I do not know if I should not add some more.
The Convention of the Hague has taken into consideration aerial warfare to a very small extent. It is quite sure, that, too, if a target should be avoided, the highest office had to issue directives which was the basis of the preamble of the Convention of the Hague, and the literature which was published after takes into account the particular characteristics of the air force. The target was considered by us admissible according to international law. Itdid not exclude that from our side, and in particular cases, examinations and investigations were made, and in detail, however, we have assumed the responsibility that our organization was ordered, by personal visits, to take care of the preparation of the bombings, the target designation and the meteorological details so methodically so that a very high amount of exactness could be expected. for the simple reason that here there offered itself a target which was not to be hit by a terror attack but an important military objective.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel wish to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the OKW. BY DR. LATERNSER: group? 1942, after I had been commander in chief of the troops, andI had certain experiences on tactical questions.
Q That is to say, the army group which you led was in Italy? the prosecution has called them, you have probably heard about that?
Q I have one third question. What does one mean in speaking about the German General Staff, that is to say, of the individual parts of the Wehrmacht?
represents a group of those officers within the part of the Wehrmacht who as assistants of the leadership, have to carry part of the responsibility. the air force and what offices were included? General Staff of the army and it was equal to that just like one after the other. The General Staff considered of the central office, of Fuehrungs Stab (Leadership Office) with the Chief of Staff, the Fuehrungs Stab (Leadership Departments), organizational groups, the General quartermaster's office, and so on. The individual command divisions all the way down to the division; and on the side of the ground organizations, the Air Gaus, had interstaff offices and assistants of the leadership, of the leaders. The co-responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff was incompatible at the time with the leadership as such. The Chief of the General Staff of the lower and higher divisions, had great influence on all the general staff officers without thereby impairing the responsibility of the military officers. General Staff of the Air Force can be understood to mean the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force plus the General Staff officers of the troops, than, I believe I understand it correctly? . is called General Staff here, do you consider this designation according to military language, do you cousider this correct? Is that group of General leaders called General Staff? of assistants of leadership in Germany, that is to say, that the commanders have nothing to do with that. According to German concepts, they did not fit into that organization and simply for that reason, that the leaders, the commanders in chief did not go that way of General Staff officers -
the commanders were individual personalities. There is probably one way of grouping them, that is, the title and the pay, title generally.
ship as General Staff, then you would consider it wrong?
before within the realm of such German situation? The commanders-in-chief were not that sort of war counsellor or similar organization group for certain purposes. They did not have the individual or in-toto responsibility to the Reich Defense Council. They were responsible only to commander-in-chief of the sector or certain office. The grouping of the commanders-in-chief for any results was impossible, according to my opinion, because, in the first place, the condition was entirely different. First, either they were under the commander-in-chief of the Army, or the Air Force, or the Navy, or the Wehrmacht, as such then they were one hundred percent under the German high command. Others were one hundred percent under the allied high command -- the Axis command. Then there were the independent commanders, independently from the commander-in-chief of the Army, and others who were independent of Army groups.
Q You speak too fast. Did the commanders-in-chief, did they only have to do with the education of military problems as they were presented to them, or did they develop their own plans to present them to Hitler? only, and only responsible for the status to which they were appointed; within that area they could make improvements, and note any suggestions or changes for improvement to the OKW; with the OKW there was no political definite reporting or collaboration.
Q You just mentioned improvements or changes. Does that mean only military and tactical directions or improvements, or did such suggestions also, I shall say, did they have to do with the "if"?
A No, only military tactical positions, and in a similar case the "if" was discussed, unless the higher officer decided, then the auditorium kept quiet.
Q I shall come later to this point. The group of the general staff, in such discussions there, did they ever meet collectively? this group?
from the International Law? positions changed, did they change them, or were they intact in that position? and commanders-in-chief. and the High Military leaders?
A We will have to distinguish between two kinds. One: consisted of an address before the campaign was started to the higher commanders who would take part in the campaign. The purpose was generally in the form of issuance of an order to these commanders, to inform them about the situation, and with the oratorical forces released by the Fuehrer, it was quite natural that he could not fear anything, particularly since they were not informed about the various matters in the background. Discussions did not take place, they were not admitted after such a question. Afterwards, sometimes, there was a military tactical conference, at which one of the commanders would put his deluge of commands forward. As I have mentioned, we never had any political questions, as it was not read, but we were put before a fact which we had to accept as soldiers. 22 August 1939, that is shortly before the beginning of the Polish campaign? to which a treaty had been made with the Soviet Union and concluded? and told that a report had just been received, according to which the Russians will have a benevolent neutrality.
Q What impression did that report give the higher military leaders? leading contention. In any other case there was the possibility of extending the war treaty east, at least, we could not deny the possibility.
