THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order to sit in closed session. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: between Admiral Doenitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this due to the fact that Admiral Doenitz was particularly willing to obey the Fuehrer's wishes?
A No, not at all. Admiral Doenitz's activities as Supreme Commander of the Navy began with a very strong controversy between him and Hitler, It was Hitler's intention that the large ships of the navy, that is to say, the remaining bat leships and cruisers, were to be dismantled. Grand Admiral Raeder had already turned down that plan.
Q That story is already known. You need not go into it in detail.
A Very well. Apart from that, Hitler's respect for Doenitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Grand Admiral made was absolutely reliable, absolutely honest. The Grand Admiral attributed particular importance to the fact that, particularly, unfavorable developments, failures and such, were to be reported at Headquarters without fail, clearly and without excuses. me the order -
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. Surely, the general statement is sufficient. obey the Fuehrer's political wishes or these of the Party?
A No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of churches, which happened during the time of Grand Admiral Raeder, and I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the navy grew.
The second request made by the Party was that, according to the Russian example, political commissars should be appointed within the armed forces.
In that case, Grand Admiral Doenitz went to Hitler and prevented that intention. so-called N.S.F.O. -- the National Socialist Leader Officers -- were appointed amongst the armed forces, this did not happen in accordance with the Party's wishes or by appointing political commissars. It was merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of commanding officers and who could not in any way interfere with the discipline or the leading of the troops. political proceedings should be taken away from the armed forces.
You prepared the records regarding the visits at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, is that correct? Courtroom. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what the purpose of keeping these records of all visitors to the Fuehrer's Headquarters was? Armaments Department, as well as the Chief of the General Navy Department -that is to say, the three leading men in the Supreme Command of the Navy -were to be informed by means of these records of all events which took place in the presence of the Grand Admiral, as far as they were of any significance or interest for the navy. That was part of my task.
Q You have just said "informed about events which took place in the presence of the Grand Admiral". Does that mean that he must have heard everything himself that has been put down in these records?
A Not absolutely necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during situation reports, when they took place in large rooms, and particularly during subjects which did not interest him so much, the Grand Admiral would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of his own to discuss navy questions with offer participants in the meeting.
It was perfectly possible that on such occasions I heard things and put then down in the record which the Grand Admiral did not hear himself, but, of course, he would hear of then not later than when he "saw my record.
Q I an going to have one of your own records shown to you. It deals with a conference on 20 February 1945. It is Number GB 209, and it is contained in the document book of the Prosecution on page 68. This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. Will you please descri how all this happened? other words, on or about 17 or 13 of February 1945 -- Admiral Foss called me from the Headquarters, which at that time was situated in Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda regarding the going over of on troops in the West, Hitler had situated his intention to leave in the Geneva Pac
Q What was the aim of itsgoing to be? was obviously to express to the troops and the German people that captivity would no longer bring any advantage. I immediately telephoned the Naval Command Staff, since I considered the intention to be quite wrong, and I asked then to give me their military and international law comments on that subject. On the 1st, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once more referred to this question, but this tine not in connection with matters of the Western front but in connection with the air attacks by the Western enemies on open German towns, attacks on places like Dresdren and Weimar, which had just taken place.
results and the effects of leaving the Geneva Convention from the point of view of the naval expert. I don't think an immediate answer was expected and it wasn't given. Colonel General Jodl was also quite strongly opposed to these intentions and he was seeking the Grand Admiral's support for his views. Consequently, a conference was agreed on, and that is the conference the record of which I prepared and to which I referred under Figure 2.
Q That is the conference of February the 20th, isn't it
Q Who participated in that conference? Hewel and myself.
Q What was the subject?
A Its subject was the Fuehrer's intention of renouncing the Geneva Convention and we were of the agreed opinion, all of us, that such a step would be a mistake. Apart from milita considerations there was that particular reason that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the armed forces and the German people would lose some of its confidence in their leaders, since the Geneva Convention was considered the loading feature in international law.
