I ordered that these torpedo boats should be arranged for that purpose, should have torpedo tubes on board. In 32 when we hoped that at the disarmament Conference we might make some progress, in order not to have breaches of the Treaty to make our situation worse, I had one boat armed at a time in order to test out the armament, and then I had the armament dismounted again so that there was only one boat available with armament at any one time. control and political sistuation after the disamament conference would permit. were allowed to construct?
Q And instead, you built only 5 torpedo boats with 200 tons. In the last analysis then, if the accusation accused that you were not including these 5 torpedo boats, you Were not doing anything secret but you wanted to discuss it with the control commission at the proper time. Prosecution submitted, Document C. 32, U.S. 50. The document is in Document Book 10-A, Page XX 8; in the new document book of the British Delegation. This list includes all breaches dated 9 September 1933. The Prosecution justly points cut that this, confirmation is Very thorough. The Prosecution presented it just as thoroughly, although I believe I can prove that they are in the last analsis small matters; but I am forced to answer these accusations which were brought up in detail.
Branch Number 1: Exceeding the permitted number of mines, in Column 2 in the Versailles Treaty; and by the commission 1,565 mines were permitted, but we owned 3,675 mines. That is 2,000 mines too many. Please tell the Court what the significance of this is -- which is doubtless true. representative at the Disarmament Conference, so that if this thing should be mentioned he could give them an explanation. That is why it was so explicit, ever though most of the things it contains are of minor importance.
I should like to add to what I said previously as regards Poland. In view of the political situation at that time we had to fear that the Poles, if they should under take an invasion of cur country, would have certain support from the sea -- or could have Certain support from the sea, by France. Since ships at that time often visited the Polish port of Gdynia through the Baltic entrance, Baltic front, they could proceed against our ports. For this reason the defense of the Baltic entrances by mines played an important role. For this reason, we undertook this breach of the Treaty in order to be able at least to protect the Baltic -- blow the Baltic entrance at the narrow points; which was of course possible only for a Certain time. With these mines only a stretch of 27 sea miles could have been blocked. A part of Danzig or a part of the bolt could have been blocked. affective for any length of time. This only was a security defense, but still they exceeded the number of Mines permitted from the war supplies still available total amount which Germany had at that time, not just the amount which was exceeded that which was permitted?
Q And then I should like to have an approximate comparison. It was said, for comparison, that the British in the First World Tar in the North Sea laid about 450,000 to 500,000 mines. Do you recall if this number is approximately right?
AApproximately it may be right. I cannot say exactly from memory.
A second small question now. Is it true that the Luftwaffe Reichsmarsha Goering in mining English harbors in one action alone used thirty to fifty thousand mines? "Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries." smaller caliber.
What can you say about this breach of the treaty?
A This is quite a small breach. There were a comparatively large number of guns on the North Sea coast. On the other hand, the Baltic coast was comparatively bare of guns since we wanted to retain free entry to the Baltic for we had great interest in blocking off the Baltic. For this reason we laid gun barrels which belonged in the North Sea but which had been brought to the Baltic for repairs. We stored them in the Baltic area for a long time in order to be able to set up these guns on the Baltic coast in case of attack. The North Sea had many guns and it was much easier to defend than the Baltic coast. Baltic coast. guns are mentioned, the ten largest being 28 centimeters were actually destroyed.
Please comment on this. "Deutschland", six 20 dentimeter guns were constructed or for the "Deutschland" and the cruisers forty-eight 15 centimeter guns were constructed, and so forth. We then had to scrap a corresponding number of old guns. Ten of this number were actually scrapped. All the guns were turned ever to the army for scrapping and we received a receipt for them, saying that the guns had been scrapped. We learned, however, that the army had not in fact scrapped the guns. But aside from the ten 28 centimeter guns it used them for the army for fortifications to be built in case of attack since the army had no such guns at all.
Q I should like to make the time clear. This must have been a breach of the treaty which occurred long before the time you took office as chief of the navy command.
