THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is the second paragraph in my document, page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: Yes. That is what I said. That is the point; that is why I am reading it slowly now.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the ear-phones, then. Read the passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British document book No. 7, page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on. BY DR. EXNER:
Q "For the work of our own intelligence service, as well as for the answers to the questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply", and so forth. six weeks. That was a basis for the work of the so-called counter-intelligence which I do not want to discuss in detail here. which we had in the East at this time appear stronger. That can be seen from No. 3, for example, which says, "When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things ought to be exaggerated, if necessary." exaggerated. All of this was done because at this time there was already concern that a Russian operation against Rumania might develop. In order to avoid this, these instructions were issued, which were intended only for the intelligence service.
Russia, I would have said exactly the opposite, for this order as I issued it would have indicated that I was acting in the interests of friends of Gisevius. I would have been informingthe Russians that we were ready to attack.
Q When did you hear for the first time of the Fuehrer's concern that Russia could be hostile to us? Berchtesgaden.
Q In what connection? said to me -- and this is a surprise to me -- that he was worried that before winter Russia might occupy more territory in Rumania, and thus the Rumanian oil territory, which was the "sine qua non" for all conduct of the war, would be taken away from as. immediately, so that we would be ready in the fall to meet such a Russian intention with strong forces. That is almost the exact words which he used. All other versions of the matter are false.
Q You have just mentioned Hitler's concern about the seizure of the Rumanian oilfields. Did the Fuehrer do anything on the basis of this concern? I answered him that it was quite impossible and that it would take four months and that it could not be done immediately, the Fuehrer ordered that these conditions would have to be improved. Two orders were issued following this: One, I believe, is of the 9th of August. It was called "Building up the East, and included all those measures to improve deployment conditions.
The second order was issued on the 27th of August. We do not have it here, but it was recorded in the War Diary of the Naval war Command.
DR. EXNER: That is Page 85 of the first volume of my document book. At the end of the page there is an entry: "Navay War Diary; displacement of ten divisions and two armored divisions to the Government General in view of possible necessity for prompt intervention for protection of Roumanian oil producing area." That is an excerpt from C 170, U.S.A. 136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you
DR. EXNER: Yes, Page 85 of the German. I don't know the page in the English book. "Displacement of ten divisions and two armored divisions to the Government General."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
THE WITNESS: This entry is proof of that intention the Fuehrer had at that time with the strengthening of his forces in the East. BY DR. EXNER:
Q When was the Fuehrer Order issued to prepare for attack? issued in writing by the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and submitted to the Fue on the 12th of November. That is Document Ps 64, and is already known to the Court.
DR. EXNER: Page 66 of the first volume of my document book.
THE WITNESS: This first written order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oil instructions of the Fuehrer to the High Command of theArmy. BY DR. EXNER:
Q That can be seen from the document itself, Page 66, Page 67. It reads: "Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued," showing that oil preparations had already been made previously. issued to the Army.
of things such as Lebensraum, extension of our food bases, as a basis for a war of conquest, and so forth? reason than a purely strategic one. For months, one can say, he repeatedly said: "There is no doubt any longer, England is hoping for this; otherwise she would have stopped the war. Secret agreements have doubtless already been made. Russian deployment is quite clearly recognizable. One day we will suddenly be strangled politically or attacked." One could speak about this for weeks. No other word was said to me except of such purely strategic reasons. how had things developed in the East after the Polish campaign? campaign the relationship was rather cool. Insight into the troops or equipment was carefully prevented. There were constantly unpleasant incident. The Russians shot at everything, Poles or German soldiers. There were wounded and dead, and the line of demarcation was crossed in many cases. The extremely strong forces which Russia used for the occupation of the Baltic states and Poland and Bessarabia we had not had from the first moment. reinforcements for the Red Army? counter intelligence reports, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about a hundred Russian divisions along the border. In January, 1941 there were one hundred fifty divisions. They were given by number; they were reliable reports. In comparison with this strength, may I add that the English-American-French forces operating in France against Germany, to my knowledge, were never as strong as a hundred divisions. means? well known, and I must say that I placed great hopes on this talk.
