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Transcript for IMT: Trial of Major War Criminals

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Defendants

Martin Bormann, Karl Doenitz, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Hans Fritzsche, Walther Funk, Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Jodl, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Wilhelm Keitel, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Robert Ley, Constantin Neurath, von, Franz Papen, von, Erich Raeder, Joachim Ribbentrop, von, Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz Sauckel, Hjalmar Schacht, Baldur Schirach, von, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Julius Streicher

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Q If you say you know nothing about letters which you signed I cannot carry the matter any further.

Now I want to deal with the last point.

AI had to sign several hundred letters per day and I could not always know what they were about in detail because that required a special knowledge which I did not possess. I only signed this in order to assist the Sanitaetsinspektor, who for some reason did not want to sign it himself and to take the responsibility.

QVery well, I am leaving that point.

Now then, the last point. You said on Friday that a German General had been executed for looting jewelry. Where did the looting take place?

AI cannot say that. I t seems to me as if that had been in Belgrade. The name of the general is General Wafer. That I remember.

QIt was jewelry looted from Belgrade?

AThat I cannot say. I only know what I have said on Friday.

QSo the German authorities regarded the death penalty as a suitable one for looting; apparently that is right.

AI could not hear that questions

QWell, perhaps it was a comment. I will ask you the next question.

What was the value of the jewelry which was looted?

AI can only say I do not know how it was stolen nor what was stolen nor how much it was, what it amounted to; only the fact that they were supposedly jewels which he took and for that he received the death penalty.

QDid Goering ever speak to you about his art collection he was getting from occupied countries?

AI don't know anything about that.

QMay I read you a peace of evidence, shorthand note 2317, and it is an order of Goering signed on the 5th of November, 1940.

"Goering to the Chief ofthe Military Administration in Paris and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg: To dispose of the art objects brought to the Louvre in the following priority:

"First, those art objects --"

THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Roberts, he has never seen this document and he says he knows nothing about it.

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MR. ROBERTS:If your Lordship please, if you do not think I should put it to him-

QYou say Goering never dismissed with you his art collection?

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A No.

QDid you not know that valuable art objects, inventoried to the amount of over 21,000 objects, were taken from the western occupied countries?

ANo, that is not know to me.

QWhat ought the General who looted the jewellery, perhaps from Belgrade, have done with it, given it to the Fuehrer, or given it to Goering?

AI ask to be relieved form answering this question.

BY GENERAL RUDENKO:

QWill you please tell me when you heard of the planning of war by Hitler against the Soviet Union?

In January 1941?

AIn January I heard, as I said Friday, form Reichsmarshal Goering, that Hitler had told him he expected an attack from Russia.

Then for several months I did not hear anything about the whole thing until by coincidence I found out from a subordinate that a war with Russia was imminent and preparations concerning the clothing of the troops had been started.

QDid you know about or were you acquainted with the Barbarossa Plan?

AI heard the name, the word, and I saw the plan as such demonstrated in a conversation with the Fuehrer one or two days before the attack, with the Army groups and Army commanders.

QAnd when did this take place, one day or two days before the invasion?

AI can tell you the date exactly in one second.

QPlease do.

AOn the 14th of June. That is about eight days before the attack which took place on the 22nd.

QAnd before that, you did not hear of this plan and you did not see it.

AI say that I probably heard the name Barbarossa, the word, before, but only shortly before.

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QAnd how long before?

AI cannot say that because during the entire Months of January, February, March and also in April, most of the time I was outside of Germany and I only returned in May.

I was in Africa, in Greece, Yugoslavia, and the West, also.

QI am interested in the period when you were in the High Command of the German Air Force.

ADecember 1940.

QSo?

AOnly partly. Part of the time I was in France and in Italy.

QAnd where were you in January 1941?

AAt that time I was in the West, and as far as I know, not in Germany.

QBut you just told us that in January 1941 you had a talk with Goering regarding the plan of war against the Soviet Union.

AYes, I-

QIn January 1941?

AYes, on the 13th of January, but I cannot say any more whether I spoke to Goering in France or whether it was via cable, via telephone, or whether I was in Germany for a day or two.

That I cannot say.

I didn't mark it down.

QPlease forgive me. What has a telephone conversation to do with an attack on the Soviet Union?

AThere was only mentioned an attack by Russia against Germany.

QYou mean this question of an attack of the Soviet Union against Germany was also discussed by telephone?

ANo, I have said nothing like that. I just say that I do not know whether I received the information by special cable which could not be tapped, or whether the Reichsmarshal told me that in France, or whether I was in Germany for one day.

