Hitler was dissatisfied with remeasures taken by Field Mars hal von Blomberg, and especially these of Generaloberst von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he felt that rearmament made but also progress in the army. As a result, Hitler made a point of exaggerating a fact known only to Goering and to Raeder, so that it is but natural that the impression of that Speech on Neurath, who had no idea about this intention, was entirely different and deeply alarming. what he wanted, because the two last paragraphs of the document indicate that to same extent Blomberg and Fritsch saw through Hitler's scheming, and that his exaggerations failed to deceive them. Though on similar occasions Hitler did not permit discussions, Blomberg and Fritsch intervened on this occasion and pointed to the need of preventing England and Fra nce from lining up as Germany's adversaries. Blomberg explained the reasons for his protest, and in the penultimate paragraph the document unmistakably expressed his scepticism as to Hitler's words, in that he remarked that under such circumstances he would not be able to carry out his planned vacation abroad scheduled to begin on 10 November. came round and, in contrast to his early statements, declared himself convinced of England's non-participation, and that, consequently, he also did not believe in military action by France against Germany.
The lack of tenability of Hitler's ideas shown in this document finds further expression in that he took as starting point for his statements an idea truly fantastic, namely an Italo-French-English war or -- equally fantastic -- a civil war in France.
Continuing such contradictions, Hitler mentioned in his speech an application of force on one hand, an attack by Poland against East Prussia on the other hand -- something which bore out a defensive idea only; and in regard to Czechoslovakia he said that in all probability England and France had already written Czechoslovakia off their books without further ado. This hint is an indication, however, that Hitler was prepared to negotiate, and this is in keeping with actual historic developments. He mentions that Lower Austria and Czechoslovakia will be brought to their knees but, nevertheless, one year later, in March, as well as in September 1938, he carried on negotiations and settled both questions without war. This fact in particular seems very significant, in that it proved to Raeder by the events which collowed that he was right in not ascribing undue importance to Hitler's rash words of 5 November 1937, because they were not supported by the fact that in reality Hitler, at a later date, carried on negotiations. second Naval Pact that had been concluded with England just a few months earlier and that as a result he could not really expect Hitler seriously to leave a path on which he was engaged.
And as a last point of view: Throughout its entire length, the document is dealing with political questions on one hand,and with possible land operations on the other. Raeder had nothing whatever to do with political questions because he was no politician: while Neurath as Foreign Minister naturally had reason to place greater importance on Hitler's political attitude. It is of equal importance that Neurath testified that, as a result of that speech, he too asked Hitler in a confidential interview for his personal attitude, and that he refused to continue in the Foreign Office because Hitler stated that those were his actual intentions. To me it seems typical of Hitler to declare to one person, namely Neurath, that perhaps he would go to war, while he told another person,namely Raeder, that he would under no circumstances make war. This difference in expressing his position obviously can be explained by the fact that at that time he no longer appreciated Neurath as Foreign Minister, because he realized that in the foreign policy which he proposed to follow, Neurath would no longer be as yielding as a successor he had in view, Ribbentrop.
On the other hand, at that time he still wanted in any case to keep Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. This is another instance of Hitler's method of acting as the situation demanded, always and without any compunction paying homage to the principle: The end justifies the means.
Hitler's speech of 23 May 1939, "Small Schmundt", US 27. Here Hitler expresses himself once more in a most dubious fashion. He speaks of a program of aggression, of the preparation of a planned attack and of the decision to attack Poland. I in no way fail to recognize that there is good reason for the Prosecution to consider this document as particularly good evidence. I believe, however,that in the case of Reader, and taking into account the numerous points of view I pointed out, the value of this document as evidence is very much less than the Prosecution is inclined to think, and much less than warranted by the impression first gained from the wording of the Schmundt version. Schmundt obviously madean endeavor to formulate Hitler's contradictory, fantastic and highly chaotic statements along the lines of his exact military thinking. This gives the document a clarity which is not that of Hitler. We do not know when Schmundt prepared the document, and Schmundt failed to show the copy he had made to other interested parties. Schulte-Moenting pointed to the contradictions of this document in particular, which I need not repeat here. Of greater importance is the decisive point, the contradiction between these words and the words which Hitler at the same time spoke to Raeder, again and again, and which always pursue the same old path, namely that he does not intend war and that he would not make excessive demands. until after he had a private conversation with Hitler, directly after that speech, as Hitler assured him in that personal interview that under all circumstances he would settle also the case of Poland in a peaceful manner.
