DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. SIEMERS:
QMr. von Weizsaecker, at the beginning of the war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office,is that correct?
AYes.
QYou will recallthat on the 3rd of September,1939 -- the first day of the war between Germany and England -- the English passenger ship Athenia was torpedoed northwest of Scotland. On this ship there were American passengers. The sinking of the ship naturally drew a great deal of attention and I should like to have you tell us how this matter was treated politically, and especially through you.
AI remember this incident. I am not certain, however, whether it was a British or an American ship. In any event, this incident alarmed me greatly at that time. I inquired of the SKL to determine whether a German warship was guilty in any way in the sinking. After I received the answer, "No," I spoke to an American, Mr. Alexander Kirk, and told the American charge d'affaires that a German man-of-war had not participated, was not guilty in the sinking of the Athenia. I asked the charge d'affaires to take cognizance of this fact and to cable to Washington as soon as possible to the effect that any such report was very important in our joint interests, that is in the interests of Germany and America.
Q Mr. von Weizsaecker, you had been in contact with the Navy before taking these steps?
AYes.
QDid you, at this first conversation, speak with Grand Admiral Raeder himself or did you speak with some other officer?
AThat is impossible for me to say, but I did receive the information. I am sorry I can't tell you as to this detail, but I did receive the answer that there was no German man-of-war involved and that satisfied me.
QIn connection with this affair, either on the same day or shortly thereafter, did you visit Grand Admiral Raeder and discuss this matter with him
AI believe I recall that, yes.
QDid Raeder on this occasion tell you that it could not have been a German U-boat since the reports coning in from the U-boats were to the effect that the distances were too great, that the distance would have been about 7500 miles?
ARaeder informed me to the effect that it could not have been a German U-boat. The details about the distance involved, the distance from the point of the sinking and the presence of U-boats, this may have been a fact which he mentioned, but I cannot tell you this with certainty today.
QAt this conversation with Raeder, did you, as well, talk about the fact that everything would have to be done in order to avoid a war with the United States, such as referring to incidents like the Lusitania in the first World War?
AMost certainly, yes, with emphasis, for at this time I recalled similar incidents from the First World War and I remembered these incidents very clearly. I called his attention to the urgent necessity to avoid any operation at sea which might in any way expand the war and, as I said in those days, any action which would have decreased the neutral substance.
QDid Raeder agree with your opinion?
ATo my firm recollection, yes.
QAre you convinced, Mr. von Weizsaecker, that Raeder gave you truthfu reports about the Athenia?
AYes, of course.
Q Now, on the 27th of September 1939, U-boat No 30 returned from its mission; that id it returned about three weeks after the sinking and the Commandant reported that by mistake he had sunk the Athenia.
He reported that he did not notice his mistake right away but afterwards through the various wireless messages. Now at the end of September Reader heard of this fact and discussed this matter with Hitler in order to determine what the course of action would be from now on. Hitler gave the decree to keep quiet, to maintain silence Of course, all of these matters have been discussed here already, and I would like to have you tell me whether you knew of these facts which were subsequent established; that is the sinking through a German U-boat, whether you received any knowledge of that?
ANo, not at all.
QDid you jear of Hitler's decree that you maintain silence; did you h about that?
ANo, not about that either.
QNow, I should like to submit to you Document No 3260 PS and I should like to have you look at it. This is an article entitled "Churchill Sinks the Athenia". That is taken from the Voelkischer Beobachter on the date of the 23rd of October 1939. Do you recall this article?
AYes.
QI should like to have you read it first.
DR. SIEMERS:Mr. President, in order to assist the High Tribunal, I would like to state this is GB 218. It is found in Document Book No 10, British Document Book 10, page 97, correction, page 99. BY DR. SIEMERS:
QMr. von Weizsaecker, you have read this article and I should like to have you tell us whether you recall this article, whether you recall having re it at the time?
AI do recall that this article appeared at that time.
QThen will you please tell me what was your attitude at that time when you heard about this article?