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Q Yes. And when did you discuss this question with Goering, and when did Goering express his apprehensions as to this war against the Soviet Union?

AThat was on the 22nd of May.

QThe 22nd of may, 1941?

A '41, yes.

QAnd where was this question discussed?

AClose to Nurnberg, in Feldenstein.

QDid you discuss this question with Goering alone, or was anybody else present at this conversation?

AAt that time only with Goering. We were alone.

QAnd you assert that Goering did not wish to go to war with Russia?

AThat was my impression.

QSo. And why did Goering not want this war against the Soviet Union?

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This was a defensive war?

AGoering was opposed to such a war because he knew -

QHe was also opposed to a defensive war?

AHe was against any war, a war of any kind, personally.

QThat is strange. Maybe you will be able to give me precise reasons why Goering did not wish war against the Soviet Union.

ABecause a war on two fronts, especially war against Russia, as I saw it, meant the loss of the war, and I believe that just as I did, many other soldiers and men saw it that way.

QYou were also personally an opponent of this war against the Soviet Union?

AA very outspoken opponent, a definite opponent.

QStrange Your explanations are not very conclusive . On the one hand, you assert it was a question of aggressive war of the Soviet Union against Germany, and on the other hand you say that the German officers did not wish war with the Soviet Union.

AMay I explain again: on the 13th of January Goering told me that Hitler had the impression Russia wanted to go against Germany. That was not the opinion of Goering, I assume and not mine, but it was the opinion which Hitler had mentioned as his own.

QForgive me. Do I understand that neither you nor Goering believed this opinion of Hitler's?

AI can only speak of myself. Also, in my close circle, I paid openly that I didn't beleive that Russia would go against us.

What Goering thought about it I could not say, because he did not talk to me about it. You Would have to ask him personally.

QYes, and I will ask you now. You mean that personally you did not believe in Hitler's opinion? You mean that Goering's opposition to war was to war against the Soviet Union?

AOn the 22nd of May, when I talked to Goering about this question and asked him with great urgency to avoid a war against Russia, to speak to Hitler about it, Goering told me that he had expressed the same arguments to Hitler, but it was not possible to change Hitler's mind; Hitler's decision was firm and there was no power in the world which could change it.

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Q I understand. You mean that Goering, speaking against war with the Soviet Union, meant that it was incompatible with war against England, that he wished to prevent a two-front war?

AFrom the military point of view, certainly, but I believe that if it wouldn't have come to war at that time, it would not have come to it later.

QAnd you admit seriously that it is possible to speak of a preventive war for such a long time, and on the other hand to elaborate the Barbarossa Plan and all the instructions which followed? Do you seriously believe in the preventive character of such a war?

AI do not understand the sense of the question.

QDo you think that one can explain on one hand that Russia wanted to commit an aggressive war against Germany, and on the other hand, if one takes into consideration the official date of this document, in the earlier part of December 1940 they began to prepare plans of war against the Soviet Union?

AWell, I can only volunteer the opinion that Hitler really believed that, that he said, "By preventive war I have to stave off the attack by Russia," but that has nothing to do with my opinion. I did not definitely believe that Russia would attack us. I could not see the whole picture, but I did not believe definitely that Russia would do it, from their own Russian interests, which I tried to understand.

QI understand.

I would like to put a few questions with regard to the prisoners of war. There has already been mentioned here the calling up of Soviet prisoners of war for work in the aircraft industry.

AYes.

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Q How do you consider it when prisoners of war are compelled to work against their own country?

What do you think of that?

AIt is, of course, a very bad thing, an ugly thing. However, so far as I know, that has been done by all other nations against our prisoners of war.

QI am talking of Germany now. You say that is an ugly thing. Isn't that a rather weak answer?

AIt depends uponwhat all the others do. All laws concerning warfare-

Q (Interposing): I would like you to answer my question. I am speaking of the action of the German Supreme Command. Do you consider that these actions were in violation of the rules of international law?

AThis question, so far as the legality is concerned, was never clear to me and it isn't clear to me today. I only knew that orders were given to use them, and in the fight for our very existence, to lead this fight also with the help of these men and women.

QDo you consider that this order was a just order?

AI cannot judge that; that depends upon conditions.

DR.LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President I ask to have the question and answer deleted from the record. The witness was asked to give a legal opinion, which is not his job. Since the question is not admissable, the answer should not be admissible either.

THE PRESIDENT:General Rudenko?

GENERAL RUDENKO:I would like to say that I did not know that the witness did not know whether this was a violation of international law or not. I had every reason to believe that the witness was competent to answer this question because, at the beginning of his statement today, this witness had enumerated ten rules of international law which were given to the German soldiers. I thought that, therefore, the witness could really answer the questions concerning the rules of international law.

