The results of the Kapp putsch in 1921, the Hitler putsch of 1923 are well-known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of the 20th of July. At that time no one hoped for victory in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, in this putsch -- in this attempt -- not one soldier, not one weapon, not one worker, rose up. All the members of the attempted putsch were alone. In order to overthrow this system, a revolution would have been necessary -- a mightier, a bigger revolution than the National Socialist one. And behind such a revolution there would have to be the mass of the workers and the whole Wehrmacht, and not the commander of the Potsdam garrison, of whom the witness spoke. ence, and at the same time carry an a revolution and expect to gain anything positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who live in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German officer were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers struck the ground with their sabres -- that was the only revolutionary deed of the Wehrmacht that I know of. That was in 1848. If today people who cooperated actively in order to bring Hitler to power, who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our triple oath were bound to support, and to Hitler -- if these people demanded revolution and mutiny from the Wehrmacht, when they didn't like the man any more, when reverses occurred, then I can only call that immoral. with Hitler? You have already said something in that connection. a brief answer. I should only like to say that aside from many moments my life in the Fuehrer's headquarters was a martyrdom for us soldiers. It was not a military headquarters; it was a civilian one. And we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to be a guest anywhere for five and a half years. I should like to add just one thing: Among the few officers who dared to face the Fuehre openly in a tone, in a form, that made the listeners hold their breath during a catastrophe -- among those few officers was myself.
tionship with Hitler. I opposed Generaloberst Halder because of unjustified opposition. It was an operational problem, which won't interest the Court. Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of anger from any human being. From that day on, he never appeared to cat at the common meal, never for the duration of the war. The report on the situation no longer took place in my map room but in the Fuehrer's shelter. At every report on the situation from that day on, an SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were order to be there. From that day on, they took down every word. The Fuehrer refused to shake hands with me any more. He hardly greeted me. This condition lasted until the 30th of January, 1943, when he told me through Field Marshal Keitel that he could no longer work with me and I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
the OKW? see to it that I might be sent to Finland with the mountain troops in Finland, but this did not happen. trace of the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer poured out his favor on you. What is true in that?
A I do not need to waste many words on that. What I said is the truth. What the Prosecution said I unfortunately have to say is imagination.
Q It was said that you were a career soldier. How about that? I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. This is quite normal. In July 1940 when I was appointed General of Artillery it is true I skipped a grade of Lieutenant General, but that was only a coincidence. A much younger General of the Air Force, Jeschonek, has become Chief of the General Staff, on the Luftwaffe and become General of the Luftwaffe. I was told the fuehrer thought that might hurt my feelings. Then shortly before the Reichstag session the Fuehrer decided to promote me to General of Artillery. This Jeschonek who is much younger than I became Colonel General much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Colonel General at the same time I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30. BY DR. EXNER: ceived the favor of the Fuehrer, and so far as you mention, it wasn't more than average. Did you receive any decorations from Hitler? was concluded on the 30th of January 1943, I received the Golden Party Emblem; and that was the only decoration which I received from the Fuehrer.
Q In the entire 5 1/2 years of war?
Q Did you receive a gift or *onation from Hitler, or from the Party?
A Not a cent; not a button. I can mention the fact that in the Fuehrer headquarters we received from the fuehrer at Christmas time a package of coffee. or gift in the occupied countries?
A Not one piece. In the indictment in a rather summary manner the sentence is set down: "the defendants profited and aggrandized themselves from the occupied countries." I can say as far as I am concerned I can characterize my position with one word, and I can say this openly: This is the libel of a decent German officer. as an officer. How did you invest this money? Can you tell me?
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he couldn't save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: Very well. BY DR. EXNER: and therefore you must really knew him very well, and therefore I should like to ask you a little more in detail about the personality of theFuehrer; but the Court is not vary fond of repetition. Therefore, tell us, but briefly, what influenced you in Hitler and what did you like especially well and what were the things you disliked.
A Hitler was a leader; he a leader's personality, and a leader's personality of tremendous scope. His knowledge and his intellect and his sense of rhetoric and his will power, all of these qualities in the last analysis triumphed in every spiritual conflict; and this applied to everyone, every person. In a very strange way, in him, logic and forecast were mixed in with his thought. Scepticism was mixed with a very intensive power of imagination, and this power of imagination very frequently foresaw the things to come, but very frequently were wrong. I marveled at him when in the winter of 1941 to '42 in his firm belief and with his energy he brought to a standstill the vacillating eastern front. At this time on the eastern from a catastrophe was imminent, to compare with that in the year 1812.
