The Soviet prosecution, from the very beginning, considered Katyn Forest as a generally known fact and the Indictment already mentioned this.
It is mentioned in the Indictment and we limited ourselves only to reading short excerpts about this incident and on account of this Tribunal, we realize that we deal with this episode merely as with an incident but if the question is raised and such is the question, which was mentioned by Sir David, that is, the fact that the Tribunal may be dubious about the credibility of vertain witnesses or certain documents -- then, once again, we would be forced to present new evidence in order to discredit the material presented by the defense again.
In such a way, if the tribunal considers it necessary to admit two new witnesses relative to the Katyn Forest shootings, then the Soviet Prosecution will find itself obligated to call about nine more new witnesses who were experts and specialists, and to present to the Tribunal new evidence which has been recently received by us, new documents.
Furthermore, we shall have to return to the question of reading into the record all of the documents of the Special Commission, excerpts from which were read before the Tribunal. We think that it will delay greatly the proceedings, and it will not be a matter of hours but days.
So far as we are concerned, there is no necessity of doing this, and I think that it should be denied since there is absolutely no basis or reason for it.
That is, my Lord, what I wanted to say in regard to the application on the part of the defendant Goering.
I would also like to add a few words to what Sir David said in regard to the application on the part of Dr. Seidl. I will not express all our motives. We certainly support Sir David fully, who considers that Dr. Seidl's applications should be denied. But I want to report to you that this morning I find a document being sent to you, your Honor, which expresses fully and in detail all our motives and considerations in regard to this, and this document is presented to the Tribunal Therefore, without taking your time, I find another way to inform the Tribunal about our position.
THE PRESIDENT:Now, it is not necessary, I think, to ask counsel, for the defendant Schirach to address the Tribunal, because there is no objection to those two applications with reference to the witness Meezellich and the interrogatory of Kauffmann.
With reference to the Hess matter, the Tribunal will consider that. They are going to consider it as they said they would in their previous order.
With reference to the defendant Funk, there is no objection to the affidavit for Kallus, and so unless the counsel for Funk wants to address us upon it, we need not bother with that.
With reference to Streicher, there is an objection to Gessner as a witness, so perhaps counsel for Streicher had better say anything that he wishes to say.
(No response)
Well, the Tribunal will consider that, then.
As to Sauckel there has been no objection. as to Seyss-Inquart, an interrogatory -- there is no objection there.
As to the defendant Frick, Sir David suggested an interrogatory. It wasn't quite clear whether the application meant that. Is counsel for the defendant Frick here or not?
(No response). Well, we will consider that.
With reference to Goering, the Tribunal will consider the applications for the defendant Goering.
With reference to Hess and Frank, as to Gesevius' evidence Dr. Seidl, do you wish to say anything about that?
DR. SEIDL:Mr. President, the application regarding collecting of information was only made for that one purpose, to obtain evidence for the credibility of witness Gesevius. Afterwards I made an application for examination on the Secret of War Patterson by means of a questionnaire, interrogatory, which would deal with the same subject.
Then there is an application for examining the chief of the OSS, General Donovan, also, by means of an interrogatory. I think that this now application has not yet reached the Tribunal.
This further application I have only made because the first named witness, Patterson, has only been minister of War for a comparatively short period, and since it appeared sui tab that additionally the chief of that organization should himsel be asked questions as a witness.
With respect to these applications, I refer to my written statement in the application of the first of May of this year, which has been submitted as an Appensix 1, and I also refer to Appendix 2, which is a report of the Associated press regarding this episode.
I should like to reply very briefly to Sir David MaxwellFyfe's statement.
In connection -with the question of additional witnesses to deal with credibility of other witnesses, the Tribunal doesn't appear to be bound to any particular rules. Neither in the Charter for the International Military Tribunal nor in any other instructions are rules contained in that respect. In my opinion it is entirely and exclusively left to the free decision of the Tribunal whether under certain circumstances such additic means of evidence referring to credibility of a witness should be admitted or not.