AI considered it as a piece of perverse imagination.
QThen you condemned this article?
ANaturally.
QEven though at that time you did not know that it was a German U-boat that sunk the ship?
AThe question of whether it was a German U-boat or not could have nothing to do with my judgement of the article.
QThen you considered that this article should be condemned even if it had not been a German U-boat?
AYes, of course.
QThe Prosecution asserts that Grand Admiral Raeder was responsible for the bringing about of this article and is accusing him very gravely on moral counts because of it, and the accusation is especially grave since, as we have seen, Raeder -- and contrary to your testimony -- at this time knew that it was a German U-boat which sunk the Athenia. Do you consider an action like this on the part of Raider as possible? Do you think that it might be -
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Siemers, you can only ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You can't ask him to speculate about what Raeder did.
DR. SIEMERS:I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believe that, according to the affidavit of Dietmann this morning, it would be possible for the witness to state his opinion; but I will dispense with the asking of this question. BY DR. SIEMERS:
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, did you at that time hear that Raeder was responsible for this article?
ANo, I did not hear that and if I had I would never have believed it. I consider that was out of the question entirely, that he would have been responsible for an article like that or would have written an article like that.
QTo your knowledge, could this article be traced back to the Propaganda Ministry?
AI can only answer that question negatively. It is not to be traced back to Raeder and not to the Foreign Office.
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, are you in a position to judge, as far as the well known violations of the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles, were especially grave points involved?
AI can only answer that question indirectly. I do not know the details but I consider it practically inconceivable that there may have been grave infringements for just the Sector of the Navy. As for the keeping of the Stipulations of the Treaty by the Navy, we can check the records of the Navy very easily.
One cannot build ships without their being seen. Therefore, I must assume that these violations were of in insignificant nature.
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, in your opinion, did the Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of any concrete case from which the attitude
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide. BY DR. SIEMERS:
QMr. von Weizsaecker, in February, 1939. were you on a train from Hamburg to Berlin together with Grand Admiral Raeder and did you discuss matters with him?
AYes.
QWhat was the reason for your conversation and what was the topic of your conversation?
AIt is correct that together with Admiral Raeder I travelled by train from Hamburg to Berlin. I met him after the launching of a ship in Hamburg. On this occasion the admiral told me that he had just given a report to Hitler and in this report he said he had made it quite clear that the state of armament, so far as the Navy was concerned, would prohibit a war against England for year hence. I believe that that is the answer to the question you are asking me.
Q That was in February, 1939?
AIt was the launching of the ship "Bismark".
QThen it is known to the High Tribunal for this launching is set down in the record.
AIt must have been in the spring, in February or March.
QAt that time, through this declaration on thepart of Raeder, did that have a calming influence on you?
AI considered this declaration on the part of Raeder very pleasing.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, we do not care whether it had a calming influence on him or not.
QIn your opinion, did Raeder speak as a naval expert or as a politician end did he have an influence on Hitler and in which way?
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If youwant to know whether he had his uniform on -
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, did you have any discussion with Raeder or with other personalities as well?
AWhat about?
QAbout the influence of Raeder on Hitler.
AIt is known to me that political arguments set forth by soldiers hardly had any influence on Hitler, except perhaps in a technical sense and along those lines an influence might have been effective.
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, in the winter of 1938 to '39, the usual diplomatic dinner took place in Berlin and, to my knowledge, you were present at this dinner. On this occasion Raeder spoke with Sir NevileHenderson about the question of the -
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.
DR. SIEMERS:No.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, you are.
DR. SIEMERS:I beg your pardon, Mr. President. This conversation was not a conversation between Henderson and von Wiezsaecker. BY DR. SIEMERS:
QI am asking you, Mr. Wiezsaecker, did you have any conversation to that effect with Sir NevileHenderson or with other British diplomats or do you know anything about the attitude of those British diplomats?