The modesty in his manner of life was very impressive. There was not one day which, during this war -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) One moment, As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in it. BY DR. EXNER: heard less frequently, which you disliked in the personality of Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can't he get on with his own case? BY DR. EXNER:
Q Did you have the feeling that you were close to the Fuehrer?
Q And your connections with the Fuehrer were essentially official?
A Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private, or personal, circle; and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and because of my name, that I probably came from Bavaria.
Q Who belonged tothe private inner-circle?
A Chiefly the "old guard" from the told time, when the party was beginning: Dormann, first of all, the old secretaries, his personal physicians, and the political, or SS adjutants. an enthusiastic follower and adherent of the Fuehrer. Tell us, how did you actually receive this characteristic? ordered it. Even though I reluctantly made this report, chiefly because of lack of time. But generally that was the wish in this period of crisis.
Q And when was this report, or this speech? When was it? About?
A In November 1943. The Italian decline had preceded it. It was the time of the serious bombing attacks. In this period of time, there was the conceivable necessity to have the political leadership at home shown a completely unembroidered picture of the situation, but at the same time, to create a certain amount of confidence at home and to have this confidence rest with the higher leadership.
This speech, which had the title, "The Strategic Situation of Germany at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of the War" could actually not be made by a Block leader. A speech like what could only be made by an officer of theWehrmacht leadership staff, the operational staff. And that is the background of this speech, given by me.
Q What were the contents of this speech? the strategic situation. Here, before the High Tribunal, only the introduction was read; and the introduction paints a picture in retrospect about those things which were behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the strategic angle. for so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify myself with the National Socialist Party; but as is quite for an officer of the General Staff I identified myself with my Supreme Commander; for at that time we were no concerned with the question of National Socialism or democracy. That was no longer the question. At that time, the question was the "to be or not to be" of the entire German people. And in Germany as well there were patriots, not only in the neighboring states. And I considered myself to be one of the patriots as long as there was breath in my body. On the whole, it is not decisive, thequestion of to whom one is speaking, but it is important and decisive what oneis speaking about. I can say also that I gave that same speech to the Kreisbefehlshaber and to the high officers of the replacement armies.
Q Can you tell us this, please? The beginning and the end of the speech contained an eulogy on the party and the Fuehrer. Why did you do that? Why did you include that in an objective and purely military speech? a critical polemic on the party, or my Commander-in-Chief. It was necessary in order to create confidence between the officer and the leader of the party--for this confidence was not only a stipulation or requirement--so that the speech would actually serve its purpose.
This confidence was the requirement for victory.
At any rate, I should like to say something of decisive importance. The material which is admitted by the prosecution as Document No. 172 is not the speech delivered by the Gauleiter; it is not that speech which I delivered. That is nothing else but the "waste basket" of this speech; for at first there was a rough draft, which this is, which-was completely changed, for it contained many things which were not true, and which were inexact. And there is lacking the entire nucleus of the speech, which concerned itself with the situation at hand, and the part dealing with the enemy, the means at his disposal, and his intentions. The things contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech, which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech with some of these notes. All this material was returned to my staff by me.
Q Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
A In no way is it the manuscript. The manuscript locks entirely different.
Q Noe we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the party did you meet from the assumption of power until the outbreak of the war?
A If I am not to mention the soldiers, Reichminister Frick. I was with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be dealt with and discussed. or before the beginning of the war? Admiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one else. National Socialism?
Q Did you participate in the party rally? last three days in Nurnberg of the Nurnberg rally, when the Wehrmacht, the SA and the Labor Front were reviewed.
Q Did you participate in the Memorial Services at Munich; that is, on the 9th of November?
A No. I did not belong there, in reality. the para-military units of the party?
A. These pari-military organizations sprang up from the eath like mushrooms after the assumption of power. Only the SA and Roehm wanted all power. The Witness Gisevius said here that there had been no Roehm Putsch. That is correct, but it was just imminent. At that time, in the Reich's War Ministry, we were armed to the teeth, and Roehm was an actual revolutionary, not a "Gehrock Putschist". When the Fuehrer intervened in June of 1934, from that moment onward there were no conflicts of any sort between the Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became increasingly suspicious of the organizations of the SS, which from that moment onward multiplied in an extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never quite convinced and saw the necessity of this dualism of two armed units within the country.
Q. Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your War Diary, Document 1718-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the Document Book, in order to show that Jodl again and again worked and concerned himself with the SS into the armed forces. On the 9th of April -- that is the second paragraph -- or rather, on the 22nd of March there is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: "H. visits Chief of Armaments Office; talks about his ideas concerning development of the SS; gives his misgivings."
