Could you tell us something about that? to limit Speer's influence and who would have been interested in such matters? It is so hard to name all of those that might have had something to do to limit Speer's power. tion day?
A Speer's position was difficult. It was Speer's total attitude that became different more and morefrom that of the Fuehrer.
Q May I ask you to turn now to something else. In February 1944, through an order of Hitler, Speer was transferred to the Truck Department, and, if I am correctly informed, he was named as his representative. Could you tell us to what extent armament depends on the transportation situation? Allied airmen that armament goods and also other goods could not be transported, particularly great factories in the Ruhrgebeit could not transport their goods to the middle area and Berlin. Extraordinary measures were taken in this regard and begun so that total collapse could be avoided in the field of transportation. That was the general situation. special arrangements to transport armaments other than other things?
A No. The entire armament industry could produce nothing more than it was already producing at this time. He laid main emphasis on food for the population, not on armaments; also on the removal of food fromthose German territories that would be lost to the enemy. have a larger importance? that were there could be assured and transported. A particularly difficult matter at that time was the question of truck transportation.
and what did Speer do regarding trucks in the middle of February 1942? that they didn't suffice; also substitutes had to be found, electrical machines and even houses, etc. Here, too, so far as I know, Speer used this means of transportation for the German population to distribute food and to make that distribution possible.
Q This was one of the main bottlenecks? undertook the repair of the oxygen works that made fuel, whether he put this on a secondary level?
A Yes. I know, because Speer discussed it with me very extensivelythe question of wat--since collapse was imminent and inevitable--what was most needed to be done. His opinion was that the only thing to do was to help the German people as much as possible in order to make the very difficult times that would follow the war, as easy as possible. There was, on the one hand, the question of food, of housing, of transportation of food and its distribution; subsequently, prevention of the destruction of all German factories that were still in our hands, contrary to the orders Hitler issued on the "scorch-the-earth" policy. Thirdly, commission of the industry with peace other than war production, to the extent that those factories still stood at all of production, of agricultural machines, of replacement parts for such machines and such matters. Once these orders were turned in, they would have repercussions for instance, if the factory came into enemy hands or, if after the conclusion of the war, the war orders were automatically cancelled by the Government.
Q Witness, I should like to ask you only one more thing. Can you give us more details regarding the prevention of destruction-
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, will you explain to me why this evidence that you are calling now is relevant and to what charge it is relevant?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the Defendant Speer is charged with the common conspiracy and with the common planning and waging of an aggressive war untilthe 7th of May 1945.
If I can demonstrate that, at last, for a considerable time before hand, the Defendant Speer was active in a way that had nothing to do with this conspiracy or planning, then I believe that this is important for the judgement to what extent he can be charged as to the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: All the evidence that you have been giving for the last fifteen minutes was related to 1943 and 1944, and is related to conferences with reference to the erection offactories for the production of bombers and the fact that, as far as I have understood it, the fact that Speer was engaged more on attempting to feed the German people than to build armament factories. What that has to do with it, I haven't any idea.
DR. FLAECHSNER: The first point related to a Document 4584-PS, in which the prosecution submitted a charge against my client, and it is stated that in a conference at Obersalzberg, the construction of particular factories was ordered and that for this construction, several hundred thousand Jews were used. I should like to establish that the Defendant Speer did not have any responsibility for this construction, since Hitler gave this commission for this construction directly to someone else. This point that the prosecution has submitted in support of its case could thereby be eliminated. That wasthe point of my first question. Now, the point of my second question, the purpose of my second question regarding Speer's effort to increase agricultural works is related to Speer, for all these activities which the witness has testified to, have exactly the opposite effect from that which the prosecution charges the defendant with. They did not serve war economy.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no charge against Speer on the ground that he attempted to feed the German people during the war. The prosecution haven't laid that against him as a charge. Now, it is simply a waste of time.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I never said that the prosecution raised this charge against him. There must be some mistake. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q I have one last question, witness. Can you tell us something about the extent to which the Fuehrer gave reports on the extent of serious damage?
DR. FLAECHSNER: I thank you.
BY DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS: (Counsel for the defendant Sauckel)
Q The Central Panel was concerned with workers' plan, was it not?
