secution's having to get up and interrupt, put on the earphones, and take the time for an individual objection to each document to which they wish to object as it turns up. I cannot see that it can interfere with you in the least.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no objection against the prosecution's stating their objections new. I only wish to avoid my answering each individual objection. If I can be permitted to take my position when each individual document comes up, then I have no objection against the prosecution's stating its objections now.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like you to state now your objections to these documents. They will then allow Dr. Kranzbuehler to proceed with his discussion of the documents, answering your argument as to the admissibility of each document that you object to when he comes to it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship please.
Your Lordship, I am afraid that I have only the Prosecution's objections in English, but it may help those of the Tribunal who do net understand English to have the numbers, at any rate, in front of them. have no probitive value. These are D-53. My Lord, the "D" in this case stands for Doenitz document book. 53, page 99, and D-49 pages 130 and 131; B-51 and D-69. war camp, purporting to be signed by 67 U-boat commanders and in purely general terms. The Prosecution submit that that is not helpful, either from its form or from its material. general terms and contains no indication of the moral or legal basis for the opinion expressed.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Sir David. 130? I have not got a page 131. Is it an affidavit, or was it called an affidavit?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: "On the basis of the documents of the Navy Court archives at-
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, maybe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a sworn affidavit by somebody or other?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now, yes. 131 comes somewhere before 130.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE. That is it. It is an affidavit by a former fleet judge, and Your Lordship sees that the description which the Prosecution give of it being in entirely general terms is, I submit, justified by the warding of the document, and it is difficult to see the basis which the learned opponent seems to profess for his statements.
bachter of 20 March 1945, and the Prosecution submit that the topic on which it is is irrelevant to the matters developed against the defendant Doenitz. November 1939, giving a list of armed British and French passenger ships.
documents D-5, D-9, D-10, D-12, D-13, D-29, D-48, D-60, D-74. to introduce by way of a footnote some of the documents which the Tribunal dealt with when considering the documents in the case of the defendant Raeder, with regard to which the Tribunal expressed its doubts of whether to allow them to be inserted. If you will remember, it was really with the Danish documents it was thought convenient to have them translated without a preliminary argument. defendant von Ribbentrop which is a correction in summary of documents which came into the German possession only after the speech of Ribbentrop was made. The Prosecution submits it is irrelevant. survivors in the years 1939 to 1941 inclusive.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the last statement, "and all apparently unsworn", is an error. It ought to be that D-13 is apparently unsworn. is quite true that a non-rescue order was issued by the defendant before the 27th of May, 1940, the really important period is around about the 17th of September, 1942. It seemed to the Prosecution unnecessary to delve into these details for the earlier Hay period. There is no real conflict that there were some rescues; the only point which the Prosecution is putting against the defendant is that he did issue an order, which the Prosecution proved, forbidding rescue when there was no danger.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date you gave us of November, 1942?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the non-rescue order is before the 27th of May, 1940. We cannot give the exact date but we know from a reference in another order that it must have been before the 27th of May, 1940. And the order with regard to the destruction of the crews of merchant ships is the 17th of September, 1942; 17-9-42.
with the evidence of the Witness Heisig. The first purports to be an affidavit by a witness who speaks to the sort of statements the defendant Doenitz usually made and does not remember what was said on the particular occasion referred to by the witness Heisig; and it contains a good deal of argument. and with the exception of one sentence denying that the defendant spoke in the sense as alleged by Heisig, the remainder is either vague or irrelevant. allegations against the character of the witness Heisig. The Tribunal will remember that when the allegations were made against him, he was examining his character when he gave his evidence. treatment of Allied prisoners in German Naval prisoner of War camps, and on which subject no issue has been raised with this defendant. which the Prosecution submit had no relevance to those declared by the Germans. and French merchant marines and their respective navies, and the Prosecution submit that they are irrelevant as far as the British Navy is concerned, if they have any relevance cumulative of D-67. System and they are D-60, Pages 173 to 19 8, D-72, D-60, Pages 204 and 205 and Pages 219 to 225.
contraband control, what articles were contraband, declarations of different governments, and it is submitted that details of the contraband control are remote from the issues raised and entirely irrelevant. I do not think in the presentation against either of the Naval defendants the question of declarations of contraband was mentioned at all, certainly not in regard to the defend ant Doenitz; and in the submission of the Prosecution, it really introduces matters which are, I am sure, not helpful to the problems of this case. allegations against the Allies, but the general objection is set out in the first paragraph. These documents consist of various allegations against the Allies; they bear little or no relevance to the issues and if submitted might necessitate the Prosecution seeking the facilities to rebut the allegations; in which case a large amount of evidence in rebuttal might be entailed. up survivors; 367, Page 96 and 90.