AI cannot recall having spoken with British diplomats about the colonial question. On the other hand, I do know that in the years' '34 to '39 the colonial question wasrepeatedly treated by the British Government either officially, semi-officially, or pari-officially and it was an accommodating attitude. I do believe that I recall that in the record dealing with the visit of two British gentlemen that I read this record and that on this occasion, as well, the colonial question was dealt with in an accommodating manner.
QMr. von Wiezsaecker, can you tell us anything about the demeanor or the action of the navy during the Norwegian occupation and the prestige that was given to the navy?
AAn occupational force finds it difficult to be popular at any time. With this reservation I would like to state that the navy, as far as I know, enjoyed a very good name and a very good reputation in Norway.
Norwegian friends of mine told me on this during the war and they confirmed this to me repeatedly.
QAmong these Norwegian friends of yours was a friend of yours an ambassador at Oslo?
AYes, 1931 to '33.
QNow, I have a last question. Yesterday a document was submitted, GB843. This document is signed by Brauer, who at that time, in March of 1940, wa at the legation in Oslo. I should like to submit this document to you.
AShall I read the entire document?
QIf you can just scan it, I think it will serve the purpose. Pay special attention to the middle part of the document.
Mr. President, GB-466; this document was submitted yesterday.
Brauer said, according to this document, that the anger of a Britihs landing in Norway is not quite as large as is assumed by the other side, and he mentioned only measures through which Germany is to be protected.
What can you tell us about these statements of Brauer's? Are those correct statements?
ABrauer was not with the legation; he was ambassador himself, and that he reported correctly on a subjective basis, that I agreed with from the beginning. Whether objectively everything took place that way, that is another question. That means whether Brauer knew of the intentions of our opponents, whether he was accurately informed about our opponents, that is another question.
QMr. von Weizsaecker, according to the information which you subsequently received from the Foreign Office were the concerns on the part of Raeder justified or was the picture given by Brauer correct?
AI must say subsequently or in retrospect that my personal opinion agreed with the opinion of Brauer, which has been seen subsequently to be incorrect, but that the thoughts of the navy at the time were justified or were more justified than the judgment when the ambassador gave.
DR.SIEMERS:Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT :Do any of the other defense counsel want to ask any question of this witness?
BY DR. SEIDL (Counsel for defendant Hess):
QMr. Witness, on the 23rd of August 1939, between Germany and the Soviet Union a non-aggression pact was concluded. Beyond this non-aggression pact on this day between the two governments, were other agreements made between these two governments?
GENERAL RUDENKO:Mr. President, the witness is called to answer to the defense questions which are Mentioned in the application of Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which has been put to him by the defense has nothing to do with the case at hand and, therefore, ought to be ruled out.
THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl , that you were going to ask.
BY DR. SEIDL:
QI would like to ask you again whether on that date, 23 August 1939, there were other agreements between the two governments which were not contained in the Non-Aggression Pact.
AYes.
QAnd where were these agreements contained?
AThese agreements were contained in a secret protocol.
QDid you yourself see this and read this document in your capacity as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
AYes.
QI have before me a text about which there can be no doubt that these agreements are reproduced faithfully and authentically. I shall have this text submitted to you.
THE PRESIDENT:What document are you putting to him?
DR. SEIDL:The secret appendix document dated 23 August 1939.
THE PRESIDENT:What is this document that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is this the same document?
DR. SEIDL:It is the document which I submitted to the High Tribunal in my documents and which was turned down by the High Tribunal as a document, I assume, for the reason that I refused to divulge the origin and source of the document. The High Tribunal at that time granted me, however, that I might produce a new affidavit given by Gauss.
THE PRESIDENT:You have not done it?
DR. SEIDL:No, but at this time, Your Honor, in order to support the memory of the witness, I should like to read this text and in connection therewith to ask the witness whether, in his recollection, the secret agreement are reproduced authentically in this document which I should like to read and submit.
GENERAL RUDENKO:I would like, gentlemen of the Tribunal, to protest against these questions for two reasons.
First of all, we are hearing the case of the main German war criminals and not the promises of Allied countries.