Q In your notes there is a sentence: "It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs 'to save face' with the outer world." What is the significance of that sentence? there be any wild actions; that if the leaders at the head considered it necessary to introduce measures against air attacks on German towns or against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one ought to stay within the limits which would be applicable to any such countermeasures; the renuncia tion of all the Geneva pacts was not to put us in the wrong before the world and our own people and no measures ought to be announced which would be well beyond the limits of the applicable law and order.
tion or were any such measures even thought of?
A No. I can remember very well that no measures, in detail, were discussed during the various discussions. We were merely concerned with the legal situation which would arise if the Geneva convention was renounced. on Adolf Hitler's part to sheet ten thousand prisoners of war as a reprisal for the attack on Dresden, the air attack?
Q The expression "to save face", doesn't that mean some secret goings on? Does it mean that the true facts were to be kept secret? thought of in any case and that neither reprisal measures against air attacks nor intimidating actions against the desertion to the enemy was considered; that they wouldn't help if one had kept then secret.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the transmission came through to me, Prosecution's Document Book, page 68. Is that right or not?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. Page 59 it should be I am told. Oh, I do beg your pardon. It is probably entered wrongly in my book. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: have taken down in this connection? talking about?
February which contains the sentences which I have just read to you? hour. deal, isn't it? Fuehrer? that. One became convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Grand Admiral, could gather from the Grand Admiral's expression and the attitude expressed by all the others that his intentions were being objected to by everybody.
We passed our views on to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Froces in writing and heard no more about the whole matter.
Q I am now going to show you another record. It is GB-210 and it can be found on the next page of the Document Book of the Prosecution. It refers to a conference at the Fuehrer's headquarters of the 29th of June, 1944. You will find an entry under the date of the 1st of July which says that regarding the general strike in Capenhagen the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Was this statement made during a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Doenitz or when did it take place?
A. This is a statement made by Hitler during a discussion which was neither addressed to Admiral Doenitz nor to the Navy at all.
Q. Well, if it wasn't addressed to the Navy, then why did you include it in your record?
A. I included everything that was said in my record, everything that was of any interest or could, be of any interest to the Navy. The Supreme Command of the Navy did, of course, find itself interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were being repaired in Copenhagen, and apart from that it was a base, Copenhagen was a base.
Q. And to whom was this record passed on by you?
A. According to the distribution list on page 4, it only went to the Supreme Commander and Department 1 of the Naval Command staff.
Q. Did the Naval Command staff have anything to do with treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?
A. No, nothing at all. Shipyards, after 1943, were entirely under the jurisdiction of the Armament Minister.
Q. The prosecution considers this sentence, this statement and its passin on to the OKW and the Supreme Command an invitation for bad treatment of all inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the meaning of this record?
A. You can't possibly say that. The only purpose of this record was to inform the departments and the Supreme Command.
Q. I am now going to have another document shown to you. Its number is US-544. It is contained in the Document Book of the prosecution on pages 64 and 65. It is a notice of the International Law Expert in the Naval Command Staff regarding the treatment of saboteurs. Do you know this document?
A. Yes, I have signed it. I have initialed it on the first page.
Q. At the end of that notice you will find the sentence that for the Navy it is to be ascertained whether the event can not be used to ascertain that members of command on troops and their treatment should be completely clarified in all the departments concerned. Admiral Doenitz had been Supreme Commander of the Navy at that time for ten days. Did he actually receive the report?
A. No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head of it will show.
Q. Please, will you explain that?
suggestion through the head of Department 1-A. This went to me and then to the chief of the Operations Staff. The head of the 1-A in a handwritten notice at the side of his initials wrote down that the subordinate commanders have been informed. That means that he had objected to the suggestions of the international law expert and he considered that an explanation of the orders within the Navy were superfluous. I investigated this matter and I made a decision which was that the operations officer was right.
I sent for the International law expert, Dr. Eckhardt, and informed him orally of my decision and returned this document to him. This means that the suggestion made in this connection regarding the report was not actually carried out. report on this matter regarding this command order? been submitted to you. This is contained in the British document book on page 66 and 67. Have you ever heard about this story before this trial?
A No. I head about it for the first time on the occasion of interrogations in connection with these proceedings. submitted during cross-examination by the Prosecution have indicated to me that before the shooting of the crew of that torpedo boat there had been two telephone calls. They took place between the chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo and between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a call from the SD at Osll arrived at your office or at an office in your department? any ether officer in my department or the supreme command. touch with the supreme command of the Navy?