However, if Russia was no more to be considered, then speaking as a leader of the Airforce, at least for the Airforce, there was a balance given which guaranteed a short decisive victory, and beyond that, it meant it would not make necessary the extending of the Fuehrer's operation.
Q At any rate, you had received this with quite a great relief? of the OKW had met with the high politicians, and also the Party people? as well as in the West. I had to cooperate, and I was depending on the cooperation of the high kommissar Gauleiter Hofer, and there was a Gauleiter on my back -politicians, and where the conference took place, and if any political plans of any kind?
A No, no. That I can definitely say that was not the case. Soldiers did not bother about politics. Politics by the politicians were made by them and we had to execute them. leaders as to use of them were used to that extent, weren't they? took place since the 18th Century in the German Army. leaders, and the 5th Column? do with. That was below their level. before the beginning of the East campaign, as well as with the military leaders. Did you believe from the situation described to you that was was inevitable? to the military leaders was to convince them of the necessity as to a preventive war.
That is to say, to attack before the mobilization and armaments in Russian fortresses would be harmful to Germany. during that conference? direction, as they gave a picture of the military general situation, the time, the element, a definite picture which was at any rate swift. I want to say here, in speaking of the Russian campaign, that I had no doubt at all, that I could not have any doubt at all until the last day practically of August, of any fight against -- during the last days I know I had no time or means to be informed about the entire situation of the Russian front, and I had so much to do in my own office -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Witness, Mr. Witness, will you go more slowly, please, and have some consideration for the interpreters. BY DR. LATERNSER: I would like you to repeat the last answer, please. action against England as commander of the airforce, and had not the entire time of mine to inform myself about the entire situation of the Russian site, such as to judge for myself to quite -responsible for events which can hardly be avoided during a war. I should like to ask you to describe this day of the commander-in-chief, describe briefly the day of the commander-in-chief of the airforce, or the army? commander, if I may speak for myself I -
Q Mr. Witness, I ask you to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Witness -- Dr. Laternser, surely that is accumulative to what the witness has already been saying, and likely to be very long. The description of the Day of a commander, this witness already said the commander had nothing to do with politics, and nothing to do with the staff. Why should we betroubled of what the commander's Day consists?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask this question for the following reasons. Since his activities were very extensive, especially at the front, not every report, or each individual report put in there can reach him.
The reports in his sector must of necessity go through the office which is accommodated for them, so that such reports which are of extraordinary importance, especially are important for the decision of military leadership for his plans on the front then.
THE PRESIDENT: Give it in that way then, rather than giving the witness a full day to describe it.
DR. LATERNSER: All right, I will put it that way.
Q Mr. Witness, in the translation of the extent of your activity as commander-in-chief, or of commanders-in-chief, in their reports because of preparations,could only such messages, which after examination by the office, be of such importance that they had to be presented to the commanderin-chief? could be brought before the commander-in-chief. It was almost impossible, if I can talk about myself, that fifty to seventy percent of my time I had to be at the front. The amount of independence of the staff of the army, of the airforce, and the Navy command, had to be responsible within their own sectors, that is, to maintain their own responsibility. so, was it possible that all reports of violations of International Law, of a minor or medium nature, would reach you?
A It had to be tried. It had to be attempted, whether any possible individual case or not; that it is very bad, and for the reason that I have mentioned before, because the commander-in-chief sometimes could not even be reached.
Q In other words, in these cases the Commander-in-Chief had to be able to depend on his assistants.
of an air fleet on the Eastern Front?
Q Do you have any knowledge about the extermination of Jews in the East? SS?
Q You didn't even know the names of these units? Russian Commissars after their capture were to be shot?
A Of this order I heard at the end of the war. The air force did not have anything -- but the ground force -- to do with this matter. I believe -and I can say it with almost absolute certain that the air force, not even in the way of reports knew anything about it. Even in the face of frequent contact with General Field Marshal von Bock with the Army leaders and commanders of Panzer groups, I did not hear anything about this order from these gentlemen.
Q And what was your attitude with regard to that order? the Mediterranean area -- I did not consider then binding on me, but just as an order within which I had certain liberty, in this matter. And my position was that I as Commander-in-Chief had the right to decide whether it was a commander incident as a violation of international law or something which could be tactically explained, and the task was that the solution was that whoever were uniforms and had a definite tactical job, if they were within the points of the Hague Convention were to be considered soldiers and to be treated as such.
Q The Commando order was therefore not used within your command?
Q What case do you mean?
ceeding. At that time did you know about that case? Were you informed? I do not believe that I was informed about that, for two reasons: First, because after conferences with my chief I found out that none of the three of us knew anything; and secondly, because just at that time by unsuccessful operations on the Southern Front I was more out of my position than in it. would you have decided? MR JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't think we can try Dostler's case or that this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler's case is being tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as to the guilt of his fellow. officer is hardly helpful. THE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember. DR. LATHERNSER: I withdraw the question in your territory?