In German criminal procedure such evidence is permissible with out any doubt, but since the Tribunal in creating this procedure is not bound by any known procedure, I see no reason why any particular habits of procedure of the Anglo-American right should now be considered since the Charter neither considers the Anglo-American legislation or legal procedure, not the German legal procedure, and since this is a Tribunal and a procedure which is going entirely its own ways and since it is given complete freedom as to the decisions. That is all I wanted to say in that connection.
THE PRESIDENT:One moment, Dr. Seidl. Do the questions which you wish to put with reference to the witness Gesevius relate solely to credit?
DR. SEIDL:In my written application I have already said that as far as I am concerned, it isn't a question of whether under certain circumstances the witness Gesevius did commit an action which in accordance with the German law may be a crime.
The questions I wanted to put were merely referring to the credibility of the witness before this very Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:That is what I thought.
Now, one other question I wanted to ask you. Are those pacts or agreements, which you say existed between the soviet Republics and Germany -- are they published in print? Have all the documents which you wish to use been typewritten or mimeographed and circulated to the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL:Mr. President, on the 13th of April of this year, six copies of those five documents were given to the General Secretary by me, and, over and above that, I have given a corresponding number of documents to the Prosecution. All those documents are typewritten or respectively they are multigraphed.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well.
DR. SEIDL:Perhaps, if I may, I should like to add one thing. That is that on some earlier occasion the Tribunal have admitted an affidavit from Bmassador Gauss as evidence. That first affidavit is a summary of these secret agreements.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, I know that.
DR. SEIDL:In my opinion, it seems that if one had the actual agreements one could refer to the agreements as such, and wouldn't have to satisfy oneself with a summary. If the Tribunal so desires, and considers it necessary, then I should of course be prepared at this stage, or at some later stage, to deal with the relevancy of these agreements, and draw the Tribunal's attention to it.
I have noted down eight points on the basis of which it appears that these agreements are relevant as evidence, and perhaps, if I may, I should like to point out -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ordered that these documents should be submitted, and then will then consider them.
That is what they propose to do; so it is not necessary to go into them in detail. We will consider the matter. DR. SAUTER.
DR.SAUTER (Counsel for defendant Funk): Mr. President, on the occasion of the examination of Defendant Funk, a film was shown on the wall in this courtroom, and an application from witness Puhl has been read. Puhl was the vice-president of the Reichsbank. At that time, following an application of mine, the Tribunal decided that this witness, Emil Puhl, should be called as a witness to come here for examination.
I should like to ask that you amend your decision in one direction. I consider that it would be suitable that this witness Puhl should see the film which you saw on this wall a few days ago, and that he should see it so that he can state whether in fact the steel safes of the Reichsbank looked as they were shown in this film.
I should like to ask, therefore, Mr. President, that you order that this short film which we were shown twice the other day should also be shown to the witness Puhl before his examination. It is, of course, not necessary that this should be done during the session of the Tribunal; it can be done in the presence of the prosecutor and myself, outside this courtroom.
Apart from that, I have certain questions to out to witness Puhl, and for that it is necessary that he should first of all see this film. I was going to make this application today so that when the witness Puhl is examined, there should be no delay.
THE PRESIDENT:Does the witness Puhl know the vaults in Frankfurt which were photographed?
DR. SAUTER:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:He was there, was he not?
DR. SAUTER:Yes; but I assume, Mr. President, that the witness Puhl, who was the acting vice-president, would know the steel safes in Frankfurt as well. Apart from that, I believe that these vaults in the various branches of the.
Reichsbank were all built after one pattern, and were in practive treated after that same system, or pattern, He will be able, also, to state whether that type of safe keeping as it was pictures in this film was, in fact, such as the Reichsbank would use when looking after deposits.
THE PRESIDENT:Has the prosecution anything to say about this?
