Then the next paragraph which deals with night conditions:
It says: "Stay above surface", and in staying above surface it perhaps goes in back of the ship, and every sailor knows that you should go around the back; and, further, in the third paragraph, I am again remaining above water for a blind to the U-boat, and I say:
"One cannot determine where the hole is in order toescape the enemy, and there might be new attacks."
Then the figure C E, and that is3 C, and there it says:
"Should it become necessary during an attack on a convey, because of being sighted by fliers, it is necessary to submerge to a depth of 20 meters, because of danger of being sighted or rammed."
We are talking about a convey. Now, we turn to point "D", and here it says:
"Should it become necessary to submerge to depth, because for example, the destroyer was proceeding directly toward the periscope, I believe in all instances he would then turn directions, and how one is to do and act under depth and attack, and the entire document
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to go into all of these military tactics. He has made a point on paragraph "E". He has given his explanation of that paragraph, and I don't think it is necessary to go into all of these o her tactics.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I have concluded, Mr. President. I want to say only the last paragraph about the non-rescue is not to be considered alone, and as such it has to be changed, first of all in this light; The U-boat in the presence of enemy defense had be be fighting near the English coast and in English ports, and secondly, the objective were ships in conveys, or protected ships as is shown from the document and I say very clearly.
Q You said that this order was given perhaps in December, 1939. Now after the issdance of this order did the German U-boats actually continue rescues? winter months. The U-boats, and according to my memory after the Norway enterprise, went out into the Atlantic, and to these U-boats the general order of rescue applies, which was only limited in this way; In that it was said not to rescue if the security or safety of your own ships did not permit it, and in this sense I would like to show the U-boats acted.
Q You wish to say then that you had reports from Gommanders about rescue measures?
and then through the war diary. rescinded, that is, formally rescinded? very shallow waters in the downs near the mouth of the Thames. It had been destroyed through depth charges, and for this beat in May, 1940, this order still applied. Then in the year 1940, after the Norway Campaign, the center of gravity in this direction was again placed in the open waters of the Atlantic, and for this boat this decree would not apply as to the facts of the rescue measures which I have just explained also. the first tool as to how U-boats were to act toward a convey, and then later it was not necessary to give instructions like that, for then the U-boat Commanders knew what they had to do and in my memory, at the latest, in November, 1940, the order was completely stricken.
Q Mr. Great Admiral. I have the table of contents of the Standing War Decree before me, dealing with the year 1942, and that may be found on page 16 of the document, and so I will hand it to you, and I wish to submit it as Doenitz No. 11. In this table of contents the number 154 deals with the order which I have just mentioned. This number is empty. Does itmean that this order did not a ply any more?
Q When were the standing orders for the year 1942 out together? you object to these measures? Did you criticize or prohibit them? great. If, for example. I had a report from a Commander to the effect that perhaps through hesitating too long with life beats, and perhaps a call had been made to the escorts for assistance and that he had been attacked by depth charges and had been damaged. That is something which would not have happened if he had left the scene of action. Then naturally I pointed out the things he had done militarily wrong in this connection, and I am of the opinion that I lost ships through rescue.
Of course, I cannot prove that because the boats are gone, but with the complete mentality of the mind of the Commander, it is entirely natural, and every sailor is of the opinion that rescue is the noblest and most honorary thing ha can do, and he knows that from the days of peace, and Ibelieve there was no officer in the Navy, and I believe it is trueof all the other nations in peace, who would not consider the medal ofrescue as the highest decoration he could have, and as a basic principle it is dangerous not to shift your position in war so that the security or safety of your own ship is first, and that war is a serious thing. is, that U-boats would not rescue when it was dangerous? end of 1939 boats were still operating, and then the different operations of 1940 which I have mentioned, and decree 154 applies during the Norway campaign, and then it went also into the spring of 1940, and this order of rescue or non-rescue, if your ship was endangered, was for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942.