The military situation for us soldiers was such that with a definitely neutral Russia in our rear which supplied us, we could not lose the war. An invasion such as took place on the 6th of June, '44, was completely out of the question. We had had all the forces available, which we used up and lost in this enormous struggle in Russia; and that our statesmen -- and in the last analysis, our commanders, too -- should give up such a situation -- it never occurred to me for a moment that that might happen. It is a fact that for months the Fuehrer struggled with himself about this decision. He was surely influenced by the many counter ideas which the Reichsmarshal the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Foreign Minister suggested.
Q. On the basis of the reports which you received, how did you see a further military development?
A. From January, '41 on, the Intelligence Service was activated. The divisions on our borders and on the Roumanian borders grew rapidly. On the 3rd of February, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army told the Fuehrer about the operations which he intended to carry out. He presented a map on the Russian deployment. This map included a hundred infantry regiments -
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need all these strategic details of plans made by the German generals?
DR. EXNER: I believe it is of great importance to ascertain what picture the General Staff had at that time. An enormous deployment of Russian troops -
THE PRESIDENT: He is telling us about February, 1941, the OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops?
DR. EXNER: No, that was the plan which was developed -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Please tell us, in generalk how the picture developed in February, 1941; how many divisions were deployed.
A. There were 150 Russian divisions deployed, against us in February
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
Q. And how many were there on our side?
A. I should like to say that at this sane time our deployment had just begun, which General Halder reported at this time. And I should like to point out further that Document C-39, USA138, page 92 of the first Document Book, shows the time-table for the deployment. One the first of June attack formations consisting of fourteen panzer divisions and twelve motorized infantry divisions were moved up end as the note shows -- on the extreme right they were moved up only from the 10th of June. I mention this so that one can't say the German intention to attack was recognizable as early as February 1941. It was not.
Q. The Prosecution emphasized especially that long before this a plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up. Can you say anything about that?
A. I will point out in one sentence, for this deployment we have ten thousand trains, and if one could have used a hundred a day, it would have lasted a hundred days. But we never reached this figure. In other words, only from the technical point of view this deployment took four months.
Q. Did the Yugoslavian events have any influence on the decision of the Fuehrer?
A. They gave the last impetus. Until that time, the Fuehrer still had doubts. On the 1st of April, and not earlier, his decision was made to make the attack. On that date he ordered preparations for about the 22d of June. The order for the attack itself, the real start of the campaign, was issued only on the 17th of June, which is also proved by documents.
Q. Then in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a protective war. Did later events prove this military necessity?
5 June
A. It was doubtless purely a preventative war. What we learned afterwards was the certainty of an enormous Russian military preparation on our borders. I will dispense with details. But I can only say we succeeded in a tactical surprise on day and hour, but not a strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
Q. As an example can you perhaps tell the Court the number of now air fields which had been built in the Russian-Polish area?
A. I recall that among the air fields in Eastern Poland there were about twenty, which was increased to about a hundred in the meantime.
Q. What under these conditions were the results of Russia's acting first -- briefly?
A. I don't want to go into the strategic basis, operation on the inner line. I will only state briefly that we were never strong enough to have been able to defend ourselves in the East. And events since 1942 have proved this. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers, we needed at least 300 divisions, and we never had them. If we had waited until perhaps the simultaneous invasion and Russian attack, we would certainly have been lost. If the political premise is correct, then, that this attack was imminent, then from a military point of view the preventative attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us in this way, and as a result we based out military work on this promise.
Q. Now, a few questions in regard to Japan. What siginificance did instruction 24 of the 5th of March 1941, to attack in cooperation with Japan have? It has already been mentioned but it is not quite clear. That is page 94 of the first volume of our document book. It is Document C-75. Then Admiral Raeder as a witness has already said something about this directive. Can you add anything?
A. The document is quite important. First, I must make a confession: so far I have only been charged with having received this document, but it originated with me; I instigated it; my staff worked it out -- in ours and the group of the navy.
As a result, I know this document better than anyone else. That is not an operational order. That concerns German officers.
Q. What does that mean?
A. That means that all German officers who officially or unofficially had to do with, came in contact with Japanese officers, were to be told exactly what the aims of the German policy was, to attack England in the Far East as well, and to keep America out of the war just by doing so.
Q. Under No.3 of the directive, "(a) the common aim is to defeat England as quickly as possible and thus keep the U.S.A. exit of the war"-
A. Such an instruction was necessary so that thoughtless statements of German officers would be prevented, and Japanese Army and Navy officers could not use this for their political aims. For this reason, the Foreign Office received a copy, as is shown below in the distribution on page 96. That would never have happened in the case of an operational order. For that reason, the Fuehrer did not sign it.