MR. ALBRECHT:If your Honor please, I think as it is a document in this case, we would be very glad to show them to the witness before he is crommexamined by Dr. Sauter.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes. And perhaps the most convenient way would be, as Dr. Sauter suggests, that he should be shown the film in some room in this court, not actually in this room, but in another room.
MR. ALBRECHT:Yes; we can do so in the presence of the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:Then you can arrange that between yourself and Dr. Sauter?
MR. ALBRECHT:Very well, sir.
DR. SAUTER:Thank you very much, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Sauter, has any time been arranged for the calling of Puhl?
DR. SAUTER:No; nothing as yet has been arranged. As far as I have heard, the witness is already here, and when he is to be examined is something I do not know. I shall leave that entirely to the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:What would be the most convenient thing? SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dalton suggest to me, at the close of the case of the defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT:Would that be convenient? I do not know, Wouldn't it be better to put it after the defendant Raeder, since they are rather connected cases ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:If the Tribunal would prefer that, we could make it after Raeder.
THEPRESIDENT; I do not know whether Dr. Kranzbuehler and Dr. Siemers would prefer that.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:Perhaps you could arrange that with them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, my lord.
THE PRESIDENT:That is to say, we would take Puhl's evidence as soon as convenient, either after the evidence on behalf of the defendant Doenitz or after the evidence on behalf of the defendant Raeder, whichever you prefer.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship prefer, we will do that.
DR. SAUTER:Very well; I agree.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I should like to inform the Tribunal that colleague Stahmer's applications for the defendant Goering for clarifying the Tribunal are interesting to me with reference to my client. The procedure of the applications represented, by the Russian prosecutor indicated to me that this subject, too, is to be used to implicate the general staff and the OKW, or has been used for that purpose, although no evidence to the effect has been submitted, that the events took place, either by order or with the agreement of the General Staff and the OKW.
THE PRESIDENTLDoes this not, perhaps, interest all the defendants?
DR. LATERNSER:Yes. But I should merely like to inform the Tribunal that I am interested in colleague Stahmer's applications, and that I am also asking you to allow them. We have agreed to share our task, and that is why the colleague Stahmer may have made the applications. And I merely wanted to inform the Tribunal of that arrangement.
I should also like to point out to you that some time ago when my colleague Melte was speaking on behalf of the defendant Keitel, and was forfeiting the examination of the witness Halder, I pointed, out to the Tribunal that by this action, my privileges were being infringed, and that the witness Halder should have to be allowed for cross examination by the Russian prosecution.
At that time, it was suggested that witness Halder would, appear to be examined, and the Tribunal was going to tell me in the near future what its decision would be now. Some time has passed, and I have not yet received such a decision. I merely wanted to point to that affair before this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Your witnesses have not been dealt with, have they? You have not applied for your witnesses yet? They have not been preferred? The matter has not been dealt with?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the same understanding, seems to appear again which occurred when some time ago I pointed out to you that when the witness Halder was cancelled, my rights were being infringed.
The situation at the time was that the Russian prosecution was submitting an affidavit from General Halder, and that when the defense objected, which was done in my name, too, at the time, the Tribunal decided that witness Halder would appear, and would have to appear for examination here.
As a matter of fact, you see, I have the right to cross examine him. And that is why I have the impression that I ought to present the situation to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:But the convenient time is the question. You will have the opportunity to cross examine him. But the question is when. You want to cross examine him yourself on behalf of the High Command.
DR. LATERNSER:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:We will consider that. Dr. Laternser.
The Tribunal will adjourn.
(An adjournment was taken until 1000 hours, Monday, 13 May 1946.)
Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the Franch Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northen Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al.
Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 13 May 1946, 1000 to 1300, Lord Justice Lawrence, Presiding.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to submit my remaining documents, and then as my first witness I shall use Admiral Wagner.
