This contains the word "selected", so that this isn't, as the Prosecution has stated, the construction of auxiliary cruisers but the selection of merchant vessels.
THE WITNESS: Yes, and the ships continued to sail for the Merchant Marine.
DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence which I find, unfortunately, is not in the English translation of the Prosecution is the following, and I quote:
"As long as there is only a restricted number of guns which can be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are only to be made for four transport ships. An increase of this number to brobably six will happen at at time when more guns are available, and until then the experiences regarding the preparation of the first auxiliary cruisers will have been made." and this shows the insignificance of the whole matter.
I now come to the document C-189, which is US-44. It is in document book No. 10 of the British Delegation, on page 66.
Please, will you state your attitude? I want to remind you that this is a conversation between you, Grand Admiral Raeder, and the Fuehrer in June, 1934, aboard the battleship Karlsruhe. which are mentioned in this brief document, which deals with the conversation you had with Hitler in June 1934?
The first question: Why did Hitler not want the increase in the displacement of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau to be known; why didn't he announce it, although, according to this document, these were defensive weapons and every expert would notice the displacement of these ships and, in fact, did see that? might do with the two armored ships D and E. After the expectant naval pact with England was concluded, these two ships, which Hitler had passed for my Navy in 1934 -- we realised that we should not continue to construct these armored ships, as such, since the material at our disposal could be used for more suitable purposes. American, or any other Admiralty would, without difficulty, be able to see, as soon as he sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, you ought not to put leading questions which put into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him, "isn't that so?"
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my questions differently.
THE WITNESS: My answer is different anyway. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Yes?
A First of all, here we are concerned with plans. I asked permission to alter the plans for these two armored ships, first, by strengthening their defensive weapons, that is to say, the armor plates; then, an increase of their offensive armament, namely, a third 28-centimeter tower. A new 28-centimeter tower was something which the Fuehrer was not vet willing to grant because, as I saidbefore, he did not, under any circumstances, want to disturn the negotiations going on with Great Britain.
To begin with, therefore, he only permitted a medium displacement of some 18,000 to 19,000 tons. We were quite aware of the fact that if the point had come where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, then the displacement would be 25,000 to 26,000 tons. because it is customary in the navy that constructions of new ships should be announced as late as possible. That was the principal reason. high speed which is mentioned, did not want to draw the attention of the countries abroad to those constructions. However, apart from that, any reason not to announce these things did not exist.
Q Please, will you come to figure 2 of the document? That has been particularly held against you by the prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose England later on. program our example. The French Navy was developing the Dunkirk type, with 38 centimeter guns and high speed, at the time that we had made that our example. Particularly, as you will hear later, according to Hitler's views, arming against England was out of the question. It was our intention to reconstruct these two armored ships by building anti-aircraft ships with 28 centimeter guns for high speeds. However, we heard that the King George type was being designed in England, which had 35.6 centimeter guns, and which were stronger, therefore, than the French type.
That is why I said, "We shall, later on, anyhow, have to depart from taking the French types as an example and work with reference to England with their 35 centimeter guns."
There is an error in the translation regarding "oppose England". It says, in my text, that developments should be coordinated with the British developments. That means that we should design our boats in accordance with the English ships. But even that was out of date shortly afterwards, because France was now building ships with 38 centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would, build ships with 38 centimeter guns. That was the Bismarck later on.
The Word "oppose" doesn't make sense at all, at a time when we were aiming at an agreement with Britain, which would mean that under no circumstances could we have any fight with England.
equally important by the prosecution, and I quote:
"Fuehrer demands keeping the construction of U-boats complete secret, with reference to the plebscite being considered in the Saar."
A The Fuehrer's wish to keep submarine construction and preparation secret is something I have mentioned before. This is the point where he was most sensitive, because under no circumstances did he wish these negotiations to be disturbed. It was quite generally the case that during all that period he was very cautious and would not do anything, under any circumstances, which might interfere with this naval pact which he was anxious to conclude.
Q I don't quite understand the reference to the keeping secret of submarines. They weren't being built, were they?
A No. This is the keeping secret of the preparations, you see. It is merely a brief way of expressing that.