he believed him, and he had every right to conclude HITLER was telling him the truth in answer to a question equally precise. I refer to the very precise statement on that document during the RAEDER examination and the examination of the witness SCHULTE-MOENTING. I especially refer to the comprison HITLER used ( according to SCHULTE MOENTINGS's testimony), stating that nobody would go to Court if he had received 99 Prennigs while the dispute involved one Mark, and concluded from it that he had received what he had asked politically, and that there could not be war because of the last political question, namely the Polish Corridor. them the deposition by DOENITZ is not the last in importance, to the effect that, incidental to the last U-boat manoeuvers in the Baltic Sea in July 1939, RAEDER EXPRESSED HIS firm conviction that in that respect he relied on HITLER's assurances. RAEDER, furthermore, knew that the navy was absolutely unfit for a war at sea against England: he had explained that to HITLER time and time again : he trusted HITLERS words and was confident that also in the Polish question HITLER would resort to negotiations again and - as shown by the testimony of the witness DAHLERUS negotiations were in fact taking place, even sucessful negotiations in the beginning. The reason why the attempt finally failed after all and that it had to come to a second World war was stated in detail by the witness DAHLERUS? who thus show portrayed the awful tragedy of this event. It seems important to me that up to August 1939 not only the witness DAHLERUS but also CHAMBERLAIN still believed in HITLER' good intentions. Therefore, here too we have the same question again and the same answer : One cannot expect RAEDER as a soldier to have been more farseeing and to have recognized HITLER dangerous ideas, if men like CHAMBERLAIN, HALIFAX and DAHLERUS themselves had not yet seen through HITLER at that time. ting character of this document, may I ask you to take into consideration that the incriminating character, just as in the document of 5 November 1937, concerns itself with political matter As defense counsel for the Commander-inChief of the Navy, I have to judge the facts, not from the political but from the military aspect.
From a military viewpoint, however, it is impossible to follow the arguments of the Prosecution under any circumstances, for the military are not authorized to take part in decisions of war or peace, but are merely obliged to make such military prepara tions as the political leaders consider necessary. In no country of the world does an Admiral have to give an opinion as to whether the possible war, for which he must make plans is a war of aggression or a defensive war. In no country of the world does the decision of the question as to whether war is to be waged rest wit the military, but on the contrary is always left to the political leaders, that is to the legislative bodies. Accordingly, article 45 of the German constitution stipulates that the President of the Reich is to represent the Reich in questions of international law and stipulates further : " The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace take place by national law. Therefore, the question whether a war was to be waged against Poland rested with the Reichstag and not with the military leader professor JAHREISS Has already explained that in the legal development of the National Socialist state these decisions rested in the last analysis exclusively with HITLER. From the viewpoint of my RAEDER case it is of no consequence whether HITLER would be regarded as legally authorized to start a war himself, as he actually did in the autumn of 1939. The deciding factor is only that in any case the military leaders, from either a practical or a constitutional point of view, do not have to participate in this decision. It is an untenable thought if the prosecution tries to regard as a crime every act of military planning which has taken place on the part of Germany; for the military leaders, who merely receive the order to work out a specified plan, are neither authorized nor obligated to decide whether the execution of their plan will later on involve an aggressive or a defensive war.