A No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo wants to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then it would have to be his own superior department in Berlin and that is the RSHA.
Q I now put to you another document; it is GB 312 and it appears on page 75 of the document book of the Prosecution. An example is mentioned there where the chief or the commandant of the German prisoner of war camp is concerned and it says he had communists removed quietly from the camp; he had them removed and killed if they became noticeable in the camp. Do you know of this story, as such?
A Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received a report from a prisoner of war who had been severely injured and who had been exchanged. It was said that the German commandant of a prisoner of war camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser "Cormorau" were detained, had secretely had a man of his crew killed because he had been active as a spy and traitor.
Q But this order does not mention the word "spy." It says "communist." What is the explanation?
THE PRESIDENT: It does not say "communist." It says "communists" in the plural.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, yes, "communists."
A (continued) In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from getting held of the story and making difficulties for the man in question. Thus, a different version was chosen. plan regarding the silent removal of communists. Can you tell us anything, knowing the origin of these orders, whether such a plan existed? which were responsible for chasing young non-commissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven personnel departments of that type. Over and above that I can only say that of course -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into all this detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making away with people of this sort or was there not -- not all the details, but how the order came to be made.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In that case I shall put the question this way.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
that communists were to be removed quietly and without its being noticeable?
A No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there we a considerable number of communists in the Navy, something which was known to every officer. These communists in the majority did their duty as Germans just as well as any other German. the spring of 1945 he advised the continuation, the hanging on in the war. This had been called evidence for the fact he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of the Navy regard him as such?
A No, the admiral's attitude was not considered to be political fanaticism. It was considered that he was feeling his natural duties as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that that was the view of the great majority of the en tire German Navy, the non-commissioned officers and the officers.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant's counsel want to ask questions
DR. SIEMERS: Dr. Siemers, defense counsel for Grand admiral Raeder. BY DR. SIEMERS: have held. I should like to make quite sure who in the Naval Command Staff was a leading position under Grand Admiral Raeder and I an thinking of the decisive years before the outbreak and after the outbreak of the war. Who was the chief of staff during the last two years before the war, the beginning of the war? was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until the retirement or even after Raeder's retirement was Admiral Fricke. These, therefore, were the two officers who worked under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Command Staff in the highest commissions. They were the immediate advisors of the Grand Admiral.
Q And the Naval Command of several departments, didn't they?
numbers.
Q And which was the most important department? BY THE PRESIDENT: observe the lights? When that yellow light goes on, it means you are going too fast?
The most important department was the Operations Department, which had No. 1. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q And the other departments, 2, 3, what were they doing? the Obtaining of Information?
Q Who was the chief of the Operations Department?
A Beginning in 1937 and until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until after Raeder's retirement I was the chief of that department. I should first of all like to ask you to speak briefly about Raeder's principal points of view during the time you were working for him. development in cooperation with Britain. Questions regarding the type of ships, training and tactical schooling in the foreground. As far as aggressive wars were concerned, Grand Admiral Raeder did not during any conference which I attended ever refer to them. Nor did he at any time make any preparations in that direction. against a war with Russia? reasons: first, that he considered that a break with Russia was wrong and not tenable, and second, for strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire Strength should be concentrated on the fight against Britain. couldn't be carried out, the Grand Admiral worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean, so that Britain's policy of encirclement should be fought against in that manner.
Q The Navy had comparatively numerous dealings with Russia during the time there was friendship between Russia and Germany.
This was due to supplies. Did everything in that respect, as far as you know, run smoothly? naval stocks, did go toRussia; for instance, completed ships, heavy artillery and other such material. view laid down in the Pact?
A Yes, that was the Grand Admiral's point of view. that he had never pothered about international law and that he had broken international contracts as a matter of principle if ever this were practical. Can you say anything about his opinions and views in that respect?
A Yes, that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder was always anxious that every measure for naval warfare introduced be examined from the point of view of international law. We had a special expert on international law on the Naval Command Staff for that purpose, and we on the Operations Staff had nearly daily contact with him. and advising the waging of a war against Russia, and that he had tried to get Japan to fight the United States. What is your opinion on that?