A This happened between 1919 and '25 for the most part. In any case I had nothing to do with those matters.
"Deviation from the places settled by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries." the middle sized batteries were placed very close to each other. In the batteries the guns were placed very close to each other. According to our experience from the World bar the heavy and medium sized guns Within the batteries were placed further apart so that a single hit would not destroy several guns at once. For this reason we loosened up these heavy and middle batteries and moved the guns a little further apart. For that reason they were no longer in the places they had been at the time of the treaty. Otherwise nothing was changed. because they were purely technical? artillery batteries and the storing of flak ammunition.
place then allowed by the Entente. Is the same thing true as to this as you said about number 4?
A No, not completely. We were glad to put the flak batteries, we wanted to put them where they were particularly useful and could be used, while the Commission did not want to have them at these places. As a result we left the flak batteries where they were but at other points we prepared socalled gun-platforms or provisional platforms so that in case of attack from any enemy we could set up the flak guns in order to use then most effectively. the foundations for a defense?
Q Then comes number six:
"Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area." through to Kiel was to be as unarmed and unhampered as possible. For this reason the setting up of guns in the Kiel area was especially forbidden and in order to be able to set up some guns in a hurry in case of necessity gun platforms were prepared there also.
"Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries." accusation. of six 15 centimeter, three 17 centimeter guns were built. Of course, It is deviation insofar as the guns were to stay there but there can be some doubt raised whether these six 15 centimeter guns might not have been better along the coast than the three 17 centimeter guns; that they are numerically less than permitted. two centimeters.
Baltic and for the purpose of finding mines and as mine-blowing aids, which we wanted to lay at the entrance of the Baltic and which were to be controlled by them and defended against light enemy forces. For this reason we gave then each one 10.5 centimeter gun and one machine gun C-30.
Q The minimum armament in practice?
"Arming of six E-beats and eight motor mine-sweepers."
Number ten:
"Setting up practice flak batteries."
Is that a breach of the treaty?
A Yes, it was a flak battery. It was only because near the garrisons where there were barracks we wanted an opportunity for practice exercises. That is why we set up these batteries near barracks. There was no intention of using them in this place for defense. It was only a matter of expediency for training. Take 23. because I believe it is necessary, since the prosecution read almost all these items.
A Friedrichsort is the entrance to Kiel. If enemy ships enter they salute there; the salute must be answered. Two 7.7 centimeter field cans had been approved, which had been rendered unserviceable; one could shoot only with absolute cartridges. We considered it expedient, since there was a battery foundation available there, that instead of those 7.7 centimeter guns we set up four 8.8 centimeter flak guns.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 16 May1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Sauckel and von Papen are absent. follows: BY DR. SIEMERS: 32, and we had got as far as Point 11, We now come to 12, "Transgression or Infringements of the Permitted Amount of Ammunition," May I remind the Tribunal that this is the document, C-32, or US-50, which is in the document book 10-A, on page 8. We come to point 12, which contains three columns. exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition? mitted amount. I cannot now, today, tell you what the reasons were in any case, by I assume that to a very considerable extent this was due to the fact that there were excess amounts from the last World War. were excess amounts; whereas the third amount, 10.5 centimeter, appears to be short instead of 134,000 permitted there were 87 thousand. In the case of the 8.8 centimeter shells there were excess numbers. Then there were 8,600 allowed of the 6 centimeter, but instead only an actual number of 3,600, and the same situation applying to the last item.
In the third column there appears to be some explanation regarding this. On the following page it says that amounts of ammunition were partly being manufactured and partly under delivery and that the total amount permissible will soon be exceeded.
stated September 1933. According to these figures, it would have been compiled according to the situation in the autumn of 1933, wouldn't it?