Q From the need for workers? the workers docket. This is in the armament industry also.
Q May I interruptyou. After the need was established, for what purpose was this need determined? they could have for work.
Q Did this not take place when they demanded workers for work? to Sauckel, who was told that such an industry could not expect such work in the amount of work that they were entitled to make.
Q Do you know the total number? by the offices of the administration of Sauckel.
Q But as to conducting the need, Sauckel had that prorated?
Q What was the job of the Central Panel regarding this question? had to do with their production.
Q I am not asking about that of raw material, but about the workers? brought that up.
Q Of raw material? workers had to be used. For example, in mining, or in the aluminium factories
Q May I interrupt you. It is clear that men were needed for production I know, but I am asking you about the workers, and in the final determining part that was necessary. basis of what he should provide, and as the time became less, and ran on -
do with the decisions?
A So far as I know the Fuehrer had a great deal to do in this matter; often it was his decision, and I noticed that Sauckel often conferred with Hitler on this matter. question take place? with the Fuehrer, and these conferences which were with the Fuehrer on the workers question was very short. He did not want to take up these matters with him.
Q How was the Fuehrer's Four-Year Plan concerned in this? Hitler the Plan was not readily discussed by Hitler, because he did not want to hear this matter discussed in that connection. matter?
A I say it was excellently conducted. The first year the workers were glad they had this opportunity to work. They were treated better, and about everything; they were given more food than that of the German population, and they, like the German workers, they received extra rations for working in heavy industries. The bench workers particularly were good, and likewise the same applied on rations. There was occasion of compensatory relations about the Dutch workers. were they known to you?
Q Did he take a mild or a sharp point of view?
A He took a very humane point of view. Sauckel had a very difficult task by Hitler's attitude. He himself was of what I know a worker; he knows hard work from having been a sailor, and having a fine feeling for the workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Witness, it seems like you have seen that light go on three times. Will you kindly observe it. You have seen that light go on three times, will you kindly observe it, and go slower when that light goes on.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS: ( Counsel for the defendant Jodl).
Q Mr. Witness, did you take part in the maneuvers of the Wehrmacht in 1937? present? who became later Governor of Gibraltar.
Q The General Ironside?
A Yes, General Ironside. I had seen him personally, and I knew a few gentlemen of his staff. They were Italians, and a large number of other nations. At the moment I cannot say precisely. I would have to look in my memorandum. I would have it in my memorandum for me to say who were present.
Q Was there a French Delegation there?
Q But you do rot know for sure? have spoken to Dr. -- General Ironside personally.
Q Now, do you know, Mr. Witness, that at that time the newest German element of armaments were shown to the foreign officers?
A Yes, also in action. Of course, only action was shown, with the exception of the demonstration of the new airplane which was not used for action, that was just shown. that demonstrated to the foreign power our measure of armaments?
A Yes, very frequently Mr. Fraser from England, together with Lord Trenchard were shown it, and further were interested in the air defense installations, and we showed him the most modern things immediately.
Q When was that?
A I believe in 1937, or 1933. I will see if I can find it. (Witness looks in small book). July 1937, the 1st of July.
Q Yes. Do you know whether under the terms, that there was something there from England? British, I personally know I made a connection. However, I have not taken part -
Q Thank you. Another question. Do you remember the conflict in the question of the occupation of Rhineland. Do you know what excitement was caused by that question? take part?
A That I cannot say at the moment, I cannot answer. The re-occupation of Rhineland came so suddenly that it surprised me while I was on a vacation, When I returned, it was all one way. I know this as when Duesseldorf was occupied also by the airforce. I was there myself only the next day.
Q That is on the right side of the Rhine?
Q On the left side, you do not know about?
A No, I could not say for the moment. I do not believe there was any airfield, but I cannot remember that exactly. was not there anything prepared for the event, in the event it was used by the air force?
A During my leave the decision had been made; that the person which it was at the disposal had been informed to put it in readiness for the purpose, but it was very wrong.
Q Yes, but I am not getting an answer to my question. During your leave for the first time the air force was alerted?
Q And how far was the period date before the occupation? the maximum.