Q Was this decree in writing? matter of course, and not only at the beginning of the war it was contained in certain orders of the Naval WarfareCommand, and bythe limitation of nonrescue, if the safety of your ship was at stake, that is taken for granted in every navy, and this was something I wasalways concerned with as I have stated. and this is your Number, Doenitz No. 22, Ibeg your pardon -- It isDoenitz No, 23, and is found on page 45 of the Document Book I. I will have this document submitted to you.
"According to instructions received from Naval War Command, submarines receive the order from F. 0. U-boats to take on board captains with their papers of ships sunk, if it is possible without endangering the boat or without impairing the fighting capacity."
How did this order come about? I did net quite understnad. What were the antecedents? captains are to be taken prisoner and that means to take them home, which, of course, is something different again from the matter of rescue. The naval war command -- and rightly -- was of the opinion that if we could not cause or bring about a high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of the sunk merchant-men home, to which rescue orders we gave cur support, which of course was taken for granted, then at least it is important that we have the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the captains -- have them taken away from our enemy for reassignment. That is why the decree to take the captains from their lifeboats and to take them along on the U-Boats as prisoners was issued. war? War Command. what results? years of the war it was maintained. But in general the result of this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a few cases. But through letters which I received from my commanders, and which I have read, I saw that there were a few more cases than I at first believed, altogetherperhaps ten or twelve cases at the most. just a few captains that were taken prisoner? How do you account for that?
A The chief reason, without doubt, was this: That the mass of the U-boats attacked enemy conveys, as the convey system of the enemy was perfected and the great bulk of the U-Boats were used in that connection.
In the other few cases, for reasons of safety of the ship, there wasn't always an approach to thelifeboats; it wasn't always possible to pick up such a captain.
And thirdly, I believe that the commanders of the U-Boats objected, and I believe correctly. They did not want to have a captain on board as long as all that. In any event, I know that the commanders were not happy about this order in any respect.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, now I shall turn to a document which is really to be termed the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-99, page 36 of the British Document Book. It is your wireless message of the 17th of September, about which the Prosecution asserts it to be a decree as to the destruction of these shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I wish to read this order to you. It is addressed to all commanding officers:
"1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
"2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
"3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for our boat.
"4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women or children in his bombing attacks on German cities." is decisive for the intentions connected with it. Describe first of all the military position in general, the situation out of which it arose. conveys. In the North Atlantic the centre of gravity in the use of U-Boats for theprotection of conveys operated between England and America. In the same way, the U-Boats which fought in the North Sea also attacked conveys. There was nothing else. The same thing applied to the Mediterrainean. There also the object of our fight was the convey. Beyond that, a part of the boats were used to operate directly to American ports, like New York and other ports.
middle or South Atlantic, and the criterion was that everywhere and in increasingly large numbers the surveillance by the American air force was taking place. There was a patrolling. And that was the point which caused me great concern, for as a matter of course, the airplane is the most dangerous threat to the U-Boat, especially because of its speed. And that was not a matter of fiction on my part. For since the, beginning of the summer of 1942 -- that is, a few months before September, before the decree was issued -- the losses of our U-Boats through air attacks was tremendous and they arose more than 300 per cent.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, for clarification of this point, I am giving a diagram to you, a diagram which I would like to submit to the High Tribunal as Doenitz 99. Will you show us the curve of losses, using the diagram? corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up until June of 1942 U-Boats losses were kept within reasonable limits and that suddenly in July, 1942, that came about which I have just described. If the losses up to new per month, as the diagram shows, changed to 4, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-Boats, so in July per month the losses jumped ten, eleven, 8, 13, 14. And the two winter months follow, which were used for overhauling of ships, and the tendency of losses is not concerned with this problem here. number of orders to the commanders as to how they were to act while they were on the surface, and that is wherethe losses came about, because the airplane could sight them, that they were to limit their surface activities as much as possible. And I was also giving our memorandums to the SKL -
Q What was that, in July, 1942?
