Q You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense, is that your testimony?
AYes.
QWhat was the German strength at the beginning of the Polish campaign in various types of planes?
AAs I was not a member of the Central Board I can only give you an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing for the historical certainty of these figures. All told I would say we had approximately three thousand aircraft. As far as I can remember now there were between thirty and forty fighter groups, bomber groups-the same thing applies to fighters, and there were ten groups of dive bomber fighters, about thirty aircraft, which would drop to about six or seven aircraft and to carry on there were ten to twelve groups of different bombers, including fighters and torpedo bombers. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance pianos and a certain number of naval aircraft.
QAnd the proportion of bombers to fighters was approximately two to one, was it not?
AThe proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and about thirty fighter groups. If I include the destroyer aircraft, then the figure would be one to one.
QThat is the way you make up the total of about three thousand units?
AApproximately three thousand. The reasonwhy I can give you that figure is because during these months of quiet reflection I made certain calculations. Without that, of course, I would give the historic truth in that connection.
QNow, do you count as a weapon of defense the bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon?
AI must include the bomber just as the dive bomber and the fighter aircraft amongst the defensive weapons, and I must regard it just as much as an offensive weapon.
I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or offensive warfare is concerned, it is the task of an air force to be offensive to achieve the aims of a deep military sector.
I have also explained that an air force which only has light aircraft is doomed to be destroyed since it cannot hit at the bases of the enemy production and since it cannot hit against military movements, in various sectors.
QIn other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive and an offensive weapon if you were on attack?
AI am afraid the last half of the sentence I did not understand.
QThe Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive and as an offensive weapon if you were on attack, isn't that true?
AYou could put it like that, but I would express it differently. As I say, the air force, because of its make-up, is an offensive weapon, no matter whether it is being used during defense or for attack.
QI think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in the Netherlands, in Poland-
AMay I just say something else on the subject?
QYes.
ANamely, that I said yesterday at the very end that the leading characteristic of an offensive air force is the long distance four-engine bombers which can carry great weight, and Germany had none of these.
QHow did it come that Germany had none of those?
AFirstly, because we were, in fact, in a period of risk. We were only confining ourselves to the absolute essentials regarding the Air force.
Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to build as many precision aircraft; in other words, different bombers, and I am here thinking of the JU-88 as a typical example of that.
QYou were examined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June, 1945? Do you recall that?
A That is quite possible, yes.
QWell, it is quite certain, is it not?
AI have been interrogated quite a lot.
QNow, I ask you whether on the 28th of June, 1945, you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey this: "Everything had been d one to make the German Air Force from the point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corp signals and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led to the facts that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940, at the latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a dive bomber viewpoint, from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft even if the standard was not uniform entirely." Did you not state that?
AThat is still my view today, that as far as material was concerned, fighters, dive bombers and bombers, we did in fact have a certain lead before other nations.
QNow, as to the failure to have the number of four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was it, or was it because of mistake in judgment as to what the requirements of war would be?
ATo that I must say the following. It would have been insanity on the part of the Air Force loaders to produce an air force within three to four years. In 1940, at the earliest, did the possibility exist to have an effective air force which would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was an amazing achievement of organization to be leading, even being restricted.
QI understood you to give as one of the indications of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I misunderstood you?
AThat is only an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the Air Force was particularly in comparision with the small States to be regarded as sufficient.
Certainly not, however, in comparision with large opponents who were fully armed in the air.
I have an example which transpired after considerable discussion with the Reichsmarshal before the beginning of the Russian campaign. I asked for a strengthening of the fighter and dive bomber section. For certain reasons that was refused; certain reasons being shortage of material and I could also gather from the conversation that the Reichsmarshal did not agree with my views.
QDid you not testify to the Bomber Investigating Commission of the United States that you intended to build a longrange heavy bomber but -
"We had developed the AG-111 and the JU-88 and they were actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The JU-88 was then used in the French campaign and against England.
"Questions: The JU-88 is not really a long-range bomber."
Your answer: "It was considered a long-range bomber at that time but unfortunately we had a low opinion of the fourengine aircraft and an erroneous belief that proved to be a mistake in the course of later years."
Is that true?
AThat is my view.
QAnd the reason you did not build the four-engine aircraft, was your low opinion of it?