Q One more question. On Friday you had told us something about the participation of the air force in the military part of the execution of the Anschluss policy of1938. From then on Then did the preparation start, the date?
A The preparation dated less than forty-eight hours back. I can say that precisely. preparation in that solution how long?
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. BY DR. KURT KAUFFMAN:(Counsel for the defendant Kaltenbrunner). I am Dr. Kauffmann.
THE PRESIDENT: For whom. You are Dr. Kauffmann, and for whom?
DR. KAUFFMANN: For the defendant Kaltenbrunner.
Q Mr. Witness, is it correct that in the way of orders, or in the way of channels, you had nothing to do with the Gestapo, or of the concentration camps? of concentration camps?
A By the general publication in 1933; I found out that one concentration camp had been installed. about other installations of that kind? and Oranienburg. Of other concentration camps I did not know anything. I have seen the camp of Dachau in 1935, and I visited it with a few higher officers of the air force, and never at any other concentration camp, I have not seen and I have nowknown anything about what happened there.
Q How was it at the time when you visited Dachau. What was your impression about that installation, and the treatment of the prisoners, and so on? question in Germany on that subject, that I decided to get the information first hand myself, and that desire was approved by Hitler without any difficulty -- by Himmler. At the time I believe there existed only Dachau. I found there that there were groups of inmates, one group where there were criminals, and another group consisted of people who committed the same crimes of less offense where you could call them not criminals, they were minor crimes. Then there was a group that consisted of, but without every reason, war patients. I saw one person there whom I knew there before, he was, I thin an SA leader, and he was in the camp. The camp was clean. Militarily organized. They had their own slaughter houses; their own bakery, we saw that, and, they gave us food which had been used, and we demanded the things which the people ate in the camp at the time. I t was good. And by leading persons in the camp we were told that for some prisoners could get better food because they had had hard work. All prisoners to whom we spoke mentioned the reasons why they were in camps. Frequently men would tell us twenty times that they committed fraud, and so forth. Whether they showed us everything in that large complex, that I could not say, of course.
Q You just spoke about the fact that among officers there were debates and discussions going on.
Did you, at any later time when you returned, convey your impressions about Dachau?
A Hardly. Only in so far as I was asked questions by my close comrades. As I said, I was not alone. There were several other gentlemen, and in a smaller circle, of course, t here was an opportunity to speak about it.
Q. In these concentration camps, cruelties, atrocities, have been committed. When did you f ind out about that for the first time?
A. On the day of my capt ivity. When I was captured I got the first impression, because there was a small camp that was evacuated and passed us, and it was the first personal impression which I received. All the rest I found out later in captivity from various evidences which we were shown.
Q. So you did not know at all that in G ermany and in occupied territories there were more than two hundred concentration camps?
A. I did not know anything about that. I mentioned the two before of whose existence I knew.
Q. Now, one could say against that that one had to know. Can you give us an explanation as to why better knowledge about the real conditions was not accessible to you?
A. Because the people who knew about it did not talk about it and did not dare t o talk about it. T hat I take from one piece of evidence in the hands of the Prosecution against the General staff, where, also. Himmler was considered a high military leader, and where he gave that order. It deals with a meeting of higher police leaders under Himmler, I believe in 1943.
Q. Is it correct then if I say that every attempt to find out about the true conditions of the concentration camps and to reveal the true conditions was impossible, unless whoever did it risked his life?
A. First of all, I did not know anything about the large number of concentration camps. Second, we did not know anything that happened there. T here was a limited circle of people who knew about that, the SD. Besides all the people were very much afraid of the SD, and it was highly dangerous to move into that circle, meaning the SD. Besides, where should the individual G ermans find out about these things, if they could not see or hear it? In the German press nothing was said about that; in the German broadcasting or radio, nothing was said about that; to listen to enemy broadcasts was forbidden by the death penalty in most cases.
Nobody was ever alone. He always had to fear if he wanted to do anything against that order that other people would listen also and denounce hip. I know that a large number of people in Germany were condemned to death for listening to foreign radio stations.
Q. Did it come to your knowledge that mass deportations of Jews took place into the eastern territories, and when for the first time?
