"The Now Plan for the Development of the German Navy", and it is a basic piece of work.
It is a report on the part of Vice Admiral Lohman, who in the summer of 835, gave that speech at the Hanseatic University at Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this Document and it's vital points, and since this is a basic work which was engaged upon, and officially requested, I should like to quote the following only: Admiral Lohman sets forth first of all that because of the freedom of the armed forces the navy no longer had to adhere to limitation but that Hitler then insisted on this copy fromwhich I now quote to you verbatim:
"The Fuehrer, however, chose another way. He preferred to negotiate on the state of German Naval armament direct with Britain which, as our onetime enemy" - I beg your pardon, I am quoting from page 70 - "has tried for years to show an understanding for our difficult position." were misleading:
"The more surprising then was the ratification of the treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments,and did not, like some armament treaties of former times, leave more embitterment than understanding in its trail. The sense of fairness, which British statesmen, along all the often very dirty paths of higher politics, have not lost, broke through in view of the unreserved uprightness of the German declarations, the worthy decision of the German representatives and the passionate will for peace, whichinspire the speeches and acts of our Fuehrer. Unlike former times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and recognition. And this has been acknowledged by us as a sign of an honest preparedness to understand. Hardly less valuable than the attitude of the official leaders are the voices from the circles of British war-veterans. For example: When, In November, 1918, the German Fleet was taken by British Squadrons to be interned in Scapa Flow, the British C-in-C Fleet, Lord Beatty, the great enemy of our Cruiser Admiral H ipper, gave the famous signal: Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible beast,' this C-in-C Fleet expressed on several occasions his dislike for Germany. But on 26th June, the same Beatty stated in the House of Lords: 'I am of the opinion that we should thank the Germans, They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the comparative strengths of 35:100. " "If they had offered other proposals we could not have prevented them.
It is truly and in fact a thankful fact that there is at least one country in the world whose competition in armament we do not have any need to fear." was set at 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution document C.23. It is of a certain importance that in this document next to the words "battleship 35,000 tons" the words "Panama Canal" are mentioned. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not a significant and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons because of the Panama Canal, because if there had been any larger tonnage the Panama Canal would have had to be made larger. I shall return to this point later, since this limit of 35,000 tons was not maintained. mentioned of 52,700 tons, as the proof that this was the point of departure for comparison with German U-boats. It is a matter of history and it is set down here that France did not participate in this limitation and at that time had 93,000 tons, from the lightest U-boat. 96 ready and 15 were in the dock. It is also know to history that Germany -- and this is shown on the same pagealways wanted to do away with U-boats. They agreed to an elimination, since 315 had to be destroyed after the first World War. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Grand Admiral, did the agreement with the British as is shown through these documents, did this show itself in other connections?
A. I tried to maintain a good agreement like this and to express my views to the British Navy and this took place, for instance, when through an English News agency through a phone call the death of the Admiral of the Fleet Jellicoe was made known to me. He served as the head of the Fleet in the first World War and he had been our opponent, and a very noble one. Through this agency I gave a message to the English fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the issues we have to consider.
THE WITNESS: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding with the British Navy in the future and to maintain this good understanding. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. On the 17th of July 1937 there was a further German-English Naval agreement, It was signed on that d . I am submitting this document as Raeder Exhibit Number 14, Document Book I, Page 81. This is a rather lengthy document which has been translated and printed in the document book only in part, and in order to understand the infringement which the Prosecution accuses us of I have to refer to several points contained in this document. This agreement concerns the limitation of the naval armament and the exchange of information concerning naval construction and expansion. In Article 4 we find the limitation to 35,000 tons for battleship, a limitation which we have already mentioned; and in Article 11 and 12, articles which are shown, I will not read because of the technical character but which I ask the Tribunal to take note of -- these articles set forth the oblications on the part of both governments to provide annual programs of their vessels, and that is to take place within the first four months of each calendar year. the annual program is to be stated, and four months before the launching of the ship, information is to be given out. In order to understand this matter, that is, the naval agreement, and the accusations made against the defendant in this connection, I would like to refer to Articles 24 to 26. The three articles show -
THE PRESIDENT: Summarize these articles.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. I just want to quote a point or two from them. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. In these articles the conditions and stipulations are mentioned according to which one of the two partners to the agreement could deviate from the agreement. Therefore, from the beginning it was considered competent to deviate from the agreement according to certain conditions. Under Article 24 if one of the partners was to be involved in a war, according to Article 25 in case another power, for instance the United States or France or Japan, and were to build a vessel or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in this agreement -- and in this article it says expressly under Figure 4 and refers to the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, -- one was bound, if there was any deviation, to notify their partners.
