The situation in which Germany now found itself made such action appear both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from the defendant Goering that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already underway. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt of the OKW.
I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in the German documents by the abbreviation WR. RUE.
General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Goering in his draft of a work entitled "Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armament Economy," which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This book is our document 2353 PS and has already been admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA 35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification purposes. I now offer it in evidence as USA Exhibit Number 35.
On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the RussoGerman Trade Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940. I read from page 9 of the English translation:
"On August 14, the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt, during a conference with Reichsmarshal Goering, was informed that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russions only until spring 1941. Later on, we were to have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demand. This illusion moved the Chief of the Wirtschafts Ruestungs Amt to give priority to matters concerning Russian war economy."
I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected to be captured.
At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will show that in November of 1940 Goering informed Thorns, that a campaign was planned against the USSR.
Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the cute of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for.
In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the Counter-Intelligence Service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered. This directive is our No. 1229-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A.-130, a photostat of the captured German document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must hot be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:
"The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the Status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.
"These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East.
On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests especially on the Balkan - with strong forces against Russian seizure.
"For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply:
"1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there.
This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.
"2) The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant, "3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.
"4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the anti aircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.
"5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, etc., it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Easter territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.
"The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, etc.
, will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.
"The chief of the supreme command of the armed forces "by order of "signed JODL".Early in November of 1940, Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the Army's operational plan.
This order was contained in a top secret directive from the Fuehrer's headquarters, No. 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by JODL.
It is No.444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as GB-Exhibit No. 116.
The directive begins by saying:
"The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:"
It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regard ing relations with other countries, and says, regarding the USSR -- and I read now from page 3, paragraph No. 5 of the English translation:
"Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being.
Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
"Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me."
On the 5th December 1940, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the USSR.
A report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured document No. 1799-PS.
This is a folder containing many documents, all labeled annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the USSR.
This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary.
The report I am here referring to is Annex No. 1, and is dated December 1940.
I now offer in evidence Document No. 1799-PS as United States Exhibit No. 131.
I should also like to read into the record a few sentences from the report of 5 December 1940, as they indicate the state of the planning for this act of aggression, six and a half months before it occurred.
"Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.
"The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad."
Then, skipping:
"The Fuehrer declares that he has agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following:
"The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich, and on the other hand the German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territory. In this way, we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible."
Then, skipping again:
"It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient."
THE PRESIDENT:Would that be a good time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN:Very convenient, sir.
THE PRESIDENT:Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will sit again on Monday at 10:00 o'clock.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours, December 9, 1945.)
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of America, the French Rep ublic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 10 December 1945, 1000-1245, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that, the Tribunal wishes the Defendants' Counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence.
At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the Defendants' Counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they propose to call, but they will be strictly confined to the names of the witnesses, and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In case there whould be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be posted up on the board in the Defendants' Counsel room so that you can study it there.
MR. SIDNEY ALDERMAN:May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of the aggression against the USSR where, with the campaign in the west at an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued to him as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa.
By the 18th of December, 1940, the general outline of the Army's operational plan, having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the high command of the Army, Navy, and the Airforce, for Barbarossa, directive No. 21, was issued.
This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the Soviet Union was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code word "Barbarossa" to denote this operation.
The Directive is No. 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the course of my opening statement, as USA Exhibit No. 31. Since it was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins, "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England."
On the same page it is stated, "Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
"Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of the attack will not be recognized."
The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed, and the parts that the various services (Army, Navy and Air Force) were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief, closing as follows: "V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
"The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time."
"Signed by Hitler, and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible."
It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself, as well as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no mere planning exercise by the Staff.
It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur, and which actually did occur.
The various services, which received the order, certainly understood it as a order to prepare for action, and did not view it as any hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning, and operation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.
So we come to the military planning and preparation for the implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January, 1941, indicated the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21, which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 132.
This document contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part. I fell, however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point, that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry reads:
"30 January 1941, Page 401 of the Diary.
"7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces."
I should note that "Ia" is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy's objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an idea of all.
I quote from the top of page 2 of the English translation:
"II. Objectives of War Against Russia.
* * * * "d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
"1) Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea."
The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates the detailed thinking and planning, which was being carried out to implement Barbarossa, almost six months before the operation actually got under way. It is but another peice in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighbouring power in the history of the world. Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references are contained in Document C-33, whihc I am now offering in evidence as Exhibit USA 133.
I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English translation, and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
"In regard to the impending operation 'Barbarossa' for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations."