A. I cannot say the exact date. Once, I don't know in which way, I receiv ed the information that Jews were settled in special ghetto cities in the East. I believe it must have been 1944, but I cannot guarantee that date.
Q. You just spoke about ghettos. Did you know that these mass deportat ions were only the first stop to mass execut ion?
A. No, That has never been told.
Q. May I ask you, furthermore, whether in this connection you knew about the camp of Auschwitz?
A. No. I have heard much later about that after I had been captured and imprisoned.
Q. In the East there were so-called "einsatz kommando", special commands, which ca rried on a tremendous destruction and annihilation of Jews. Do you have any knowledge that such einsatz kommandos were established on the basis of an order by Adolf Hitler?
A. No. T he first that I have heard about these einsatz kommandos I heard here in Nurnberg in prison.
Q. Do you know that a special action to annihilate Jewish citizens took place or was carried out in the southeast of the Reich, and, according to information by the respective leader, Eichmann, about four to five million Jews wer e the victims?
A N o. I know nothing about that, and this is the first t ime that I h ave heard the name Eichmann.
Q. Is it correct if I assume that in G ermany, under the absolute leadership state(F uehr *---*t), each protest against an order was connected wit h danger for *---*
A. Yes.
Q. Is it furthermore correct if I assume the same consequences would have occurred if the man who received the order would have protected, even against an immoral and illegal order?
A. I believe that he would have to count with that punishment, not only h e himself, but also his relatives.
DR. KAUFFMANN: T hankyou; I have no more questions. BY DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder):
Q. Witness, I have only a short question. You told us Friday that you had conversations with the British delegation. This British group was led by Vice-Marshal Courtney. I would like to know from you whether, in the course of these discussions, an agreement was made that the German and the British officers would inform each other about the plans of establishment in the air forces?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. In which form was t hat agreement taken?
A. There was a writt en statement.
Q. Did the Brit ish or the G erman air force have plans for each year?
A. No. T hat went for over more than one year.
Q. Over how many years at that time, in 1937, did that plan extend?
A. I cannot say that off-hand at the moment. Maybe two or three years.
Q. T hat would be for the years 1933 until 1940?
A. 1937,1938, 1939, and 1940. But I cannot say that precisely. I have forgotten.
Q. And this plan, did that have a particular technical designation?
A. I could not say that. We have generally spoken about aufstellungsvorhaben (plans for establishing units).
Q. And on the British side, these plans were in the same form that they extended over a cert ain t ime, let's say, three years?
A. I believe that the times were about the same.
DR SIEMERS: Thankyou.
THE PRESIDENT : Does the Prosecution now wish to cross examine? Mr Justice Jackson, I am sorry to have called you up. Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn now for ten minutes.
( A recess was taken ) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: present time?
A No, I am not a prisoner of war of the United States. I was a British prisoner of war and since I have been here I have been declared an internee. I do not know what that is. At any rate It is not in accord with a prisoner of war who falls into the hands of the enemy before the end of hostilities. trial was in progress and -
A With some of the defendants' counsel I have been able to speak, not with all of them. But I assume that the other defendants' counsel did not desire it. questi ns as briefly as possible and answer yes or no. You have been allowed to prepare and keep and bring to the Court notes, after your consultations with counsel?
THE PRESIDENT: Answer please/ with defendants' counsel. counsel?
A One note I made about one conference. That was only a date mentioned to me and which I could not have remembered by heart.
Q And you occupied a very high position in the German Air Force?
Q You frequently attended conferences on behalf of Goering? frequently? to attend on account of my office. As a substitute for Goering, very rarely, because he usually was there himself.
Q You had a very large part in building up the Luftwaffe, did you not?
Hitler regime?
A 41--no, I believe you mean, Mr. Justice, in 1940.
Q 1940--well, perhaps I'm wrong.
A You mean the promotion to Field Marshal?
Q When was your promotion to Field Marshal? recognition of your services? nition.
Q And the recognition was in the form of cash, wasn't it? estate.
Q And What did it consist of? that the regime, of which you were a part, put Germany into a war for which it was in no way prepared. Do I understand you correctly? for which it was not prepared as far as the Air Force was concerned. the German people?
A I could not say that. I do not believe he could do that.