Q We now cone to document C-19, which is US045. It is in document book number 10 of the British Delegation, on page 67. This is a conversation between Hitler and Raeder on the second of November 1934 aboard the Emden. you, according to which he wished speedy reconstruction of the Navy up to 1938, and that, in an emergency, he would get Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of the Navy some one hundred and twenty million marks from the Laborer's Front.
Did you have anything to do with raising funds for rearmament?
A. I can't hear.
Q. Can you hear now?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. This document, as I said, mentions one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty million, which Hitler was going to place at your disposal through Ley. Did you have anything to do with raising funds for the rearmament of the Navy?
A. No, not actually the raising of sunds. I was applying for finances from the Minister of Defense for the Reich, who would pass such finances on to me. I presume that this statement was made because the allotment which had been granted for the Navy appeared too small to me. Then came the Fuehrer's statement that in an emergency he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich Minister of Defense.
Q. Although the accusation of the prosecution does not appear quite clear to me, I want to come back to this figure once more. I want to point out that an armored cruiser of the old, small, 10,000-ton type, cost seventyfive to eighty million. How was this figure of one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty millions large enough to place the Navy in a position to. carry out large-scale armament?
A. Well, it isn't true. Apart from those two armored cruisers there were two battleships which were under construction, so you can imagine how the costs increased.
Q. So that this total figure is not decisive?
A. No, it is not a decisive one.
Q. Will you pass on, then, to figure 2 please? According to this figure 2 of the document, you had pointed out to Hitler during this conference that possibly, during the first quarter of 1935, six submarines might be constructed or assembled.
Q. The reason whi I said this was because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 the freedom for the armed forces, without any restriction, was being aimed at. I thought that perhaps this might create a critical situation and sanctions, something which Hitler always expected. suggested that if any particular steps for a defense would be necessary should the situation become critical, then six submarines should be previously assembled, which would normally be assembled later. Parts were to be used which would be obtained abroad.
Q. Did Hitler actually give the order?
A. No. The order was not given.
THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then we shall turn to document C-159 and that is US-54. This document may be found in the document book of the British document 10-A, page 110. This document is dated the 2nd of March 1936, the document written by von Blomberg, and deals with the demilitarization zone. Did you, witness, carry out long preparation for the action which took place on the 7th of March 1939? Will you please pause between question and answer. liar to me only through the document of the 2nd, of March. I would like to point out and refer you to figure "6", where it says that in order to preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military secutiry or advance measures are not to be taken without my express orders; therefore, it was shown that the entire action was to have a peaceful character. book of the British Delegation 10, page 128. This document deals with a memorandum of the suprem command of the Wehrmacht, the OKW, to the commander in chief of the navy, dated 1936 and it seems to be from the 6th of March 1938, as shown from the wording; therefore, it deals with the same subject matter as a document mentioned before this. May I please have your opinion and attitude on this?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me the page again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL*FYFE: 128-A, my Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. BY DR. SIEMERS: connaissance on the 6th of March was to take place; that is the day before the occupation of the Rhine. That would be, air reocnnaissance above the North Sea was to take place and the decision whether U-boats were to be used as a means of reconnaissance, that decision he was to roach the next day; thereupon, I issued an order on the 6th of March 1936 and decreed a special-
Q I beg your pardon. I would like to point out that the order by Raeder, on the 6th of March 1936, is appended to the same document; therefore, it is at the disposal of the High Tribunal.
It is verbatim. Please continue. planning of the channels to be used by the U-boats in the bay on the 7th of March and I pointed out especially that it was to be avoided, that a wrong picture was to be given of the intentions of the Fuehrer and to make more difficult the nature of this peaceful action. of the 6th of March 1936, may be found under Figure 5. It is the last few lines action was to take place.
Q Were those large preparations?