It ist well known that the allied military leaders rightly hold the same viewpoint. No admiral or general of the allied armed forces would understand it if someone should bring a charge against him because of military plans that were made on the Allied side a long time before the war. I do not have to explain this any further I believe it will suffice if I refer, for instance, t the RIBBENTROP Document exhibit No. 221. This is a question of a secret document, which, according to the title concerns " Second Phase of the Anglo-French General Staff Conferences". From this document it appears that exact plans were wormed out on the part of the Allied forces for a war embracing many countries; plans which, according to this document include a war in Europe and a war in the Far East. There it expressly says that the French and British High Commands in the Far East " worked out a joint pla of operations." There it expressly speaks about the importance of the possession of the Belgian and Dutch national territories as a starting point for the beginning of the offensive against Germany and the decisive point for this in this parallel military case se to me to be the fact that this document is dated from the same month as HTTLER' s speeech to the commanders-in-chief, which has already been discussed, namely, May 1939. The document bears the inscription : " London, May 5th 1939". on 22 august 1939 at the Obersalzberg.
Regarding the value as evidence of both the documents 1014PS and 798 PS submitted by the Prosecution, for the sake of brevity I should like first of all to refer to my previous statements which I made to this Court, when I made the formal proposal to cancel Document 1014 PS.
Although this high Tribunal did not accept this proposal, I still believe that my statements on the limited value of this document as evidence are important, in so far that only an very small value as a evidence can be attached to both these documents and particularly to Document 1014 PS. The American Prosecution, when submitting these documents, duly pointed able to submit a more accurate version of this speech. In accordance therewith I submitted the Reader Exhibit No. 77, a version coming from the witness General that it is here a question of a more accurate version, then the versions of the Prosecution documents. Thereupon, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe handed in two documents under Nos.
GB 464 and GB 465 in which he compares in the most scrupulous way BOEHM'S version with the versions 1014 PS and 798 PS, by which he considerably facilitated the comparison of these document for all of us. In order on my part to facilitate also this comparison for the high Tribunal and for the prosecution, I requested Generaladmiral BOEHM in the meantime to compare the versions under consideration himself also and that by using the compilations of the British Prosecution mentioned just now. The result is to be found in BOEHM'S Affidavit which I submitted as RAEDER Exhibit No. 129.
tremely incomplete and inaccurate, alls the more so as,apart from its formal deficienies, it is only 11/2 pages long, and for this reason cannot be an adequate reproduction of a 21/2 hour's speech.
as shown by BOEHM'S Affidavit. It is hot a question of every passage. The point, Commanders - in-Chief might more likely be charged have actually not been spoken according to BOEHM' s sworn statement. According to BOEHM'S Affidavit it is not true that HITLER declared, that he had decided as early as Spring 1939, to attack the West first of all, and only afterwards to attack the East. Nor have the words been used; " I only fear that at the last moment a filthy fellow Will submit me an offer od mediation, we shall continue in the pursuit of our political goal". And the most decisive thing is that the words:
" Annihilation of Poland in the foreground, the aims is to eliminate the living forces and not to reach a determined line", have not been used; HITLER only spoke of the breaking up of the military forces. For the differences lie precisely in the sharp phrasing to which the Prosecution national law, even the intention to assassinate civilians, can be derived. If these phrases had been spoken, we would justly reproach the Commanders - in - Chi present with having waged the war at Hitler's order, in spite of the criminal and in view. If, however, these sentences have hot been used, but, as Boehm testifies under oath, merely sentences aiming at the establishing of a military goal, the Prosecution cannot reproach any of the Commanders- in - Chief present with having remained at their posts. No one can in earnest demand of an Admiral the resignation of his post a few days before the outbreak of a war, thus shaking the military power of his own Fatherland. I am quite sure that the most serious reproaches can be leveled at any rate against Hitler's attitude after the Munich Agreement up to the outbreak of the war in Poland, but and this is decisiv for the Raeder case - not against the military Command, but exclusively against the political Leader. we knew that Hitler himself also admitted this, and evaded the responsibility by committing suicide, without having the slightest regard even for the life and the well-being of the German people during and especially at the end for the war, I shall now come to Hitler's speech delivered to the Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, which I shall mention only very briefly. If, Mr. President, you will permit me to do, then I should like to complete that brief part of the case, because after that follows a rather long section.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I can cut it relatively short with regard to this last key document.
