content of such orders?
A I don't know that question - - in generality, as chief of the state from the 1st of May on, I was a political man.
Q And before that time? hall you mentioned. "As a soldier I did not have in mind such political considerations which might have been in existence." On the 10th of May, at twelve hours thirty-five minutes, here, you said, when the question of submarine warfare was taken up: "All this concerns political aims but I, as a soldier, was engaged in military problems." Isn't that so?
A Yes, It is correct. I said before the 1st of May 1945, I was a soldier, and as soon as I became the head of the state I had to relinquish the supreme command of the Navy because I became the chief of state and not a political personality.
Q Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, about fifteen minutes ago, addressed you also and referred to two documents, and in particular to document GB-186, D-640, and he cited one sentence out of this, quoted one sentence which contradicts greatly what you said just now.
You remember this sentence "nonsensical chatter"?
Q I want to ask you: How can you reconcile these two contradictory statements, the statement about unnecessary chatter about the fact that the officer is not a politician. This statement took place on the 15th of February 1944, at the time when you were not the supreme head of the state. Isn't that so? government, that doesn't make him a politician and that is said in that sentence that was meant by that sentence.
Q All right. We will be more exact about it, whether this is really the fact. You, several times in a very different manner right here at the Tribunal meeting, testified thay for many years before the war and during the war, you were indoctrinating the navy in the spirit of pure idealism and firm respect to the customs and laws of war. Is that so? four minutes, you said "I indroctrinated the submarine fleet in the pure idealise and I continued such indoctrination during the war. It was necessary for me to achieve high morale." Five minutes after on the same day, you said, in speaking about the navy: "I never could tolerate giving orders to such people which would be contradictory to such morale and, of course, it is beyond the question that I myself could give such an order. You acknowledge that those were your words, or approximately your words, considering the inexactness of translation; isn't that so? possession now, the document presented by your defense counsel, Doenitz 91. In this document, your defense counsel presents an excerpt from the testimony, sworn testimony - - - an affidavit made by Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. In order now not to consume unnecessary time, I would like you to tell us briefly in one word, yes or no, whether Rudolphi is correct in his testimony; that you were always decisively protesting against introducing into the armed forces of Germany so-called "People's Military Tribunals?"
Did you understand me? courts. I said that one has to carry the responsibility for a branch of the armed forces and in doing so also has to have the judiciary power. That is what it means.
Q And you are familiar with Rudolphi's affidavit? presented by you to the Tribunal, it is said there that "In the beginning, early in the summer of 1943, the first threatening attempt to undermine the non-political system of the armed forces was initiated." Is Rudolphi correct in explaining this question and is it true that you were against this attempt to introduce special political courts into the navy and armed forces? but early in the summer things were already going on, may be right.
Q Do you acknowledge, Doenitz, or not that this so-called people's court had to do with what Rudolphi considers as the smallest hint towards a political attack? That is his sentence which you can find on the first page in document D-91. but I wanted to keep the soldiers under my own jurisdiction. I did not mean to judge and I could not authentically judge the proceedings outside of the Navy, of courts outside of the navy, because I wouldn't know anything about that. My point was that my soldiers should be under the jurisdiction of the navy.
Q For also crimes, including political; isn't that so? Did I understand you correctly? opinion that they should remain under military jurisdiction. encouraging murder of defenseless people, among those who were members of the armed forces, due to purely political reasons and you were looking upon such murders as the acts of military valor and heroism?
A I don't understand you. I don't know what you mean.
Q You didn't understand my question?
A No, I haven't understood it. I didn't understand what you meant by the question.
Q I can repeat it. Perhaps it will be clearer to you. I am asking you: will you deny the fact that you preached in favor of murders of those members of the armed forces, by other members of other forces, and the members who had to be killed were killed purely for political reasons? Now, is the question clear to you?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't find your question quite clear?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: What I have in mind, my Lord, is the order No. 19, for the Baltic Fleet, which was in part ecplained by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. There is one point of this order and permits to clarify the motives for publishing and promulgating this order. It is said in there this way - - - one idea is expressed in a cery clear manner - - - and with your permission, I shall read one paragraph from this document.
For instance, it is said in Order Number 19:
"In the prisoner-of-war camp from -
THE PRESIDENT: Which paragraph?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The paragraph before the last of the document D-650, page 4 of the English text. It is the last paragraph of the third page of the English copy.
THE PRESIDENT: It was read already in cross examination.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: This particular part wasn't read in the cross examination, and it is really very important for the case.
THE PRESIDENT: We have just heard this very question, this very example, read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, not a half an hour ago.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: But Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in reading this example did not read one particular sentence which is of great importance to me, and which clarifies the matter finally, and that is the reason why I permitted myself to come back once again to this particular passage. It is said in there -
THE PRESIDENT: What sentence are you referring to?
COLONEL POKROVSKY: The first sentence in the second paragraph from the end. It is the paragraph which begins, "For example, in the prisonerof-war camp -
THE PRESIDENT: You are entirely wrong. He read the whole of the paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: When, with your permission, I shall read these few words, then you will convince yourself that these particular words were not read, and they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have a note in my notebook made at the time, which shows that the whole of this was read; that the Defendant was cross examined about the meaning of the word "Communist"; and that he explained it by saying that he was referring to a spy among the crew who might give away submarine secrets. The whole matter was gone into fully by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear any more about it.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It is absolutely necessary for me to read two words out of this sentence which were not read into the record here, and I ask your permission to read these two words.
THE PRESIDENT: Which two words do you say were not road? State the two words.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: "Plan" or "systematically." That is, according to a certain plan, and also "noticeable." They are not talking about one particular instance, but they are talking about the whole definite plan.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that was all read, Colonel Pokrovsky; You must have missed it.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: It wasn't read. Of course Sir David may have omitted that,
THE PRESIDENT: That was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and put to the witness, to the Defendant.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Perhaps Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe might have accidentally omitted this, but it is really very important for me, because Doenitz mentioned here, testified here, to the conversation about killing only one spy, but really what is meant here is that there was a plan to exterminate all Communists.
THE PRESIDENT: It is exactly what Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put to the witness. He said "How can you say that this refers to a case of spies or one spy, when it is referring to all Communists?" It is exactly the question he put to him.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: Perhaps I didn't understand quite correctly what our interpreter translated, but in our translation this wasn't mentioned. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: of high military valor, that military valor which serves as a basis or the reason for extraordinary promotion of non-commissioned officers, that you used, as one example, systematic murders of people for political reasons? Do you deny that this order was correctly understood?
A No, that is quite wrong. That order refers to one incident in a prison camp, and it should express in what serious conflict of responsibility that camp commander was, and that from the point of view of responsibility he had acted correctly in removing that Communist, in the interest of the German nation, as a spy.
It would have been easier for him and simpler if he just would have let things go. That would have caused a damage and the loss of U-boats. He knew that he would have been put before the responsibile authorities after his return home. That is the reason why I gave the order. happenings as you explain them now are absolutely different from what are written in your order.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that the Tribunal does not wish to hear further cross examination upon this subject. You are now continuing to do that, and I must draw your attention again clearly to the ruling of the Tribunal, that the Tribunal will not hear further cross examination upon this subject. BY COLONEL POKROVSKY: about some alleged objections in principle against the special political courts--that is, special political considerations which are being sworn to in this affidavit by Dr. Rudolphi?