In this case, as to the problem of the utilization of prisoners of war-if the Tribunal considers that this question is unnecessary, I will certainly retract it.

THE PRESIDENT:The question might have been framed differently, as to whether it wasn't a breach of the rules which he had gotten in his pay book.

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However, as to international law, that is one of the matters which the Tribunal has got to decide, and upon that, of course, we don't wish the evidence of witnesses.

GENERAL RUDENKO :Yes.

I still have two questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT:We wanted to rise at half-past four. If it is your intention to ask some more questions, perhaps we had better rise now, or, have you finished?

GENERAL RUDENKO:We had better call a recess now, because I still may have a few questions to put to this witness.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)

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Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 12 March 1946, 1000 to 1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

THE PRESIDENT:General Rudenko, have you concluded your interrogation?

GENERAL RUDENKO:Yes.

THE PRESIDENT:Does the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to examine further?

DR. STAHMER:No, sir.

THE PRESIDENT:Then the witness can retire.

(Whereupon the witness left the witness box.)

DR. STAHMER:I call as the next witness, Colonel of the Air Force, Bern von Brauchitsch.

COLONEL BERN VON BRAUCHITSCH, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows.

THE PRESIDENT:Will you repeat the oath after me. I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath.)

You may sit down if you wish.

BY DR. STAHMER:

QWhat is your name?

ABern von Brauchitsch.

QMr. Witness, which position did you have on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force?

A (No answer.)

QWhich position did you hold on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force?

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A I was the Military Adjutant of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

I held the rank of Chief Adjutant. I had the job of keeping the daily journal and organizing the adjutant service.

Daily the military position was to be reported--the military situation was to be reported, and, military reports, so far as they were not reported by the offices themselves.

I had no command function.

QIn this activity did you know that on 25 March 1944, from the prison camp of Sagan, Stalag Luft 3, seventy-five English Flight Officers had fled?

AThe official incident is known to me, because at one time it was reported that a number of Flight Officers had fled.

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Q Can you give us some information about the fate of these officers after their flight?

AThe fate of these officers is not known to me.

QWeren't you ever informed that fifty of these officers allegedly were shot while trying to escape?

AI was informed about that much later. I was informed that a number of these officers allegedly had been shot.

QCan you tell us under what circumstances these shootings were carried out?

ANo, I do not know anything about that.

QDid Reichsmarshal Goering order the shooting or did he have any part in these measures?

AI know neither of his taking part in these measures nor of any order.

QDo you know of the attitude of Hitler with regard to the treatment of so-called terror fliers who were shot down?

AIn the spring of 1944 the losses of the civilian population by bombings increased steeply. These attacks were directed against civilians who were working in their fields, against secondary railroads and railroad stations without any military significance, against pedestrians and bicycles, all within the homeland. This must have been the reason for Hitler deciding to give orders or to issue orders concerning measures against these fliers. That is as much as I know. Hitler was for the sharpest measures, and lynching should not be prevented.

QWhat was the attitude of the Reichsmarshal of the Air Force to this order?

AThe commander-in-chief and the chief of the general staff have expressed their opinion by saying that these attacks, which were solely directed against the civilians, should be condemned. However, no special measures should be taken against these fliers -- lynching and non-protection for parachutists. By the orders of Hitler, the Luftwaffe was forced to take into consideration these questions. It was desired to avoid the consequences of Hitler's opinion. A way will be found, and it was seen in the fact that measures were allegedly taken, but which should not be executed.

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Then I received the mission, which was outside of my regular functions, to confer with the OKW about the definition of terror fliers.

In these conversations and correspondence, all these cases were discussed which, according to international law, could be considered as violations and criminal acts. By these definitions, lynching should be avoided. The correspondence, which took quite some time, also shows the tendency of the various officers to delay the solution of this problem. At the end of June, 1944, the definition of terror flier was stipulated. The stalag was directed to report all cases of violations but not to take any measures. By these measures the directive, in the sense of Hitler, was avoided.

QIn your opinion, therefore, could we say that the measures directed by Hitler were not carried out by the air force?

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A Yes, that can be said. It can be said that the measures directed by Hitler were not carried out.

As well, the commanders of the air force can certify they had not received any orders to shoot enemy fliers or to turn them over to the SD.

QDo you have any knowledge about the fact that the air force had received directives to take hostages or to shoot them?

AI did not know of any directive or any order which has anything to do with hostages.