AMay I say the following: That was the conception of a service department on a lower level but the decisions would have been made by the highest service department.
QThe highest made a mistake about the utility of the four-engine bomber?
AWell, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say that the absence of the four-engine bomber turned out extremely awkward.
Q And that the highest authority in air production was Hermann Goering.
He was the head of the whole plan of aircraft production, was he not?
AYes, that is correct but that erroneous conception of certain war measures did exist temporarily.
QYou were in the Polish campaign, you have said?
AYes.
QIs it not a fact that the German Air Force made the decisive contribution to that campaign as to the time taken to conquer Poland?
AFrom the point of view of the Air Force officers I must agree with that conception but the Army officers do not quite share it.
QWell, you are testifying now as to your opinion. And in that campaign you developed the technique of low level attacks by fighters, light bombers and dive bombers against marching columns and the dive bomber, the light bomber and the fighters all contributed to the success of that movement.
AI must admit that. The beginning of the short range fighting technique was certainly found during the Polish campaign.
QI turn now to the French campaign. You were in the air in the French campaign, were you not?
AYes.
Q And the Air Force contributed decisively to the success of that campaign, didn't it?
AFrom the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must also agree with that view and call it correct.
QAnd you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there? That is true, isn't it?
ADunkirk, did you say? I didn't quite understand.
QYes, Dunkirk.
AYes. That is certainly my view. It would have increased if bad weather hadn't kept us back a bit.
QThat is, the catastrophe would have increased for the English except for bad weather. You had the Air Force to do a better job at Dunkirk than you did from your point of view?
AWe were kept down for about two days.
QYou were one of the principal advocates of the plan to invade England, were you not?
APersonally, I am of the opinion that if the war against England could have been brought to a successful end, then it could only have been achieved for certain by invading.
QAnd you had an adequate air force after having defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, did you not?
ATo that I shall give an explanation,
QFirst tell me if that is true. THE PRESIDENT: Witness will you please understand that you must answer the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, or nearly every question. admits of either an affirmative or negative answer, and you will kindly give that answer and wake your explanation afterwards. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON.
QDid you not advocate the invasion of England, and was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
AThe Air Farce was, subject to certain conditions under consideration of the existing air situation at that time, ready to fulfill that take
QAnd you recommended very strongly to the Reichsmarshal that the in vision take place immediately after Dunkirk, didn't you?
AYes, and I still presented that view later on, too.
QAnd the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this invasion were complete, and the invasion was only called off because the procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
AYes, certainly, but I have to supplement the previous statement by saying that of course a certain interval between the French campaign and the English campaign would have had to be available to replenish the materials necessary for the Air Force.
QNow, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets, including industrial production, but also the bombing of political targets. Is that true?
AAfter a certain date, yes.
QThat is, to paralyze the government of the enemy. That is what you meant by a political target, did you not?
AThat is what I mean tinder political aims, but I answered the questions differently. I understood it differently. What I wanted to say was that that order became effective after a later date.
QYou attended the speech made by Hitler in August of 1939?
AYes, certainly
QAt that time you were informed that the attack on Poland would commence immediately or very soon?
ADuring that conference, the final decision to commence the Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Certainly, negotiations were still in progres and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable results.
QYou were ordered on the 15th of August to get the Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland?
AThis order as such is not known to me in detail, but months ahead, in a certain general defensive way, we did make preparations, always thinking, of course, of a defensive situation. That is something which I must regard and state as being absolutely certain.
QYou expected Poland to attack Germany in the air? Is that your point?
A At any rate, that was a possibility which we took into consideration and expected.
The whole political situation was too difficult for us to come to a certain judgment about it all.
QYou have said that you never held conferences with Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians, in substance, have you not?
ABasically, yes.
QWasn't your immediate superior the number two politician of Germany? Didn't you know that?
AI did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I had with the Reichsmarshal were 99 per cent concerned with military and organization problems.
QBut you know that he, at all times, was one of the leading men in Nazi politics?
ACertainly.
QYou testified that you knew of the order to shoot Soviet Commissars?
ACertainly.
QAnd that you did not approve it and did not carry it out.
AI didn't answer in that sense yesterday, no.
QWhat did you answer?