On the third of February 1941, the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans for Sonnenblume, which was the code name for the North African operation - Sunflower. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Defendant Johl; the Commander in Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder, as well as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant.
A report of this conference is contained in our Document No. 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 134.
During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own strength, and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer.
At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which although written in semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to inform us that elaborate time-tables had already been set up for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:
"The intended time period was discussed with a plan: 1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front Germany - East; 2nd Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) from the middle of March will give UP 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila"-- I might state here parenthetically that this was the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France"can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained." "Felix" was the name for the proposed operation against Gibraltar.
"In industry the full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.
"From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from theWest. (Seelowe, or Sea Lion,--was a code word for the planned operation against England and Marita, which we shall see a little later in the quotation, was the code word for the action against Greece.) Seelowe can no longer be carried out. The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.
"The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
"C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.
"Fuehrer: 'When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and made no comment.'" This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February of 1941 - almost five months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched.
The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows. I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation. which is on Page 8 of the German:
"Conclusions:
"1). Barbarossa.
"a). The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan.
When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
"b). The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
"c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage.
The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.
"d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila.
"e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita," On 13th March 1941, the Defendant Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21, which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas". This detailed operational order is No. 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 135.
This order which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed "Area of Operations and Executive Power," and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory through which the army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks". This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b, which appears on page 1 of the English transla tion, and reads as follows:
"b) In the area of operations, the Reichfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems.
Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility.
The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this.
It is the responsibility of the Reich sfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks, military operations shall not be disturbed.
Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS".The order then states that in time political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of these officials to the army.
This is contained in paragraph 2c and paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:
"c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear.
The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration.
For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
"3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
"The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights.
He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General.
In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
"a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political tasks.
"b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry."
The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, paragraph 4, which I shall read:
"4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the admini stration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal, who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rue Amt' with the execution of the task.
Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt."
The second section deals with matters of personnel
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at sometime who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN:The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Goering.
THE PRESIDENT:And who was the Reichsfuehrer SS at that time?
MR. ALDERMAN:Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT:Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes.
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply and communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.
Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other countries, and states in part as follows -- I am reading from page 3 of the English translation:
"III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.
"9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands.
In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW."
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on page 3 of the English translation.
"IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
"12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops.
However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
"The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
signed: KEITEL" As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941.
In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.
I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 136.
Although I shall refer to this document again, I should like at present to read only an item which appears in the 2nd paragraph of item 142, on page 19 of the English translation, and which is in the text and in a footnote on page 26 in the German original.
This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:
"Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about five weeks.
All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order."
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straigntened out to permit the Fuehrer to definitely set "D" Day as the 22nd of June more than seven seeks away. Document No. 873-PS, in our series, is a "Top Secret" report of a conference with the Chief of the Section Landsverteideigung of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab on 30 April, 1941.
I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 137.
I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this report:
"1) Timetable Barbarossa:
The Fuehrer has decided:
Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May, maximal troop movements performance schedule.
At the beginning of operations, the OKH reserves will have riot yet reached the appointed areas.
"2) Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:
Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.
Sector Middle: Great German superiority Sector South Russian superiority Early in June, practically three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable, showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
This timetable is Document No. C-39 in our series, and I offer it now as Exhibit USA 138.
This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:
"Top Military Secret Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/abt.
L (I op) Fuehrer's Headquarters (no date) Top Secret (Chef Sache) 21 copies Only through officer 1 op.
00845/41 Received 6 June Enclosures:
-
The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for 'Barbarossa'.If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.
Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces signed:
Keitel" I shall not bother to read you the distribuation list which indicates where the 21 copies went.
The next two pages of the document are in the form of text, outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters ahead of these documents, "Top Secret," "Only through officer," and then the various reference numbers and file information, when you give identification of a document.
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes, sir.
The next two pages of the document are in the form of text, outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General, Negotiations with Friendly States, Army, Navy, Air Force and Camouflage.
I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page - Date, Serial Number, Army, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, willyou read the first paragraph, for that seems to be important.
There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:The heading "General" on page 2.
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes, sir.
"1. General.
"The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22nd of May."
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
MR.ALDERMAN: (Continuing) Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on pages 9 and 10. These are at page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9, it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy and Air Force that, and I quote:
"Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled."
Under the column headed OKW appears the note that, and again I quote:
"Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word:
'Dortmund.'" In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
"Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be reckoned with."
The second entry on page 10 of the chart for the 22nd of June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Navy and OKW, and provides as follows, under the heading:
"Invasion Day "H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces.
0330 hours."
In the Remarks column, it states that:
"Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force.
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted, and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.