This letter was dated 17 June 1944. That executions were carried out by the SD pursuant to the said Hitler order of 18 October 1942, while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD is indicated by document 526-PS, heretofore received as USA Exhibit 502. That was the order introduced this morning, I'm sure the Tribunal recalls. The policy of the police to protect civilians who lynched allied flyers was effective during the period that Kaltenbrunner served as Chief of the Security Police and SD. 526. This is an affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, the former Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and provides in paragraph 7 -- this is all I'm going to read from the affidavit:
"In 1944, on another occasion but also in the course of an Amtschef conference, I heard fragments of conversation between Kaltenbrunner and Mueller. I remember distinctly the following remarks of Kaltenbrunner:
'All offices of the SD and the Security Police are to be informed that programs of the populace against English and American terror fliers are not to be interfered with. On the contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.'" of the Security Police and SD is the taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment and the punishment of civilians of occupied territories by family methods. The fact that this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is shown by document 835-PS, which is offered as exhibit next in order, USA Exhibit 527. This is a letter from the high command of the armed forces to the German Army's commission under date 2 September 1944. The document begins, and I quote:
"Conforming to the decrees, all non-German civilians in occupied territories who have endangered the security and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in other ways, are to be surrendered to the Security Police and SD.
Only those prisoners are accepted who were legally sentenced to death or were serving a sentence of confinement prior to the announcement of these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which endanger the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are those also of a political nature." of the Security Police and SD is the crime of executing and confining persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives. That this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is indicated by document L-37, heretfore received in evidence as USA Exhibit 506. That was received this morning. That is the letter of the Kommandeur of Sipo and SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, in which it was stated that the male relatives of assassins and saboteurs should be shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age sent to concentration camps.
I refer again to Document L-215, which has heretofore been received in evidence as USA Exhibit 243, and specifically to the case of Junker, who was ordered by Kaltenbrunner to be committed to Sachsenhausen concentration camp by the Gestapo "because as a relative of a deserter, he is expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go free." the Security Police and SD is the clearance of Sipo and SD prisons and concentration camps. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-53, which was received in evidence as USA Exhibit 291. This was the letter from the Kommandeur of the Sipo and SD, Radom, dated 21 July 1944 in which it is stated that the Kommandeur of the Sipo and SD of the General Government had ordered all Sipo and SD prisons to be cleared and, if necessary, the inmates to be liquidated. I now offer Document 3462-PS as exhibit next in order, USA Exhibit 528. This is the sworn interrogation of Bertus Gerdes, the former Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich. This interrogation was taken in the course of an official military investigation of the U.S. Army. To this interrogation Gerdes was ordered to state all he knew about Kaltenbrunner. I'm only going to read a very small portion of his reply, beginning on the third paragraph of page 2.
"Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant touch with him because he was greatly worried about the attitude of the foreign workers and especially inmates of concentration camps Dachau, Muehldorf and Landsberg, which were in the path of the approaching Allied armies. On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945, I received a telephone call from Gauleiter Giesler asking me to be available for a conversation that night. Giesler that he had received a directive from Kaltenbrunner by order of the Fuehrer to work out a plan without delay for the liquidation of the concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish labor camps in Landsberg and Muehldorf. The Directive proposed to liquidate the two Jewish labor camps at Landsberg and Muehldorf by use of the German Luftwaffe, since the concentration area of these camps had previously been the targets of repeated enemy air attacks.
This action received the code name of 'Wolke Al'". this interrogation.
"I was certain that I would never let this directive be carried out. As the action Wolke Al should have become operational already for some time, I was literally swamped by couriers from Kaltenbrunner and moreover I was supposed to have discussed the details of the Muehldorf and Landsberg actions in detail with the two Kreisleiter concerned. The couriers who were in most cases SS officers usually SS lieutenants, gave me terse and strict orders to read and initial. The orders threatened me with the most terrible punishment including execution if I did not comply with them. However, I could always excuse my failure to execute the plan because of bad flying weather and lack of gasoline and bombs. Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered to have Jews in Landsberg marched to Dachau in order to include them in the Dachau exterminati operations, and that the Muehldorf action was to be carried out by the Gestapo "Kaltenbrunner also ordered an operation -Wolkenbrand - for the concentration camp Dachau which provided that the inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau were to be liquidated by poison with the exception of Aryan nationals of the Western Powers.
"Gauleiter Giesler received this order direct from Kaltenbrunner and discussed in my presence the procurement of the required amounts of poison with Dr. Harrfeld, the Gau Health Chief. Dr. Harrfeld promised to procure these quantities when ordered and was advised to await my further directions. As I was determined to prevent the execution of this plan in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr. Harrfeld.