Secondly, the document which Dr. Seidl is attempting to submit has been rejected by the Tribunal as it is a document of unknown origin and, of course, cannot be a document having probitive value.
DR. SEIDL:May I just say the following, Mr. President, in answer?
Mr. President, this document is an essential part of the Non-Aggression Pact which has been submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB 145. Now I should like to submit the text-
THE PRESIDENT:The question is whether it is the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL:It was refused as a document, but it seems to me there is a difference, Your Honor, in connection with the question of whether, with the testimony of the witness, this document may be shown to the witness, and I should like to affirm this question for the reason that the Prosecution, in cross examination, for their part, have the possibility of submitting to the witness the document which they have, and on the basis of the testimony of the witness we will see which text is the correct one or whether these two texts agree at all.
THE PRESIDENT:Where does the document which you are presenting come from?
DR. SEIDL:I received this document a few weeks ago from a source, a man on the Allied side, who seems entirely reliable to me, but I received it only on condition that I would not divulge the exact source, and it seems perfectly understandable to me.
THE PRESIDENT:Do you say that you received it a few moments ago?
DR. SEIDL:Weeks ago.
THE PRESIDENT:It is the same document that you say just now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?
DR. SEIDL:Yes, but the High Tribunal decided that I might secure a new affidavit from Ambassador Gauss and submit it to the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I know, but you have not done so. We do not know what affidavit Dr. Gauss has made.
DR. SEIDL:I have this affidavit of Ambassador Gauss. I have it in hand, but it has not been translated as yet.
MR. DODD:I join General Rudenko in objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection is of the treaty, without putting the document to him. Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol. BY DR. SEIDL:
QMr. Witness please describe the contents of the agreement insofar as it remains in your recollection.
AWe are concerned here with a very comprehensive and extensive secret appendix agreement to the Non-Aggression pact which was concluded at that time. The scope of this document was very large for the reason that it partitioned spheres of influence and drew a line between those areas which, under given circumstance would be of interest to Soviet Russia and others which should belon to the German sphere of interest.
To the Soviet Russian sphere, the following were to belon Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, the eastern part of Poland, and, as far as I can recall, certain areas of Rumania were also dealt with. Anything west of this area was to belong to the German sphere of interest.
Of course, this secret agreement was not maintained in this form. On a later occasion, either in September or October of the same year, a certain change was made, an amendment was made to the agreement which existed, and the essential difference was, so far as I recall, that Lithuania, or in any event the largest part of Lithuania, was to be put into the Russian sphere of influence, and vice versa in the Polish area.
The line of demarcation of the two spheres of interest was moved to a considerable extent to the west.
I believe that with this matter the essential content of the secret agreement and the later secret appendix agreement may be summarized.
Q Is it correct that in the case of a territorial change, the line of de-
marcation was agreed upon in the territory of Poland, the Polish State?
AWhether the expression "line of demarcation" was contained in this protocol or whether it was a line of separation of the spheres of interest -- I cannot give you the exact wording.
QBut a line was mentioned and drawn?
AJust this line which I have just mentioned, and I believe I do remember that this line, later on, when this agreement was realized, was adhered to in the main, perhaps not in every detail, but on the whole, yes.
QDo you recall -- and this is my last question -- whether this secret appendix agreement of the 23rd of August 1939 also contained an agreement dealing with the future fate of Poland?
AThis secret agreement included and brought with it a complete new order in Poland, and it may very well have been that explicitly or imlicitly a new order was set forth in the agreement, but I would not commit myself as to the wording.
DR. SEIDL:Mr. President, I have no further questions. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWitness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?
AI saw a photographic copy of the original, and perhaps the original as well, but in any event I had the photostatic copy in my hands repeatedly. I had a photostatic copy in my personal safe, had it locked up in my personal safe.
QWould you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you?
AOh, I do believe so with certainty, Your Honor, yes.
The original signatures were appended as well, and they were marked. That would let me recognize it immediately.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken)
21-May-A-NG-24-1
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but, in view of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it dois not appear what is the origin of the codument which is in Dr. Seidl's possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document to the witness.