A I didn't quite understand you, I am afraid. figures which were permissible had been exceeded, then whereas in accordance wit this statement they were short, then this must apply to the situation in autumn 1933. ammunition had to be scrapped. It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery which is not listed here was in every case short of the standards. We had a comparatively large amount of heavy artillery and ammunition for heavy coastal guns which had been granted us.
We hadn't as much as we could have had.
DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal I want to point out that to this last point is proved by the actual documents in the hands of the Tribunal. I am referring to figure 12 on page 2 and the paragraph immediately after the figures. It says that the ammunition for heavy artillery has not been included.
Q We now come to figure 13, "Exceeding the number of machine guns, etc., rifles, pistols and respirators." just slightly higher than permitted. This was greatest, for instance, in gasmasks, showing 43,000 actual instead of 22,500 permitted. There were large quantities of machine-guns after the World War which had been put away by individual persons. They had been hidden in farms and so forth. Later on, they were once more collected and by reason of that there was a comparatively large accumulation of them. But nowhere here are we concerned with any considerable figures. And the same applies to ammunition, bayonets, hand-grenades, search-lights and such like. Anyway they are not considerable amounts.
Q Now, figure 14, "Obtaining 337 m/g C/30 without scrapping equally serviceable weapons" -
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various points in the documents in one statement, as to why there were these excesses. We have a statement here which contains thirty different items, and you have only gotten as far as 13 -- and you are dealing with each one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I am most agreeable to stopping talking about the document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of trouble finding my way through it, but I don't think that I was the cause of this. The Prosecution, you see, have submitted every individual point -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is, I am not blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can't it be done in one explanatory ststement. one short statement?
DR. SIEMERS: I shall try, Mr. President, and I shall abbreviate it.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Well, they are the most important points. They were points which were planned for the most important years; they applied to the years '33 to '34. intended construction of reserve destroyers and that construction was permitted through the Versailles Treaty.
I'll skip 18 because we've dealt with that. Nineteen, once more, only intended construction. Figure 20, I may consider it irrelevant. It's the arming of fishing vessels. Figure 21 to 29 -
THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the defendant to explain some of these remarks in the third column. I mean in 18, for instance, "Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied." at the disarmament conference on his way by the expert in question. It doesn't refer to the local conditions. Construction of U-boat parts, for instance, took place abroad or was to be prepared, and in 1934 and '35 it took place. The first submarine was launched at the end of June of 1935.
Q May I ascertain, Mr. Witness, that only the construction and purchase of submarines was prohibited? agreements in the case of the spare part or parts, but I think that you ought to point out just why at that time, and in spite of the fact that spare parts were permissible, one intended to conceal this. May I remind you that this is September, '33, at a time when negotiations were planned. regarding the negotiations 35 to 100, Himmler was particularly anxious to avoid everything which might in any way interfere with the negotiations. Since the subject of submarines was a particularly delicate one in England, it was part of this plan to treat the construction of U-boat parts in that manner.
Q Wasn't this appendix and several other remarks in this column due to the unfortunate experience which the navy had made politically in the country; namely, that every time when the smallest action was taken there was an immediate inner political row about it?
A Yes, and that went so far that the armament minister -- with reference to Prussian ministers who had different attitudes than the Reich ministers, that he was attacked by then and was reported to the Reich Chancellor for doing things which he wasn't allowed to do; whereas the Reich Government itself had passed these matters already and had signed him as the responsible party for them.
Q This means, doesn't it, that these things were only kept secret for inner political reasons, so that they weren't appearing, but they had been approved by the Reich, hadn't they?
A Yes, they had. As far as these terms are concerned, this means
Q I beg your pardon. But under these circumstances I shall come to column 2, under figure 20, considering that this point was emphasized by the Prosecution. It deals with the arming of fishing vessels, and it had been pointed out that these warning shots should be made littleof.