Q. On page 96, at the top, the German war aims are stated:
"Furthermore, attacks on other systems of bases of the English sea power, on the American ones, can only when the entry of the U.S.A. into the war cannot be prevented, are appropriate to shake the system of power of the enemy there". entry of the United States into the war, and only if that is not possible to attack.
A. I may add that the purpose of this document was not to influence Japan. That world have been political action. It was only to give officers instructions as to what they should say in such a case.
Q. Then Admiral Raeder has already told us that naval orders issued to keep America out of the war. Have you anything to add?
A. Only one point which the Grand Admiral did not mention.
That is shown in Document C-119 and AJ-14, and can be found on page 98 of Document Book 1.
Q. Page 98 of the first volume. This is special orders on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway.-
A. Only the last sentence need be read. ships engaged in foreign commerce flying the U.S. flag, as well as planes -
Q. And on page 98 the last sentence at the bottom speaks of a prohibition against departure of warships, merchant vessels and planes. Americans are to be excepted.
A. America was given a certain exception here for a long time in all war measures of the Naval War Command.
Q. Before the attack of Japan on America, did you have anything to do officially with Japanese officers?
A. No, not at all. No.
Q. Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. The attack was a complete surprise to me, and I felt it was a surprise to the Fuehrer too. He came in the middle of the night to my map-room in order to give this news to Field Marshal Keitel and to me. He was completely surprised.
Q. Now, there is a mistake in this letter that I should like you to clear up. It is page 81 in the first volume of our Document Book.
There is a letter, PS-376, USA-161. That is a letter from one Falkenstein to you -
Q It says, "The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands" -- was that interpreted to mean that these intentions of attacking America -- "with a view to prosecution of war against America at a later date." What was meant by that? How did you understand it? occupy the Atlantic Islands which the Fuehrer always wanted to do.
Q For what purpose?
A. As a certain basis of security, in case of American intervention. We had to consider these things, although the Navy as well as the Wehrmacht operational staff and the chief of the Wehrmacht strictly restricted this, we at least had to think about these things. And in this matter he says this General von Waldau, if something is said in the document, in the order, PS-444, the same thing that he writes here -
Q Did we have any interest in extending the war?
A I personally not. I can only say that the extension from the North Cape to Tobruk and from Brest to Rostof and the Don was greater then I liked.
Q. Did we have any interest in having Japan at war with America? enemy.
Q How did Italy get into the war?
A I don't know what was done politically, but after thecollapse of France, Italy wanted to participate in this war. We tried to prevent it, we soldiers in the OKW. We succeeded only in delaying Italian intervention four to six days. The Fuehrer could not refuse entirely, but felt that during the whole war Italy would be no aid but only a burden. That will be confirmed by future history of the war. documents which Goering, Ribbentrop, Raeder, Doenitz submitted. I do not know whether such a reference is necessary.
The last question: The Prosecution called this whole series of campaigns a long prepared, long agreed plan of conquest which you as a conspirator provoked and carried out.
What do you have to say to that? torted has already been essentially corrected by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having had any part in its preparation. It developed into a world war, against all the hopes of the soldiers. For this war, everything has to be improvised. There was nothing but theplan of attack against Poland. There was not enough bombs; there was not enough ammunition. No soldier at that time thought Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or Russia. There were no military agreements with Italy or with Japan. The presentation of the American Chief of Staff, General Marshall, I recognize as absolutely correct in almost all points.
DR. EXNER: And, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defendant's Counsel wish to ask any questions? BY DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff)
Q. Colonel General, as Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, you were for many years thefirst general staff officer ofthe Wehrmacht? time a teacher at war Academy? which preceded the War Academy, and which were at that time held at the seat of the various commanders' defense commands. course, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself to the following points: how much time was given to instruction on attack, to wars of aggression; the attitude toward international law and to politics -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this question is completely irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court believes that this question is irrelevant, I will dispense with the answer.