According to Article 26, this shows the general basis for a deviation from the agreement in case it would be required by national security, I any such consideration obtained, it was possible to deviate. Details are not necessary at this point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The deviation is subject to notification of the other party under sub-article 2. It was just relevant on 26, any deviation is subject to notification to the other party of the deviation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe -
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement was broken?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. To the remains just made by Sir David I would like to say that I referred to the fact that a deviation was permitted under these con tions but that the obligation was present that the other partners were to be n tified. Perhaps that did not come through before. BY DR. SIEMERS: under the same point of view which you have already stated. Are any other fact remarkable? Facts which relate to the agreement? had made with other powers -- these treaties had expired as I remember, and th and the circumstance that we in 1937 were asked to join the treaty which had * made by all of these powers, this fact of being invited meant that Germany fr* now on would be included into the frame-work of these treaties.
DR. SIEMERS: There seems to be a technical disturbance. I do not get the German on my mike. Neither does the witness, Neither do the court reporters.
(A short recess was taken.) BY DR. SIEMERS: this German- English Naval Agreement, and this is found in the document C-23, equal to U.S.49; in Document Book 10. Page 3 of the British Delegation. This document is dated 18 February, 1938, It has been mentioned repeatedly in this proceeding and reads, at the beginning: "The true displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" and "F/G" exceeds by 20% in both cases the displacement reported to the British." Then we find a list which shows that the "Scharnhorst" was given as 26,000 tons but the actual displacement was 31,000 tons, and in the depth that was given there was a difference of one meter. The "Bismarck" and "Tirpitz" were reported as 35,000 tons but had an actual displace ment of 41.700 and there is a difference of 8 centimeters. Therefore, according to what we have seen, there is a clear infringement or violation of the Treaty. Grand Admiral, I am assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the Treaty? which we had to consider, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck and Tirpitz -
THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things to the Tribunal making ststements instead of asking questions of the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating my documentary evidence to bring about a transition so that one could follow the story. I was about to put the question, and my question was: The four battleships mentioned, at the time of this document was drawn up, were they in actual service?
Q None of these battleships?
DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I should like to refer to the fact that I have the exact dates of the putting in service of these ships, facts which would be hard for the witness to testify to. This is from an affidavit by Lohmann -
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You can't state them without proving them.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I am ready to do that, Your Honor.
I am referring to Raeder Exhibit No. 2, which has been submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, Page 5 of Document Book 1, Page 8. I quote "The German Navy, within the bounds of the German-English Naval Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. As far as I can still determine with certainty the dates for the laying down, launching and commissioning, I am stating them herewith. "Scharnhorst" - laying down cannot be ascertained with certainty; launching, 3 October, '36; commissioning, 7 January, '39. "Gneisenau" - laying down cannot be ascertained by me; launching, 8 December, '36; commissioning, 31 May, 1939. "Bismarck" - laying down. 1936; launching, 14 February, 1939; commissioning, 2 August, 1940. "Tirpitz" - laying down, 1936; launching 1 April, '39; commissioning, 1941" Exact date cannot be ascertained by Admiral Lohmann. I would like to mention that the other ships mentioned under C-23 were each planned but in the summer of 1939 were broken up, and that applies only to the first letter "H". There were no actual final preparations. determine how this violation is to be considered. The prosecution has said that this violation of the Treaty was criminal for it contained intentions of aggression. In order to save time, since there are technical problems involved, before I question the Defendant further I would like to refer to my documentary proof, which I am referring to with the permission of the High Tribunal, that Raeder Exhibit 15 is now being submitted by me, and, in my opinion, we can see from it that there were no intentions of aggression present here.