Again, it is a document without signature, the author of which, therefore, is not knwon, and without indication as to the date of writing. It is no official transcript; again it pursues a special trend.
Early in November 1939 a serious difference arose between Hitler and the General; for Hitler inten of a differenttopinion, and apparently hoped that the outbreak of a real World War might still be avoided.
Hitler's dissatisfaction and annoyance with his Generals show themselves clearly. In consequences of this, he strives to show, by customary repetition of his former actions, what he has accomplished, and further to show that he has always been in the right. It is really a typical Hitler speech, which corresponds to his public speeches in which he also loved to put on airs and to boast of being gifted with genius. Hitler, after all. belonged to these people who always believe themselves in the right, and avail themselves of every opportunity to prove it. He further took the opportunity of stifling at birth, by threats, resistance in high military circles, resistance which had become known to him, and in this way of establishing his dictatorship. It is absolutely significant, when he says literally in this document: I shall not shrink from w anything and will destroy everyone who is against me."This has also been recognized by leading foreign military personalities.I refer for example to General Marshall's official report, which speaks about the "Lack in far- reaching planning in military respect" and in particular about the fact that the German High Command did not have an all- embracing strategic plan, and points out in this connection that " Hitler's prestige reached the stage that one no longer dared to oppose his views." at this time the war was already in progress, and that the higher military officers cannot be blamed if in the war they strove in all their plannings to come off victorious. The Allies were also planning at the same time. I refer to the documents RIBBENTROPS Exhibit No. 22 and RAEDER Exhibit Nr. 34. The former document dates from 1 September 1939; it is a confidential latter from General GAMELIN to DALADIER' and contains the basic idea that it is necessary to invade Belgium in order to wage the war outside the French frontier. The latter document deals with military plans in the same wa , in a confidential letter from General GAMELIN to General LELONG, military attache of the French Embassy in London, of 13 November 1939, and also concerns the enterprise in Holland and Belgium planned by the Allies.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 17 July 1946, at 1000 Hours.
DR. SIEMERS: Yesterday I dealt with the events before the outbreak of war. Now I shall turn to the events which occurred during the war. in all events prior to the War, and that the transactions in which the Navy was authoritatively involved were carried out on a peace basis, namely, on the basis of the Naval Treaty with England. When the war nevertheless ultimately broke out on the 3 September 1939, also involving England, a regrettable incident occurred at the outset, on the first day, namely the sinking of the "Athenia", from which the Prosecution attempts, in exaggerated terms, to construe a ponderous moral accusation against Raeder, not so much indeed on the basis of its actual military side, that is, the sinking, which my colleague Dr. Kranzbuehler has already discussed, as on account of an article published in the "Voelkischer Boebachter" of 23 October 1939 and entitled "Churchill Sinks the 'Athenia'." Were the statement of facts brought forward by the Prosecution correct, the moral accusations against Raeder and the Navy would be justified, even though, of course, an untruthful newspaper article is no crime. Consequently, the accusation brought by the Prosecution is only made for the purpose of deprecating Raeder's personality in contradiction to the life-long esteem which Raeder has enjoyed in the whole world and especially abroad. facts presented by the Prosecution is not correct. Surely this must be our conclusion if the Prosecution believed at first that the odious article in the "Voelkischer Boebachter" could not have appeared without the knowledge of the Naval Command. they think there was permanent intelligence and close cooperation between the various departments and especially between the Navy and Propaganda Ministry, between Raeder and Goebbels, was far greater than the opposition between individual departments in a democratic State.
Consequently, the testimonies of witnesses Raeder, Schulte-Moenting, Weizsaecker and Fritsche, together with the documents, establish the following facts absolutely clearly:
1. In early September 1939 Raeder himself firmly believed that the sinking was not imputable to a German U-boat because it was revealed by the reports that the nearest German U-boat was at least 75 nautical miles away from the spot of the sinking.