31 and 32 deal with Allied attacks on German Air-Sea Rescue planes; 33 accuses a Soviet submarine of sinking a hospital shin. that the Allies shot up survivors. The question of Allied treatment of survivors is dealt with exhaustively by extract from the German Naval Diary and, My Lord, that we are not objecting to because there it is important not as evidence of the facts stated but as evidence of the matters that had an effect on the German Naval Command. For that purpose I am quite ready that Dr. Kranzbuehler should put them in and the Tribunal should consider them. And there is another document which deals with that point quite fully, and I am quite prepared to let that go in. national law by the Allies, and these are Numbers 19, page 24, the Goering exhibit; Numbers 7 and C-21, Page 91; 47, Pages 120, 121, which is also a newspaper report; 52, 60, Pages 152 and 208; D-75, 81, 82, 85 and 89. with regard to the order which we say sets out the destruction of survivors.
it is not that it was a reprisal, but the defense is that the order did not mean destruction but merely meant non-rescue. these matters become relevant at all.
And similarly with regard to the order for shooting commanders. The justification alleged for the order is set out in the order itself. I haven't heard any defendant develop any justification of that order in giving evidence before the Tribunal. The defendants so far have sail this order was given by Hitler and whether they approved of it or net they had to carry it out.
So that in my submission there isn't even the argument which is foreshadowed that breaches of the laws and usages of war can be in certain occasions properly committed as reprisals. It is not rut forward from that point of view; there is no attempt here as I understand the defense to show breaches for which reprisal is the answer. Therefore, the Prosecution submit that these documents are also irrelevant.
Again, I tried to out it as shortly as possible because I didn't want to occupy too much time, but I tried to correct them and describe those which seemed of greatest importance.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know why this matter of the admissibility of these documents hasn't been argued before. In the other cases with which we have dealt, the question of the admissibility has been dealt with by, first of all, your offering your criticisms and objections, and then the defendant's counsel being heard in reply. Then the Tribunal have ruled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand the position, we did put in objections to the documents and Dr. Kranzbuehler suggested that he would very much prefer the documents being translated and the objections taken at a later stage. And I was certainly informed that the Tribunal agreed with that and ordered the documents to be translated.
THE PRESIDENT: That may be, for the purposes of translation. However, that doesn't mean that they are necessarily admissible. In most of the other cases, if not all, as you will remember, we have had an argument in open session in which you, or one other member of the prosecution, have made your objections, and then the defendant's counsel has replied to those objections.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Dr. Kranzbuehler has just handed me this note.
The ruling is: "The Tribunal have ruled that the documents mentioned in your application may be translated, but that the question of their admissibility is to be decided later."
My Lord, I am afraid I am at fault there. It didn't occur to me, if I may be quite frank with the Tribunal, that I should have come before the beginning of the case of Doenitz to make this argument. I am very sorry, and I must accept responsibility. I assumed, without real justification, that that meant the argument of admissibility would come at the beginning, or at some convenient time in the case of Doenitz. I am very sorry, My Lord, and I can only express my regret.
My Lord, there is this excuse: We had three of the books on Saturday, and we only got the last one yesterday. Therefore, we really couldn't have done it before today, even if I had thought of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal considers that in view of the large number of documents to which the prosecution object, it will be highly inconvenient to have you answering Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's argument as you go through your documents, and therefore that you must answer now and deal with them in the way in which the other defendants have dealt with the objections to the admissibility of documents. Then the Tribunal will be able to consider the arguments that Sir David MaxwellFyfe has put forward and the arguments that you put forward in support of the documents.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I should like to emphasize that especially because of the many objections which the prosecution makes against the documents, I would have to submit all my documents, practically. That is because the trend of thought of my documents is in a certain order, and I cannot take out one document or another without disturbing that trend of thought. Therefore, I believe it would save time if the Tribunal would permit me to answer the objections when I come to the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: What difference could it make, assuming that the decision of the Tribunal is the some, whether you argue the matter now or whether you argue the matter afterwards? The documents which will remain, which will have been held to be admissible, will be the same. Therefore, there is no difference. I can't see any argument in favor of what you are saying.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President. My documentary material, in the same way as the documentary material of the prosecution, is organized in a certain way. If, of the 50 documents which are contained in my material, I have to discuss 40, or argue about 40, and withdraw some of them, then there are some more missing. Therefore, I should like to discuss all 50, in the order in which I intended to submit them to the Tribunal. relevancy of the document is not sufficient, then acceptance of the document will have to be refused, and the document withdrawn. However, it seems essential to me that I present my arguments in that order which I intend, and not in the order in which the prosecution has made its objections.
That would entirely disturb the trend of thought of my presentation, and, as defense counsel, I believe it is my task to present my trend of thought and not that of the prosecution, or of the objections.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if that is so, then you can present your argument upon the relevancy of the documents in the order in which they come.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But you have to do it now.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You can begin with D-5, which is the first, and then go on with D-9 and D-10; take them in the order in which they stand.
Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal doesn't see any reason why you should be dealt with in a different way from which the other defendants have been treated. Therefore, they think that you ought to be prepared to deal with these documents in the way in which they are grouped here. They would prefer that you should deal with them now, if you can deal with them in a reasonably short space of time. Then they will be able to determine the question of which documents shall be admitted during the adjournment. Otherwise, they will have to adjourn tomorrow for a consideration of that matter, which will still further hold up the trial.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, of course I can state my position as to the groups which the prosecution has referred to. That is, I can make general statements, but I cannot refer to the individual documents with the care which is necessary, and the detail which is necessary. That is impossible immediately after I receive a list which I have not seen before. document now, that I be given an opportunity to do that tomorrow morning. groups, I can do that right now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbuehler. The Tribunal will adjourn now, and we will hear you upon those documents at 9:30 tomorrow morning.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In open session, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes.
(The Tribunal, adjourned until Wednesday, 8 May 1946, at 0930 hours.)
THE MARSHALL: May it please the Tribunal; the report is made that Defendant Schirach is absent.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now take my position on the documents to which reference has been made by the prosecution. things concerning the groups; First, I ask the Tribunal to recall that in general questions I am also counsel for Raeder. I have already mentioned, at the occasion of my first applications for documents, that I cannot separate all the charges against Doenitz and Raeder; and I agreed with Dr. Siemers that I should like to treat these charges together. documents. cution has made is directed against the fact that the war measures of the Allies are mentioned in the documents. I believe that especially in this field I have been completely misunderstood. It is not my intention to criticize any war measures, and I shall demonstrate in detail later that the documents mentioned do not serve that purpose. these documents what naval warfare was really like. I could not demonstrate this only be showing the German methods and practices, but I have to submit to this Tribunal also the methods of the Allies in order to prove that the German practices which are like the Allies' were legal, and the Tribunal even has recognized this to be correct by approving the use of British Admiralty orders and an interrogatory of Admiral Nimitz.
I am very grateful that these documents were approved; and my own documents are along the same line.
have been raised, first to the document Doenitz-5, which is in Document Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal has examined all these documents; so I think you can deal with them as far as possible in groups.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: If possible, you should follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, it would not be possible for me to follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, because then again and again I should have to return to deal with the same thing which I have already mentioned. I believe it will facilitate the proceedings if I form groups according to my order of presentation; and I should like to remind the Tribunal that that was approved for me yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, it would be very much more convenient to the Tribunal, if you followed the order in the groups. But if youfind that impossible, the Tribunal would not make it a matter of order.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should be very grateful, Mr. President, if I could keep the order in which I intended to present them. In part, it is the same as the order that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe suggested.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Concerning the problem of aggressive war, I have to submit another document which is Doenitz - 5. It is an excerpt from the document of German policies, and concerns the question of bases in Norway. I consider this document relevant because it shows that on the part of the British Admiralty an interrogatory has been prepared about the question of the necessity of a German base, which is quite according to the one which the prosecution has submitted in document G B 83 as proof against Admiral Doenitz, and proof for preparation of aggressive war. nothing to do with any consideration concerning an aggressive war, which a subordinate office could not even make. The document is in Group 2 of Sir David classification.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that the footnote stems on the same footing as the other part of the documents?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The footnote is the essential part for me. I had the other part copied only to keep the connection with the footnote.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, who wrote the footnote? Doesn't the footnote represent information which was not before the German Admiralty at the time?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the footnote state that it was before the German Admiralty at the time?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. The footnote was not known to the German Admiralty at the time?
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I said; the footnote was not known to the German Admiralty.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, it was not known.
THE PRESIDENT: Who wrote it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Please?
THE PRESIDENT: Who wrote the footnote?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The footnote is part of that document which can be found in the collection of documents of German politics, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant Ribbentrop the author of it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. The documents of German politics are in an official collection, and the footnotes have been written by the editor of that collection on the basis of official material.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Now I come to the documents concerning naval warfare in general. A large part of those are in Sir David's Group 3.
The first document is Doenitz-60, on page 152. It concerns an American note of the 6th of October, 1939, and is in connection with the document Doenitz-61, which has not been objected to by the prosecution. It is in Volume 3 of the document book, Mr. President, at page 152.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This document is an American reply to the document which you will find two pages before this, at page 150. Both documents deal with the warning of neutral nations against suspicious actions concerning their merchant marine.
In this document a charge is made against an order that ships which act suspiciously -- that is, proceed without lights -- should be sunk.
The next document is from Sir David's Group 1, Doenitz 69, on page 170, in book 3. It is an excerpt from several copies of the Voelkischer Beobachter of November and December 1939. There are published lists of armed British and French passenger ships. This document also is in connection with the preceding document and the next one. All these documents deal with the question of treatment of passenger ships by the Naval Warfare Command.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better give the numbers of the documents You mentioned the next document and the one before it. I think you had better give the numbers of the documents.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. That was document 69, Mr. President, Doenitz-69, and it is on page 170, in book number 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is, but you said something about documents that were akin, or some words to that effect, to the documents next to it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. It is in relation to Doenitz-68, on page 169 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that objected to?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, that was not objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, you needn't bother with it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I only wanted to show, Mr. President, that this document which was objected to is only part of the proof about treatment of passenger ships, and it shows that the German press had warned against the using of armed passenger ships. contraband and control system.
These are the documents Doenitz-60, from page 173 to page 197 of the document book, and I should like to form three groups of these. contraband. I consider this question relevant because document GB-191 has stated that the German U-boats sunk a large number of allied ships while these ships were on a legal merchant trip; and the development of rules against contraband will show the Tribunal that from 12 December 1939 on, a legal import to England did not exist, but actually only contraband. for the German point of view, which became known under the slogan of "hunger blockade", and which played on important part in all German deliberations about the nature of naval warfare.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't hear the word you said. Some sort of blockade.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Hunger"--famine. "Hunger blockade."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The documents contain the German contraband regulations the British regulations, and two German statements concerning these regulations.
The next group is Doenitz-60, from page 183 to page 191. That concerns the regulations about control ports; that is to say, the British because in this document the German Naval Warfare Command is accused of the fact that its war measures against England were taken without consideration of the danger against neutrals. The group which I have mentioned shows that it was not possible for the British Admiralty either to take war measures without endangering the neutrals, because, by the establishment of control forms, the neutrals were forced into German zones of operations and thereby, of course, endangered. This danger was confirmed by the neutrals themselves, and the documents on page 186 to 189 will prove this. group, GB-194, at page 198, which contains a renewed American protest against the control ports.
concerned with the question of an export embargo. This export blockade is based on a British Order in Council of the 27 November 1939 and was expressed against Germany. This measure is essential to determine the question of legal trade because thereby legal export was not possible either. later declared by Germany against England. Since the document G.B. 191 disputes the legality of a total blockade I have two proofs, bases, for this blockade, and also the basis for the export blockade.
The next document objected to is Doenitz 72 on page 185. It is a note by Great Britain to Belgium of December 1939. In this note the British Government states that it will net tolerate any increase of trade between Belgium and Germany. I use it as a means of proof for the fact that the economic pressure which can be seen from this note was a natural and accepted means of warfare. This question is relevant concerning the document of the Prosecution, G.B. 2 to 4. There on Page 6 under Figure 6 it is stated that Germany necessarily had to exert economic pressure on the neutrals, and these statements represented were submitted by the Prosecution to prove illegal measures.
The next group contains the following documents: Doenitz 60, page 204; Doenitz 72, page 207; Doenitz 60, page 208; Doenitz 60, page 209; and Doenitz 75, page 218. All of these documents concern the development of German zones of operation and treat the zones of operation which have been stated by the opponents. These documents are relevant for the question of the treatment of neutrals. In document G.B. 191 the charge was made against the Naval Warfare Command that without any consideration it had given the order to torpedo neutral ships, and my evidence shall prove that that happened only in such areas as neutrals had been warned against the use, and that this is an accepted and permitted measure of warfare; which can be shown also by the practices of the enemy. the ether side, Doenitz 60, page 208, which concerns the statement by Mr. Churchill of 8 May, 1940, concerning the activities against ships in the Skagerrak.
This document and the next one, being Doenitz 60, page 209, I wanted to put to a witness. Doenitz 60, page 209, is a French statement concerning a warning of a dangerous area in Sicily. Both documents I am using as evidence for the practical facts of Naval warfare and should like to discuss them with a witness.
enemy also have some influence on German practices. 224. They deal with the British system of Navicerts. The British navicerts were certificates which all neutral ships had to get from the British Consulate before they could proceed. Ships which refused to use navicerts were confiscated. The navicert system is relevant for two reasons. First, it is mentioned in the German statement concerning the total blockade against England on the 17 August 1940 as one reason for that blockade. Secondly, from the German point of view it is a non-neutral act by the neutrals -- on the part of the neutrals-- if the submitted to that system. This question plays a considerable part in determinir to what extent Germany herself from that time on took consideration of neutrals in the zones of operations. val welfare law, and that is an important subject for me.
The next document is Doenitz 60, page 256. It is a French decree of the ls November 1939, concerning the creation of an insigna for the crew members of French merchant ships who can be mobilized. This document is relevant for the question of whether the crew of merchant ships at that stage of the war should be considered combatants or noncambatants. The details of the decree seem to me to show that they have to be considered combatants. the document of the Prosecution 181. These are my documents on page 233 and 234. I have said that these two documents shall dispute the probative value of the document G.B. 191, that is, the report of the British Foreign Office about German naval warfare. In this report on Page 1, Article 72 of the German Prize Regulations is attacked, in which it says that ships can be sunk if they cannot be brought into port. Document G.B. 191 says that this is contrary to traditions British way of thinking. My document Doenitz 81 shows the sinking of the German freighter "Olinda" by the British cruiser "Ajax" on the first day of the war. It is only one example to show that the statement made the report of the British Foreign Office in incorrect according to which the British fleet had not sunk ships if they could not bring them to port or would not bring them to port.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In the same report of the British Foreign Office, German U-Boats are accused of never making any difference between armed and unarmed merchant ships. Later on I shall submit to the Court the orders concerning armed and unarmed merchant ships, but in my next document, however, I shall only try to clear the U-boats by providing that each case of mistake or error is always considered a case of bad intentions. from which we can see that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in some cases to distinguish between armed merchant ships and unarmed merchant ships.
THE PRESIDENT: You said GB-82?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I said GB 191.
THE PRESIDENT: Doenitz 82 is on page 234, is that right?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 234, yes, sir. American Secretary of the Navy Knox concerning secrecy about the sinking of German U-boats. For me it is essential in connection with the document of the Prosecution, GB 194. In this document the Naval Warfare Command, Seekriegsleitung, is reproached for the measures which it took to keep secrecy about the sinking of U-boats. That is the fiction of a mine hit. I should like to give this as an example that during war, of course, military measures can be kept secret, but that, in itself, is no proof for or against their legality.
The next document is Doenitz 89, on page 246. It is a list of the Naval War Command of violations of neutrality committed by the United States from September 1939 to September 1941. The document is essential against the document of the Prosecution, GB-195. In GB-195 an order from Adolf Hitler of July 1941 is mentioned in which it is stated that now, also, the merchant ships of the United States must be treated within the German zone of blockade in the same manner as all other neutral ships; that is to say, they should be sunk. portunistic handling of U-boat warfare by Grand Admiral Doenitz. I wish to show by submitting this list that from the German point of view, it can be understood and is quite justificable if in the summer of 1941 one did not grant the United States a better position than any other neutral.