A Yes. SKL is Navy Far Command. future, that air power might stifle us some day and force us into the water. fears for the future were great, and that that is not imagination on my fart is shown by the losses which ensued. After the submarines left their dock, that is, about February, 1941, there, was a loss of 18 boats. In March, there were 15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38.
planes through Radar -- which in my opinion, next to the atom bomb, is the most decisive war winning invention of this war, an invention by the Anglo-Americans -- these brought about the collapse of the U-boat warfare. This forced me into the water for I could not maintain my position on the surface. Not only was I put out of position when the airplane saw me but it was already many miles, up to sixty sea miles beyond there, beyond range or sight. Through this Radar apparatus, this development, and the necessity to remain submerged during the day as well as the night -- of course this was an impossibility with the old U-boats; at least for recharging of their motors they had to surface -- this development forced me, therefore, as far as the old U-boats were concerned, to have them fitted with the so-called "Schnorchel". This was an entirely new U-boat weapon which made it possible for them to stay in the water and they could travel from Germany to Japan without surfacing at all. You can see, therefore, that I was in a very dangerous situation, a situation which was dangerous and which was increasing.
Q Mr. Grand Admiral, in order to characterize the situation I would like to confront you with your War Diary of this time. This will have the number Doenitz 18, found on Page 32, Volume 1. I am confronting you with the entries from the 2nd until 14th of September by showing just the contents. Page 32. On the 2nd of September: U 256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit for sailing and diving; on the 3rd of September: Aircraft sights U-boat; on the 4th of September: U 756 did not report, must be presumed lost on the 5th of September: Aircraft sights U-boat; on the 6th of September: U 705 probably lost through enemy aircraft attack- 7th of September: U 130 bombed by Boeing Bomber; 8th of September: U 202 on trip through Biscay bombed by aircraft; 9th of September -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the defendant has already tell us of the losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I wanted to show therewith, Mr. President, that the testimony of Admiral Doenitz is confirmed through his entries in his diary at that time.
But if the Tribunal is not -
THE PRESIDENT: We can read it. Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we will read it. We don't need you to read the details of it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER* Yes, Mr. President. Very well.
THE WITNESS: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary just in those days before the issuance of my decree; but I wanted to say the following as well : The aircraft was so very dangerous and especially for psychological reasons. Why, perhaps in just one moment the commander of the U-boat considered his situation as perfectly clear if the aircraft is not present and in the next moment, when the aircraft is in sight, his situation is already hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders but to old experienced commanders who remembered the good old days. Perhaps I may, but briefly, describe this with an example. A U-boat needs one minute, practically one minute, for the crew to come in through the hatch to submerge. An airplane flies on the average in one minute six thousand meters. The U-boat, therefore, must, in order to be able to submerge at all -- so that it will not be attacked while it is still on the surface -- the U-boat must sight the aircraft from a distance of six thousand meters at least. But that is not sufficient, for if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached its safety depth. The U-boat, therefore, must see the airplane before that and almost at the limit of perspicasity. Therefore, -- and this is the condition so that you might meet with success -- the U-boat is in a matter of constant alertness a state of alarm and that means above all that it should proceed at maximum speed, because the faster the speed the faster the U-boat can submerge; and, secondly, that as few people as possible are on the tower of the U-boat, so that the going in of the people into the U-boat and the closing of the hatch can be done as soon as possible, that there shall be no crew on the upper deck, and so on.
All of those things interrupt the state of alertness of the U-boat completely. In that case, the U-boat would be hopelessly delivered to any air attack.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I wish to consult on the case and I am reluctant to interrupt. If it is agreeable to the High Tribunal, I would suggest that we have our recess now.
(A recess was taken.)
the enemy in September, 1942. During these days of September you received the report about the sinking of the British transport boat "Laconia." I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that incident under number Doenitz 16, 20, 2l and 22. These are the war diaries of the flag officer of the U-boats in question under Hartenstein, Schacht and Wuerdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on page 34 and following pages. I shall read to you the report which you have received. That is on page 34 of the document book under 13 September, the time 0125, and I read:
"Wireless message sent on America circuit:
"Sunk by Hartenstein British ship Laconia."
Then the position is given and the message continues:
"Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now picked up 90,157" -- then the details, and the end is : "request orders."