DR. SIEMERS: Then we shall turn to the last documents which deal with the same topic of Versailles and rearmament, document C-135, equal to GB-213, to be found in document book 10, page 20. That is the document book of the British Delegation, book 10. This has the heading: History of the KD." That is the war organization and mobilization plan. This dates from the year 1938. This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave accusation is brow forth thereby, because the document says that Hitler had put the demand that within five years, that up until the 1st of April 1938, he would create a Wehr macht which would serve as a political instrument of power and also, since this document mentions, establishment organization, 1938 and have the final objective of the KD, of the war organization. With special consideration for the significance of this point, I asked Vice-Admiral Lohmann to give us his position and attitude to this rather technical question. We are dealing with Raeder Exhibit No.2, in my document book Roman I and Roman III, page 5. I believe that here there is a misunderstanding in the concepts as used by the prosecution. The concepts "Kriegsgliederungs" and "Aufklarungsgliederung" have been misunderstand and I ask permission to read this affidavit in conjunction with my documents, and I quote Roman III:
Order of Initial Distribution, that is Aufstellungsgliederung, AG, and Order of Battle, Kriegsgliederung, KG, I would like to add that because of reasons of simplicity, since C-153 and 135 belong together I have treated them together. Therefore, I would like to make this statement for the record, that 153 is US-43, and may be found in British Document Document Book 10-A on page 107. It has the heading "Armament plan for the Third Armament Phase. It is a rather long document and is dated the 12th of May 1934.
"The above named documents, submitted to me, deal with the order of initial distribution, the order of battle, the mobilisation-plan and the armament-plan. The first 3 plans or respective orders of distribution have essentially the same these, and differ only in their manner of composition The armament-plan differs from the other plans in as much as it deals only with new construction and the required new materials, and is hence less extensive.
"The German Navy, like all the armed forces -- and no doubt the armed forces of every nation -- made such plans in order to be able, in case of a conflict or of war-entanglements, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat on hand. Due to the change of conditions, military developments, change of personnel, and the advances in the techniques, such plans were newly revised every year. An essential part of these preparations self-evident for any armed forces, consisted in the order of initial distribution, mobilisation - or battle order, which gave a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defences and their tactical subordination, as well as of all war-material on hand and material to be secured within set time limits, or to be increased or newely organised. The military command based all its operative contemplations upon this order of battle, Kriegsgliederung, K.G., while the political leadership judged from it the possibilities according to the number and strength of the available military means.
"The order of battle always had to be prepared with very much foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy, the OKM, usually 1 1/2 years before it was to go in effect, so a to enable the responsible offices to begin in time with the necessary preliminaries such as placing financial requests with the Navy-Budget-Office, requests for materials, steel, iron etc.
, in so far as all this was not already provided for in the peace.-time expansion of the navy.
"When Hitler in 1933 in his Five-Year-Plan, demanded an armed force by 1 April 1938, which he could throw into the balance as an instrument of political power, the initial order of distribution of 1938, the Aufstellungsgliederung, was worked out independently of the yearly planned initial order of distribution, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities not yet exhausted, of the Treaty of Versailles and with supplementing the naval force with craft which was not limited in type or number. After the Naval Fact of 1935, the planned order of battle 1938 was replaced by an "order of battle, final goal", K.G. Endziel, in which the number of warships on hand and those to be built of all types was to be in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually on hand in the English Fleet. In consideration of the monetary and material possibilities, the capacity of the shipyards and the long time required to build large warships, this final goal was in the meanwhile set for the year 1944-45.
"There remained always the possibility to shift it again, depending on the building program of the English Fleet.
"The various terminologies have only a naval technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans." text. The word "terminierungen", translated "terminology" is, in my opinion, not correct. Instead of being translated by the word "terminology, it should most likely be "terms" or "termination". BY DR. SIEMERS: Lohmann correct and how can you supplement this basic point of view. on this matter. All these expositions are, in my opinion, preparations which are taken and have to be taken in every war navy if it is to be equipped according to plan and be ready for use. 135, page 1, under Figure 2 -- that because the tension between Germany and Poland became more critical, it forced us to use a practical instead of a theoretical preparation for war, and that was interpreted to mean that at some period of time -- I believe in the year 1930 -- we planned an aggressive war against Poland. objective, an attack of Poland on East Prussia, and could not go beyond that. That was the objective of the work which we carried through, in case of an attack by Poland. At that time, an aggressive war against Poland or anyone else by the very weakly armed German forces would have been utter nonsense. I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first of all was the end figure of the Ship Armament Plan Phase 1, and these armored ships were to be built in '36 and '38.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to call your attention to the fact that this was Raeder Document No. 7.