Raeder Exhibit No. 15 is an affidavit -- I beg your pardon -- it is Document I, Page 94. This document deals with an affidavit which was deposed at Hamburg on the part of Dr. Ing. h.c. Suechting, and this document is important for the reputation of Document C-23, and for that purpose, to refute, I should like to quote:
"Iam the former ship building director of the ship-building-yard of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1907 to 1945, and I am conversant with all the questions of construction of capital and merchant ships, especially as engineer I was informed in detail about the construction of capital ships for the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law, at Hamburg, presented to me the document C 23, dated 18 February 1938, with the request to express my opinion about it. From this document it can be seen that the Navy-contrary to the prior agreement -- informed the British about the displacement and the draught of the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and in addition of some more designed capital ships of about 20% less than they naturally had. In order to explain why this information was given, I state the following: I believe the information given to the British, that according to Naval Agreement 4, had to be given four months before keel was laid down, was based upon the fact that the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the beginning were designed to be constructed with the given displacement of 26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters, and the capital ship F("Bismark") with a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7.90 meters. If these capital ships were later built with a greater displacement and a greater draught, these changes were made upon orders or requests of the Navy that appeared during the working out of the plans and had to be fulfilled by the construction office. The changes were based upon the viewpoint again and again pointed out by the Navy, to construct the capital ships in such a way that would become as nearly as unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage was meant to increase the offensive power of the ship --"I beg your pardon, Mr. President. "The increase of the tonnage was meant not to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for defensive and protective purposes." I should like to offer that in the English text there is a mistake in translation. In this text the word "Not", n-o-t-, is missing. In the te xt it says: "The increase of the tonnage was meant--" and it should read: "was not meant". "As for capital ships, the Navy increasingly in the course of time made a point of having the body of the ship divided into more compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible and the protection -- in case of water flooding the ship-as good as possible.
Therefore the new battleships were built with a great width, very many bulk-heads, with only about ten meters distance, and many length-and transverse bulk-heads outside the torpedo bulk head. At the same time the strength of the vertical, as well as the horizonatl armour, as far as I am informed, are greater and divided on wider spaces, as is used by other navies. In order -
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It doesn't matter what the technical reasons are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do believe that when we are concerned with a violation of a Treaty, a violation which is known to be a fact, it is correct to show just how the violation took place. I do not believe that in each and every violation of a treaty one can say, that is a war crime. The point is whether this violation of the Treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter and therefore occurred with the intention to carry on aggressive wars. A harmless violation which, in the final analysis, takesplace in every commerce, that can not be a crime.
THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. In fact you have already read the material parts.
Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect to be?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge that accurately, but I would judge that I shall be able to conclude sometime tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude at noon, but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration that I must include my documentary proof in my testimony and this documentary proof will be dealt with in this connection in my case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopesthat you will make your presentation as short asyou possibly can. We have already been so long a time over this Defendant.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 16 May 1946)
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, first I make a formal request, and will ask that I may have a second secretary here in the courtroom. She was here this morning, but she was just told she could not come into the courtroom, and she is outside the door now.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. BY DR. SIEMERS: Suechting; is it true and by what process was the thought or idea based to enlarge the battleships by about twenty percent? that time when we were beginning on the construction of the battleships again. When we could see that we would have a very small number of battleships, the thought arose that we should increase the unsinkability of the ships asmuch as possible in order to make the battleships as strong as possible. We had nothing to do with stronger armament, or anything like that; only the unsinkability and resistance against shots. strengthen the divisions of the ship, and the space within the ship. This meant a great deal more of iron had to be built into the ships, thereby, the draft and the displacement were made greater. This was unfortunate from my point of view; so we had projected the ships with a comparatively small draft, because then the lines of the draft ere extremely shallow, whereas, ships with a deep draft could not go in and out in a tide. We wanted to build these ships with a small draft, and by building in these many now projects the draft became greater, and also the displacement. construction, partly because of the fact we had a comparatively slight experience in the construction of battleships?
