THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: 28 November 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank You.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: You are welcome. As the Tribunal will see from Greece from the north.
Only from this letter is to compare how it was an GB-116.
It is a "Top Secret Directive." It is from an issue from Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, and initialed by the defendant, Jodl, dated 12 November 1940.
I may read the first two lines, and then pass to paragraph 4 on the third page:
"Directive No. 18.
following lines:"
its offensive against Egypt, we will read paragraph four on the third page:
"Balkans "In order to be able to face all eventualities and keep Turkey calculations of deployment.
It will not be possible to count on "So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations in accordance with the intended ground operations."
I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next That is a Directive issued for an actual attack on Greece.
Before reading Hitler in the Directive.
I will make it very short. I can use the words of the Reichsminister as reported:
"Morale of the Greek Army throughout, has done much to maintain it.
The relative power of modern facilities has at the point of abandonment.
The modern Greeks have thus shown that they taining their freedom."
In fact, the Italians were getting the worse of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue.
On quoting this Directive of 17 September 1940 which the Top Military Secret, Direction number 20:
Commander of the Navy, that would, of course include the defendant Raeder;
take it, would, rightly be the defendant Jodl. I shall read first the two paragraphs, and then summarize the next two, if I may:
"The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.
My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task (b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita) The support of Bulgaria is to be expected."
graph 4 is the operation Marita itself. You will perhaps read back:
"The Military preparations which will produce exceptional political necessary measures by the General Staff.
The transport through "Consultations with the Rumanians, or the Bulgarians which may point advanced parties."
I don't think I'll trouble you going over the rest. Referring to the next document, PS-448, which I put in as GB-118, is again a "Top Secret Directive" carrying the plan a little farther, but which deals with decisiv action of the Turkey forces, and of the Italians in Albania.
I read, if I "The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations de England against our allies."
what the duties of the German forces will be:
"a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an
b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:
in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army."
which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course a copy went to the Defendant Raeder, and I take it that for Intelligence it would probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General, Guzzoni, and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl Were present. if you would pass to Page 3 of the document there is a paragraph there in the speech which the Fuehrer made which is perhaps just worth reading, the speech by the Fuehrer on the 20th of January 1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the conference with the Italians and then shows who was present. Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl; and on the Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then the General.
It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read:
"The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose:
"a. An operation against Greece.
"b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.
"c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.
"Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.
"Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment."
I pass to the next document, PS-1746, which I offer as GB-120. That document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on the 8th of February. if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. document.
"Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command - General Field Marshal List - in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war." with the Bulgarians:
Paragraph 3: "The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.
"The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success of the military operations."
I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as GB-121. It is a further top secret directive of the 19th of February. I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2nd of March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the latest. actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel. moment. Bulgaria adhered to the three-power pact on the 1st of March-
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
COL. H. PHILLIMORE: Of 1941. And on the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the directives to which I have referred the Tribunal. with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His Majesty's Government, may have accelerated the movement of the German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time. in as GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records.
It is a short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention.
"The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?
COL. H. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?
COL. H. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. H. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted, that the Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to insure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their Italian allies. their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. In accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the three-power pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February, 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister CinkarMarkovic to the Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the next document in the bundle, PS-2450, which I put in as GB-123. If I might read from half-way down the page:
"Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
"At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes:
"'Mr. Prime Minister:
"'In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:
"'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.'" remember was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia, and in fact it was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order.
If I might read the second letter:
"Mr. Prime Minister:
"With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung), that in the agreement between the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory." that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, whilst Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler's own term in his letter to Mussolini, "Become disinterested" in the cleaning up of the Greek question. appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, PS-2765, which I put in as GB-124. That is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph:
"The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's joining the Tripartite Pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy venture." when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simowitsch and his colleagues effected their removal by a coup d'etat, and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend, if need be, its independence. The Yugoslav people found it so.
The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.
as GB 120, to the second part on page 3 of the document, consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia, dated March 27, 1941.
It shows that those present included the Fuehrer; Reich Marshall, of course the Defendant Goering; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht, Fuehrung Stab, that is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page later on the following persons were added. I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop.
If I might read the part of Hitler's statement set out on page 4:
"The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German."
I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:
"The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the Government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious." draw the Tribunal's attention:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.
"It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce.
"Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised in these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
"This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time." third paragraph, two days after the pact had been signed and the assurances given because there had been a coup d'etat, and it is just possible that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia is decided on without any question of taking the trouble to assert the views of the new Government. the document, which I would like to read.
"5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by waves."
I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this bombing was done, when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?
COLONEL H. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April. Part V, at page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by Defendant Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, page 6:
"In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory." the Defendant Jodl. put that in as GB.125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting, from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the 27 of March, recorded in PS.1746, Part II. It is worth reading the first paragraph.
"The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible."
I pass to the next document, PS-1835? which I put in evidence as GB-126.
It is an original telegram, containing a letter from Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop.
It is written to advise Mussolini of language the Duce is given his orders.
If I might read the first "Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the "(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece.
Considered "(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly together by mutual interests.
Unfortunately these endeavours produce any definite result.
Today's reports leave no doubt "(3) I don't consider this situation as being "(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all with necessary military means.
The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria.
Now I would operations in Albania in the course of the next few days.
I "These measures should not be considered as designed for "I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should "(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything anything about them.
These measures will completely lose their value should they become known."
I pass to R.95, the next document in the bundle, which I put in as GB-127.
It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney General.
It is merely an operational order, signed by General von contained in Directive No. 25, which was the document C-127, an extract from which I put in as GB-125.
I won't trouble the Tribunal with GB-114.
The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this "From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes.
"The documents published today afford"--that refers to the German 'White Book' which they published of all the documents leading up to the invasion--"The documents published "In the face of this I have always emphasized that:
"(1) The German people have no antagonism to the "(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate German living space.
We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south."
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's "In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it place between Germany and Serbia.
I have not only offered the and various Nations allied to Germany."
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as U.S. Exhibit No. 34.
It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November, 1943.
At page 4 there is a short on the action taken in April, 1941.
I refer to Paragraph 11 on page 4:
"What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which -- taking a long view of the matter -would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country."
If I might summarize the story; the invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting victim. course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece or at least, to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.
The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided, that irrespective of whether or not his Government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.
It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia's intentions when it would be so little trouble, now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously, with the formality of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British.
M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October. But, as I have the honor to conclude the British case, I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I can do it, I think, in five minutes. was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland. the night of April 8 - 9 and was well under way, as a military operation, before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning. than five o'clock, in most cases earlier, in the small hours of the 10th of May, whilst the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland, the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens.
In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of the 28th of October, in 1940, when his Minister in Athens presented a three hours ultimatum to General Metaxas. in the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia, no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event but a proclamation was issued by Hitler, a proclamation from which I read an extract, on five o'clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was bombed. five that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory. out is, in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own. the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short adjournment? That's what you were intending to do?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, we'll adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken from 1600 to 1610 hours.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take about fifteen minutes to offer two further documents relating to the aggression against Austria.