A I consider that there is no basis for such an accusation. I know that Grand Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to it, that all naval war measures -- and this is especially applicable to the critical year of 1941 the United States of America. He has in fact forfeited a number of perfectly sound military measures so as to prevent incidents with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941, he ordered that in a large area outside the U.S.A. submarines should be withdrawn, although that area could certainly be regarded as the free seas. A certain mine-laying action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax, in Canada, was forbidden byhim, so as to prevent at all costs the situation where a United States steamer should strike such a mine.
And finally, attacks also against British destroyers in the North Atlantic were forbidden by him because of those fifty destroyers which had been handed over to England by the United States. Out of this fact there was the possibility that British and American destroyers could be mistaken for each other. nevertheless occupied Iceland, when British Warships were being repaired in American shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units should be reported to the British fleet and when finally President Roosevelt in July, 1941, gave the order to his forces to attack German submarines on sight.
Q. Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval Command Staff that there were no objections to a war against America and that the American fleet and American submarines weren't worth much?
A. No, Admiral Raeder as an expert could hardly have made any such unreasonable statement.
Q. Didn't Raeder, to the contrary, state expressly that he considered the American fleet very strong and that one couldn't fight simultaneously tin such first-rate powers as American and Great Britain?
A. Yes, and we were perfectly aware of the fact that America's entry into the war would mean a most substantial strengthening of the enemy forces.
Q. But then an one occasion Grand Admiral Raeder had suggested in a war diary that Japan ought to attack singspore. Was there any discussion about Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Command Staff?
A. No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a complete surprise, both to the Grand Admiral and the Naval Command Staff, like any other department. That is my conviction.
Q. Weren't there any continuous naval-military discussions and conference. between Japan and Germany?
A. No, before the entry in the war with Japan, no military discussions in my opinion and in my conviction took place.
Q. I should now like to show you Document C-41-
(Addressing the President) Mr. President, this is GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it in the Document Book against Reader, and I don't know now whether I can refer to it at this time. It is not contained in the trial brief against Raeder. The new Document Book, C.H. contains it on page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You can put it in now, if you want to. You can offer it in evidence, if you wish. It is already in evidence through the Prosecution. So you can put it to the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has mentioned it, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q. This is a document signed by Admiral Fricke and it is dated the 3rd of June, 1940. It is headed, "Expansion of Areas on the Question of Bases." Detailed consideration of future plans is contained that document, and I should like to ask you if Raeder had given the order to prepare this memorandum or how it happened that this memorandum was compiled.
A. Grand Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum. This constitutes personal theoretical thoughts of Admiral Fricke regarding the possible developments and possibilities for the future. They are pretty fantastic, and they had no practical significance.
Q. Was this study discussed in a large group in the Naval Command Staff or was it conferred about?
A. No, in my opinion, only the operations officers had knowledge of this document which in its entirety proves that this isn't a well-thought out study made by order of the Grand Admiral but some thoughts jotted down at the moment they occurred to Admiral Fricke.
Q. Was that document passed on to any outsiders at all?
A. I think I can remember that this document wasn't sent to anybody outside. It was used only within the operations department. The Grand Admiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it, particularly since this letter she is that he didn't initial it.
Q. You have a photostat copy of that letter. Are there any ether initials an it which night show that this was put before Grand Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally handled in oho Naval Command Staff?
A. Every document that was to be put before the Grand Admiral had on its first page, in the left margin, a remark saying "to be put before the GA before dispatch" or "to be reported during situation reports". And then on that spot the Grand Admiral would initial it with a green pencil or the officers of his personnel staff would indicate that it's been put before him or give some such indication.
Q. And there are no such indications on this document, are there?
A. No, no.
Q. I should now like you to see document C-38, which is a document of the Prosecution. Its number is GB-225. It is contained in Raeder's document book of the Prosecution on page 11. The war between Germany and Russia began on the 22nd of June, 1941. According to the last page, or, rather, last but one page of the document, the Supreme Command of the armed forces in Germany had, as early as the 15th of June -that's the week before the outbreak of the war -- ordered the use of arms against enemy submarines near the southern corner of Memel. This is supposed to have been done following an application from the Naval Command Staff. The Prosecution are basing the accusation on this document, and, once more, referring to an aggressive war, and, unfortunately, the Prosecution have only submitted the last page of this document.