A (Continuing): Then Hitler decreed a Five -Year Plan, which incidentally ran from 1933 to 1938. The KG was to be set for the year 1938. Then the KG Endziel was set for the year 1944-45, and the reason for the setting of this date was, as it is set down in this document, the part that you have just read, that we needed that time for financial and material capacity to build large ships. This was not a period of time in which aggressive action was planned. Engliah Naval Agreement, is that correct?
Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. When it was said that from then on a new plan was set up, it meant thereby that it was in accord with the German-English Naval Agreement? be understood and interpreted in that way, as saying "a new navy in accord with the German-British Naval Agreement?"
1933. with national socialism before 1933? for the first time and talked to him for the first time. It was at the occasion of a festivity given by General von Blomberg at the home of the chief of the general staff, von Hammerstein, in the evening, and at which occasion the Reich defense minister, General von Blomberg, Hitler, the older generals who were in leading positions, and other generals were to be present.
Later I shall return to this occasion. But before that time, I had no connection whatsoever with national socialism. I knew only Admiral von Klewetzow; I had known him from the first world war. He had been on the staff of Admiral von Scheer, with whom I had many social connections, and who at a rather early date met Hitler. matters and had a surprisingly large knowledge of these matters. On the other hand, I do believe that von Klewetzow had talked to Hitler about his opinion of the navy. But beyond that, I had no other connections. office, even though you had no correction with national socialism? commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, had called the leader of the largest party to be Reich Chancellor, I believe that if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to resign or had any intentions of resigning because he had called in a new chancellor, that he would without doubt have considered that an insult, and, indeed, would have dismissed me. I did not have any occasion at all to ask my superior to be relieved of my military position just because he in his capacity as Reich president had called in a now Reich chancellor.
directives about political matters? after the dinner at the home of General von Hammerstein. Before the dinner, I had met him, and after the dinner he gave a speech. He was accompanied by the foreign minister, Mr. von Neurath. There were no other party members present. and spoke about the fact that he wanted equal rights for the German Reich. He wanted to recapture the equal rights, but also mentioned the fact that he would try to rid the country of the shackles of the Versailles Treaty, to r estore national sovereignty to Germany within; and he also discussed his social aims, the establishment of a true community among the people, and the aims that the standard of living of the workers was to be increased, that agriculture was to be promoted, and that unemployment was to be eliminated; he emphasized especially -- and this seems to have been his main point -that the entire policy -- that is, domestic as well as foreign policy -- was to be in his hands alone, that the Wehrmacht was not to have anything to do with this at all, that the Wehrmacht was not to be used in domestic unrests, and that he would have other forces to deal with these matters. that it could develop into that factor which would be necessary in order to prevent the Reich from becoming or being the "football" of oahte nations; and for that reasonit would be necessary for the Wehrmachtto devote its entire work in the coming years to the preparation of its main objective, the training for the defense of the country, so that, if necessary it could use its force. In that way, the Wehrmacht would be the only bearer of arms, and in that structure there was nothing to be changed.
It was rather a large circle that was gathered there. As far as belligerent or war intentions were concerned, they were not even mentioned. He mentioned Vice President von Hindenburg, and appointed him as commander - i chief of the Wehrmacht with special honors.
And one got the impression that he respected and honored very much this man who was honored throughout the land. and gave to the chief of the army and the other chiefs. the navy, and what was the basic position taken by Hitler at this occasion; that is, his position towards the navy? who was my superior, who was the Reich defense minister. I reporte d a very few days after this, but I cannot recall the exact date. coming leadership of the navy. I told Hitler first of all about the position of the navy, about the rather small navy due to the Versailles Treaty, about the rather small power that it had, and about the political incidents, such as theTreaty of Washington, London, 1938, and then the Disarmament Conference; and about all of these matters he had been completely advised. policy was to be put at the disposal of the navy. I remember these words especially well. entanglements with England, Japan, or Italy, but above all not with England. And he wanted to document this by the fact that he would try in an agreement with England to establish the power ratio of the German navy versus the English navy. Through this step, he wanted to show that once and for all he wanted to give England the right in her dominating world interests, because of her interests all over the world, to have naval dominance. The German navy would have to be only in the framework of a European continental background; and the German navy would have to be developed only to that extent.
the navy. The actual ratio of power between the two navies was not discussed at this time; rather, it was discussed later. and it afforded extraordinary satisfaction, for it meant that we were now excluded from a senseless rivalry with the first sea power, and I saw the possibility of a solid and a gradual construction of our navy. joy and with much understanding; and later the same understanding met the Russian pact. The naval agreement meant a wonderful development. this was a going back. But this limitation was accepted with a great understanding by the majority of allGermans.