QNow one more question: Can you give us any information about the treatment of the five enemy fliers who, in March 1945, jumped into the Schorfheide and were captured?

AIn March, 1945, an American bomber was shot down after an attack over the Schorfheide. Part of the crew saved themselves by jumping. Some of those were injured. The injured ones were sent to a rest center hospital. The observer, an American captain, who had been a director in Hollywood in his civilian occupation, was interrogated by the Reichsmarshal about his mission and his jump.

DR. STAHMER:I have no more questions to this witness.

THE RESIDENT:Do any other Defendants' Counsel wish to ask the witness any questions? BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):

QI have only a few questions to this witness. Which official position did you have when the war started?

AAt the beginning of the war I was at the War Academy.

QCan we say that the beginning of the war caused a happy sentiment among the professional soldiers?

ANo, one could not say that enthusiasm would have been caused by the beginning of the war. On the contrary, we took it with great seriousness. As young soldiers, we saw out mission to train the soldiers, to educate them, and to turn them into preparedness for the protection of our country.

QWhich positions did you have, then, during the war? Were you ever in the staff of an air fleet?

AI was never active in the staff of an air fleet, with the exception Of a short time as group commander.

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I was also adjutant of the commander-in-

chief of the air force.

QAs chief adjutant, as you said before, with the commander-in-chief of the air force, you could get a lot of information about the Luftwaffe?

AAs much as I had the material, yes.

QNow, according to your possibility to get materials, did the chief of air fleets have any influence on political decisions or the manner in which the war was conducted?

AAccording to my information the chief of air fleets had no influence on any political decisions. Their job was the technical execution of the orders received, and orders about the conduct of the air war in increasing number came from Hitler himself.

QDid these chiefs of air fleets make any suggestions to take sharper measures in the conduct of the war?

AI do not know of any suggestions in this direction given by chiefs of air fleets. They were professional soldiers who held their positions on the basis of orders.

DR. LATERNSER:I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT:Does any other Defendants Counsel wish to ask my questions? Do the Prosecution wish to cross examine?

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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would ask that the witness be Shown document 1156-PS of the United States documents.

(witness handed document)

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:

QDo you recognize that document, witness?

ANo, I do not know this document

QI call your attention to the date, the 20 of March, 1941, and I call your attention to the fact that it purports to be a report to Reichsmarshal Goering on the 19 of March 1941 meeting.

ADuring the time of my service I only took part in military conferences if they were personal conferences only at the headquarters. I have not seen this document and I do not know anything about the facts at this conference.

QLet me call your attention to Item 2, which refers to you, I take it and which reads:

"The directives worked out by the W.I. for destructive measures to be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in the 'Fall Barbarossa' were agreed to by the Reichsmarshal. One copy was handed to Captain von Brauchitsch to be forwarded to the General Staff of the Luftwaffe."

And I ask you whether that states the facts.

AI can not remember these facts and I cannot give any more information about the contents of the letter mentioned here.

QYou knew about the "Fall Barbarossa"did you not?

AI was informed about the "Fall Barbarossa" in the beginning of 1941 for the first time. I was not present at the conference.

QBut you didknow that certain destructive measures were planned to be undertaken in connection with that by the Lufteaffe, did you not?

AI know only about the first orders of the Luftwaffe in which attacks against the airfields were ordered.

QDid it net also provide for attacks against cities, particularly St. Petersburg?

AAt the time at which this letter was written, as much as I remember, nothing was said about these targets but only about attacks against airfields, which were the main targets of the Air Force.

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MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that the witness be shown Exhibit 735-PS, in evidence as GB Exhibit 151.

(witness handed document) BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:

QThat is in evidence and appears to be a most secret document of which only three copies were made, is that correct?

AMay I read this letter first before I answer the question?

QI call your attention first to the signature at the end of it and ask you if you recognize who that signer was?

AThe signature is Warlimont.

QWho was Warlimont?

AWarlimont was the Deputy Chief of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab.

QAnd you knew him welland he knew you well, did you not?

AI knew him from seeing him and at that occasion I spoke to him for the first time.

QOn the occasion of this meeting that is recorded in these minutes, is that the occasion when you first met Warlimont?

AWhere I spoke to him first officially, yes.

QThat was on the date 6/6 of '44, when this meeting was held?

AAccording to this letter, yes.

QNow, I call your attention to paragraph one of the minutes of that meeting, by which it appears that Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner opened the meeting with a report that a conference on the question of the flyers had been held shortly before with the Reichsmarshal, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfuehrer SS. That is the opening of it, is it not?

AI know nothing about the words of this letter and of the fact of that conference.