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: On page 35, Mr. President, the entry of the 13th of September, time 0125, the beginning of the line; it is on the bottom of the page, second paragraph from the bottom of the page. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q (continuing) I had the documents submitted to you to refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what your impression or what your knowledge was about that ship Laconia, which had been reported sunk and of its crew. we had at our disposal, that the Laconia was armed with fourteen guns. I had to expect, therefore, that it would have at least a British crew of do out 500 men. When I found out that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was clear to me that the number would be increased by the necessary guards for the prisoners. which became necessary by your order of the 17th of September and emphasize, if you please, first, the question of rescue or non-rescue of British or Italians; and, secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question, U-boats that were in that area.
I issued the order: "Schacht, Group Eisbaer, Wuerdemann and Wilamowitz, proceed to Hartenstein immediately." Hartenstein was the commander of the group. Later, I had to have several boat deviate from their course because their distance was too great. The one that was furthest away and received orders to participate in the rescue was 700 miles away. Therefore, he could reach the part only after about two days. because I hoped that thereby American rescue ships would approach. He confirmed it and, besides, Hartensin, himself, sent the following wireless message in English.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is on page 36, Mr. President, under time figure 0600.
A (continuing) "If any ship will assist the shipwrecked Laconia crew, I will not attack her, providing I am not being attacked by ship or air force. reports of the U-boats that with great devotion they started the rescue.
Q How many U-boats were there?
A There were three or four submarines. I received reports which mentioned the figures of those rescued between one hundred and two hundred. I believe Hartenstein had 156 in one submarine, 131 in another. I received reports about supply and taking over the crews of lifeboats; once thirty-five Italians and twenty-five Englishmen and four Poles, and, another time, thirty Italians and twenty-four Englishmen; the third time, twenty-six Italians and thirty-nine Englishmen and three Poles. I received reports about the towing of lifeboats, and all these reports caused me the greatest concern because I knew quite well that could not end well. the submarines. "Take only as many lifeboat survivors so that you will still have your chance for diving." It is clear that, if such a narrow space in the U-boat is crowded, additionally by 100 to 200 people, the U-boat is absolutely in danger as such, not to speak about the possibility for fighting Furthermore, I sent the message:
"All boats--"
THE PRESIDENT: Are these messages in the document?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, where are they? Why did he not refer to the time of them?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: These ate all messages which are contained in the three diaries. The first message is on page 36, Mr. President, under datetime group 0720. I will read it.
"Wireless message received:" That is a message from Admiral Doenitz. "Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Secure all clear for diving. Detailed boats to take over only as many as to remain clear for diving."
A (Continuing) Then I sent another message:
"Safety of U-boat is not to be endangered under any circumstances."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This message is on page 40, Mr. President, under date-time group of 17 September, 0140 hours.
A (Continuing) "Take all measures ruthlessly, including discontinuance of rescue activities."
Furthermore, I sent the message:
"Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and underwater use."
A "Beware of enemy interference by airplanes and submarines."
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say page 37?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: What time?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The time 0740, figure 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q "All boats, also Hartenstein, take in as many people when boats under-water are completely ready for use." the report which was received from Hartenstein, which said that we had been attacked by bombs from an American bomber.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: These messages, Mr. President, are on page 39, under time group 1311, an emergency report. Under 2304 there is a detailed report which I should like to road.
THE WITNESS: At this occasion -
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: One moment, Great Admiral.
The report is:
"Radiogram sent: von Hartenstein to Admiral Doenitz. Bombed five time by American Liberator in low flight when towing four full boats in spite of Red Cross flag on bridge and good sight. Both periscopes at present out of order. Breaking off rescue; all off board; putting out to West. Will repair."
THE WITNESS: Hartenstein, on that occasion, as can be seen from a later report, also had 55 Englishmen and 55 Italians on board his submarine. At the occasion of the first attack by bombs, one of the lifeboats capsized, since it had been hit by a bomb, and according to his report there were great losses of those that had been rescued before. submarine, and damaged the submarine seriously, and he reported that it was only by a miracle of shipbuilding technique that the submarine did not fall to pieces.