A Yes. The designers in the shipyards of the Navy, and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had for a very long time not built any big warships. They lacked experience, and as a result these disadvantageous changes became necessary. I close this second phase. tonnage surpass the tonnage accorded by the Fleet Agreement? war.
Q Grand Admiral, in this connection I should like to refer to Raeder's Exhibit No. 8, which has already been submitted, document book No. 1, page 40, under Roman numeral II. This affidavit at the moment gives the comparative figures, which show how much battleship tonnage Germany had according to the Naval Agreement. Please take notice of it. I won't read everything, but the only important thing is that according to comparison with the English figures, Germany had 183,750 tons, at that time, and we had 3 armor cruisers with 30,000 tons, so that according to this affidavit we still had 153, 750 tons.
In Raeder Exhibit 127 I should like to submit a short correction, because, Grand Admiral Raeder, in looking through the affidavit, observe that ViceAdmiral Lohmann made a mistake in one figure.
The mistake is unimportant, but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary to point it out to Vice-Admiral Lohmann. difference not of 53,750 tons but of 149,750. We were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that the result is not changed. Thus, Admiral's Lohmann's mistake -- as the Tribunal knows -- is attributable to the fact that we were very limited in our statistical resources.
A May I add a sentence to what I said before? The indication of this displacement deviated from the terms of the treaty in so far as the original construction displacements were reported and not the draft and displacement which resulted in the course of the construction through these changes.
Q In addition, may I refer the Court to the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the Protocol of London, June 1938 -- I refer to Raedor Exhibit 16. My secretary has told me it isn't here at the moment; I will bring it up later. Court that Document C-23 is of February, 1938. This London Protocol at the suggestion of the British Government, the limitation for battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was changed because the British Government as well as the German Government realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the Protocol shows, effective 30 June, 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised to 45,000 tons. A few months later this difference in the battleships -- in Document C-23 -- was settled. in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents which the Prosecution admitted. In these speeches of Hitler's to the commanders-in-chief, I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document is 386-PS, US-25, in the document book of the British Delegation No. 10, page 18. It is Hitler's speech of the 5th of November, 1937.
Grand Admiral, did you ever see this document of Rossbach?
A No. I saw no document and no Protocol; and any speeches which Hitler made, no minutes were taken officially.
In later years -- I believe in 1941 -- stenographers were present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes but a taking-down in indirect discourse. It was written down five days after the speech itself, as I have heard. contrast to other documents it has no distribution. It was written down five days after the speech and is not even marked "secret". Can you explain where these minutes were set down?
A I don't know; I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept the minutes in his secret cabinet. or nine years. clearly seen, it contains references to a war of aggression. There is, for instance, a mention of "testament," of the problem of space, the enemies -England and France; it says that armament was almost completed; the first goal is to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria. happened that you did not ascribe such importance to the speech as, for example, Mr. von Neurath who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not seek a solution by force? influential group of Nazis met in order to examine the situation does not characterize the situation correctly. Hitler called together the persons mentioned in the document, to explain to them the political possibilities for development and in order to give them any instructions he might have.
And here I should like to say something general; There were a number of Hitler's speeches. I should like to comment on the type of his speeches. Hitler spoke a great deal. He went very far afield. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose, that depending on the listeners. Just as he was a master of dialectic, he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions, depending on the purpose. He let his imagination play. He contradicted himself frequently in successive speeches.
One never knew what his last goal and intentions were.
At the end of such a speech it was very difficult to decide that. As a rule, his speech made a greater impression on people who heard him very seldom than on those who knew his manner of speaking on such occasions. It was never a question of a consultation but as has been said, always in giving of orders without discussion. Goering said at the beginning -
Q Excuse me, that is at the beginning?
A Yes, at the beginning of the speech. He told me he had spoken with the Fuehrer beforehand. The Fuehrer wanted to spur on the Army to be a little quicker in rearmament. It was going too slowly for the Fuehrer. the object of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he said he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest date would be 1943-1945, that after that our situation would become worse. But the case could come up earlier under two conditions: In the first place, if the internal unrest occurred in France, in the event of a Mediterranean war -- which in my opinion was fantastic -in which England, France, Italy and I believe Spain would participate.
The assertion that the armament of army, navy, and luftwaffe was practically concluded in November, 1937, I could not understand.
The Navy had notyet a single battleship in service. It was similar with the luftwaffe and with the army. We were in no way armed for war and a war against England, for example, would have been made necessary. As for me, the decisive sentences in his speech were that first, England and France, I believe, have already gotten rid of Czechoslovakia; and, second. I am convinced that France and England would not interfere. In the third place, the fact that a few months before, in July, 1937, the second naval agreement had just been construed. These three facts seemed to me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution of these questions, Austria and Czechoslovakia, under any circumstances; but that he would strive for a peaceful solution. time Hitler wanted to change his policy; that he wanted to turn from peace policy to a war policy. I could imagine that Mr. von Neurath, who did not know the purpose of this speech, received a different impression. But, as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine that this exaggerated character of the speech was intended to force von Neurath out of the cabinet because I have learned that at that time there was already an inclination in the Fuehrer to replace von Neurath with von Ribbentrop; but that is only an assumption which I have had afterwards.
I concluded from this speech as fellows: The construction of the fleet in the proportion of one to three to England was to be continued, and from the relationship with England was said to be maintained. The agreement which has just been construed was to be observed. from the end, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and General Oberst von Fritsch, in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies. And then it is said:
"One sees that Blomberg and Fritsch were disturbed and the case occurred that they contradicted Hitler."
After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, who can unfortunately not be examined, and Fritsch, who is also dead, that they saw through this exaggeration of Hitler's and, therefore, pointed out the misgivings and wanted to exert some influence on him.
What was your talk to Blomberg about after this speech?
THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness' mouth what you want him to answer. If you want to -
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry I did so. It is a little difficult when the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. I only wanted to point out that they are not alive.
THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must get it from the witness, not yourself. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q What impression did Blomberg have after this speech? What did he say to you afterwards? that when the military men leftthe room. Blomberg, who was with the Fuehrer most often, said that had not been meant so seriously and was not to be judged so seriously. He believed that the Fuehrer would settle these questions peacefully, too. And, beforehand, as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and Fritsch had both called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that under no circumstances could England and France intervene since the German Wehrmacht would not be able to deal with them. objections because that was a daily occurrence. Whenever I met the Fuehrer, I told him, "We must remain on the course to avoid becoming involved with England." And the Fuehrer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is typical that Hitler, at the moment when the chief of the army command, General Oberst von Fritsch, said that in the winter of '37-'38 he would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt which he had planned for his health. The Fuehrer immediately took it back and said that the affair was not that urgent; he could go ahead and go on vacation, which he then did.
This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. That was the speech of the 5th of November, 1937. He did not crush either Austria or Czechoslovakia. Butin 1938, the question was settled peacefully, without bloodshed, and with the agreement of the other powers.
Q In this connection may I submit the document from thenext year, Raeder Exhibit No. 23, document book 2, page 127.
On 30 September, '38 -I need not say anything further about Munich because the defendant was not directly participating. -- Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement are considered symbols of the desires of both the people never again to wage war against each other. The rest of the contents are known. L-79; document book 10 of the British delegation, on page 24. The document, in spite of its astonishing length, was also read in full by the Prosecution so that I will not read from it. May I remind the Court, though, that it mention further successes could no longer be achieved without bloodshed. On the 23rd of May, 1939, Poland and Danzig was not the object but lebensraum.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the reference? The reference we got was document book 10, page 24.
DR. SIEMERS: 74.
THE PRESIDENT: 74, was it?
DR.SIEMERS: Yes.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. It speaks of the extension of lebensraum. The Polish problem can not be separated from an altercation in the west. Thereupon Hitler said that the decision remained to attack Poland at the best opportunity. Unfortunately, this is again a document which is undated.
Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this report?