In the French translation this "H", standing for Henry, is replaced by "Heydrich", and that, of course, is utter nonsense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings on the development, of the SS; but the "H" stands for "Halder", who was the Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this correction was made in the French document book, but I am sorry to say I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French document books and applied to the General Secretary in this connection, to have these corrections made. I must say this large number of errors in translation makes me a little doubtful, especially if for an "H" the word "Heydrich" is substituted and the Chief of the Armament Office is brought together with one of the most unfortunate figures in the SS. I must saythis, that I am filled with misgivings in this direction because in the course of the last few months the Tribunal has received hundreds of documents, documents which were submitted and whose translation we could not check on, and when we do check on the translation we find that there are quite a few inadequacies, as Dr. Siemers said.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. You are making some long statement now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to read this.
THE PRESIDENT: We can't have counsel making long statements which are not in evidence. You can't make statements of that sort about -- if there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it, but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Yes, Mr. President. I do not wish to give another explanation but I should like to quote an extract from my document book referring to the 3rd of February.
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or misinterpretation of the letter "H". Well, you can do so again if necessary in other places. You can't make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: Very well. I should like to read, Mr. President, may I? I should like to read extracts from my document book without trying to criticize. I have no further statements along that line. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. In this spot it says, on the 3rd of February, I quote: "General Thomas informs that the Liaison Officer to the Ministry of Economics and to the General Plenipotentiary Colonel Drews has visited him by order of Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS employed all means to implicate the Army and to press her against the wall in its present weak state." Then it says, under the date of 10th of February: "Himmler is supposedly distressed that high officer of the armed forces had made unheard of accusations against him." Then perhaps one other passage to be found in the next document on page 4 of the document book, again the same Diary, PS-1780, the entry of the 26th of February: "The unlimited plan for expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious." Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this dualism that you just mentioned a few minutes ago?
A. I had many, many thoughts about this and I am very well versed in history, but not only did I have misgivings but even during the war I quite openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.
Q. How did it come about that Himmler had more and more influence in military spheres?
A. That can be explained as follows: that the Fuehrer had the feeling -which perhaps on the whole was true -- that a large part of the Officer Corps rejected his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an inner political danger but he saw it in as well a danger to civtory and he believed that the war was to be won only through ruthless means and methods.
Q. And what practical results came about through this?
A. The practical results were that the SS units were multiplied tremendous ly, that the police received authority which extended into the operational sphere of the Army, and later that the Higher SS and Police Leaders were established; the Intelligence Service was transferred to the SS and the service was organized before; that the Replacement Army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler and, in the end, also the entire prisoner of war system.
Q. In your Diary you said about the appointment of General von Brauchitsch as the commander in Chief of the Army, that this appointment was made by the Fuehrer and that you were glad about this appointment. At that time there was a choice between him and von Reichenau. Why were you glad that Brauchitsch came in?
A. General von Reichenau was known as a truly political general and I was afraid that perhaps he might be willing to sacrifice the good old traditions of the Army to the new regime and do this without any scruples.
Q. I should like to refer to the Diary of Jodl, Document 1780-PS, page 6, first volume, with the entry of the 2nd of February, 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of the 3rd of February, to be found on Page 7: "The Chief of the Wehrmacht informs me that the battle has been won. The Fuehrer has decided that General von Brauchitsch would be appointed --"
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need read this. It simply says that he is in favor of von Brauchitsch.
DR. EXNER: I was just pointing that out to Your Honor.
BY DR. EXNER:
Q. The consequences for the generals concerned, you thought about that in connection with the appointment of von Reichenau, is that true?
A. Yes. There was no doubt that the older generals, such as von Runstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have subordinated themselves to von Reichenau.
Q. Then, after this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against the laws of war and humanity, charges which have been levelled against you. There is very little time left today. Therefore, I should like to clarify your participation in the Commissar Decrees. A draft on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to the Leadership Staff of the Wehrmacht, and you put a notation in the margin of this draft.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. EXNER: The number of the document is PS-884, R Exhibit 351, page 152, second volume of my document book. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. The document is a report noted by you, and perhaps you can tell us first of all what connection you had with this matter; that is, the treatment of commissars.
A. I did not participate in the drafting of this report. I was not concerned with prisoners of war nor with the legal questions of war at that time. I was not concerned with either one of these matters, but the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field Marshal Keitel.
Q. All right. Now, you added, "We must count on retaliation against German fliers. It is safe, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation That is a supplement that you made. What did you mean by that statement?