2. Accordingly, Raeder, as stated in Document D 912, published a "bona fide" denial, and issued declarations to this effect to the American Naval Attache and to the German Secretary of State Baron Weizsaecker.
3. Raeder did not realize the mistake until after the return of the U 30 on the 27 September 1939.
4. Hitler insisted, as evidenced by witnesses Raeder and SchulteMoenting, that no rectification of the facts should be made to any other German or foreign department, that is to say, that the sinking should not be acknowledged as caused by a German U-boat. He apparently yielded to the impulse of political considerations and wished to avoid complications with the USA over an incident which could not be remedied, however regrettable it was. Hitler's order was so strict that the few officers who were in the picture were put under oath to keep it secret.
5. Fritsche disclosed that after the first investigation by the Navy in early September 1939, he made no further investigation and that the "Voelkische Boebachter" article appeared as a consequence of a complete agreement between Hitler and Goebbels, without previous notice to Raeder. On this point the testimonies of Raeder and Schulte-Moenting coincide. It is consequently clear that Raeder -- in contradiction to the claim of the Prosecution -- was not the author of the article and moreover had heard nothing about the article before its appearance. I regret that in spite of this clarification, the Prosecution apparently are intent upon persisting in their claim by the production, on the 3 July 1946, of a new document, D 912. This newly submitted document contains only radio broadcasts by the Propaganda Ministry which are of the same kind as the "Voelkischer Beobachter" article.
These radio broadcasts were a propaganda instrument of Goebbels and cannot, any more than the article, be brought up as a charge against Raeder, who, in fact, was at the time informed of the article only and not of the radio broadcasts. Ev the fact that Raeder did not attempt any rectification, after being informed of the article, cannot be made a moral charge against him since he was bound by Hitler's order and had no idea at the time that Hitler himself had a hand in the article, which Weizsaecker aptly described as perverse phantasy. notorious fact that precisely at the beginning of the war, inaccurate reports also appeared in the English press about alleged German atrocities, which, even after this clarification, were not rectified, as for instance, the false report about the murder of 10,000 Czechs in Prague by German elements in September 1939, although the matter had been cleared up by a commission of neutral journalists. the defendants. If this presumption were correct with reference to Raeder, the Prosecution would scarcely have felt the necessity of bringing forward precisely this "Athenia" case in such ponderous and injurious terms with the sole purpose of discrediting the former Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
violation of neutrality and breach of international law, namely :
1. On the basis of document C 12 according to which Hitler decided on the basis of a report by Raeder on 30 December 1939 that :
"Greek merchant ships in the zone around England which the USA declared prohibited, are to be treated like enemy ships."
2. According to document C 167 on the occasion of delivery of a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, Raeder asked for confirmation that "all of Greece is to be occupied, even in case of peaceful settlement." support ; in both cases there is no action which violated international law.
With reference to accusation one : Raeder and the German naval command learned in October /November 1939 that quite a number of Greek merchant ships had been put at the disposal of England, either at the instance or with the approval of the Greek government. This fact cannot be reconciled with strict neutrality and, according to principles of international law, it gave Germany the right to take an equivalent counter measure. This justified counter measures consisted in treating Greek ships, which sailed for England, as enemy ships from the moment they were in the zone around England which had been declared prohibited by the United States.
With reference to accusation two : Germany, especially the High Comman of the Navy, had received reports that certain Greek military and political circles maintained the closest connections to the Allied General Staff over since 1939.