QWho was the Reichsmarshal at that time?

AI remember the fact because on the 6 of June the invasion started and in the night from the 5th to the 6th I called the Reichsmarshal, informed him about the beginning of the invasion and on the morning he left from Feldenstein to be in the afternoon in Klessheim.

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Q And this meeting is said to have been held in Klessheim on the afternoon of 6/6, isn't it?

AI have said once before that I do not know anything about the meeting as such and the content of the meeting.

QYes, I understand, you were not present. That was between the Reichsmarshal, who wasGoering, was it not? Goering was Reichsmarshal at that time, was he not?

AYes.

QRibbentrop was Foreign Minister at that time, was he not?

AYes.

QAnd who was the Reichsfuehrer SS?

AHimmler.

QNow, it was as a result of that meeting at which the Foreign Minister -- just follow the next sentence -- "The Foreign Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on German civilian population.

It was agreed that this conference, which you did attend, was to take place; is that not the sense of the first paragraph?

AI was not at this meeting and secondly, I do not know anything about the contents of this meeting, of this conference, as I have said before.

QWell, were you not at the meeting with Kaltenbrunner which Kaltenbrunner called?

AI was not at the meeting with Kaltenbrunner, which is mentioned here.

QDespite the signature of Warlimont on these minutes which says you were?

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A I say this is spite of the signature but maybe I can read the whole document before I give a definite answer.

QRead the last sentence. Witness, I may be misinterpreting this. It does not say you were present but it does say that you gave them this information. I ask you to look at the last paragraph and say whether that is not true?

AThe last paragraph in this document before the signature can only refer to a conference which, if I remember correctly, took place on the 6th late in the afternoon in General Warlimont's house and which I have mentioned in my statement before.

QI think I was confused about the two meetings and that these minutes do not show you to have been present. There was such a conference as Warlimont describes but it was not the same conference at which Kaltenbrunner was present, is that correct?

AYes, that is correct. I only know of this one meeting on the 6th late in the afternoon, between Walimont and myself.

QAnd that is the conference to which he refers in the third paragraph?

ANo, the conference in the afternoon has nothing to do with the first paragraph, which I just read and there is no connection between the two.

QT he third paragraph had no connection with the first meeting, you say?

AParagraph three has no connection with paragraph one because I had no knowledge of paragraph one. I mentioned before that I had the mission to confer with the OKW about the definition of acts which were to be considered as violations of international law and crimes.

QLet us ask it once more so we will have no misunderstanding about it. The conference referred to in paragraph three of Warlimont's minutes is a conference between you and him later that afternoon and had nothing to do with the Kaltenbrunner conference which was held earlier in the day.

AYes.

QNow, what was the situation in the beginning of 1944 with reference to the bombing of German cities?

AThe situation was such that the air war increased in intensity and in the beginning of '44 it was very strong.

QThat was becoming very embarrasing to the Reichsmarshal, was it not?

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A Of course it was very disagreeable for the Air Force that their defensive forces were too weak to stave off these attacks.

QAnd they were being blamed somewhat and the Reichsmarshal was being blamed for the air attacks, was he not?

AOf course, that goes without saying.

QAnd the Reichsmarshal was in the embarrassing position of having assured the German people back in 1939 that they could be protected against air attacks on the German cities. You understood that fact, did you not?

AI understand that that is the fact but I also know that the conditions in 1939, which led to this statement, had an entirely different background than in 1944; because in 1944 the entire world was against us.

QBut the fact was that German cities were being bombed and the German people had looked to the Reichsmarshal to protect them, isn't that a fact?

AIt is clear that the German people expected that the Air Farce with all means at their disposal would go against these attacks.

QNow, what were the relations between Goering and Hitler at this time?

AMay I ask to have the question repeated? I did not understand it clearly.

QWhat was the relation between Goering and Hitler and was there any change that came over the relationship as this bombing of German cities progressed?

AT he relations between the Reichsmarshal and the Fuehrer were doubtless worse than they had been before. Whether that was only based upon the conditions caused by the air warfare is not known to me.

QYou were very close to Reichsmarshal Goering throughout this period, were you not the entire period of the war?

AI do not know what you consider close. The relation of a commanderin-chief to his adjutant, that is what it was.

QWell, you were particularly friendly; he had great confidence in you and you had great regard for him. Isn't that a fact?

AI can affirm that but frequently -- well, conferences about the motives which the Reichsmarshal may have had we did not have.

QYou were with him on the 20th day of April, 1945, when he sent the telegram proposing to take over the government of Germany himself and was arrested and condemmed to death?

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