A Small landings behing the lines south of Venetia. There were aerial landings north of Albende in the Genetial territory. There were smaller cases in the territory of Ortona. I am convinced that the troops understood the general view and acted accordingly.
Q You were Supreme Commander of an air fleet in the East. Can you tell me anything about the treatment of the Russian civilian population by the troops?
A Until the end of November I was in Russia. I can only say that the relations between the population and the troops was the best possible, that the field kitchens were placed at the disposal of the poor and the children, as it was the custom, and was a fact; and the high moral level of the Russian women was recognized by us. It was respected by German soldiers. And I know that the services of our doctors were often used by the Russian population. I remember this particularly, since we always had an ability to suffer pains. But war passed across the field of the Smolensk so rapidly that the whole territory made a peaceful impression.
The farmers were working and every sign of peaceful life existed. German soldiers in the East? Are you aware of any cases of violations of international law and did you in such cases always use every means at your disposal to deal with them?
AAt least I tried to. I did that since I was interested in preserving the reputation of the German Army, and I did it because I wanted to preserve the relations between us and the Italians. For those reasons I proceededagainst German soldiers who violated any of these paragraphs with which we are here concerned. However, since I was aware that war is a nasty business and that as the years go by men become raw, I always considered it necessary to order preventative measures. noticed on the spot when they marched through Italy -- I am referring to my various decrees for punishing violators which were generally and publicly knownthese preventative measures prove the wards which I have just spoken. or if that was difficult, at least the interior of towns -- were to be cleared of administrative officers, and that towns and centres should be fenced off.
Furthermore, as far as anti-aircraft interests permitted, soldiers were to be accommodated in barracks or drawn together in a small order.
Furthermore, that isolated cases which always caused such orders were summed upand any return leave journeys used to proceed in groups. Thus the supervising authority were given strict instructions, field police and military police were attached; they had summary courts martial attached to them. stores were to be established on the return route, where soldiers should be able to purchase certain goods. Certain punitive measures were introduced. Cases which were reported to me by the Italians or Germans were always taken care of. Perpetrators were prosecuted. When operations prevented my personal interference on the spot, I made it known that all cases would later on be prosecuted by me. And in other cases, when solution became difficult, I fixed the death penalty and set up special courts-martial. Few of these death penalties served to solve the problem, However, against any superiors who would protect their soldiers, I proceeded -- if they were too lenient in carrying out their tasks. the reports from the front reached police and law courts and so forth. part of your opponents? large number -
GENERAL RUDENKO: I protest against putting the question in this way. From my viewpoint, the witness is not competent to conclude whether Germany's enemies have broken international law. I believe that this question should be put aside.
DR. LATERNSER: May I defend my attitude on that question? I am interested in having that question answered since subsequently I want to put the further question to the witness, whether after he heard of violations of international law from the other side he then failed to proceed against violators of international law on his own side. That is the reason I am anxious to have that question answered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know exactly what your question is and why you say it is competent.
DR. LATERNSER: The exact wording of the question is as follows:
committed by the opposing side? following question: opponents he took the attitude that violations of international law committed by his own men should for this reason either not be punished at all or less severely. attitude and views of a member of the group, and for that reason I consider the answers to these questions of extreme importance.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear what Counsel for the United States says about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Honor please, I believe it is a wellestablished principle of international law that a violation on one side does not excuse or warrant violations on the other side. There is, of course, a doctrine of reprisal, but it is clearly not applicable here, on any basis that has been shown. competent, here is a broad question, "Did you hear of violations of international law?" It would at least, even if the subject were proper, require that some particularity of a case be given. A broad conclusion of a charge -- a violation of internationallaw -- would hardly be sufficient to inform this Tribunal as to the basis on which this witness may have acted. to his attention, there might be some basis; but merely the question as asked by Counsel does not afford a basis here. this is far afield from anything that is involved in the case. I do not know what particular atrocities or violations of international law are to be excused by this method. There must have been atrocities committed, on the basis of which thereis sought to be excused atrocities committed by somebody else. Who else committed them, where they were committed -- is a subject we might have have to try if we went into this subject.
It seems to me that the inquiry is quite beside the point and if it were, if there is anyway that it is within the point, it is improper when put in this manner.
DR. STAHMER: This question which is of principal importance has some-
time ago already once been put before this Tribunal. It was when I applied to present "white books" in which reports about atrocities were contained. I think it was at the session of February 25. on that question and the Tribunal then permitted me to submit these "white books", subject to information on the subject of what out of these books was to be presented.