As time went by more and more reports came in. What the Allies were planning on the Balkans is known; the intentions were the erection of a Balkan front against Germany. For this purpose local Conditions in Greece, as well as in Rumania, were examined on the part of the Allied General Staff of the Allied officers, in order to build airplane bases there. Furthermore preparations were made to land in Greece. As proof, I have presented as Raeder Exhibit No. 59, the minutes for the session of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940. which shows that the War Committee at that time had already checked the question of possible operations in the Caucasus area and in the Balkans, from which results the activity of General Jauneaud in Greece for the continuation of investigations and preparations and the attempts to camouflage the trip by making it in civilian clothing.
represents a violation of neutrality on the part of Greece; for Greece did not appear as England's ally But formally continued to maintain her neutrality Therefore, Greece could no longer figure that Germany would fully respect Greek neutrality. Germany nevertheless, respected Greek neutrality for a long time to come. The occupation of Greece took place in April 1941 only after British troops had already landed in Southern Greece on 3 March 1941. generally recognized rules, without importance in international legal relation and for the international legal decision between Germany and England and between Germany and Greece; it has importance only for the legal relations between England and Greece. the fact that Greek neutrality was menaced by Germany, especially by the occupation of Bulgaria on 1 March 1941. In this connection the Prosecution is overlooking that not only the execution of the occupation of Greece by British forces, but also the planning of the Allies starter essentially earlier than the German planning. But however that may be, no accusation, at all, can be raised against Raeder, because the date of document C 167 submitted by the Prosecution is 18 March 1941, which means it is 14 days later than the landing if the English in Southern Greece . In any case, at that time Greece could no longer demand that her alleged neutrality be respected. But beyond that the accusation is also unjustified when the Prosecution points out that Raeder asks for confirmation for all of Greece to be occupied. This question of Raeder was not a causal factor for the fact that all of Greece was occupied for Hitler had provided already in his order No. 20 of 13 December 1940 that the entire Greek continent was to be occupied, in order to frustrate English intentions of creating a dangerous basis for air operations under the protection of a Balkan front, especially for the Rumanian oil district.
In addition to that, the inquiry of Raeder on 18 March 1941 was justified on strategic grounds, because Greece offered many landing possibilities for the British and the only possible defense was for Greece to be firmly in the hands of Germany, as witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Moenting have explained.
est or desire for glory, as the Prosecution thinks for the navy won no glory whatsoever in Greece because the occupation was a land operation, and the occupation of an originally neutral country is simply the regrettable consequence of such a big war; it cannot be charged to one belligerent, if both belligerents had plans concerning the same state and carried out these plans.
I should like now to go on to the subject of Norway. On 9 April 1940 troops of all 3 branches of the German Armed Forces occupied Norway and Denmark. From this and the preceding plans, the Prosecution have drawn up the most grave accusation against Grand Admiral Raeder, alongside, I understand, with the collective charge of participation in a conspiracy. gested the occupation of Norway, to Hitler and believes that Raeder accomplished the occupation out of a spirit of conquest and vainglory. I shall demons trate that this argumentation is incorrect. Only one thing is correct, that is, that in this single instance Raeder took the initiative of first approaching Hitler on the subject of Norway, namely, on the 10 October 1939. I shall, however, show that he has in fact acted in this connection not as a politician but enclusively as a soldier. Raeder sensed purely strategic dangers, and pointed out these strategic dangers to Hitler, because he assumed that the Allies contemplated the establishment of a new from in Scandinavia in Norway in particular, and knew that an occupation of Norway by Britain could have a militarily decisive consequence to the detriment of Germany. I shall show that Germany has committed no violation of international law by the occupation of Norway. Before I state the legal foundation and connect the facts established by the appraisal of evidence with the principles of international law, I should like first to state an important fact As Raeder's examination shows, he was very reluctant in acting as Supreme Commander for the Norwegian action and as disclosed by Schulte-Moending's interrogations.
Raeder had the natural feeling of justice that a neutral state could not be drawn into the existing war without an absolutely imperative emergency. In the period between October 1939 and Spring 1940, Raeder had always defended the opinion that by far the best folution would be that Norway and all Scandinavia remain absolutely neutral.