THE PRESIDENT: Where has he gone to now? What page is he on?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: He is speaking about the events which are described on pages 28 and 39, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal, you know, if you kept some sort of order instead of going on to one page and then to 40, and than back to 38.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The reason is that we are using two different war diaries, Mr. President. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: the report by Hartenstein that he had been attacked repeatedly at the occasion of rescue measures.
all attempts at rescue, and beyond doubt, from the point of view of military considerations that Would have been the right thing to do, because the attack showed clearly in what way U-Boats were endangered. the Naval War Command that the Fuehrer did not want me to risk any submarines for rescues or to pull them from other areas. It came to a very temperamental conference with my staff, and as I can remember very clearly, I summed it up with the statement, "I cannot throw these people into the water." would occur, I would have to assume full responsibility, and from the military point of view continuance of rescues was wrong. Of that, I received proof from Submarine U-506 of Wuerdemann, who also reported -- I believe on the following morning -- that he was bombed by an airplane.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That report, Mr. President, is on page 42 in the War Diary of Wuerdemann, an entry of 17 September, under the time group 23:43. It is the last on the page, an outgoing Wireless:
"Mission on 'Annamite' completed." Then the details, "Attacked by heavy sea plane at noon. Fully ready for action."
A (Continuing): The third submarine, Schacht's, the U-507, had sent a wireless that he had so many men on board and was towing four lifeboats with Englishmen and Poles.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is the report on page 40, the first report, top of the page.
A (Continuing): Thereupon, of course, I ordered him to let go of that tow because with those boats he could not dive in any way. Later, he again sent a long message, speaking about the supplying of Italians and Englishmen in the boats.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is on page 41, under time group 23:10. I shall read that message:
"Transferred 163 Italians to Anamite," The Anamite was a French cruiser which had been called to rescue. "Navigation officer of Laconia and other English officer aboard ship. Seven lifeboats with about 330 Englishmen and Poles, among them 15 women and 16 children deposited at Qu. FE 9612.
Kept women and children aboard ship for one night. Supplied all shipwrecked with hot meal and drinks, clothed and bandaged as far as necessary. Sighted four more boats at sea anchor Qu. FE 9619."
A (Continuing): Because I had ordered him to let go of the lifeboats and that report was considered a later report by us, he was admonished by another message, and from that, the Prosecution by error concluded that I had prohibited the rescue of Englishmen.
That I did not do that can be seen from the fact that I did not do anything about the many reports concerning the rescuing of Englishmen. not come off very well on the occasion of the rescue. That this impresssion was correct can be seen from the figures of those rescued. Of 8ll Englishmen, about 800 were rescued, and of 1,800 Italians, 450. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: that entire action. The Laconia was torpedoed on the 12th of September. When was the air attack on the lifeboats?
Q On the night of the 16th? On the 17th?
Q On the 16th of September. So the rescue action took how many days all together?
Q And it was continued after then until when? had requested. Laconia which you have just described, and the order which the Prosecution put to you as the destruction order? had about the submarines, in addition to they strong feeling that the Angle-American side in spite of the.
proximity did not help, was this basic impression which I received from that event, that the time had passed when U-Boats could carry out such actions on the surface without danger.
As can be seen from the two bombing attacks, in spite of good weather, in spite of large numbers to be rescued, which were clearly visible as such to the aviators, the danger to the submarines was so great that asthe one who was responsible for the boats and the lives of the crews, I had to prohibit rescues. and I cannot express it any differently, and I should like to mention, as an example, that all the submarines which took part in that rescue action were lost by bombing attack at their next action -- the situation was such that it was contrary to thebasic common-sense of warfare and to any primitive law of warfare to carry out a rescue under the greatest danger for oneself and to be killed on that occasion by the enemy.
incident in order to carry out an idea which you had had previously; that is, to kill survivors in the future. Please, will you say anything to that. The subject was to rescue or not to rescue; the whole development of that order, however, speaks clearly against it. The fact that we had rescued with devotion and were bombed while doing so-- and it is also a fact that the U-boat Command, that is myself, was faced with the serious decision and was putting myself on the wrong side, military speaking, on the humane side-- so I have to say that I don't believe any more words have to be lost. order. I have read it before. In the second sectence, we read: "Rescue is contras to the most primitive laws of warfare after destruction of ships and men," What do you mean by that sentence?
A That sentence, of course, is a reason. The prosecution said that it would have been easy to order, because safety was not permitter, concerns of safety, about the predominance of the air force -- that I had order continuously, and we have seen just now, also in the case of the event of the "Laconia", I had ordered that four times. That was an old record, if I may use that expression, and I was now concerned to give a reason to the commanders of the submarines which would forestall all discretion of the commanders or on decisions of the commander because I had always made the experience that for the reasons mentioned before, the situation, since the sky was still clear, was considered too favorable by the boats and then the submarine was lost, or that one commander was no more able to make decision, such as the "Laconia" case showed; therefore under no circumstance whatsoever did I want to give the old reason which again would give the opportunity to the U-boat commander to say "Well", there is no danger from the air attack and to make his own dicision; for instance, to make up his mind, since there was no danger from the air attack; and I wanted to make sure that that discussion she should not arrive in the mind of one of these U-boat commanders or that he might say that if one rescued the enemy and at that occasion is killed by the enemy, the this contradicts the most primitive laws of warfare. I could have said that, too but I didn't want to say that either; therefore I have put that sentence here as it stands.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't referred us back to the order, but are you referring to page 36 of the prosecution's trial brief or rather British Document Book?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, page 36 of the British Document Book.
THE PRESIDENT: There are two orders there, are there not?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No. That is one, one order, four figures.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are two paragraphs, aren't there? There is paragraph I and there is paragraph 2 of the 17th of September 1942.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, you probably mean the excerpt from the War Diary of the Commander of the U-boats or the Flag Officer of the U-boats, which is also on page 36 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better read the phrase that you are referring
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. I speak now about the second sentence in the order of the 17th of September, under figure one, which is on page 36 of the document book of the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The second sentence : "Rescue is against the most primitive laws of warfare after the destruction of the enemy ship and crew". That is the sentence to which Doenitz referred just now.
THE PRESIDENT: On page 36, the first order is an order to "All Commanding Officers" and paragraph one of it begins :" No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships .." Is that the paragraph you are referring to?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, yes, and of that I mean the second sentence., Mr. president, the rescue contrary to the rules of warfare.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the next paragraph, 17th of September 1942, paragraph 2?
DR. KRANZBUEHIER: That, I just wanted to put to him. That is an entry in the diary about which I wans to ask him now. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 17th September, and there we find "Commanders are again advised that attempts at rescue of crews of sunk ships are contrary to the most primitive rules of warfare after the destruction of enemy ships and their crews. Orders about picking up of captains and chief engineers remain."
THE PRESIDENT: It is differently translated in our document book. You said: "After destruction of enemy ships..." In our translation it is "...by annihilating enemy ships and their crews."
DR. KRANSBUEHIER: It should be "by", Mr. President, not "after."
THE WITNESS: This entry in the war diary refers to that wireless message and refers to the four messages which I had sent during the case of the "Laconia" sinking. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q One moment, Great Admiral. Will you please at first explain to the Tribunal how such entries were made in the war diary? Who kept that diary, did you keep it yourself or who did that? was a difficult thing for me because I did not have any valuable officers left to use them for that work. That entry, as I presumed and which has been confirmed here, a former mate made, who tried to put all my orders during the entire case into one entry. Of course, I am responsible for each entry but any actual consequences to reality could not be seen from that entry but from my wireless orders. Those were the essential things. whether that entry represents your considerations or whether it is only an excerpt of the wireless order, an extract which had been taken by a subordinate?
A The latter is correct. My real long consideration is based on my concern over the call from the Naval Warfare Command, the order of the future and my serious decisions, whether I should break with that method or not, that is not even included in the entries in the war diary.