Q These fishing vessels were tiny ships which were actually unarmed. They were serving the purpose of fishing, of supervising the fishing in the North Sea all the way to Iceland, and in the case of emergencies, they were assisting these fishing vessels; that is to say, to take people aboard who had taken sick and also to protect fishermen of other nations. We considered that it was suitable that at least a five centimeter gun should be mounted on these ships which were actually war ships. "For warning shots" means that they had to be in a position, when they wanted to draw the fishermen's attention to something, to fire a salute shot. It was quite an insignificant affair altogether, and it wasn't artificially reduced in its significance because it was a Bagatelle. firms carrying out rearmament tasks. The Versailles Treaty had allowed certain firms whereas others weren't allowed to be given orders. In effect, other firms had also been given orders. Perhaps you can generally make a statement on that. disarmament conference would be making progress. Certain points had already been accepted which meant improvements and we had to expect, therefore, that the few factories which we had would during the subsequent years show a greater output.
That became necessary to the shipping replacement plan. Consequently, such factories which were turning out special articles were more efficiently equipped; but this is never a case of having guns. These are automatic ignitors, explosives, then there are mine containers, small items, but special items which could only be produced by certain firms. But, apart from the firms which were allowed, such firms were also employed which had not been passed. So, for instance, the Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A. G. at Magdeburg, that's No. 25, was given the task of manufacturing Flak guns and anti-aircraft guns; barrels from two centimeters to 2.5 centimeters applies to 26, which is a firm manufacturing anti-aircraft explosives. Under No. 27 -
Q I don't think, Mr. Witness, we need go into details. And then, of course, there is a case of engines which were used more and more. I have one question which applied to all these figures. Isn't there a certain compensation due to the fact that some of the firms which had been passed and for some economic reasons had already dropped out?
A Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively few orders which alone couldn't keep them together.
Q Witness, I think one can't only say so; I think one must say so. May I draw your attention to the items under 22 and in particular to column 3, which states: "The list has been superceded in any case by the exclusion of firms."
Q That leaves us with 29 and 30. Twenty-nine, "The preparations in this sphere of major experimental boats." I think that these were preparations on a very small sector.
AAt the moment I can't tell you for certain what this is.
Q In that case I don't think that the Tribunal will attach a lot of importance to it. Probably in the near future the following serious breaches will be necessary, up to and including 1934. You've answered the question in principle by your remark regarding the planned and partly already operative discussions with the British Government.
A Yes, that's what we're concerned with. case as these conferences went on with the British Government and the Admiralty.
A You can't say that about them all. Take 1 to 3, for instance, they were mines. The numbers of mines were to be increased or respectively more modern material was to replace the old one. Then we go on and we come to the transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic. thing looked to a naval expert like you; you see, the whole complex, would you say that these are minor violations and how far would you say did they have an aggressive character. defense and at a time when we were completely merely without a defense. The individual items, as I explained yesterday, are so unimportant that one needn't spend a great deal on them at all. I believe that the control commission, too, had the impression that not too much weight need to be attributed to all these matters because when, in 1925, the control commission left Kiel, where it had been stationed and where it had worked together with the organization of the command staff, Commander Fenshow, the chief of such a commission, who was mostly interested in matters relating to guns, together with a Captain Rankin, who was a specialist for these matters, said the following words:
"Now we must draw the dividing line --" No, I'm sorry.
"Now we must leave. We are sorry to leave. We didn't have a very pleasant task; we certainly didn't. I must tell you one tiling. You must not think that we believe what you have been saying. You have not said a single true word, but you have given the information so cleverly that we might have believed you, and for that I am grateful to you."
Q. I now come to Document C-29, which is US-46.
Mr. President, it is in Raeder's Document Book 10, on page 8; I mean the document book of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10-A?
DR. SIEMERS: No, 10, page 8. This document, too, was submitted during the general speech of the Prosecution at the beginning of the trial on 27 November. It is a speech -- or, correction -- it is a document signed by Raeder of 31 January 1933, general directives for the support of the German armament industry by the navy. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. The Prosecution have pointed out and have thought fit to draw the conclusion from it that as soon as one day after Hitler's nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were acting positively on his behalf by means of this letter. Please, will you define your attitude?
A. There is no connection between this letter and Hitler's coming into power at all. It must be admitted that between the evening of 30 January and the morning of the 31st, it would be impossible to compile so long and complicated a document, which has been carefully thought out. This document is the outcome of the hope which has already been mentioned, the hope which had arisen under Papen and Schleicher that the rules of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference might be somewhat relaxed. The British Delegation had repeatedly said that they were in favor of a gradual state of equality. they were suitable for armament and putting them into as good a condition as possible. This should be done by increasing their output and making them capabel fo meeting competition.
As I say in this letter under (c), all countries were making efforts in that direction at that time, even those that, unlike Germany, were in no way restricted -- Great Britain, France, North America, Japan, and particularly Italy. They all made considerable effort to insure markets for their armament industry. I was trying to follow them in this particular sphere, and it was necessary that within the Naval Command Staff there should be an understanding in the various departments for the fact that this industry would need support in that manner and in a measure which would not be toommean. Technical developments should be kept secret. That is why I state under (e) that it is not so important to keep small details secret as it is that generally one should be at the top and in the lead. importance to guaranteeing the continuing support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions had been relaxed, so that the industry would have confidence abroad and could sell their goods. on my own behalf.
Q. Can you tell us when, approximately, these directives were created by you?
A. In the course of the month of January -- I would say in perhaps the beginning of January -- we had a meeting about it, and then I wrote this document.
Q. Certainly two to three weeks before the writing of this letter?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. I can not imagine that any organization might write a letter like this a day after the thought for the document had first arisen.
May I ask you now to tell me just one more thing. This point, the lossening of the present restrictions, that means the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, by means of a disarmament conference. You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume that was your basis.
A. Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at the time was just like that. It was such that one could expect an improvement.
Bruening, had fought, and you felt it your duty to take certain precautions?
Q I think there is no need to go into further detail. I have read this document again and again, and I have not been able to find any point on the basi of which the prosecution could come to the conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.
I now come to document C-140. It is US 51, and is in the document book 10-A at page 104.
A May I interrupt you please? Would it not be appropriate that I should say now what I wanted to say in addition to the statement already made regarding C-154, regarding airplanes?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg to apologize. It would be practical before going over to another subject that the witness should deal with this point. I had forgotten it.
The Prosecution have submitted document C-156. It is Captain Schuetzler's bock from the year 1937. Nearly all the same violations were contained therein which were found in C-132, so that that document would be dealt with simultaneous ly BY DR. SIEMERS: tructed in Holland, which was dealt with, but there is yet one more point to which I want you to state your views, and that is the question of certain preparations regarding the navy aircraft which night later on be permitted. aviation sector. As I see from this book, there had been purchases of a number of aircraft. They were put in the hands of a firm called Severn G.m.b.H, limited Company, which was known to the armed forces minister. Anti-aircraft had been allowed in the Versailles Treaty, both on the border and on the coast, and these anti-aircraft guns had to fire in firing exercises. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number of aircraft for this purpose, which were towing the targets. Those aircraft were being flown by old navy pilots, who were being employed by this Limited Company. The company, in turn, was led by an old navy flier were not allowed to have any aircraft, we dealt with certain aspirants, before they joined the navy, by having them trained in civil aviation as pilots for one year.
In other words, for one year, they were being trained as pilots, and then they joined the navy and went through their ordinary navy training. and which was dissolved in the summer of 1928 by Reichs Armed Forces Minister Groener, there were these aircraft which had been purchased, and Minister Groene in the autumn of 1928, soon he himself had made the contacts so as to be able to watch for correct handling of the whole matter, carrying out experiments regarding the development of aircraft for a later naval air force.
allowed to manufacture a model of each one of the types which we might be able to use, whereas we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. That had been prohibited by the Government explicitly; and so it happened that as years went by this company was developing a number of aircraft types which we could use at a later stage when aviation would once more be permitted. pilots. That is to say, there were certain exercises during which ships would learn how to behave with regard to aircraft. When such a period of exercises occurred, when these youg, newly trained fliers were also used, then they were discharged from the Navy for that period. It is a small matter, but formally it was always carried out. book 10-A on page 104. It is a letter from the Reich Defense Minister von Blomber dated the 25th of October 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1933?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, Page 104.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, my page 104 says 1935.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg to apologize, but according to my list it should be on page 104.