This, Raeder and Schulte-Moenting disclosed unanimously at their interrogation and it is, moreover, proved by documents. For this, I refer to Raeder Exhibit No. 69. In this, the conviction of Raeder that the most favourable solution is undoubtedly the preservation of the strictest neutrality by Norway which is entered in the War Diary on 13 January 1940. Raeder had clearly convinced himslef that an occupation of Norway by Germany for motives of international justice or strategic reasons could only be conceivable if Norway could not or would not maintain an absolute neutrality. in particular to Document TC 31, in which the German Reich Government, on 2 September 1939 expressly assures Norway of her inviolabity and integrity. In this memorandum, the following legitimate remark is added "If the Reich Cabinet makes this declaration it, of course, also expects that Norway in turn, will observe irreproachable neutrality towards the Reich and that it will not tolerate breaches of Norwegian neutrality should attempts along that line be made by third parties."
way, this was done because of the threat that the plans of the Allies created the danger of occupation of Norwegian bases by then. In his opening speech, Sir Hartely Shawcross declared that according to the indictment, Germany's breach of neutrality and its war of aggression against Norway remained criminal even if Allied plans for the occupation had been correct and he added that in reality such plans were not ture. I believe that the argument advanced here by Sir Hartley Shawcross is contrary to accepted International Law. If Allied plans for the occupation of Norwegian bases existed, and there were dangers that Norway neither would nor could maintain strict neutrality, in such a case accepted standards of International Law did justify Germany's Norway campaign. of International Law, in order to create a foundation for my own reasoning, while I shall at the same time try to set forth those legal viewpoints which contradict the Prosecution's interpretation. In order to save time in this legal exposition, and in order to make the conception comprehensible I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 66 an opinion on International Law on the Norway Campaign by Dr. Hermann Mosler, A Professor of International Law at the University of Bonn.
The High Tribunal will bear in mind that I was given permission to make use of this opinion for purposes of argumentation, and I may therefore refer at this point to this detailed scientific compilation and argument. In my final pleading I shall confine myself to a summary of the most essential concepts of legal opinion. Neutrals in the event of Warfar at Sea stipulate that "the parties at war are bound to respect the rights of sovereignty of neutral powers in the territory and coastal waters of the neutral power", and that all unfriendly acts on the part of the belligerent parties within the delimitation of the coastal waters of a neutral power "are strictly banned as violations of neutrality." Contrary to these stipulations, Great Britain violated Norway's neutrality through the laying of mines in Norwegian coastal waters for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate passage of German warships and merchantmen, especially in order to cut off the exportation of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. In the letter of the Foreign Office which I received in reply to my petition for authorization to submit files of the British Admiralty, confirmation as per Raeder Exhibit No. 130 was received to the effect that His Majesty's Forces laid mine fields in Norwegian waters, and in addition it was stated that this was a well known fact. reestablishing the disturbed equilibrium between the belligerent parties, in other words in wresting from the enemy's forces the benefit they were deriving from violation of neutrality.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know what your contention is on this subject. Do you contend that any breach of neutrality of a neutral state entitles one of the warring nations to enter that neutral state.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry, Mr. President; I did not understand it all, I am afraid.
THE PRESIDNET: Well, there seems to be a certain amoung of electrical disturbance. What the Tribunal would like to know is whether it is your contention that any breach of neutrality by one of the warring states entitles the other warring state to enter and invade the neutral state.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in this general respect, I certainly would not think of saying that.
It is a principle of international law that a violation of international law committed by one state only entitles the other warring nation to counter-measures, or a counter-measure, which the breach of neutrality is equal to. In other words, certainly an occupation of Norway on the part of Germany would not be justified because Britain mined the coastal waters. That fact, as such, does not justify an occupation.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be your contention that it made any difference on the rights of Germany if Germany were to be held to be an aggressor in the original war?
I will repeat it. According to your contention, would it make any difference that Germany was held, if it were held, to be the aggressor in the original war, out of which the occupation of the neutral country occurred?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, but I am afraid I can not quite understand the sense as it comes through in translation.
THE PRESIDENT: I will say it again more slowly. According to your contention, would it make any difference if the Tribunal were to think that Germany had been the aggressor in the war which led to the occupation of the neutral state?
DR. SIEMERS: I simply can not understand.
My apologies, Mr. President. Now, if I understood it correctly, you wish me to answer the question whether the fact that previously a war had been begun by Germany against Poland, whether this fact would influence my juridical attitude toward the question of Norway.