The Tribunal will now adjourn (The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.)
Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the Matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann "ilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 22 May, 1946, 1000-1700,Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:DR. Siemers,I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other Defendants' Counsel wishes to ask any questions.
DR.Seimers:(Counsel for defendant Raeder)Yes, indeed, I believe Dr. von Luedinghausen wishes to examine the witness.
ERICH VON WEIZAECKER -- Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION -- Resumed BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant von Neurath)
QWitness, I should like to put several questions to you about the activity of Mr. von Neurath in the capacity of foreign minister. At that time you were director of the political department of the foreign office. What were those dates?
AFrom the late summer of 1936, in a deputy capacity, and beginning with the spring of 1937, until the spring of 1938, in a full capacity.
QBut before then you had the opportunity to work with Mr. von Neurath, and on an occasion in the year 1932, in the autumn of that year, you attended the same disarmament conference at Geneva?
AYes.
QWhat tendencies did Mr. Von Neurath follow, and what was the attitude that he represented at the disarmament conference? What was his position?
AThe attitude of Mr. von Neurath was prescribed along the lines of the League of Nations; and disarmament was stipulated according to the treaty. He followed those lines.
QIn other words, he followed the same policy which his predecessors followed at this conference?
AIt was always the same.
Q All the regimes and all the governments before then were inter-
ested in bringing about peace and unity, and had followed their policies accordingly. Did Mr. von Neurath represent these same peaceful policies?
AI never noticed anything to the contrary in him.
QAt that time -- that is in the year 1932 -- did you notice in any way that he had national socialist tendencies, or that he was sympathetic with the National Socialists?
AI had the impression that there was no common meeting point between him and national socialism.
QCan you briefly give us his foreign political beliefs, and what he was at that time? Was he a belligerent or was he a representative of a determined peace policy and a policy of negotiation and understanding?
AI should like to say that Mr. von Neurath represented the peaceful revisionist policy, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. He pursued a good neighbor policy, a policy of being good neighbors with all without binding himself in a political way in any manner. But as far as a war-like tendency is concerned in his political leanings, I never noticed anything like that at all.
QIn the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, did he change his political beliefs at all, or were they always the same?
AIt was always the same.
QHe was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England an well as with France; is that right?
A I had the impression that Mr. von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.
QI should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less show his relationship with Hitler.
According to your knowledge of the circumstances - that is, as a collaborator of von Neurath -- was he of the opinion that he had the confidence at all times of Adolf Hitler during the time when he was foreign minister, and that Hitler allowed himself to be advised and lead by him?
AAs far as I am in a position to judge, he was an advisor but not a confident of Hitler.
QBut there was a certain contact between both of these gentlemen; is that not right?
A was never a witness to any such contacts.
QDid you observe that von Neurath and Hitler met and frequently discussed political matters, and to the effect that these things which were to happen would happen? Did they discuss any matters like that?
AI can tell you this much only, that we of the foreign office regrette that the contact was not closer; and we were especially sorry since Hitler frequently was not in Berlin. e considered, that the contact was not quite binding enough.
QThen, you cannot speak of a close collaboration between Hitler and von Neurath?
ANot in my opinion, no.
QAnd in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of von Neurath effect foreign pollicy? Was he the leading man there, or was he a retarding element, a brake, so to speak?
AI have no clue to the effect that important foreign political actions were influenced by von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the important political sphere -
THEPRESIDENT: (Interposing) I do not think we can have the witness can imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask. BY VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
QDuring the time when Mr. von Neurath was foreign minister, did any agency of the party influence foreign policies, and specially to the effect of being contrary to the tendencies of von Neurath?
A I do not believe that. There was not only one agency but many who acted along these lines, and those were the agencies who had the connections and influence with Hitler.
That was beyond control; but according to the outcome, one could gather that.
QDo you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact, which in November of 1935 was concluded with Japan, was not signed by von Neurath but by then Special Ambassador von Ribbentrop in London?