"The inmates of Landsberg had hardly been delivered at Dachau when Kaltenbrunner sent a courier declaring the action Wolkenbrand was operational.
"I prevented the execution of the Wolke Al and Wolkenbrand by giving Giesler the reason that the front was too close and asked him to transmit this on to Kaltenbrunner.
"Kaltenbrunner therefore issued directives in writing to Dachau to transport all Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol, where the final liquidation of these prisoners was to take place without fail."
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours on 3 January 1945).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
LT. HARRIS: If the Tribunal will recall, at the end of the last session, we had finished reading a portion of the sworn interrogation of the Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of Munich, and had touched on the point where he said that Kaltenbrunner issued directives to Dachau to transport Western European prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol. interrogation report of Gottlieb Berger, Chief of the Head Office of the SS, made under oath on 20 September 1945 in the course of these proceedings. You will find these pages at the end of the document book. This is offered as Exhibit U.S.A. 529. These pages have been translated into German and made available to the Defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Does it have a number?
LT. HARRIS: It has no PS number sir. It is at the very end of the document book. I wish to read only one question and answer from these pages, and I refer to the last question and answer on page 3 of the exhibit:
"Q Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think is primarily responsible?
"A The first one, the Commandant; the second one Gluecks, because he was practically responsible for all the interior direction of the camps. service between the camp commandant and Gluecks actually operated. I want to give you the following example: during the night of the 22nd and 23rd of April, I was sent to Munich. As I entered the city, I met a group of perhaps 120 men dressed in the suits of the concentration camps. I asked the guard who was with them: 'What about these men.' He told me that these men were marching by foot to the Alps.
Firstly, I sent him back to Dachau. Then I wrote a letter to the Commandant, to send no more people by foot to any place, but whenever the Allies advanced further, to give over the camp completely. I did that on my own responsibility, and I told him that I came straight from Berlin, and that I can be found in my service post in Munich. The Commandant, or his deputy, telephoned at about twelve o'clock and told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of Munich, the Reichskommissar." the Security Police and SD is the persecution of the Jews. This crime, of course. continued after 30 January 1943 -- and evidence has heretofore been received that these persecutions continued until and were accelerated toward the end of the war. Kaltenbrunner took a personal interest in such matters as is indicated by Document 2519-PS which is offered as exhibit next in order, U.S. Exhibit 530. This exhibit consists of a memorandum and an affidavit, and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the affidavit. Quoting from the affidavit:
"I, Henri Monneray, being first duly sworn, depose and say that since 12 September 1945 I have been, and I am the member of the French Staff for the prosecution of axis criminality, and have been pursuing my official duties in this connection in Nurnberg, Germany since 12 October 1945.
"In the course of my official duties, at the instruction of the French Chief Prosecutor, I examined the personal document of the Defendant --"
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all of this? What is the object of this affidavit?
LT. HARRIS: To show that this document was derived from the personal effects of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: From the personal possessions?
LT. HARRIS: From the personal possessions, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You can leave out the immaterial parts.
LT. HARRIS: Very good, sir.
Passing to the last sentence of the affidavit:
"Said Document 2519-PS is the document which I found in the envelope containing Kaltenbrunner's personal papers."
I now read the memorandum, quoting:
"Radio message to Gruppenfuehrer SS-Major General Fegelein Headquarters of the Fuehrer through Sturmbannfuehrer SS-Major Sansoni, Berlin.
"Please inform the Reichsfuehrer SS and report to the Fuehrer that all arrangements against Jews, political and concentration camp internees in the Protectorate have been token care of by me personally today. The situation there is one of calmness, fear of Soviet successes and hope of an occupation by the Western enemies.
Kaltenbrunner"
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): That is not dated?
LT. HARRIS: This is not dated. persecution of the churches. It is unnecessary to present specific evidence that this crime continued after 30 January 1943, since this was one of the fundamental purposes of the Security Police and SD, as has already been shown. answer. As to his intent, there is no need to go outside the record before this Tribunal. On December 1, 1945, in these proceedings, the witness Lahousen was asked on cross-examination: "Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?" After describing his meeting with Kaltenbrunner on a day in Munich when a university student and his sister were arrested and executed for distributing leaflets from the auditorium, Lahousen said -- and I wish to refer only to two sentences on page 724 of the transcript -- quoting:
"I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time I saw Kaltenbrunner, whose name has been known to me. Of course, Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, and witnesses were there and everybody was under the terrible impression of what had happened, and Kaltenbrunner spoke about that to Canaris in a manner of which cynicism we would be a very mild description.
This is the only thing I can say to this question."
Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader of the SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a principal role in the betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators. As higher SS and police leader in Austria after the Anschluss, he supervised and had knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and the SD in Austria. he visited it several times. On at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in action. With this knowledge and background he accepted in January 1943, appointment as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the very agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that office to the end, rising to great prominence in the SS and the German Police and receiving high honors from Hitler. Like other leading Nazis, Kaltenbrunner sought power; to gain it, he made his covenant with crime.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, next will be some witnesses, and Col. Amen will handle the interrogation.
COL. JOHN H. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I wish to call, as a witness for the prosecution, Mr. Otto Ohlendorf. Your Lordship will note that his name appears under Amt III on the chart on the wall.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say appeared?
COL. AMEN: The name of this witness appears under Amt III of the chart, RSHA, the large square, the third section down.
THE PRESIDENT: I see it.
Otto Ohlendorf, will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
THE WITNESS OHLENDORF: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
BY COL. AMEN:
Q Where were you born?
Q How old are you?
Q When, if ever, did you become a member of the Socialist Party?
Q When, if ever, did you become a member of the SA?
Q When, if ever, did you become a member of the SS?
A I must correct myself. I answered the first question as if I were speaking of my membership in the SS.
Q When did you become a member of the SA?
Q When, if ever, did you join the SD?
Q What was your last position in the SD?
Tribunal whether you can identify that chart in any way. consequently be identified by myself.
Q What, if anything, did you have to do with making up that chart?
COL. AMEN: For the information of the Tribunal, that is U.S.A. Exhibit 493, the chart of which the witness speaks. basic organization of the RSHA, as well as the position of Kaltenbrunner, the Gestapo, and the SD in the German Police system? sentation of the organization of the RSHA. It serves correctly the position of the SA as well as the State Police, the Criminal Police, and the SD. the RSHA and state for what period you continued to serve in that capacity.
A (At this point the witness pointed to Amt III on the chart.) the RSHA, and state for what periods of time each of than continued to serve in his respective capacity?
A Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Sicherheits Polizei and the SD; as such, he was also Chief of the RSHA, The Internal Organizational Term for the SD and The Sicherheits Polizei. Kaltenbrunner occupied this position from 30 January 1943 until the end of the war. Mueller was Chief of Amt IV, the Gestapo. He took part in the foundation of the Gestapo and occupied the Office of Chief and subsequently, and consecutively, rose to the chiefdom of Amt IV. He occupied this position until the end of the war. Jewish problem from 1940 on. To my knowledge, he occupied this position also until the conclusion of the war. Chief of Amt III?
Q Turning now to the designation "Mobile Units" shown in the lower right hand corner of the chart, please explain to the Tribunal the significance of the terms "Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkommandos".
A The concept "Einsatzgruppe" was promulgated after a meeting between the Chiefs of the OKW and the OKH, and they served the purpose of allowing the SIPO to have its own organizational units in the field. The concept "Einsatzgruppe" first appeared during the Polish campaign. before the biginning of the Russian campaign. This agreement specified that the Army groups, or the armies, should have an official of the SIPO or the SD, that this official should have under his disposal all mobile units in the form of Einsatzgruppe, subdivided into Einsatzkommandos. The Einsatzkommandos should, on orders from the army group, or the army, be at the disposal of the army units as needed.
Soviet Russia, any agreement was entered into between the OKW, OKH and RSHA? were used in the Russian campaign, according to a written agreement between the OKW, OKH and RSHA.
Q Do you know that there was such a written agreement? Schellenberg had with the OKH and OKW, and also I had a written copy of this agreement in my own hand.
Q Explain to the Tribunal who Schellenberg was; what position, if any, did he occupy? that he was conducting his conferences on Heydrich's Commission.
Q On approximately what date did these negotiations take place?
A The discussions took several weeks. The agreement must have been reached about one or two weeks before the beginning of the Russian War.
Q Did you yourself ever see a copy of this written agreement?
Q Did you have occasion to work with this written agreement?
Q On more than one occasion?
A Yes; and that is in all questions that had to do with the use of Einsatzkommandos in the Army. located today?
A No, I don't. to the Tribunal the entire substance of this written agreement. kommandos should be set up and used. Until that time, the Army had done the job that the SIPO should have done itself; so it used to be that Einsatzkommandos were a nacessity.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say the Einsatzkommandos did under the agreement?
A (continuing) The second was the relationship between the Army, the Einsatzgruppe and the Kommandos. The agreement specified that the Army Groups or Army should take care of the Einsatzgruppen, so far as transportation and housing were concerned. Further instructions came from the Chief of the SIPO and SD.