Q Do you know the points of view of the Prosecution that the military leaders formed a group with the aim of waging wars of aggression and to commit crimes against international law and the laws of humanity?
till you comment on this point, especially, and whether there was actually a group of high military leaders? understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean steamer; that must unit e them; they must follow the orders of the captain. This so-called group of high officers perhaps existed in the Kaiser's time, in absolute unity, but not entirely then, either. However, after the National Socialist revolution this group was divided in all aspects, politically and ideologically. The only thing that united them was soldiery and the necessary obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours) (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 5 June 1946). BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): 1938, there was a meeting at the Berghof, a meeting between Hitler and Military leaders. You were present at that Meeting. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I now want to ask you what was the subject of that conference. Staff officers only and gave then a lecture that lasted for about two and a half hours. He spoke about the entire military and political situation. He went into detail, in particular, with reference to the Sudeten-German problem, about which he said that it would have to be solved under any circumstances. He described the various possibilities, and, particularly, he described clearly his intention, but also the confidence he had that he would be able to bring about that solution without France and England hindering him.
Q That was the subject of that conference? the various armed forces were not there? informed of the subject of that conference, and he told me that it was the Fuehrer's intention to speak to the senior staff officers directly at a time when they would not be under the influence of their senior officers, their superiors, so that they would realize the critical attitude which the Supreme Commander sometimes had. critical attitude indeed on the part of those officers, was there not? of the generals believed that he ought to draw the Fuehrer's attention to that one possibility that England and France might interfere after all if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General von Biedersheim.
the highest military leaders from such conferences again?
A The Fuehrer did that quite often. I want to say that he even did it on principle. For instance, after our attempt to attack the bridgehead at Nutono, southeast of Rome, which had failed, he ordered the junior officers from that battle to come to the Fuehrer Headquarters. They were regimental commanders down to company commanders. For days, and without the presence of their superiors, he interrogated each one of them. He did the same thing very, very often with air force officers, whom he interrogated without the Supreme Commander of the air force being consulted. conferences about the situation. Could the Supreme Commanders present at the Fuehrer's headquarters take part in such conferences without difficulties? subjects were discussed as had already happened in the past, the Fuehrer was very generous regarding the participation, but as soon as something was discussed which was, shall we say, an intention, an operational intention, such as for instance the Russian attack in 1942, a Supreme Commander from the Western Front would not be allowed to take part, nor would it be possible the other way around so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only invite such officers who had to be informed for official reasons.
Q In such cases, the so-called "Smallest Circle" would be consulted?
A That is right. In that case the Chief Adjutant announced on behalf of the Fuehrer that now a discussion among the "Smallest Circle" would take place in which only these would take part who were officially concerned. energetic representations on the part of the Supreme Commanders?
Have you heard then, and when did you? please limit yourself to the most important episodes of that type. question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. where the old, traditional conceptions regarding operations did not come into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Fuehrer Apart from certain operations during the first part of the war, I can quite well state that during every such report made by the Supreme Commanders, there was a clash of opinions. I could quote every Supreme Commander who has over existed in that connection. I know of none to whom this would not apply. did you not? war I know up to and including Army Commanders. I know all of those. During the second half of the war, there were army commanders in the East whom I did not know. They generally did not come from the General Staff but were career officers who came from amongst the men. of an army, without difficulties announce himself for a discussion with Hitler?
A The commander of an army could not. The commander of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander in Chief of the army. When the Commander in Chief of the Army no longer existed, the Army Group Commanders then applied to the military adjutant's office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to be asked to report, but Army Commanders could not do that. tentions to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he would have to go to the Commander of the Army Group, and then he in turn would have to go to the Supreme Commander of the Army, so that only through all the official channels could a protest be made to Hitler?
Q. What do you know about Himmler's attempt to bring about a hostile attitude on the part of Hitler against the generals, and I mean the group generals?
A. Perhaps I have already given you part of my answer to that. I complained that we were not in a position to worn the Fuehrer against military information and news which he heard from irresponsible sources. It was a current phenomenon that particularly from circles of the police there was an incessant flow of news through Himmler, news referring to the traditional, or, as they called it, the reactionary attitude of the higher military leaders, through which these severe orders of the Fuehrer regarding a brutal action were continuously brought about. commanders, but it was concentrated on certain of them.
Q. Colonel General, you still haven't quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler's attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
A. Well, the consequence of what I have just described was a report made by Himmler, of course alone with Hitler, in which he would talk against certain senior commanders -- men of the army exclusively, of course -- and complain about them. We noticed that because the following day the Fuehrer would suddenly begin to speak against a particular commander without our knowing why; he would make him look bad.