The next document I come to is Doenits 37. It is an extract from the documents of German Politics about the Altmark case. I do not propose to read it. It is from the reports of the Captain of the Altmark, He has reported that the sailors of the Altmark were shot when they were escaping into the water, partly across the ice. There were seven dead.
It can be found, Mr. President on page 78. It is volume No. 2 on page 79. It is shown that this entire action did not find full recognition in spite of the bloody incidents which no doubt were regretted by the Admirality.
The next document is Doenitz 39. It has partly been read by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe during cross examination and can be found on page 81 and the follow ing pages.
It deals with the question of reprisals following a report received regaring the shooting of the survivors of a German ship, Ulm.
On page 83 there is a summary regarding the incidents which had been reported to the German Naval Command at that time, and which contained examples delaing with cases where survivors were shot at by Allied Forces, I am not so much interested in these twelve actual examples but entirely in the attitude adopted by the Naval Command Staff, and the example were, of course, submitted to German Naval Command and Staff.
I would like to road the third sentence from it, which can be found on page 83, at the top.
"The following accounts deal with incidents which, as directed, have already been reported, and in making use of then it must also be considered, that
a) Some of those incidents occured before the battle had been closed;
b) Shipwrecked persons swimming about in the water easily mistake shots which missed their real target, as directed against then.
c) so far no evidence has been found whatsoever that a written or oral order for the shooting of ship wrecked persons has been issued." The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but it also occur to the personnel serving on the ships at the front.
Now we cone to Document Doenitz 41, which is on page 87, and it deals with a conversation it. Commander Witt had with Admiral Doenitz. The actual conversant took place in June of 1943 and it is dealt with an affidavit made by Lt Command Witt. After discussing the story of an attack made by British Fliers on shipwrec German submarines the thought was then expressed, that as reprisals the order she be issued to shoot on survivors of enemy ships as well.
The affidavit also orders in its third paragraph:
"The Commander declined the idea sharply of attacking the enemy after having made him defenseless in combat, they were incompatible with our way of warfare."
I shall then refer to the Prosecution Document, GB-205, and shall submit a document of my own connected with it, which deals with the question of terror at tacks, It is an extract from Document GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be found on page 91.
It deals with the question of whether in the case of scuttling of German ships, there should be the duty of rescuing the crews.
The French press desires to turn down such an idea pertaining to an emergency situation which is involved, and the same document contains a report accor ding to which British warships have had certain instructions to permit further scuttling of German ships.
I now shall try to prove that the principle according to which no Command is to take rescue action if he endangers a valuable ship, is justified.
For that purpose I refer to Doenitz Document 90, which is in the 4th volume of the Document Book. It is an affidavit of Vice Admiral, retired, Rogge, and he reports that in November 1941 -
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:Page 258. It is in the fourth volume of the document books.
He is reporting that in November 1941 in his auxiliary cruiser he was sunk at a great distance by a British cruiser and that the survivors had taken to the boats. This was towed away by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few days later, was sunk at a long distance by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the boats and to the floats. The affidavit closes with the words:
"At both sinkings no attempt was made, possibly due to danger involved for British cruiser, to save even individual drew members."
The principle that avaluable shi must not even be risked to save its own personnel is expressed in the classical clear conception in the British Admiralty Order, which I have already submitted as document 67 and the extract is printed on page 96. There it says:
"No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats."
THE PRESIDENT:Where are you reading now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:Document Book volume 2, page 96.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:No British cean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats, Small coastal ships, fishing steamers and other small ships with little draught should give all possible aid."
The next document I am submitting is Doenitz 44, which is on page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch, who based on a decision by the Tribunal was interrogated as a British prisoner of war. From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the chief, the officer in charge of submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for the submarine warfare in the Mediterranean.
According to his statements he knows of no order or no suggestions regarding the killing of survivors and the way he instructed his commanders was by saying that rescuing measures must not endanger the safety of their own shi I shall new come to the question whether Admiral Doenitz was a member of Reich Government and in that connection I should like to ask the Tribunal to to judicial notice of the German Armed Forces Law of 1939 which can be found on page 105 of volume 3 of my document books.