AWasn't that in 1936?
QYes, that is correct. that was in 1936.
AI assure for this reason, that Hitler liked to use several personalities for the same thing and then to select from among these personalities the one he considered suitable for carrying it through.
Q as von Neurath in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?
AThat I do not know.
QAnd what was the personal policy of von Neurath? Did he try to Keep old officials in office or did he try to bring in National Socialist officials?
AMr. von Neurath was always interested in keeping old officials whom he knew in the Foreign Office and to keep them in other positions as well.
QAnd that was changed at the moment when he resigned?
ANot immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
QNow, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Mr. von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister, when political questions become acute in the autumn of 1938 and when the Munich Conference was concluded? hat was his activity in that connection?
AI recall a scene in the Reich Chancellory, --It took place on the day before the Munich agreement, -- on which occasion Mr. von Neurath very determinedly and decidedly advised that there should be a policy of appeasement and advised that they follow the suggestion of Russolini to have a Four-Power conference
QDo you Know that, after the departure of von Neurath from the Foreign Office, the policy was that he was forbidden to have any more foreign political information?
AI do believe I recall that the successor of Mr. von Neurath reserved that sphere for his own.
DR. VON LUEDING HAUSEN:I have no further questions.
DR LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
QDr. von Weizsaecker, beginning in the summer of 1943, you were German Ambassador at the Holy See in Rome?
AYes.
QAt the same time, the Commander in Chief in the Mediteranean Theater was Field Marshal Kesselring?
AYes.
QThat is, he was the Commander in Chief in this theater from the 25th of September, 1943, onward?
AYes.
QBefore that time an Italian Gener 1 had this post?
AYes.
QWere you frequently called in by Kesselring in order to arbitrate conflicts between the German authorities and the local population?
AThere was a Very close connection between Field Marshal Kesselring's and my own position, not only in order to clear up differences but, first of all, to prevent differences.
QDid you, through you frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, receive impression of him, specifically, of the attitude of the Military -
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Laternser, you are asking about Field Marshal Kesselring. We are not trying von Kesselring. What relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER:This question is relevant for this reason: In cross examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution brought forth incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not follow the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that, Mr. President, and this may be Seen on Page 5805, and applied to an objection to Dr. Siemers that this concerned itself with an accusation against the General Staff. Through just a few questions, I should like to ask the witness about this material which incriminates the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT:If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER:Yes, Mr. President. I started with that idea and that was to be a preparatory question.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
QMr. von Weizsaecker, in the Italian theater of war, the objects of art of Italy, were they spared and were they put in safe keeping?
AThe German Wehrmacht, the German Air Forces, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, went to the greatest trouble to spare church goods, the actual churches and church property. This, however, was a large chapter in the activities of the Field Marshal and his Staff and, of course, success was not wanting.
QCan you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?
AThere is such a wealth of examples that I would like to mention only that six months or a year ago there was an exhibition of manuscripts which took place in the Vatican. These were objects which were saved, for the most part, through the activities of the German Wehrmacht; and the German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for it.
QThat is sufficient, Nr. von Weizsaecker. The High military leadership in Italy is accused of treating the Italian population especially harshly and cruell: Can you tell us anything about the fact that, on the part of the high military leadership in Italy, certain measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period of time when the food problem was a difficult one?
AThis question is especially to the food problem?
QYes, the food problem in Rome.
AMy sphere of observation was just Rome. and I can say in this connection that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half of his days were being used up in concerning himself with the feeding of Rome; and I know a higher military official -- I believe his name was Seiphart or something like that, who with great devotion concerned himself with this problem and carried it through with success.
QNow, Mr. Witness, I come to my last question. Through your observation of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you gained a clear picture of those people. Did you, through that observation, receive the impression that there was sincere effort to carry through the usages of war and the laws of humanity and to adhere to these?
AThat is a matter of course. Otherwise, certainly success could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communique, an official communique, to the effect that the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome was being praised especially and the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not acted the way it did.