Q Let us understand. Is it correct that an Einsatz Group was to be attached to each Army Group or Army? Einsatz Group was to operate? the fact that the Einsatzgruppe was attached to a specific Army Group and marched with it, whereas the Einsatskommandos functioned in territories as determined by the Army Groups or Armies. direct the time during which they were to operate?
A That is included in the concept "March."
Q And also to direct any additional tasks they were to perform?
A Yes. So far as the actual instructions of the Chiefs of the SIPO and SD were concerned, they were guided by the general proposition that they could issue orders when the operative situation made it necessary. of the Einsatz Group Command to the Army Command?
A I can't remember whether anything specific was said about that. At any rate, there was a liaison leader between the Einsatzgruppe and the Army.
Q Do you recall any other provisions of this written agreement? that agreement.
Q What position did you occupy with respect to this agreement?
Einsatzgruppe D, and was subordinate to the Chief of the SIPO and the SD with the Army.
Q When was Heydrich's death? against Soviet Russia? leaders?
A There were four Einsatzgruppen, Group A, B, C and D. Chief of Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker; Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe; Chief of Einsatzgruppe C Dr. Rausche, and later, Dr. Thomas; Chief of Einsatzgruppe D Bierkamp.
Q To which Army was Group D attached? attached to the 11th Army.
Q Where did Group D operate? area in which Group D originally operated, naming the cities or territories?
A The most northern city was Czernowitz; then southward to Mogilev Podelsk; southwest to Odessa; northeast of that, Melitopol, Mariopol, Taganrog, Rostov and the Crimea.
Q What was the ultimate objective of Group D? Caucasus. An Army Group was provided for this operation.
Q When did Group D commence its move into Soviet Russia? and they marched to the goals already set by the Army. The entire Army Group started at the beginning of June.
Q You are referring to the 11th Army? Einsatz Groups concerned with Jews and Communist Commissars?
Einsatz Groups and Kommando leaders were hourly instructed. Communist functionaries? the Jews should be liquidated, as well as the political soviet Commissars.
Q When you say "liquidated", do you mean killed?
A I mean that word "killing". conference at Pretz? and Kommandos, their work goals; and at this time the necessary commands were issued.
Q Who was present at that conference?
Q What were those orders? contributed to the liquidation that I have already mentioned.
Q And that conference took place on approximately what date? received orders at this conference to exterminate the Jews and Communist functionaries, in addition to the regular professional work of the Security Police and SD; is that correct?
A That's right. any communication from Himmler to the Chiefs of Army Groups and Armies, concerning this mission?
A Yes. Himmler informed me before the beginning of the Russian Campaign that Hitler, in a conversation with the High Command, had stated his aim and had commanded them to act accordingly. had been similarly informed of these orders for the liquidation of the Jews and Soviet functionaries?
A I believe that it is not correct in that particular form. They had no orders for liquidation. Rather, the order for the liquidation originated with Himmler, but since this liquidation took place in the operational region of the High Command of the Army, the Army was asked to support these measures. Without these instructions to the Army, the Einsatz Groups would not have been able to function in the sense that I have just described. order?
A Yes, in the late Summer of 1941, Himmler was in Nikolaiev. He assembled, the leaders of the Einsatz Groups and Kommandos, and repeated to them the order for liquidation, so that the leaders and men who took part in such liquidation had no personal responsibility for their acts. The responsibility was his alone, as well as that of the Fuehrer.
Q And you yourself heard that said? the Army Group Commanders?
Q How do you know that? these orders with Army leaders. OKW, OKH and RSHA known to the other leaders in the RSHA? active in the Einsatz Groups and Kommandos; furthermore, also known to the leaders who had to do with organization.
Q Most of the leaders came from the RSHA; did they not?
A Which leaders?
A No, one cannot say that. The leaders in the Einsatz Groups and Kommandos came from the entire Reich.
to Kaltenbrunner? with these questions, and consequently must have known the background of these Einsatz Groups that were under his command.
Q Who was the Commanding Officer of the 11th Army?
AAt first, von Schober; later, von Mannstein. of the 11th Army directed or supervised Einsatz Group D in carrying out its liquidation activities? were to take place at a distance of not less than 200 kilometers from Army Headquarters.
Q Do you recall any other occasion? leaders to hasten the liquidation on the grounds that in this region a famine was threatening, and there was a housing shortage. your direction?
A In the year June '41 to June '42, the Einsatzkommandos announced approximately 90,000 people as liquidated.
Q Did that include men, women and children?
Q On what do you base those figures?
Q Were those reports submitted to you?
Q And you saw them and read them?
A I beg your pardon?
Q And you saw and read those reports, personally? the Tribunal?