They did not produce the first and second page of the document because, if they had done so, then this accusation would probably have been dropped. May I put it to you, Mr. Witness, what is contained there, and I quote:
"On the 12th of June, at 2000 hours, one report came from the guarding vessels which had been put into their station at 2000 hours, 20 sea miles west of Oslo, that there had been sighted an unknown submarine which had surfaced and was proceeding on a westerly course, after being called by wireless and replied with a letter to which no significance could be attached." did not, first of all, reply to ES call? the arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, that there is a call and a reply. By this means the identity of the ship and its origin can immediately be ascertained and, if there is a wrong answer to an ES call, then this proves that this was not a vessel of the own fleet. remember, of a similar kind showing that ships appeared which were clearly the ships of the enemy?
A Yes. I remember that there were individual cases when unknown submarines appeared of the German Baltic ports. Later on it was found that when the stations of our own submarines were consulted that these were indeed enemy vessels.
Q. Were these facts the reason why the Naval Command Staff were asked that certain ships should now be fired on? Greece. It has been ascertained from the war diary that on the 30th of December, 1939, the Naval Command Staff made an application to the effect that Greek ships in the American blockade zone and of Great Britain may be treated as hostile.
Since Greece was neutral at the time, there has been an accusation of a breach of neutrality against Raeder. caused the Naval Command Staff and the Chief Raeder to make such an application to the OKW? of its merchant navy fleet at the disposal of Great Britain and that these Greek vessels were sailing under the British command. were not principally treated as hostile but only the American blockade zone? which occurred in June, 1942. The Naval Command staff made an application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although Brazil at that time was still a neutral.
The war with Brazil started some two months later on the 20th of August. What reasons were there for such a step? America, according to which they were being attacked by aircraft, which could on, have flown from Brazilian bases. To begin with, that question was clarified by means of inquiries, and it turned out that the reports were correct. Over and air that, I think I can remember personally that even at that time it was generally known that Brazil was giving bases to the United States, with which we were at we or placing those bases at their disposal.
Q. So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part of Brazil
Q. I shall submit to you C-176 and D-658. The document C-176 has the number GB- 228. These two documents are based on this command order. That's the order to destroy sabotage troops. which occured in December 42, Raeder was participating. In the document C-176, on its last page, you will find something which I shall quote.
"On the 11th of December 1942, shooting of the two captured Englishmen by a commando under the Port Commander at Bordeaux, numbering one to sixteen men, in the presence of an officer of the SD, the Security Service, and by order of the Fuehrer."
Previous entries, which. I don't want to quote in detail would give the same picture. And they show that the Secutiry Service, the SD,..were including them in the proceedings and that they were in constant direct touch with the Fuehrer. prisoners were shot, did know anything at all about this matter, hear about it, whether they know anything about this direct order from Hitler which is mentions in this connection? way come to the Naval Command Staff. The Naval Command Staff knew the tactical events in connection with this enterprise in Bordeaux and, over and above that, knew nothing at that time.
therefore, not discuss this case previously and it was not put to them, is that correct?
A I Am certain that this was not the case; that they did not hear about it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the fact that this war diary is not the war diary which has been frequently mentioned, the diary of the Naval Commander in the west, that is, therefore, unknown to the Naval Command Staff that this is why the Naval Command Staff did not know of this case.
THE PRESIDENT: You are referring to document C-176?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: C-176, Yes, Mr. President, and likewise D-658. This in turn, is the war diary of the Naval Command Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This is D-658, which will show .the following: According to reports of the armed forces, these two soldiers have since been shot. The measure would be in keeping by special order by the Fuehrer. That has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows -- and it is something I shall refer to later -- it shows the Naval Commander Staff knew nothing about the entire episode because, even this shows an entry dated the 9th of December, whereas the whole affair happened on the 11th.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be the time to break off.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. SIEMERS: