Now I come to the subject of the treatment of shipwrecked survivors. The document Doenitz 9 -
THE PRESIDENT: The treatment of what? You said you came to the treatment of something or other.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The treatment of shipwrecked survivors.
These documents are in volume one of the document book. The first document Doenitz 9, on page 11 offers a description of exaggerated measures to save survivors taken by German U-boats from September-October 1939. This is essential
THE PRESIDENT: There must surely be a group of these, is there not? Have you not a number of document which deal with shipwrecks?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The group, Mr. President? I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there not a number of these documents which fall into a group concerned with the subject of the treatment of shipwrecks?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, there are a number of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you not deal with them all together?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I can summarise. They are document Doenitz 19 on page 34. That is an order from the winter of 1939-1940 in which the rescue measures of U-boats are limited. Sir David objected to that group that it was not important if after this order of the winter 1939-1940, rescues were still carried out. I cannot share this opinion. If the Prosecution accuses Admiral Doenitz of having given an order about the limitation of rescue measures in the winter of 1939-1940, then it is essential to point out for what reasons such an order was issued and what practiced consequences it had in fact, and it is my assertion that that order can be traced, first, to the fighting conditions of the U-boats along the British coasts and, secondly, to exaggerated measures of rescue of the commanders. The order did not prohibit measures of rescue generally, and that will be shown by the statements made by the commanders, which I have submitted under Doenitz 13.
THE PRESIDENT: It is possible for you to give us a page where we can find these GB documents? For instance, GB 196.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. It is in the British document book on page 33. In the document book of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: GB-195?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 32, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to state my position on a formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements, and I refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is to use all matters of evidence which have probitive value. I believe that a written report by an officer about his activity as the commanding officer has probitive value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of this kind before a German Naval Court would certainly be accepted in evidence. ment of the Prosecution GB-199.
Prosecution. It is a radio message from the U-boat of Kapitanleutnant Schacht received from Admiral Doenitz, and deals with the rescue or non-rescue of Englishmen and Italians. armament and crew of the Laconia, which is the one in question, and then it explains why of the numerous Italians compared to the few and less numerous Englishmen, so few compared to the many had been rescued. ments and examined them, and therefore it isn't necessary for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn't necessary for you to go into each group, if you will indicate the nature of the group.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents, Doenitz 29 on pages 54 to 59 of my Document Book; Doenitz 61, page 54; Doenitz 32 on page 55; Doenitz 33 on page 66; Doenitz 37 on page 78; Doenitz 38 on page 88 and Doenitz 40 on page 86. Doenitz 29 is concerned with a statement of the witness Heisig. The prosecution has stated that I could not bring in anything concerning the character of the witness Heisig because I had not made any objection during the crossexamination of the witness Heisig, and, therefore, I wish to state that in my opinion I have attacked the credibility of Heisig during the cross examination as much as that was possible at the moment. Of the existence of that witness I knew only three days before he appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: You are now proceeding to deal with each document. You have given us quite a number of documents of that group, and since we have already seen those documents, therefore, we consider them as a group. We do not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of Heisig, which is already before us.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER: I believe it is very difficult to state the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents, Doenitz 31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200.
That is an order by the flag officer of the U-boats dealing with the so-called rescue ships, and the Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of rescue ships but they objected to the tendency that by the sinking of rescue ships also the ship crews would be killed, and my documents pertain to this issue, which shows that this means they applied moral measures which do not exist during war time, and that he was assured that the sea emergency planes would be shot down, and quite rightly so, by the German planes and air force, because there was no agreement which prohibited that. consideration, since the International Law does not prohibit it, and we have the same point of view concerning the rescue ships. correct an error. That is Document Doenitz 33. It does not deal, as Sir David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a Ship by Russian U-boats, but it is the sinking of a German Transport which carried injured. This sinking was quite in order, therefore, and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Warfare Command did not for a moment object to it.
I believe, Mr. President, that I should like to show from the above documents, Doenitz 37, 38 and 40, because also these documents have been objected to by the Prosecution, because they explain the measures taken by the Allies.
THE PRESIDENT: As I have told you more than once, the Tribunal does not wish to hear from you on each individual document. We have already considered the documents and we want to deal with them in a group. You have already given us the documents in a group and have indicated to what subject they relate.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the document of the Prosecution to which my documents refer? Document 37 is a Document of the Prosecution D 638 (December, 1938). That is the statement by Great Admiral Doenitz concerning the case of the Athenia. At the end of that statement a question of the punishment of the U-boat Commander is mentioned and the Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Doenitz that he had not punished the Commander in a different way. I want to prove only that a Commander-in-Chief has to tolerate certain measures during war time even if they were not quite correct or partly not correct. objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the Document 39. That is the attitude of the Naval Warfare Command to alleged reports about the Allies firing on ship wrecks, and Doenitz 38 is the only proof that the very careful attitude of the Naval Warfare Command was not based on lack of proof, but they did not have affidavits, and in spite of that rejected any thought of reprisals. against which no objection has been raised. In this document the question is raised as to whether a ship wreck could be shot at or not, and I should like to show that such considerations are considered inhumane and impossible, but that during war such conditions are examined and according to military necessity in certain cases have to be answered in the affirmative. deal with the document of the Prosecution GB-205. That was a radio message concerning the sinking of an Allied Sailing Ship.
G.B. 205 is on page 53 of the Document Book. The Prosecution in connection with this document has raised the accusation against our Naval Warfare Command that it tried to terrorize the crews of neutral ships. Both documents submitted by me give only a few examples to the effect that that terrorizing is nothing illegal but that each belligerent, of course, considered the psychological effect of military measures.
The next group is Document Doenitz 43, on page 95; Doenitz 92, on page 258, and Doenitz 67, on page 96. They all deal with the subject as to whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger the ship itself, and that relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196, on page 33 of the Document Book of the Prosecution, and GB-199 on page 36 of the Document Book of the Prosecution. They show first the methods -
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us the subject they relate to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether or not a ship is obliged to rescue if it would be endangered thereby, and that, you say, is an answer to No. 196 and 199. Why should you tell us anything more than that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed.
The last document in this group is Doenitz 530, page 99. It is a statement signed by some U-Boat Commanders from a prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact they they never received an order for the destruction of shipwreck. The Prosecution objected to it because it was considered too general and it wasn't sworn to. I believe that it is very concrete and contains very concrete statements concerning the alleged destruction order. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German Commanders who were prisoners of war, to the Commander of the Camp, and I received it through the British Ministry of War. I should ask the Tribunal especially to approve of this document, because it has a high probative value and moral value for myself and for my client. heading of "Conspiracy". It is in the Document Book, Volume 2, Doenitz 47, and relates to Document GB-212. Doenitz 47 is on page 120. The corresponding document of the Prosecution is GB-212, on page 75; it deals with an incident, namely, that Admiral Doenitz approved that a traitor should be removed in the prisoner-of-war camp.
Doenitz 47 will show that the removal of traitors is a necessary measure which during the war is approved by all governments. It is related to the document of the Prosecution, GB-209. 68 of the Document Book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209, the possibility of leaving the Geneva Convention is treated. Doenitz was accused of wanting, without any consideration, to risk the lives and safety of thousands of American and British prisoners. In my opinion, it is not sufficient to simply dispute a statement like that which is made by the Prosecution, but I must be allowed to prove that those prisoners of war for whom Admiral Doenitz himself was responsible were not only treated according to international law but even better; and as it can be seen from a British confirmation, which is among my documents, with fairness and consideration. It is on page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the Prosecution, GB-210, Prosecution Book page 69, and GB-211, Document Book of the Prosecution, page 72. With these two documents it is attempted to put Admiral Doenitz in connection with the conspiracy for the committing of crimes against the natives of the Occupied Territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for which he personally was responsible he did everything necessary to protect the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. Therefore, I have submitted the document concerning the sentences which have been imposed by the courts, the native courts, for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed even in the case of death sentences against German soldiers by Admiral Doenitz. Here also the Prosecution state that that document was very general, but it has an appendix with about 80 individual examples. I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators extra work, but if the Tribunal considers it essential I will certainly have that appendix translated.
The last group contains Doenitz 51, on page 134; Doenitz 52, on page 135. They are in connection with the Document of the Prosecution, GB-188, on page 10 of the British Document Book.
That is a speech made by Admiral Doenitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler's death. In connection with that document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a fanatical Nazi, and as such had prolonged the war at the expense of the men, women and children of Germany. The documents of the Prosecution proper, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation in order to make it possible for people to get from the East to the West and thereby in safety. of thousands -- if not millions -- of German people during these last weeks of the war were brought to safety -
THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Please?
THE PRESIDENT: That is part of the details in the documents, isn't it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. So I don't have to say anything further about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal are inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal has ruled on these documents, if you called the Defendant Doenitz first. Would you be willing to do that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it, but of course I can do it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it is to try and save time, and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be dealt with in the course of direct -- and cross-examination.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty however, is that during the examination of Admiral Doenitz I should like to count on the knowledge of the contents of the documents, and I should like to discuss some documents with him. I don't know whether the Tribunal will approve these documents now or not.
THE PRESIDENT. But what I am suggesting was that the Tribunal should consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of the documents, and then tell you -- make a rule -- as to what documents are admitted.
You will then know what documents are admitted. Or you can call Admiral Doenitz and of course examine him with reference to the documents which are admitted, and as I have told you, the Tribunal have already looked at those documents. They will now reconsider them, in order to see whether they are admissible, and in that way, to a large extent, fully acquainted with the documents.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I agree to call Admiral Doenitz if the Tribunal wants it so.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Kranzbuehler, you have been dealing with a document, Doenitz 60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to refer. When we have ruled on them you will have to give separate exhibit numbers to each one of the documents -- to each one of the pages which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in evidence.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. Mr. President, may I point out that this is one book, Doenitz 60 is one book, one volume, and that is why I have given it one exhibit number, because I admit it is one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more convenient, will it not, to give each page a separate exhibit number?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, a collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely different order than the way in which Sir David Fyfe dealt with them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David.
SIR DAVID FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. My Lord, I have heard the Tribunal say that they have had an opportunity of examining the documents and therefore I propose to be extremely brief in any remarks I have to make, and may I make one explanation before I deal with the very few points. it was clear to the Tribunal yesterday -- that there had been no objection to Documents 3 and 4 because in their they deal with a secret base in the north which is only of importance for the attacks against wood imports from the north Russian ports. The objectionable matter, as I think the Tribunal pointed out, was introduced in a statement of Dr. Kranzbuehler which has no foundation in the documents. Colonel Pokrowsky was very anxious that I should make that clear on behalf of the prosecution. emphasize in reply to the Tribunal. The first is on my Group 3, the details of the contraband control system.
My Lord, I submit that on this there is an essential no sequita in Dr. Kranzbuehler's argument. He says that, first of all, the carrying of contraband by merchant ships, to carry his argument to its logical conclusion, would entitle a belligerent to sinking at sight. That, I submit, with great respect to him, is completely wrong, and it doesn't follow that because you establish certain rules and lists of contraband that the right to sink at sight is effected at all. system. That system was used in World War I and is a well known system. But again, the essential non sequita or absence of connection is this, that if a neutral goes to one of the control ports and gets a navicest that does not put that neutral into so un-neutral an act as to make it the equivalent of a ship of war, which is the position that my friend -that Dr. Kranzbuehler would have to take if that argument were to succeed.
His third (division)?? wishes to put in documents showing economic pressures on, for example, Belgium, with regard to the import of goods. The naval defendant are not being charged with economic pressure; they are charged with killing people on the high seas. Now again, I have dealt with it very shortly, and the prosecution does submit and take the view very strongly that the whole of that documentary evidence is several steps removed from the issues in the case. take as an example the document making several score of allegations of un-neutral acts against the United States. The case for the Prosecution on sinking at sight is that sinking at sight against various groups of neutrals was adopted as a purely political matter, according to the advantage or, when it was abstained from the disadvantage which Germany might get from her relations with these neutrals. And it doesn't help in answering that allegation of the prosecution. That is a matter of fact which can be judged as to whether the prosecution are right. It doesn't help on that to say that the United States committed such nonneutral acts. If anything, it would be supporting the contention of the prosecution that sinking on sight was applied arbirarily according to the political advantages which could be obtained from it.
wishes me to emphasize it -- is that these, the Collection of unsworn statements, are of course in a very different position from any legal standard, from reports made by officers in the course of their duty. These are admissible in all military courts, probably in every country in the world. These are an ad hoc collection. They are not only unsworn but they are vague, indefinite, and insufficiently related to the order which is adhered to in the case of the prosecution. Tribunal to appreciate that on all these groups and especially, if I may say so, on Groups 3 and 4. The prosecution feels very strongly on this matter in the case. I am grateful to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of saying this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International (The Tribunal convened for the afternoon session at 1440 hours.)
THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent from this session.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the documents in the order in which they were dealt with by Fleet Judge Kranzbuehler.
It rejects Doenitz 81, pages 233, 234; 234 being Doenitz net allowing -- page 58.
It rejects Goering No. 7, page 89. know from Fleet Judge Kranzbuehler whether that is already in evidence or not. It is page 91 in the Doenitz Document Book in English, volume 2, page 91. It is headed "C-21, GB-194."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is an excerpt from a document which the Prosecution has submitted here and which is therefore already in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; we need not be troubled about it. sitting in closed session thereafter.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call Grand Admiral Doenitz as witness.
(The Defendant Doenitz came to the witness-box.) BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: that correct?
Q Yes. During the first World War you were with the U-boats?
Q Until the end? U-boats? tilla Weddingen, the first U-boat flotilla after 1918 in Germany. As chief, the beginning of that command, some days before, two days before, I was in Turkey in order to go on a U-boat, and fill in the gap since 1918. boats?
Q What was your rank when you came to the U-boats in 1935?
Q What did the U-boat weapon at that time in Germany consist of? of three small boats of 250 ton each, so-called Einbaune. Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in a U-boat shcool which was not subordinate to me for the purpose of training. Then there were in the service another six of these small U-boats.
Q Who announced to you that you fot that command, Great Admiral? U-boat weapons should be prepared for war?
A No. I only received the order, the mission to train the U-boats for sailing, submersion and firing.
Q Did you prepare the U-boats for war against merchantmen?
merchantman and I also issued, accordingly, tactical orders for each individual commander. was a preparation concerning prize regulations? ships, surface ships? men was an instruction, how does the U-boat, submarine, behave in case of stopping and examining of the destination and so on of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the drought of the German prize regulations came, I passed them on to the flotillas for the instruction of the commanders. name "Wolf pack tactics" or "pack tactics." What were these pack tactics about and did that mean anything in connection with the warfare against merchantmen and the prize regulations? other categories of ships, which by tactical maneuvers, collective maneuvers, try to got better results. The development of wolf pack tactics was nothing further than to break with that principle of individual action of U-boats and the attempt to use U-boats in the same manner as all other categories of warships, collectively. Such a method of collective action was naturally necessary when a group was to be attacked, be it a Group of warships -- that is several warships together, or be it a convoy or convoy escort. These wolf pack tactics, therefore, had nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to prize regulations; that is a tactical measure to fight groups; Of course, also convoys where measures, according to prize regulations, can not be applied. enemy?
A I did not receive such a general mission. I had the mission to develop U-boat weapons as well as I could, such as it is the duty of each front line officer of all armed forces of all nations to be able to be prepared against all emergencies.
Once in the year 1937 or 1938, in the mobilization plan of the Navy, I received the order for me that in case France should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany it would be the task of the German Uboats to attack in the Mediterranean the transports which would go from North Africa to France.
Then I ordered a maneuver according to that in the North Sea. That was the only mission, if you ask me about a certain purpose, which I received from the Naval Warfare Command in that regard, and that occurred in the year 136 or 137. To my recollection, that plan had been issued over the concern that the rearmament of Germany, at that time unarmed, could be interrupted by some measures. and tactically for naval warfare against England?
A No. The German submarine weapons, in the fall of 1939, consisted of about thirty to forty main boats. That means that at all times about one-third could be used in the front lines, and in reality that looked much worse later. There was one month, for instance, when only two boats were on the sea. With that small number of submarines it was, of course, only possible to pinch a large sea power such as England that we in the navy were not prepared for a war against England. navy at the beginning of the year had to be changed most radically. It had been the intention to create a homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much smaller than the British, would not be capable for war against England. That building program of this fleet, then when war had started with England, had to be discontinued of the capital ships; only those ships were finished which were close to completion. Everything else was dropped, and that was necessary in order to free the building capacity to start building submarines. And that, also, explains why the German submarine warfare in this last war really has started in the year 1942; that is to say, when those submarines for which the order has been given for b uilding at the beginning of the war and had become ready for action. From previous years, that is 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses. weapon. What do you say to it?
A Yes, that is correct. Submarines have the mission to approach an enemy and to attack him by torpedoes, and, in that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon.
for an aggressive war? it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can certainly use a submarine in a defensive war because, also in defensive warfare, vessels of the enemy have to be attacked. Of course, I can use the U-boats just the same in a political way as an aggressive war. If one should conclude that the navies which hav e submarines are planning aggressive war, then all nations and all navies of these nations have to be considered and they, more than Germany, twice as much or three times as much, could be accused of planning aggressive war. have anything to do with the planning of warfare as such?
A No, nothing, nothing at all. My tasks were in the front lines to train U-boats, militarily and tactically, and to train my troops, to educate my troops and my officers. make any proposals concerning the war against a definite enemy? enemy? orders from you to the U-boats before the beginning of this war; an order for the installation of certain U-boats in the Baltic and an order before the Norway action for the installation of U-boats along the Norwegian coast. I ask you, therefore, when, at what time, were you as Flag Officer of U-boats informed about the then existing plans? plans only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was expected to participate in the carrying out of these plans with a special task; and that only at that time when it was necessary to make possible the carrying out of my military tasks.