Q. What was the relationship between the OKW and the OKH?
A. Before the war, and during the first part of the war, the relationship between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Command of the Army was burdened by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one, because through creating the OKW a group of general staff officers had arises, who were outside the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Army, and who were, I would say, in command of the General Staff of the Army and would give orders. distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I ought to add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and other reasonable officers succeeded in removing this tension as the war went on.
Q. I think, General, that that is enough. war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal von Runstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
A. I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Fuehrer had flown to the headquarters north of Rouen together with me. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal von Runstedt and Rommel stated in an unmistakeable manner how serious the entire situation in France was; tremendous superiority, against which ground operations were powerless. the end, "My Fuehrer, how do you imagine the continuation of this war will go on?" The Fuehrer was rather angry about this remark, and he only answered shortly, "That is a question which it is none of your business to put. You will have to leave that to me."
Q. Did you read a letter which Field Marshal von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
A. I stood next to the Fuehrer when he received that letter. He opened it, read the letter, and then gave it to me. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Fuehrer's personality, by describing how he had admired him and the energy with which he had held out during this war. He said that he was probably psychologically much closer to him than the Fuehrer could guess. He had still begun his task in the West full of confidence, but after the promised support of our own air force had not arrived, he had now found himself convinced that the situation was hopeless, and in the last hour of his life he could give him only one piece of good advice, and that was to make peace now.
Q. Colonel General, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the senior military commanders to end the hopeless war?
A. No supreme commander could touch the political questions because the ending of a war isn't a military but a political decision. But indirectly I have to say that there wasn't an officer in a responsible position who would not tell the Fuehrer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as so hopeless as it turned out to be towards the end. memorandum which I handed to the Fuehrer.
Q. I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
A. About the evening before the march into Austria, at 2 o'clock in the morning, I visited Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. I found him in a desolate mood. I didn't really see any reason for that, but apparently it was his conviction that this march into Austria might, under certain circumstances, develop into a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia, or perhaps he was not alto gether very pleased politically speaking regarding this impending considerable increase of the South German element in the Reich. I don't know, but at any rate he was most depressed.
Q. What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on one side and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?
A. That was a phase of a particularly serious conflict, because the Commander in Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals did have just that view to which I testified this morning, namely, that one ought to remain quiet in the West to end the war, Since this was again a political argument which they couldn't possibly use, the Commander in Chief of the Army brought a military argument before the Fuehrer at that time, and that argument was that considering the condition in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to fight against an army like the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, and would not be able to attack. every speech and every lecture before the supreme commanders.
The entire speech of November 23d, the entire memorandum which he wrote on the 10th of October, all arose and can only be explained from that conflict. groups have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with affidavit Number 12, U.S.557, which originates from Walter Schellenberg. There on page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the Frontal Zone the "Einsatzgruppen", the Action Groups, of the SD had been under the command of the Armies entirely. That is to say that tactically, factually and from the point of view of discipline, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Colonel General?
A It is only true to a very limited extent. At the beginning of my answer I am asked this sentence, named , that the "Einsatzgruppen" with "Einsatzkommando" is something I didn't know until I came her to Nurnberg. I must say that quite openly, even if it is decided that I am to be called a "Parcival", but it is a fact, I only knew of the Secret Police in the operational territory that the Army was divided into three sectors. The Front territory was called the fighting zone, and that went as far, approximately,as the artillery of the enemy could fire. In that sector everything that would be there at all, every one, would in every way be under the jurisdiction of the Army. But in that sector there wasn't any police anywhere except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case fully under the jurisdiction of the Army.
Q The Secret Field Polish was only a part of the division, wasn't it? amongst the men. Then behind that came the pear area which can under the various Army commanders ("Befehlshaber"); and then behind that came further rear area in which all replacement columns would be, and all the organization of the Qartermaster General of the Army. main section which represented 97 per cent of the entire operational area. There the entire police did anything that did not belong to the Army organically"; wasnot under the commend of the Army tactically; with such of the police, for instance, as came under the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. And only from the standpoint of discipline or supplies or movements during advance or retreat did the Army of course have the jurisdiction to dispose of these troops regarding their movements and their accomodations and so on and so forth.