Q You do not know that he ever did do it, do you? publicly. I should like to assume that the warning was given to the military officer above him.
Q What officer would be above him?
A That was the leader, the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. As a soldier Q Now, can you point to any time, at any meeting of the High Command or at any other meeting that the Fuehrer called, that Reichsmarshal Goering raised the question that Germany was not prepared for war, in the presence of any of these people?
were held only between the two people concerned. The Reichsmarshal has never reported to the Fuehrer before the public or before a large number of his offices and he has never protested to him publicly because Hitler would not have tolerated such opposition. the box ever took a public position against going to war?
A Publicly no, I cannot remember. But I should like to believe also for the personalities who are now accused the war came as a surprise.
Q You would like to believe that?
Q How long did it take the German forces to conquer Poland?
Q Eighteen days. How long did it take to drive England off the continent, including the disaster of Dunkirk?
Q How long did it take to overrun Holland and Belgium?
Q How long did it take to overrun France and take Paris? session of Norway?
AAlso a short time. Denmark very short because Denmark gave in immediately and for Norway a few weeks. as an officer, as saying that there was no preparation known to the officers in advance of those movements? Is that your testimony as an officer?
Q You testified that those were all surprise movements to the officers of the Luftwaffe.
You were surprised at every one of them, you said. only Poland was spoken about. The other things came later and were covered by the preparations for this war. was well prepared for a war with Poland, do you? What I considered by saying preparedness for war when I testified, means for the extent of a world war. For that Germany was not prepared in 1939. she not?
A I would not like to say it that way. Of course there was armament as every other nation that has an army has it and with regard to Poland it was alerted and was sufficiently large even though it surprised us to crush Poland. thecontinent of Europe, Germany was the best prepared for war on the first day of September, 1939? stronger than the German.
Q I asked you in reference to the continental powers. Do you question that Germany was far better prepared for war than any of her immediate neighbors? forces were just as well prepared as Germany. They had the advantage of linger work in that field, which in Germany could only start five years before the outbreak of the war.
Q When did you first meet Hermann Goering?
Q What was he then,what position did he hold?
Q What were you doing?
A I was then the chief of the German Lufthansa, a civil transport agency.
that time as to what would be done with air forces if the Nazi Party came to power?
Q When did you first discuss that with Goering? There existed a plan to take over the government in 1932. One believed that at that time already the other parties would form a coalition with the National Socialists and at that occasion I believe Goering had talked about the possibility that if a government would be in power, of which the National Socialists would be a part, there would be a chance that Germany would become "Wehrfaehig", that is, able to fight. not? and then this fact did not count any longer.
Q And you wai ted until after they won to join?
A. Yes. the 28th of January 1933?
Q And where did that take place?
Q Did he call upon you? because he wanted to talk to me very urgently. with Goering at that time. agreement had been made which foresaw a common government with National Socialists; Reichspresident von Hindenberg now agreed to appoint Adolph Hitler as Chancellor in this government. ministry which should be founded. Only for the reason that I did not want to leave the Lufthansa, I named two other persons in my place. Goering refused and insisted that I should place my cooperation at his disposal.
Q Did you agree to do so? circumstances of Hitler's insisting on it.
Q Well, what did Hitler do? my technical knowledge and ability in the field of aviation he considered it necessary. task of building a Nazi air force, did you not?
A No, not the air force. First, there was only the question of organizing various fields of aviation. There was the civil aviation transport, and the transport schools, fliers' schools, the weather service, and the various research institutes. I believe that that covers the entire field of aviation, not air force, at that time.
Q Perhaps, I will say, you took over the task of making Germany preeminent in the air.
task. That was the task in general. Hitler personally, did you not? activities of Ribbentrop?
Q What did you tell Hitler about the activities of Ribbentrop in England? not persona grata, was not a liked person.
Q Now, when you were interrogated before, didn't you state after your capture that you told Hitler that if he didn't get rid of Ribbentrop soon he was going to have trouble with England? Isn't that what youtold Hitler in substance?
Q But the sense of it? to further the desire which Hitler often expressed about England in his policies, to realize that. Goering, had you not?
A With whom?
AAbout what? not, to inspect the air construction there, factories, facilities, and that sort of thing?