A. The intention on the part of the Fuehrer, which was set forth in this draft of an order, was rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very excited discussions took place about this; also with the Commander in Chief of the Army. This resistance also ended with the characteristic sentence by the Fuehrer, "I can not expect that my generals will understand my orders, but I do demand that they follow them." Field Marshal Keitel, a new way through which one could possibly circumvent this order or decree which had been demanded by the Fuehrer.
Q. This order, as you probably remember, is used by the Prosecution to accuse the German military, for it was drafted before the beginning of the war, on 12 May 1941. That is the date of this, and now you are telling us that "It is best to brand the entire action as retaliation."
what do you mean by that?
A. It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to Bolshevi the Fuehrer counted on the participation of the Commissars as a certainty and that he wanted to meet this. He was confirmed in this belief and gave reasons by saying: "I carried on the war against Communism for 20 years. I know it, but you do not know it." Those were his words, and I must add that we, as well, were under a certain influence of that which the literature of the entire world, beginning with 1917, had written about Bolshevism, and we had had some experiences dating from the communist republic in Munich. whether in actual fact and in practice the commissars would actually act as the Fuehrer expected them to act, and that if the Fuehrer's suspicions were confirmed, we could make use of reprisals, and that was the sense and intention of my notation in the margin.
Q. First of all, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war, and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be used as reprisals against tie conduct of the war as carried out by the enemy, measures which would have to be used then, and those were your thoughts, and that was what you meant when you said, It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation
Q. What do you mean by "Man zieht auf" -- "It is branded--"? These words were translated by the Prosecution -
MR. ROBERTS, K.C. My Lord, in the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission, that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner and I would ask him not to make another one now.
DR. EXNER I am almost of the belief that it is necessary for me to determine just what the defendant thought while he was writing these words.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when Counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of the witness it carries very little weight with the Tribunal.
It is perfectly obvious that, if your wanted to ask what the witness meant by his note, he could have answered and that is the proper way to put the question, and not to suggest the answer to him.
DR. EXNER: First of all, I put the question, and then I believe I was giving a resume of what the witness had said. point out. The expression "aufziehen" is translated as "It is best therefore to brand --" in English and in French as "stigmatiser". It seems to me as though this were not quite correct and as though one should say, "It is best to handle it as a reprisal", and in French to say "traiter". BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Then what happened?
A. I believe I must explain the German word "aufziehen". It was said that that was a remark typical of the defendant Jodl. That was a typical remark or military expression current in this time That does not mean, as is assumed by the Prosecution that I said I believed we must make this operation appear different. That meant to handle it differently. If we said that we would handle the showing of new weapons in a different way, we would arrange it differently It would be in another order. I meant another way. Among us soldiers "aufziehen" meant to handle or to arrange it, but it did not mean to deceive
Q. Then it does not have a deceptive connotation?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946, 1000 hours.)
BY DR. EXNER: Can you hear me? And I should like to put a few preliminary questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the time of the war? operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me, was the Military Propaganda Division, and this division had the duty of cooperating with the press. And my third task was that I was the head of an office which, on a broad scope, had to distribute reports and information to the various branches of the Wehrmacht, the various branches of the armed forces. And this entire sphere of tasks took up my time to such an extent that night after night I worked until three o'clock in the morning. And that was the order of the day, every day. To concern myself with other things I had no time to do that at all. My collaboration with the press, the press which had to be advised daily, that task I had to delegate to my personal General Staff officer. with your work and with your office, and that was in connection with the Wehrmacht operational staff, whose chief you were? ment, was the operational department, and that was your influence. The Prosecution is calling you the Staff Chief of the Field Marshal Keitel. What can you say in that regard? organization which was presented when Field Marshal Keitel's case was dealt with. There is a great difference as a chief of staff if I had been an auxiliary of Keitel's and of his duties, but on the other hand I was only the chief of one of the many offices or agencies which were subordinated to the Field Marshal.
Beginning with the year 1941 it was the custom or had become the custom, rather, that I, together with my operational departments, would report to the Fuehrer direct all matters concerning operations. Whereas, Field Marshal Keitel in availing himself of my Quartermaster Division and using this division as a sort of personal working staff, took over all other tasks. authority to issue commands?
A No. Or to say it more explicitly, only about my working staff. I was subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel, but even Keitel himself was not a "Befehlshaber," one who could give commands, he was only the chief of a staff. But of course during this war I decided many operational details, and signed them as well. There was never any conflict of any sort about these matters, conflict with my commanders in chief, for I had their confidence and worked on the very best possible understanding with them. though you had no authority to issue commands and orders, there are many orders available here which are signed by you, and signed in many ways,sometimes with the entire signature, sometimes, with the initial "J", the beginning letter of your name. Can you explain these various signatures and ways of signatures?