At that time the Tribunal's attention was drawn to the fact that the question whether atrocities were committed on the other side as well was important since this would primarily contribute information as to the German attitude and it would explain the German attitude, since the motive for the perpetration is also of decisive importance and important also for the findings. It will be necessary to realize that the perpetration on the German side will have to be judged differently, if in fact a perfectly correct procedure was adopted by the other side. concerned with reprisals. events be of importance and be permitted to be put.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have considered the questions which Dr. Laternser proposed to put to the witness and have also considered the objections made by General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, and they hold the questions are inadmissible.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I assume that I may be entitled to put the following question. BY DR. LATERNSER: of international law of your own men when violations of that law by your opponents were reported to you?
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to me to be putting in one question what
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that question is meant to cause the opponents.
In having that question answered, I merely want to
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would see no objection in your asking the witness whether he was anxious to avoid violations of international law; if you wish to put that ques ion to him there willbe no objection to that question. The question which you have suggested putting is really identical with the questions you put before. BY DR. LATERNSER: because of atrocities committed by German soldiers. Is not every soldier sufficiently well informed about international regulations, and has he not been instructed on that subject?
A I must asnwer that question in the affirmative. During the many addresses which I have delivered to my subordinate commanders, such pointers and instructions have continuously been issued.
Q Did you, as commander of an army group, try to protect towns containing art treasures and churches?
cultural objects and art treasures of churches. I gave orders accordingly, and during my tactical actions my measures were designed in that respect, fell into German hands? after certain controls which I had ordered to be carried out. If there were violations, the commandant in question was warned and these matters were terminated. enter the war?
A No, I had not been informed about that. As far as I know, the entry of Italy into the war occurred so spontaneously that even the political leaders were surprised. should be placed against America?
A No. I can't say anything about these questions.
Q And now the last question. What was the situation regarding the retirement of military leaders during the war?
AA resignation from the armed foeces on one's own initative, or an application to resign from the armed forces, was not permissible. During the later years --that is to say, 1944--an order existed which threatened severest penalties and prohibited the exercising of those rights or any changes in theleading positions. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces reserved for himself that right, alone, and exclusively.
Q Bid an order exist about that fact?
A Yes; I should so assume, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. BY PROFESSOR DR. JAHRREISS (Counsel for defendant Jodl): in the military field had the right and the possibility to put demands to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Hitler, and express their views.
Did I understand that correctly? with Hitler about matters referring to orders?
Q Were they actual conflicts?
A "Conflict" is probably saying too much; certain changes of opinion.
Q Shall we say quarrels, and frequently, if I understand you correctly? difficult customer.
A That must be admitted. On the other hand, I--I don't know why--was lucky enough to find him understanding as to the questions which I put up to him.
Q Didn't these quarrels with Hitler solve themselves?
Q You mean when you couldn't get through?
A No, when he couldn't put his point over.
Was Jodl also of a different opinion than Hitler? of opinion between the two gentlemen, and I found that Jodl--who was our administrative superior in the OKW--acted with remarkable energy and presented his views. He adhered to his views right to the end.
Q What do you mean, he was your representative at the OKW?
so-called OKW theaters of war. Contrary to other army theaters of war, the East was an army theater of war, whereas the others were known as OKW theaters of war. did the Army have no influence in the OKW theaters of war? I don't believe that everybody will understand the difference.
A It is asking a bit much, since I myself didn't have enough understanding for that situation.
Q You, in other words, were in an OKW theater of war. What does OKW stand for?
A Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Immediate subordination of the supreme commander under Adolf Hitler, and then the command department under Jodl's staff of leaders. Who is OKW? Who gave these orders? that was Adolf Hitler. The other personalities were executive officers, which did not exclude, however, the executive organs having their own conception or the conception of the army groups under their command. They could include the views of army groups, when they represented these army groups with Adolf Hitler.
Q That surprises me somewhat, what you are saying now. The opinion has been voiced that Jodl, whom you defined as a sort of administrative man, was a cheap tool of Adolf Hitler?
A I believe one doesn't exclude the other. I cannot imagine a marriage lasting six years without both sides making attempts to misunderstand. On the other hand, I can imagine that in every good marriage there must be frightful disputes.
Q But in a normal marriage the husband doesn't necessarily have to be a cheap tool, a willing tool.
A Here the situation is rather different. That comparison, that example, seems to limp, as all examples do, and, of course, it limps once more.
In the military theory, we have the absolute subordination principle. as administrator for the supreme commanders sounds to me as if Jodl would have to be the intermediary. thus acting as an intermediary for everybody. Hitler's opinions, if Hitler published one of his orders? HQ, when I saw Jodl get red in the face, that he expressed his views in such a way that I considered it just about bordering the possibilities a military person had.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjour.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 13 March 1946, at 1000 hours.)