THE PRESIDENT: Assuming. I only say assuming that the war begun by Germany against Poland were to be held to be an aggressive war.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that the answer is in the negative because the individual acts, under international law, must be dealt with separately. The fact that the Tribunal may possibly assume--namely, that an aggressive war was conducted against Poland -- can not have any effect upon the point of view of international law in the subsequent years. Sir Hartley Shawcross also dealt with the complex of Greece and the question of landings entirely from the point of view of the Greek events, and he has not said that Britain could occupy Greece because Germany had occupied Poland. He said, just as I did, that from the standpoint of international law Britain could occupy Greece because Greece was threatened by a German occupation, and that is all that I am trying to say from the point of view of international law.
Other parallels I am not trying to draw. It applies to Norway also, as the further part of my plea will show.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There is one other question which I should like to ask you. Is it your contention that Germany was entitled under international law to use the territorial waters of Norway, either for her warships or for the transport of ore, or for the transport of prisoners of war?
DR. SIEMERS: In my opinion, from the standpoint of international law, the situation is that Germany was entitled to use the coastal water, observing at the same time the various international rules; as, for instance, only brief stays in ports and similar rulings such as, for instance, the duty of submitting to investigation by neutrals, such as, for instance, was carried on in the case of the battleship "Altmark", but principally, to carry out shipping operations off Narvik was justified as far as I know from the point of view of international law.
THE PRESIDENT: Continue.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, with reference to the last point, may I add one thing? If one were of the opinion that Germany was not allowed to use these coastal waters, then the mining of these coastal waters would have been a justified breach of neutrality on Britain's part, so that, as far as I am concerned, the mining operations would have to be left out of my plea but not the other facts which I am referring to. Mining is an equivalent circumstance. I myself consider that the mining operation was not permissible and that travelling through coastal waters was permissible, but the entire complex is not bringing me to any final conclusions with reference to the occupation of Norway. I do hope that I shall be understood correctly. I am not saying that Germany was allowed to occupy Norway because Britain had mined the coastal waters.
THE PRESIDENT: But you are saying, are you, that Germany was entitled to use the coastal waters, first of all, for the transport or ore; secondly, for her warships?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And thirdly, for the transport of prisoners of war?
DR. SIEMERS: It is my opinion, Mr. President, that for ore transports there was no clause in international law which prohibitsthat, so that that shipping was permissible.
out that there is only one inference, and that is the case of the ship "Altmark". If Germany was not allowed to use coastal waters for transport of prisoners of war, then that could only bring about the consequences that Britain would be allowed to adopt an equivalent counter-measure, in an individual case to adopt some measure, some action; that it would not allow her to mine the entire coastal waters. The mining of the entire coast, from the point of view of international law, is only justified if you adopt the point of view that Germany's merchant navy was prohibited from entering those coastal waters. But that, in my opinion,is not the situation.
THE PRESIDENT: You may continue.
DR. SIEMERS: Reaction against such violation of neutrality is primarily direct ed against the adversary and not against the neutral party. Legal relationship deriving from neutrality exists not only between the neutral party and the two belligerent parties, but the neutrality of the respective neutral State is at the same time a factor in direct relations existing between the belligerent parties. If the relationship of neutrality between one of the belligerent parties and the neutral power suffers disturbance, the neutral powercan in no way file complaint if the other belligerent power take appropriate action, in which case it is entirely immaterial whether the neutral State is unable or unwilling to protect its neutrality. proceed to counter measure is "the right of self-preservation"; "le droit de preservation personell." As brought out in detail by legal opinion, this right of self-preservation is generally accepted by International Law. It may suffice to point out here that this basic law is not affected by the Kellogg Fact as often mentioned in this Court. I may therefore also ask permission for a brief quotation from the circularised memorandum of the American Secretary of State Kellogg dated 23 June 1938, as follows:
"There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which That right is inherent in every Sovereign State and is implicit in every treaty."