THE PRESIDENT: How is it headed? Is it "Directives for the armed forces in case of sanctions"?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Sanctions are mentioned under Figure 1, but that is not the heading.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but it is signed "Blomberg." It begins, "Appendix to the Reich Minister for Defense."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, it must be'33 from the subject matter. It must be a misprint. I notice that Dr. Siemers' copy has got '33, and from the subject matter dealt with it must be '33.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
25th of October 1933. It is addressed, to the chief of the Army and Chief of the Navy and the Reich Minister for Aviation. Witness, had prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might become necessary because of Germany's renunciation of the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, perhaps you can briefly state your view. hadn't known of before. This directive appeared 11 days after we left the League of Nations, and it deals with defensive measures only in the event that because of that departure from the League of Nations there might be some sanctions by other powers against Germany.
It says under 2-C, first of all, "I prohibit any practical preparations." So that, to begin with, nothing was actually done following this directive, The Reich Minister for Defense was merely asking for my report regarding what should be done. the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely quiet. There was no need to assume that the case of a defense would even arise.
Q The words under figure "-A which say "preparation for possible sanctions" would show that this is merely a case for defense. That was 11 days before the document was written, That is known, and it has been mentioned by the Prosecution. It is contained on page 255 of the records of this trial.
We shall now come to document C-166. This is US Exhibit 48.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is in document book 10 on page 36. It is a document dated the 12th of March 1934, and it is written by a Naval Commander and refers to the getting ready of auxiliary cruisers, preparation of auxiliary cruisers. The Prosecution have only quoted paragraphs 1 and 2 of this document, and they have pointed out that according to it, auxiliary cruisers were to be constructed and were to be camouflaged as transport ships "O". contradicted, and I refer to Lohmann's affidavit, which is document Raeder Number 2, contained in my document book, Volume 1, page 5. I refer to the paragraph "The document 3166, submitted to me as a communication from the Naval Command Office, of the 12th of March 1934, deals with the preparation of auxiliary cruisers, which, as stated in the document, were to be known as transport ships "O". These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the stock of the German Merchant Marine according to the specifications given in the document, and were to be examined as to their suitability for this purpose.
Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the Merchant Marine,."
May I state at this point that in the English translation 'the word "Umbau" has been translated by the word "reconstruction." I have my doubts whether this is quite correct. I presume that the interpreter has now correspondingly tranlated it. It should be "conversion." I know the German word "umbau" has some connection to the English word "changes."
I continue to quote:
"The order to select such boats from German ship owners was also received at the Navy Office, Hamburg, where I was serving at that time." So far I quote Admiral Lohmann. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. Witness, is Lohmann's statement correct? Have you anything to add?
A No, I can only emphasize again that we weren't concerned with immediate construction but merely the selection of suitable ships, and that we were investigating the question of which alterations should be made before these ships could be used as auxiliary cruisers. e were concerned with the making of drawings, and, as stated under figure 12, these preparations or drawings should be ready by the 1st of April 1935. They were to be submitted to the Naval Command Staff, so that, if necessary, the ship concerned could be taken out in case of necessity and converted.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated two further sentences, The English version is very short and figure 11 is missing. This is the wording of figure 11, and I quote.
"Request is made that in cooperation 'K', to begin with, the suitable vessels should be selected, and that it should be ascertained how many 15 centimeter guns can be mounted to achieve the necessary broadside," and so forth.