Q Grand Admiral, how did you personally stand toward Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years? How did Hitler act toward you? who had tremendous will power, who was a master in the art of dealing with people and treating people, and according to my observation in the first years a very great politician, and who because of his national and social objectives, which I have already named, had -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this might be taken more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others.
DR. SIEMERS: By that you mean the injecture of his relationship to Hitler at this point, the Tribunal considers that irrelevant?
THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.
DR. SIEMERS: I ask you to br brief, please, Grand Admiral.
THE WITNESS: I would like to show only in this connection with Hitler just why at no period of time I left him, which is an accusation against me by the prosecution, the fact I did not leave Hitler. The first steps which he undertook in domestic politics, as well as foreign politics, created without doubt a great wonder for his political craftiness and also brought forth the hope that since as he was taking the first step without less of blood, and without entering into political intrigue, he would be able to leade us peacefully -
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out, as to this quality or power of Hitler's ability by nearly every one of the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler's qualities, that is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.
THE WITNESS: Very well. Then I should like to say only in the first year I had no cause to give any reason to think whether I should remain in my position or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Grand Admiral, at a later time we shall deal with this. Therefore, we shall now leave this point according to the wish of the Tribunal, to ask you, but briefly, how did this naval agreement of 1935 come about. I am referring to Raeder Exhibit No. 11, in the Document Book, Roman Numeral I, page 59.
This document contains the naval agreement in the form of a letter of the German Foreign Minister to the British Government. The letter contends it was established on the British side, as is shown by the introductory words: "Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you were so good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the following:"
On the part of the British the following statements were made:
"During the last few days the representatives of the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. I now have much pleasure in notifying your Excellency of the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations that the future strength of the German Navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that the agreement which they have now reached with the German Government, and which they regard as a permament and definite agreement as from to-day between the two Governments"
THE PRESIDENT: This is a well known document and the Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It isn't necessary to read it all.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. small "f", on the part of the British Government it was recognized that as far as submarines were concerned, Germany was permitted to have the same number as Britain. At that time that was about 52,000 tons. That was more than a hundred U-boats. The Government of the German Reich obligated itself solely to be satisfied with forty-five per-cent of the total U-boat tonnage of the United Kingdom.
as a peaceful development on the part of the Germans and was that hailed in the Navy
AAs I have already said it wa*---*et with great satisfaction.
DR. SIEMERS: Since an attitude dating to previous years has more weight than a declaration which is made here and now, I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 12, Document Book Roman Numeral I, page 64. This document deals with a writing by Grand Admiral Raeder for the construction of the Officers Corps. This is dated 15 July, 1935. It is dated sometime after the naval agreement was signed. At that time Raeder said and I quote the second paragraph:
"The agreement resulted from the decision of the Fuehrer to fix the ratio of the fleets of Germany and England at 35:100. This decision, arrived at after deliberations on European politics formed the point of departurefor the London conferences. This decision was imperturbably adhered to and our demands were all together met. The underlying purpose of the Fuehrer's decision is the will to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany and England for all future times, and, consequently, to exclude naval rivalry between the countries forever."
And the sentence on page 66 is also important. The rest I wish the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of.
"Throughthe agreement the construction of the German Navy to the extent fixed by the Fuehrer was formally approved of by England."
Then comes the actual tonnage. when I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which shows the position and attitude of the British at the time:
"In the political sphere this agreement is of importance since it represents the first stop in a practical understanding, and because it brought about the first step to relaxation of the inflexible front up to now kept up against Germany by our former Allies, which was demonstrated recently at Stresa in particular vigor." followed in the next years?
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 13. This is a document which makes it possible for me to dispense with testimony here in Court of Vice Admiral Lohman. In Document Book I, page 68, this Document is entitled: