supplement to Document Book N. Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It roads:
"My Lord, "With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
"The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time."
to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
"Dear Reich Minister, "My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
"I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct H.M.G. - meaning the Majesty's Government - "in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.
"As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues."
I now offer Document 3287-PS, as U.S.A. Exhibit No. 128. to the British Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath's letter of response dated 12 March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter "L". British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria's independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:
"In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria's independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers".Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany's ultimatum.
Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events.
I quote the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I start at the bottom of page 1 of the letter:
"Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria's internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a now Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.
"This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the Gentian Government, as assorted in your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exorcise its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people."
presented to the Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant von Neurath is a hollow mockery of the truth. 1780-PS, USA Exhibit No.72, Jodl's diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Fuehrer wished to send an ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization orders were given. different documents. I refer to 812-PS, USA Exhibit No.61, Report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The portion reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to the Tribunal. of Goering's telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have already read to the Tribunal. clarity, that the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government, that it would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not resign, and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor. telegram came from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Goering composed the telegram and Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said "agreed."
The transcripts of Goering's telephone calls also included the telephone call between Goering and Ribbentrop, indicated as Part W of that document, in which the formula was developed and recited for English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.
find the same bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant von Neurath. He was at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach minutes, United States Exhibit 25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet, in the period after March 10, 1938, when he was handling the foreign affairs for this conspiracy -- and particularly after the invasion of Austria he played out his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, GB Exhibit 21. using the letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council, as the exhibit shows, reciting this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story also encountered by us in the transcript of the Goering-Ribbentrop telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the conspiracy. appropriate for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed chronologically, so that part of the case must wait its turn for presentation next week. wars of aggression, perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler's intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. account of the aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, our British colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual aggressive war.
In addition, they have laid before the Tribunal the story of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, and in doing so, the British prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various international treaties, agreements and assurances and the evidence establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.
but one of the defendants' acts of aggression, the invasion of the USSR. The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count I, Section 4 (f), Paragraph (6), German invasion on June 22, 1941 of the USSR Territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August, 1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we shall be concerned today. It reads:
"On June 22, 1941, the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR and without any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory, thereby beginning a war of aggression against the USSR." in document book marked "P", which we now hand to the Court.
First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take the date 23 August, 1939. On that date, just a week before the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the USSR, which is referred to in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty, Document Number TC 25, has been introduced in evidence by our British colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to the attention of the Tribunal. Article C 1 provided as follows:
"The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other Powers." the Contracting Parties, regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions. story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German Government by the defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy.
The explanation for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a witness than the defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information. This report we now have. It is number 1834-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 129, the original German document. for the Pact with the USSR. That is Page 4 of the German.
(Reading)
"Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia -a necessity for avoiding a two-front war." entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it is not very surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all treaties and pledges, as binding on than only so long as it was expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the USSR. set forth in our document L-172, already in evidence as USA Exhibit Number 34, the defendant Jodl admitted -- and I shall, read from Page 7 of the English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:
"Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East' -- that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you say Page 7?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I seem to have only five pages of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is numbered at the top of thepage.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from L-172?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. I thought you were reading from 1834-PS. Yes, go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: "Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East -- that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible." in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June, 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne, and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the USSR as a political factor and in the acquisition of lebensraum at their expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.
appear both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from the defendant Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already underway. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt of the OKW. to in the German documents by the abbreviation WR. RUE. in his draft of a work entitled "Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armament Economy," which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This book is our document 2353 PS and has already been admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA 35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification purposes. I now offer it in evidence as USA Exhibit Number 35. German Trade Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940. I read from page 9 of the English translation:
"On August 14, the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt, during a conference with Reichsmarshal Goering, was informed that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russions only until spring 1941. Later on, we were to have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demand. This illusion moved the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt to give priority to matters concerning Russian war economy."
preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will show that in November of 1940 Goering informed Thorns, that a campaign was planned against the USSR. Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the cute of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. the Counter-Intelligence Service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered. This directive is our No. 1229-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A.-130, a photostat of the captured German document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must hot be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:
"The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the Status shown on "These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East.
On the other hand, Russia will the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protekterat; she "For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer apply:
"1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the East of the army units there.
This change is to be explained by movements into "2) The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of "3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially "4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the anti "5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, etc.
, it "The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, etc.
, will be "The chief of the supreme command of the armed forces "by order of "signed JODL".outline of the Army's operational plan.
This order was contained in a top secret directive from the Fuehrer's headquarters, No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by JODL.
It is No.444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as GB-Exhibit No. 116.
The directive begins by saying:
"The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:"
read now from page 3, paragraph No. 5 of the English translation:
"Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being.
Irrespective of the results of these "Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me."
of the plans for the coming operation against the USSR. A report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured document No. 1799-PS.
bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the USSR. This folder was The report I am here referring to is Annex No. 1, and is dated I now offer in evidence Document No. 1799-PS as United States Exhibit No. 131.
I should also like to read into the record a few sentences from as they indicate the state of the planning for this act of aggression, six and a half months before it occurred.
"Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.
"The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad."
Then, skipping:
"The Fuehrer declares that he has agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following:
"The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich, and on the other hand the German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territory. In this way, we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible."
Then, skipping again:
"It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient."
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will sit again on Monday at 10:00 o'clock.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours, December 9, 1945.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that, the Tribunal wishes the Defendants' Counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.
At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the Defendants' Counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they propose to call, but they will be strictly confined to the names of the witnesses, and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In case there whould be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be posted up on the board in the Defendants' Counsel room so that you can study it there.
MR. SIDNEY ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of the aggression against the USSR where, with the campaign in the west at an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued to him as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa.
By the 18th of December, 1940, the general outline of the Army's operational plan, having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the high command of the Army, Navy, and the Airforce, for Barbarossa, directive No. 21, was issued. This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the Soviet Union was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word "Barbarossa" to denote this operation.
The Directive is No. 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the course of my opening statement, as USA Exhibit No. 31. Since it was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins, "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England."
On the same page it is stated, "Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
"Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack will not be recognized." intended invasion was to proceed, and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy and Air Force) were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief, closing as follows: "V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
"The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time."
"Signed by Hitler, and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible."
as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the Staff. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur, and which actually did occur. stood it as a order to prepare for action, and did not view it as any hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning, and operation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive. plementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January, 1941, indicated the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21, which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 132. formation concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part. I fell, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point, that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads:
"30 January 1941, Page 401 of the Diary.
"7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces."
I should note that "Ia" is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an idea of all.
I quote from the top of page 2 of the English translation:
"II. Objectives of War Against Russia.
* * * * "d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
"1) Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea." detailed thinking and planning, which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa, almost six months before the operation actually got under way. It is but another peice in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighbouring power in the history of the world. Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained in Document C-33, whihc I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit USA 133. for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English translation, and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
"In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations." progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume, which was the code name for the North African operation - Sunflower. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Johl; the Commander in Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder, as well as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant.