by Fascist Germany for attacking Russia? General Staff of the German Forces in Norway. I was called into the OKH, where the Chief of Staff, Colonel General Halder had a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Army Groups and the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference we were told that there was a directive from the 8 December, 1940. At this conference, also, we received basic information for the intended operations against the Soviet Union. take part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one speech, which the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, who was there also, made. He spoke at that time about the military actions in the war between Finland and the Soviet Union. He gave us an impression of the fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops. conference with Colonel General Halder, in which I did not take part, but I assume that they were concerned with possible cooperation between the Finnish and German troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There existed since the Fall of 1940 a military cooperation between Germany and Finland. The German Air Force had made arrangements with the Finnish General Staff for through traffic through Northern Norway to the Finnish points. This transit traffic, in conferences at Helsinki with the OKW, was extended. It increased to a general transit traffic of the German Wehrmacht from Northern Norway to the Finnish ports. that German transport units would be brought to Petsamo. Furthermore, offices for supply were installed along this route and along the railroad which led from North Finland to ports at the Finnish south coast. discussions about details of the participation of troops from Norway, together with Finnish troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.
the Finnish General Staff about the collaboration in attacking the Soviet Union? Staff about the cooperative attack against the Soviet Union? Government and how did the negotiations take place? superior of myself and my army. In February, 1941, I receive, after the basic facts had been cleared as to the participation from Norway based on Finland, I received the order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with the Finnish General Staff and to discuss these operations with them, operations based on middle and northern Finland. following days, I had conferences with the Chief of Staff, General Heinrich, his representative, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of Operations of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle and northern Finland, especially from the area of Kuusamo and Rovaniemi; also from the area of Petsamo, Northern Finland. These conferences led to an agreement. Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to middle and northern Finland, to see the areas of Kuusamo, Rovaniemi and Petsamo; to study the possibilities for deployment and supply and for operations from that sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were present. The trip ended on the 28 of February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish border, and in a short conference results were laid down about the planned operation from the area of Kuusamo and another operation from the area of Rovaniemi. The operations from Petsamo would have considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.
High Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from these areas. That plan was presented to the OKW for approval. That is where I heard, through the High Command of Norway, the name of "Blaufuchs." Heinrich, who had been invited to the Fuehrer's headquarters at Brandenburg and flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of that section, a discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg. Marshal Keitel, Jodl on the one side and on the other, General Heinrich and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic plans for cooperation between German and Finnish troops were laid down. Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economy and Armament Office of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force about the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air Force and its material. Colonel General Halder, in which I did not participate. In my statement of the 26th of December I said that this conference took place at the end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of fact it took place on the 2nd of June. Tapola, the details of this collaboration were brought out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization and there it was pointed out that the Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the border patrols and military field exercises. Furthermore, it was agreed as to the deployment and organization of the German-Finnish forces; that the main Finnish forces should be under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim in the south, together with the German Army Group "North", coming from East Prussia, in the direction of Leningrad and further east.
Falkenhorst at the River Sulujoki. For this army of Colonel General von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a southern group from the area of Kuusamo against the Murmansk Railroad; the middle group east of Kemijaervi through Salla on Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo against Murmansk. details discussed about exchange of information, about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives of the Air Forces about questions of air warfare and about the use of Finnish airports by the German Air Force. of these discussions. Then again, on the 12th or 13th of July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with Colonel General Erfurt, who was the German Liaison Officer. We met General Heinrich at Helsinki and gave him a memorandum, minutes of the points which we had agreed upon in previous conferences. He agreed to these points, except for a minor detail. Then I turned over my duties as Liaison Officer to Colonel General Erfurt, to resume my activities as Chief of General Staff of the Army in Lapland. character were these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff? In particular, was the question of defense taken into consideration? as its sole purpose the participation of the Finnish Army with the German troops on Finnish territory, participation in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. that all these measures had only the character of defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was, from the very beginning, no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union and all the agreements pointed in that same direction -- the agreements for readiness for attack. Nobody ever expected the possibility of a Russian attack on Finland at that time.
ten days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, there were certain measures taken as to security during the deployment of troops but the entire organization of the troops, the entire state of readiness of the troops was one of planning for offense and not defense. I believe you can see from that sufficiently the character of the preparations for attack.
GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the French prosecutors desire to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTION: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTION: No questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): the purpose of declaring them criminals. Members of this group, to state it shortly, are all the high commanders of the Wehrmacht. against the Soviet Union that an order came out according to which the captured Commissars had to be executed? spoken to General von Falkenhorst?
Q What opinion did General von Falkenhorst and yourself have? your army, this order was carried out?
Q For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because the commands and his chief were of the opinion that this order could not be carried out or should not be carried out or because it would not have been practical because, as it is known, the Soviet Commissars fought until the last and in case they were captured, their papers, which showed them as Commissars, had been destroyed before?
For what reason was this order, as you say, not carried out in your army? not in agreement with that order and we let it known to our troops. We found a lot of understanding amongst our commanding generals and second, for the reason that you have mentioned. As a matter of fact, as far as I can remember, there was no Commissar who was captured by us. order, had the same attitude as you did? to others? other armies that I had no opportunity to speak to any others.
Q Aren't you of the opinion that the greatest majority of high commanders had the same attitude concerning this order as you? the others.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?
General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?
GENERAL ZORYA: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.
GENERAL ZORYA: I now have a document which I wish to present to the Tribunal under Number USSR 154, which sets forth in detail the preparations of Rumania for war. I ask you, respectfully, to accept this as evidence. You will find it on page 71 of the document book. I shall now read this document, which is of interest to us.
Pantazi testified:
"Rumania's preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in November 1940, when, in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Antonescu regarding Rumania's adherence to the "Tripartite Pact", there arrived in Bucharest the German military missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors, those for the army headed by Colonel-General Hansen, and those for the air force - by major General Speidel.
"With the arrival of the German military missions in Rumania, the chief of General Staff of the Rumanian Army, General Joanitiu issued an order to the army, on direction of Marshal Antonescu, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganising and retraining the Rumanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the German Army.
"At the same time, on Marshal Antonescu's orders, all reserve officers of the Rumanian army were called up for two month's retraining, and underwent instruction under German direction.
"During the period of the re-training of reserve officers, the General Staff of the Rumanian Army developed a plan for calling up into the army, of 12 age groups subject to mobilisation, in case of war, training of all those groups to be done in accordance with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army, and to be completed by the 1st July 1941. The personnel of the Supreme and Senior commands of the Rumanian armies underwent similar re-training in their respective branches of service.
"In this way, under the leadership of the Germans, at the beginning of Rumania's and Germany's war against the Soviet Union, the whole of the Rumanian Army and Air Force were reorganised and re-trained on the German pattern" the second paragraph, which you will find on page 72 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could omit these details of the preparations made in Rumania and go on to the place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on the Russian frontier.
GENERAL ZORYA: This question is of importance.
I refer to page 74 in the document book. This paragraph commences:
"In this connection, the following units which were already mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union, were in February 1941 directed to the frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia on Marshal Antonescu's orders: the 4th Alpine Rifle Division, the 7th, 8th and 21st Infantry Divisions; the Infantry Guards Division, the Cavalry Corps, and another infantry division, whose name I do not recall at present. Besides these, three German divisions selected from the 21 German divisions which were moving to Greece across Rumania, were sent to the USSR frontier ...
I am skipping several paragraphs. On page 73 of your book of documents there is a place marked in pencil:
"In accordance with instructions of Marshal Antonescu in May, 1941, the following were in addition sent to the frontier: the Frontier Division, the Third and First Alpine Rifle Divisions, the Thirteenth Division and an armored division. Simultaneously with these divisionsthe Germans transferred to the USSR frontier seven German infantry divisions. Thus, at the beginning of the Rumanian and German attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the Rumanian frontier with the USSR twelve Rumanian and ten German divisions, totalling 600,000 men. grounds for stating that on the directions from the staff of the Fascist conspirators, Rumania's preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union had begun long before they found their expression on paper in "Plan Barbarossa." gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On the 27 of July, 1941, Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing his gratitude to the latter and to his army. Antonescu, as Exhibit USSR-237. In it Hitler writes -- page one of the Russian translation of the letter, paragraph three, page 74 in your book of documents :
"Congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success -- for me as great a pleasure as it is a satisfaction. The return of Bessarabia will be the best reward for you and your armies."
February, 1942, between Atonescu and Ribbentrop. This conversation is Document USSR-233. I shall now refer to the third paragraph from the top which you will find on page 61 of the book of documents. The following entry will be found there:
"I reminded Herr Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him in Berlin, he raised his glass to a Great Rumania, to which I replied that we entered into an alliance with the Axis in order to create a Great Rumania".
What, then, was this "Great Rumania" to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop raised his glass? This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as USSR Exhibit No. 242. This document is one of Antonescu's letters to Hitler, dated the 17th of August, 1941. I request you to accept this document as evidence, and will read paragraphs two and four of the paper, page two of the Russian translation and in the book of documents, which is in your possession, the corresponding text is at page 68. I quote paragraph two:
"In compliance with the wish of your Excellency, I take upon myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the Rivers Dniester andDnieper, for maintaining order there, and for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delimit.
"In order to secure order and to direct the economic exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of war, I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be established.
"I therefore beg your Excellency to give precise instructions defining my rights and my responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding of whole territory between the Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for the maintenance of order there and for its security.
"I beg you, your Excellency, to accept my best assurances from your devoted General Antonescu." of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of "Transistrian" regions. governor, George Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army. Alexianu, giving details on his nomination, testifies, page two, paragraph two of the Russian text, page 79 in the book of documents, which is in your possession:
"Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he offered to annex to Rumania the Soviet territories captured by the German troops and extending from the Dniester to the Dnieper, and to establish there their own occupation authorities." Russian text of the testimonial, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was present at the Rumanian Ministers' Council, at which :
"Marshal Antonescu, referring to the German and Rumanian military successes, stated, 'It is now evident how well I acted when, as early as November, 1940, I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint aggression against the Soviet Union.' territories away, right and left, to his vassals, noticeably diminished in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.
In front of me lies Hitler's letter to Ion Antonescu, dated the 25th of October, 1943, which I respectfully beg the Tribunal to accept as an Exhibit under USSR-240. Something like two years and three months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Rumanian satrap on seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been tormented by the question of organizing a unified administration in Zadniestrovye.
The circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now wrote:
"My next request concerns the question of the utilization of Transistria, unhampered and unrestricted by any formal juridical or economic considerations, as the rear area for the Southern Army Group and for Army Group A. And further, I ask you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the whole network of Transistrian railways."
As a very poor consolation Hitler added:
"All these measures have as their aim in the long run, to preserve Transistria for Rumania". his faithfulness, could not endure. On the 15th of November, 1943, he wrote a long reply to Hitler. Without shame Antonescu wrote of how he accomplished the will of his master for the sake of his country.
I present Antonescu's letter to Hitler as Document USSR-239. His letter is dated Bucharest, 14th of November, 1943. I quote, beginning with the second paragraph of the letter, at the end of the sixth page of the Russian text. It is on page 82 of the book of documents:
"As to the regime in the Transdnestrie we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in minor details the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply, etc.
"I would like to begin by explaining the cause of my anxiety. I do not know whether tire truth about the Rumanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told to you -- that this war has cost Rumania 300 billions of leis, that during this period we gave Germany more than 9 million tons of oil, thus threatening our national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves, that we are incurring heavy expenses to support the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle.
"Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transdnestrian territory,is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Rumania. Our only desire is that this take place in good order and be utilized in the most advantageous manner possible.
"As regards the transfer of the Transdniestrian railways into German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion, this transfer is not indispensable.
"Transdniestrian railways from 1941 to the present day worked well under the Rumanian administration. They always satisfied German demands and their management was always highly appreciated."
I request you to turn one page in the book of documents. I shall now read from page 90 in the book:
"If the traffic capacity of Transdniestrian railways could not still be increased pursuant to the established plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for that. Here, too, we kept our obligations." stated:
"I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the measures necessary in order to improve the railway transport and to increase the traffic capacity.
Inasmuch as I personally was in charge of the organization of the administration and economics of this district, it would have been a great vexation to me if the administration of the railways were to pass to the Germans, as one could justly say that our incapacity in this respect was the reason of the measure." the former harmony, which had as its source the seizure of land and riches of other nations, gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the greater financial responsibility for the losses suffered as the result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners. This is evidenced by the following document, which I intend to submit, and which was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu. I submit it under No. USSR-245. I want to take quite a fair amount from this document, but what I want to read is very important to enable one to realize the relationship of Fascist Germany with its satellites. This document is called, "General Hansen's Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on the 7th July 1943." in Rumania. I shall read excerpts from this document, underlined in red pencil, pages 92, 93, in the book of documents -
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be possible for you to summarize these documents with reference to Rumania? Because you have already drawn our attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to Rumania's participation, General Antonescu's statements and other evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the question of the Hungarian participation --in Document USSR-294. What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the Rumanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought, from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the case at all.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: I shall put this document before you in a few phrases, and then I shall pass on to the next document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: The sense of this conversation with Marshal Antonescu is absolutely -- is like a trade that went on between two traitors. In the discussion the subject of money was brought in, and war material and human lives. Antonescu, who felt rather uncomfortable - as he had no kind of agreement with Germany - insisted that all the relations of monetary nature and other relations should be accompanied by agreements. He demanded from Germany either ammunitions of war or money and when General Hansen stated that "We have no lei," Antonescu said, "Give us the ammunitions of war." taken in pumping various resources from its satellites. in dealing with its satellites. I should like to take up the document which relates to Transylvania. managed to obtain subservience from their Hungarian and Rumanian vassals. formerely Colonel-General of the Hungarian Army. Foreign Ministry. Subsequently but prior to September, 1942, he commanded an army corps, following which he bacame Deputy War Minister of Hungary. to the Rumanian question. The part which I want to quote is at the end of page three and the beginning of page four of the Russian text, which corresponds to pages 102 and 103 in book of documents:
"The second Vienna arbitration has assumed the form of a decision of little profit to Hungary. For Rumania, there was reserved the district of Medvesh-Kasharmash, where natural gas could be obtained. In the Hungarian political circles this was interpreted as Hitler's desire to insure himself an alliance with Rumania in the war with Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Rumania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would most certainly need Rumania's southern wing which faces the Black Sea."
of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me on the subject the following:
"The second Vienna arbitration has aroused a bitter envy of Rumania in Hungary and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler." Tribunal, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:
"In November 1941 Hitler told me that by the Vienna arbitration, the last word had not been spoken, thereby giving me to understand that Rumania could still count upon a revision of the solution previously adopted as regards Transylvania." expressed an entirely opposite point of view. I will present to the Tribunal three documents concerning the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering under these circumstances. conversation between Antonescu and Hitler, which, took place on April 3, 1942. This is on page 1516 of the book of documents. I will quote some excerpts from this document, page threw of the Russian translation, page 113 in the book of documents.
"I (Antonescu) reminded him (Hitler) that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press (after Ribbentrop's visit to Budapest) that should they intervene (that is, should they send their troops) Transylvania would belong to Hungary. These rumors circulate, and they greatly demoralized the Rumanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor, that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, that this did not correspond to the actual facts."
(A recess was taken.)
which concerns the Transylvanian question, and the defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of conversation which took place between Antonescu and Von Doernberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry, and which took place on February 10, 1942, on the frontier. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this record as evidence. The origin of this document is the personal archives of Marshall Antonescu, which was received by a unit of the Red Army during their offensive. I do not think it is necessary to read this whole document. However, if required I shall limit myself to only several excerpts. Will you please open your document book on page 116, where there is a record of the conversation that took place on 10 February 1942. I quote:
"Von Doernberg introduced the subject of the order of "Charles I" which Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various German Official channels in our country, as well as through the Rumanian offices accredited to the German Government."
I skip to the next page, page 117 of the Document Book. I quote:
"I told Herr von Doernberg that I would not be able, to grant this award until Herr von Ribbentrop at the first opportunity would make a public declaration to Rumania (about the Transylvanian problem) which would bolster the faith of the Rumanian people, in its struggle for the cause of justice, and its legitimate claims in Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that this would be made public only after such a declaration had been made by him.
"Herr con Doernberg asked for time to consider the matter. Next day, before leaving the railroad car, he asked me to hand him this decoration, telling me that von Ribbentrop wanted it, and requesting me not to tellRibbentrop about our conversations he had promised to make the award public only upon the fulfilment of my conditions. Upon this condition, I gave him the decoration, without however, handing him the corresponding certificate."
And so Ribbentrop (interruption in procedure) was ready to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Rumanian Order. and Goering. If the Tribunal will refer to page 118 in the Document Book.
Unfortunately, of this document discovered together with other documents in Antonescu's personal archive, already mentioned by me, there is no date. We are submitting this document the same as it was. I am submitting it as USSR-238, and I am quoting only one excerpt. I quote: "During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshall Goering was very reticent to discuss the problem of Transylvania. On the way there in a car, he said to the Marshall", that is, to Antonescu, "After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania, which in itself essentially is more German than either Rumanian or Hungarian." Unquote. viewpoint of the Fascist Conspirators on the Transylvania problem with a sufficient degree of truthfulness. At present with a view to concluding the clarification of German's mutual relations with her vassal, Rumania, I should like to pause on the subject of crude oil. Now Rumania in this field was one of Germany's principal suppliers. That even during the war the Hitlerites had pumped crude oil out of Rumania by all possible means. Antonescu refers to this in one of the letters that have already been quoted. on what it meant to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves, as USSR Exhibit No. 224; and I submit here an urgent telegram from the defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonezcu, and receive by the latter on October 31, 1942. I shall not mention it in detail. That this document also was taken from the personal archives of Antonescu, the same as the next one. I make this telegram public in that I ask you to admit it as evidence. "Urgent telegram transmitted via the German Mission". On page 119 of the Document Book.
"To Marshall Antonescu.
their military operations in the Mediterranean. Due to the absence quantity of fuel to Italy.
It is for the exclusive use of the Devoted to you, Keitel, Fieldmarshal."
I want to submit to the Tribunal Antonescu's reply-wire to Keitel and I submit this document as Exhibit USSR 244-A. Please refer to page 120 of the Document Book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to quote this document here?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: I can summarize it in two sentences, the contents of that wire, to increase to the maximum the quantity of crude oil to Italy, which was Antonescu's reply in his wire addressed to Keitel; that the pledges of fuel or everything that was asked by Germany's order was given, and nothing else can be given to Germans but what was in question. If something can be accepted from the internal market, then perhaps in some way Rumania will be able to help German allies, and in general she asked General Keitel to accept his expression of loyalty and full respect in giving of any crude oil, and he signed, "Marshal Antonescu." were the months when Rommel's fate was being decided in North Africa, and, when the Red Army was barring the Germans way to the Grozny and the Baku oil on the frontiers of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans did not have sufficient crude oil. February 12, 1942, as a conversation between Antonescu and the defendant Ribbentrop, and has not as yet been quoted. The record of this conversation had been previously submitted to the Tribunal as USSR-233. I ask you to refer to the end of page 61 and page 62 of the Document File, which corresponds to page 4 of the Russian text, or document, with the following lines which are in this document, in reply to Ribbentrop's mention of the crude oil question, Antonescu stated:
"Regarding crude oil, Rumania contributed the maximum which it was in her power to contribute. She can do no more. The only way out of the situation will have to be the seizure of the territories rich in oil." One should note here that Antonescu was not original in his desires for the seizure of other people's territories rich in oil.
I am asking Your Honor to refer to page 129 of the Document Book. There is one document which is from the personal office of the defendant Rosenberg, which I quote, as formulating the German opinion on this subject. I submit this document to the Tribunal as USSR-58, and I ask for it to be submitted as evidence. In July 1941, the defendant Rosenberg in the following way formulated the German opinion this question, page 122 in the Document Book:
"Germany's interests consist in creating a stable position in the i.e. securing for themselves the link with the Near East.
It is future.
The aim of German Policy is to control the Caucasus, and the adjoining lands to the south, both politically and militarily."
Unquote 4 of the Russian Text document. The same idea is formulated there by defendant Rosenberg with extreme clarity: "The German Reich must take all petroleum in its hands." mutual relationship between Germany, the fascist conspirators, and their other satellites, inasmuch as the witness, Mr. Buschenhagen gave conclusive testimony on this question, and that the Tribunal probably already has certain ideas on this question, I just want to remain the Tribunal that in accord with Article 3 of the second variant of the Plan Barbarossa: "Finland will have to cover the advance of the German landing group 'North' (Units of the XXI group) which is due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. It will also be Finland's task to liquidate the (Russian) forces at Hango." Exhibit C-39, in regard to the Barbarossa time schedule, on the question of participation of Finland in the war is mentioned in section 2, where I have mentioned already it was stressed, as on page 57 of the document book, the preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since May 25th; and on page 57, at the beginning, I would like to call your attention, if you will permit, to the following paragraph out of the same documents:
"It is envisaged to transport from the Fatherland to Norway the 10th Finland 1 reinforced infantry division with army corps units.
Out SS combat 'North' are designated for the case 'Silver Fox'.the attach on Hangoe."
of negotiations with the Finnish General Staff; that is, on May 25, 1941, mentioned in the time table Barbarossa, is not the exact date to furnish. It is incorrect as the exact late far the purpose to confuse the true nature of this preparation for aggression, to present it under the guise of the preparation for so-called "Preventive War." Buschenhagen which was given to the Tribunal, I shall now present the original under USSR. No. 229, the deposition of the former Colonel of the German Army Kitchmann. I ask that the original be accepted as in evidence.
Kitchman held the office of military attache' in the German Embassy at Helsinki since October 1941. Here is what he testified to an the question, if interested, and you can find this clause on page 130 in the Document File Book It is a very short quotation:
"A long time before the 22nd June 1941, the German Government and the High Command of the German Armed Forces carried out secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General Staff of the Finnish Army and made join preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the following circumstances. On my arrival at Helsinki in October, 1941, as Deputy of the German military attache!."