A. No, I can not say.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date when the document was prepared. There is only the date of "Minutes of Conference of 23 May." In the case of Hossbach the conference was on 5 November, but it was written down five days later from memory, on 10 November. In the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written down after one day, five days or four weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of 5 November was written down five days later?
DR. SIEMERS: No, the document of 5 November shows that it was prepared five days later. The document is dated at the top Berlin 10 November 1937, Notes on the Conference in the Reichschancellory on 5 November 1937.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, the; there is evidence. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. In the case of Schmundt, there is no indication?
A. No.
Q. You do not know when it was written down?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see this document before this trial?
A. No.
Q. Does this document contain a correct reproduction, in all points, of Hitler' speech, or is it true what you said about the Hossbach document?
A. It is even more true. In my opinion, it is the most unclear document on a Hitler speech which is at all available. A large part of the statements in my opinion have no sense at all, as I will show. The adjutant wrote down that only the sense of the statements was taken down.
DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.
A. I should like to point out that the trial brief says in this case it does not reproduce the character of the speech correctly. The whole first part of the speech, as I said, is extremely unclear. In the 1937 speech, 1943 to 1945 was given as the latest date, and the remote possibility was given of an earlier date, Here Hitler speaks of fifteen to twenty years in which solution would be necessary. He says that Poland is still on the side of the enemy, in spite of the Friendship Treaty. "Her intention is to take advantage of any opportunity against us." For that reason, he wanted to attack Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem was inseparable from the conflict in the west, but a simultaneous conflict in the west could not be permitted. In the course of a German-Polish conflict, a war with the west would remain impossible. Then the battle would be against England and France. Then he says that we could not allow ourselves to be drawn into a war with England through Poland. A war on two fronts seemed impossible then as in 1914. The, again, England -- and that is comparatively new here -- is the mortar driving against Germany. We should prepare for a long war, aside from a surprise attack, apparently with reference to England. It is astonishing that we were to endeavor at the beginning of such a war to strike a destructive blow against England. The goal is to drive England to he knees.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be reading from a document an argument about this document. That is not giving evidence. If he can tell us anything about what happened at this meeting, it is open to him to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: He says that, with the aid of this document, on the complicated thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, he is pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler's speech at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the argument, to point out that there are conflicts between one part of the document and another. That is not the subject of evident He has already told us that Hitler's speeches -- that one speech generally contradicted another, but we can see for ourselves from the document if one part of it conflicts with another.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the unclear statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the witness that he says so and so many points are false? Then the whole tendency which we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand the witness, Hitler must have had another though in the back of his mind if he said such unclear things to the Commanders, but I believe we can shorten it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Grand Admiral, according to the wish of the Court. Just explain what the effect was on you and what the special thoughts are connected with this document was. At the end there is a second part in which a number of doctrinaire, academy thoughts on warfare are expressed, and they conclude by saying that it was also Hitler's wish that a study staff should be formed in the OKW which would work out all these plans for the preparation for war, evaluation of the various weapons, etc, eliminating the General Staffs, with which he did not like to collaborate. He wanted to have these things in his own hands. The formation of the study staff -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I have already told you that the Tribunal thi* that argument is not evidence. This seems to be purely argument upon this document. If there is anything in the shape of recollection as to what passed at this meeting, that would be evidence, but merely to argue upon the document is not in evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, may the witness not say what effect Hitler's processes of thought had on him?
THE PRESIDENT: Can you say that he did not understand or did not think it was sincere?
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to point out to the witness referred to this point because this was the only place where the Prosecution did not read this document. In this document, the sentence about the study staff, noticed immediately, were not read.
This study staff was what Hitler wanted to achieve. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, after this speech, was anything changed in your department?
A No. The conclusion which was drawn was, first, that the ship construction program was to be continued as in the past. Hitler said so himself. In the second place, he said that the armament programs were to be adapted to the year 1943-1944. That was the positive thing which I could take away from the meeting. himself made at the launching of the battleship "Bismarck" in Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the sharpest instrument of war, had to protect the peace of true justice. That was what made the greatest impression on me at that time. In regard to Hitler's intentions. It was completely incompetent , incapable -