A One has to discriminate. The decrees which the Fuehrer himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, then with these orders, at the end and the lower right, there is my initial. And that means that I was active in the formulation of this order. Then there were orders which also originated from the Fuehrer but they were not signed by the Fuehrer personally but on the order of Jodl. But thenif that was the case they always carried the opening sentence: "The Fuehrer has decreed" or the sentence was found somewhere in the course of the order. And there wan a preamble to this order, usually reasons for the order, and then: "The Fuehrer therefore decrees."
Q And what was the difference between these two groups of orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Fuehrer actually, and the other not signed by the Fuehrer, but rather by you alone? less significance.
Q Now, there were other orders which did not open with "the Fuehrer has decreed", but they were signed by you, nevertheless. How about these?
A In these orders, the signature said "The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, by Order of Jodl". These were orders which emanate fromme. By that I mean that I formulated these orders, or my staff did. The Fuehrer himself and Field Marshal Keitel perhaps might have been informed of these orders, but not in every case. upper right hand corner there is my initial. Those were orders given out by other offices. My initial "J" on the first page meant solely and alone that it was an office notice, to show that this decree, or order, had been submitted to me. But it was not a proof of the fact that I had read it; for, if on examining the first page, I saw that this decree dealt with a matter which did not touch my sphere of work, then I initialed the order and put it aside, because, after all, I had to save time. which are being held against you, which are not actually orders but rather report notices. Can you comment on that, please? level and applied to people who did not have time to go through enormous volumes and files. Therefore, a report notice contained in a very brief form the picture of any certain incident or occurrence, frequently the attitude taken by other offices; and sometimes it contained a proposal as well. But the decisive factor was the fact that it was not an order, it was not a draft for an order, but rather it served as a basis for an order, and supplied the data. report notice dealing with the commissars which we dealt withyesterday. You set this as a case in point. This is 884 PS, Exhibit R-351. We touched on this matter yesterday, already.
It is Volume 2 of my document book, Page 152. Tribunal to an error in translation. On Page 152, under I, it says, "OKH presents a statement for the instruction of directives regarding the treatment of commissars has been submitted."
In the English translation, it says, "The Army high Command presents a statement"; and it obviously should be "presents a draft for a statement", for it was a draft. I cannot quite follow all the French, but it should be "Projet" instead of "Confirmation".
The German original says, "OKH (the Army High Command) presents a draft for a statement of the instructions concerning the high military functionaries end in the instructions which were issued on the 31st of March, 1941, this deals with the Commissars".
This is a report notice. Please tell us what the significance is.
A This document is a typical example. First of all, it contains a draft by another office of the Army High Command, the OKH, not word for word, but rather in a brief, abbreviated, form. Then under Figure II, on Page 153, the attitude and opinion of Reichsleiter Rosenberg is set forth. Then further it contains a proposal of my staff itself, under Figure II.
The entire matter, therefore, is not an order, but far from it; rather i was to become an order. And as far as this report note is concerned, I made many, many marginal annotations. A few words were to serve for the further treatment and for the discussion, or the carrying out, of the entire procedure. Therefore, you cannot apply the same criteria, that you could apply to the well thought out words which are contained in the actual order itself.
Q All right. That takes care of the report note and your remarks on that subject. Now, let us turn to the very difficult topic of Commando Order. This matter has been dealt with by the Court on various occasions, and it is really going beyond the matters at hand in this court. order. We have already seen that this Order 493 PS, U.S.A. 150. I did not include this order in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to have this order put at the disposal of the High Tribunal in the various languages. I am not sure whether it has been done, but I certainly hope so.
Then a supplementary decree was added to this original. This is PS 503, U.S.A. Exhibit 542.
MR. ROBERTS: It is 498 PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book No. 7, Page 34. BY DR. ETHER:
Q It is a clarification addressed to the commanders-in-chief. I repeat, the first order was addressed to the troops, and the second, the supplementary order, was addressed, to the commanders-in-chief. The first decree is addressed to foreign soldiers and threatens them with destruction in the event of bandit-like activity; and it refers to a Wehrmacht report. Order and the Wehrmacht report of 7-10-42? I may enlarge upon this matter in greater detail. Very much is at stake in this order, not from my own standpoint, not with respect to one person, for one person actually plays no part in this very important law proceeding here. Here we are concerned with the honor of the German soldiers and of the German officers, this honor which I am representing here in my person. 7th of October, 1942, in the Wehrmacht report. The two orders are very closely connected; for this Commando Order was the executive order for this announcement in the Wehrmacht report.