AI said the following, that the Air Force, which was not fighting on the ground, was not concerned by this problem, and that an official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection.
QWho executed that order? Who was expected to execute it?
AI was only in Russia until November 1941 and I can't answer your question.
QDid you ever hear of the SS?
AYes, of course.
QAnd isn't it a fact that the execution of that order was committed to the SS?
AI knew nothing about that.
QWhat did you think the SS existed for?
AIn my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military operations, was a section of the Army, was a sort of guard of the Army.
Q The SS was to guard the Army or to guard whom:
AThe SS divisions were, from the point of view of human numbers and materials, well above the average as far as equipment or normal army divisions were concerned.
QWho was commanding the SS?
AThe SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions were used within the Army, they were tactically under the commanders of the Army groups to which they were attached.
QSo far as they had special missions, they were under the command of Himmler, is that right?
AYes, certainly. There was a very clear way from them up there.
QYou testified yesterday that you did not consider Hitler's commando order binding on you, and that you did not carry out that order, is that right?
AIn the military sector in the Mediterranean, yes.
QWas that because the order left discretion in your hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?
AI made those reservations myself, firstly for various considerations, and secondly because I had an ambiguous task which could not easily be included in the general administrative leadership.
QWell then, the extent to which an order of that kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of the officer who received it, didn't it?
AI would like to express it slightly differently. These orders could be interpreted -- that commando order, for instance -- because it was certainly quite possible for the supreme commander to carry out an operation as a commando or as a militarily perfectly justified one.
QYou were in command of the forces in Italy at this time, were you not, at the time of the commando order?
AWith certain divisions. I didn't have full powers until September '43.
QI will ask to have you shown Document 498 in evidence as Exhibit 501.
THE PRESIDENT:Is that 498-PS?
MR. JUSTICEJACKSON: 498-PS, sir, I'm sorry. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QI call your attention to Paragraph 6 of that order which reads as follows:
"I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed."
You see that paragraph in the order?
AI just read it, yes.
QNow, did you ever report that you were not carrying out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether it was being carried out
AIn one special case that question was treated very decisively at headquarters. This concerned the commando action where Adolph Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of the fact that we, my troop and I, wanted to spare them. I think that in this connection, Jodl, as an intermediary, achieved decisive results, namely that this point was eventually forgotten and that consequently these people were kept alive, both in hospitals and prisoner of war camps.
But as far as deceiving -- as you just said -- is concerned, I wouldn't talk about that. I wouldn't call it that since I, in my military sector, considered these orders as side orders, and this commando order certainly allowed for several interpretations.
QIn other words, the extent to which one of these orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that right, that Hitler couldn't depend on it that an order as emphatic as this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the German army?
ANo, not that, the situation can be explained like this: If, on the part of an army, such an operation is regarded as a commando operation and reported above in the sense of that order, then the necessary measures would have to be carried out, but that depended on the way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already had an opportunity yesterday to explain that an added coordinated conception did eventually set in. Where the carrying out of tactical moves were concerned, it was recognized what commando actions were within the framework of this order.
QYou testified today, and another witness has testified here, that if an order of Adolph Hitler was resisted, it meant death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute commandos, under threat of punishment if you filed, left you discretion to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject.
AI must repeat what I said before, namely that the Italian theater of war cannot be compared with the ether theaters of war, and that particularly as far as the cooperation of Hitler and Mussolini was concerned, there was a great deal of understanding all around, and therefore, these orders made by OKW can not simply be applied to the Italian theater of war.
QThey were applied everywhere, so far as you know, except in the Italian theater, then?
AThat is something I can't say. I have repeatedly been allowed to say that I was confining myself to my own sphere of influence, which was considerable
QYou testified, as I understand you, that you punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy.
AAs soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and I ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to be extremely strict.
QNow, the punishment was very mild that you ever inflicted for any looting, wasn't its A I punished even up to having someone shot on the spot.
In that manner I succeeded in remedying the difficulties which had arisen.
QSo a German general, dealing with a German soldier, considers shooting the proper penalty for looting?
AThis far-reaching consequence is something I can't quite admit. I want to add to that, that if an army--as the 14th Army at the time -gets into a certain rut, then the most severe measures are just sufficient. They have to be taken in the interest of the reputation of one's army and to bring about orderly conditions amongst the civilian population. Particularly because of that problem I had a pretty bad quarrel at headquarters.
Apart from that, I represent the view that penalties which are too severe should be out, and therefore, for some time I made penalties an educational measure and didn't really regard them as penalties. That is one reason why, for some time, penalties were rather mild.
QYou testified that you took vigorous steps to protect the art treasures of Italy.
AAs far as the art treasures are concerned, yes.
QThat steps did you take, and against whom did you take them?
APrimarily they were preventive measures, first, by excluding cultural towns and art treasures from the military field; second, by having these places cleared which caused the enemy to bomb; and third, by cooperating with General Wolff and having these art treasures removed to secure places. I am reminding you of the art treasures of Cassino, Florenz.
QDid you know that any art was removed from Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin?
AMuch later, at Mondorf, I heard about that, but at the time all I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome.
QOh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and delivered to Goering from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that?
AI heard something about some holy statue, but I can't really give you any more details.
QAnd if Goering received such a thing from Mount Cassino, was it a violation of your orders?
AThe division "Hermann Goering" was stationed in that sector. It was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Goering, and it is quite clear that there is a certain connection here, certainly, but just how far that went I can't tell you.
QI have a few more questions concerning your interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT:Perhaps we had better break off for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken).
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think, Your Honors, that it will save some duplication, perhaps, and save time, if at this time I yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to think up, and I think he is in a better position to take up the examination than I am.
THE PRESIDENT:Whatever you wish.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, your Honors, that we will save some duplication -- perhaps save time -- if I now yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to take up.
I think he is in a better position to take up the examination.
THE PRESIDENT:Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
QWitness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence? Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer why he wanted you to give evidence?
AThe points in question were communicated to me, without all questions being directly defined.
QI want to read you one sentence, so that you will have it in mind Dr. Stahmer's statement: When Rotterdam became a battle-zone in May, 1940, it became a military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled parachute troops who had no support from the artillery had urgently asked for help from bombers.
Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind.
AYes, certainly.
QDo you remember being asked about this incident in the interrogation on the 28th of January , by the United States Bomber Survey? Remember?
ACertainly.
QWere you asked this question, "What about Rotterdam?" And did yougive this answer, "First, Rotterdam being defended in the parts which were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of Rotterdam."
Do you remember saying that?
AApproximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those words yesterday.
QI want to deal first with the strategic aspects. I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, wasn't that right?
AThat wide task had not been given to me. As I said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to me in such a way that he said subsequent to the attack the surrender of Holland followed.
QBut I want you to think of your own words. This was approved by the OKW;
a firm attitude had to be taken. Wasn't your purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization of the people of Rotterdam?
AThat I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I say, when I was at Mondorf, that I wanted to adopt a firm attitude. I merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to be carried out under all Circumstances. We merely had the one task and that was artillery support for Student's troops.
QWhat did you mean by saying that a firm attitude had to be taken, if you didn't mean that the people of Holland had to be possibly terrorized into peace.
AMay I repeat in that connection that the conception of the expression, "firm attitude," is not in keeping with my accustomed wording. I can't admit that I said that. I can't admit the protocol, and it was not read out to me, either.
QWhat do you think you said instead of firm attitude, if you didn't say it?
AI expressed that severe measures would bring the quickest results.
QThat is exactly what I am putting to you, Witness, "severe measures" -
ABut only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and didn't act as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with Student's requirements.
QJust before I deal with the tactical position -- which I do with great pleasure -- have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder? Have you had to work with Raeder at all?
AAdmiral Raeder? No, only in a very distant way. Because of certain matters we had in common.
QI just want you to listen to the views which the Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit 65, Document L-157, and the answer in the transcript is at page 2375. Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind:
"It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international Law. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law."
Do you agree with that?
AI cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite.
QWell, just for the moment we will deal with the Defendant Raeder's words. Do you agree with then?
ANo.
DR.LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): I have an objection. I object to the earlier and this present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and secondly because they don't refer to facts but opinions. The witness is here to testify to facts.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: My lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out carefully, to deal with what is military necessity.
THE PRESIDENT:Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of the views of the Defendant Raeder.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military necessity. I was asking whether he didn't agree with the views of one of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a number of fields, and I distinctly don't abondon that point, which will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters.
QNow, I will come to the tactical position at Rotterdam: Will you just tell us the officers involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major General Student -- who were in charge of the troops that were attacking Rotterdam, Do you remember that?
AOnly General Student, I don't know about Schmidt.
QWell, the evidence that is given in this case is that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation were actually written out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam, I suppose he would be General Student's superior officer, wouldn't he?
AGeneral Student was the highest German officer in that territory and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
QSo that General Schmidt would be junior to General Student, would he?
A He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I don't know of him.
QI want you to have the tines in mind: Do you know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started?
AAs far as I know, just before 1400 hours.
QWell, I was going to put you 1330.
AYes, that is quite possible.
QDo you know that negotiations for a capitulation had been in progress since 1030 in the morning?
ANo; as I said yesterday, I had no knowledge of these facts.
QAnd did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms of capitulation at 1235?
ANo, unknown.
QThat had never been told to you?
AIt was not communicated to me. At least, I can't remember it.
QWell, you see, Witness, it is 55 minutes before the bombing began and -
AWhat is important is, when did Student call of the attack, but that cancellation never reached me, and didn't reach my unit either.
Q Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind, and then I will ask you some questions.
The terms that were discussed at 1235 were to expire.
That answer was called for at 1620. After Captain put up by the German ground troops under General Student.
Did you ever hear of that?
AOf this fact I have not heard. Two red lights would not suffice for the purpose.
QNo, but in addition to that, your ground troops were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they not?
Will you answer the question?
AYes, and no. According to what I know, there was no immediate communication from the ground to the aircraft.
As I said yesterday, the communication was from the attacking tactical force, to ground station, to aircraft.
QIf it had been wanted to pass the communication to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares?
AIn my opinion, yes.
QNow, what I am suggesting is, you see, that everyone saw these bombers coming over.
You know that. Student saw the bombers coming over.
You know that, don't you?
AYes.
QIf that attack had any tactical significance about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not?
AI did not understand the final sentence.
QIf the object of this attack was merely tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes, could it not?
AYes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then you could have called it off.
Q But if in honest negotations, witness, terms of surrender have been given and are to expire three hours later, it is only demanded of a soldier that he will call off the attack, is it not?
AIf no other arrangements have been made, yes.
QBut if he can stop the attack, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my suggestion quite clear--that this tactical matter had nothing to do with the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the Dutch into surrender.
AMay I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that these political considerations are denied emphatically by me.
QWell, you know that General Student apologized afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch Commander for the attack?
AI do not know it, and as I explained yesterday, General Student was suffering from a head injury, and I could not talk to him any longer.
QI am not going to take more time. I have put my point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack on Warsaw on 1 September, 1939, was made bcause you considered Warsaw a defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair?
AYes, certainly.
QNow, you know that at the same time--at 5 o'clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September, the German air force attacked Augustow, Nowy Dwor, Ostrow Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrow, Radomsko, Torun, Kutno, Tunel, Krakow, Grodno, Trzebinie and Gdynia, which is in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German air force attacked these towns?
AWith my comrades, yes, not the towns, I repeat.
Q Now, all this attack was made at 5 o'clock on the morning of 1 September, was it not?
AThe attack started in the morning, but not as you put it, on the towns, but on military targets; airdromes and staff headquarters and traffic centers were attacked. As I said yesterday, very detailed instructions were published by OKW that only these military targets should be bombed.
QYou are suggesting that all these towns I had read out were military targets?
AAs far as they were in my sector, yes.
QYou had not had time for a single reconnaisance plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you?
AThat is correct. On the other hand, agents furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation, and, apart from that, the whole plan of operational considerations of air warfare were generally on record.
QOf course, the whole plan had been worked out in April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not?
AAt that time, I did not even know that I was going to be appointed, or anything like that.
QDid you not know, witness, after you were appointed that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were never told that?
AThat was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo so many alterations by September, and sizable alterations would have to be made at the very last minute.
QJust one other point I want you to have in mind. Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland at 9 o'clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that?
AI believe I do.
QThat was eight hours before your attack, and you know, do you not, that the Defendant Goering had been at his secret head-quarters for a week before that, considering this matter?