Paragraph three will show that there was only one minister for the German ArmedForces and that was the Reich Minister for War.
On the following page in paragraph 37 it is shown that this one minister had the right to issue legislative orders.
On page 107 I have one more printed decree which has been submitted to the Tribunal as 1915-PS and in which decree, dated the 4th of February, 1938, the post of the Reich Minister for War is abolished and the tasks of his ministry are transferred to the supremecommander of the OKW, the head of the OKW. No new ministry for the army or the navy is being established.
The Prosecution have described Admiral Doenitz as a fanatical follower of the Nazi Party, The first document to prove this statement, which is dated the 17th of Decanter, 1943, is GB 185, Considering the time factor I shall refrai from reading a few sentences from it which will show that anything that Admire Doenitz mayhave said about political questions was said from the point of view of the untty and strength of his soldiers. May I ask the Tribunal to take Judicial notice of this document, which is on page 103 and 104?
THE PRESIDENT:Volume 2?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:Volume 2, Its, sir, page 103 and 104. On page 104 what deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the Ministryof Rearmament, a matter which was arranged in the autumn of 1943. It is an important question, important for the responsibility regarding the use of labor in the shipyards. Something which has been accused upon repeatedly in this Court root This tendency towards unity becomes clear from yet another document of the Prosecutions from which I propose to read one sentence, It is GB 186. In the British trial brief it is on page 7, I shall only read the second and third sentences.
"As officers we have the duty to be guardians of the unity of our people. Every disunity would also affect our troops." The following sentence deals with the same thought at length.
THE PRESIDENT:British trial brief page 7? Mine has only five pages. You mean the document book?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER:It is the British document book, not the trial brief the document book, second and third sentences on page 7 Mr. President.
The fact that Admiral Doenitz was not a fanatical follower of the Party but that on the contrary he fought against a political influence exercised upon the armed forces by the Party is shown in my following document, which is document number 91.
It is on page 26* of the document book number four. It is an affidavit from thechief of the legal department in the Command Staff of the Navy, Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution have already used this document during their cross-examination.
I should like to very briefly summarize the contents, which show that in the summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt through the ReichMinister of Justice to deprive the armed forces courts of their jurisdiction in certain matters. They were to be transferred to the peoples' court and special courts. The attempt, however, failed. It failed due to a report which Admiral Doenitz made verbally to the Fuehrer on this subject and during which he contradicted the opinion and intentions of the Party violently. After the attempt of the 20th of July Bormann renewed his attempt. Again Admiral Doenitz intervened but this time without success. A decree was issued on the 20th of September, 1944 which deprived the armed forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-called political perpetrations. This decree was signed by Adolf Hitler and by special request of the supreme commander of the Navy was not applied to the Navy, as such I shall read the last, but one, paragraph of the affidavit, which ways:
"This attitude of the C. in C. of the Navy made it possible for the Navy as the only branch of the Armed Forces until the end of the war not to have to transfer to the People's Court or to a Special Court any criminal procedures political coloring."
On page 113 in Volume 2 of my document book I have printed an extract from GB 211, a document of the prosecution, and this is an application of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, addressed to the Fuehrer, asking for supplies for the construction of new merchant ships. During the examination, interrogation and cross examination of Admiral Doenitz this document has already been referred to. I should merely like to point out that this is a memorandum containing more than twenty pages and the prosecution had taken up two points conatined therein.
The original of the document is dealt with in document 46, which is on page 117 and the following pages. This is an affidavit from the officer who ha drafted this memorandum. I can summarize the contents. The memorandum is concerned with measures which didn't actually come within the sphere of the C.I.C. of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a discussion which took place between all persons interested in the construction and repair of war and merchant Navy vessels. All these measures are being summarized, in this memorandum The point objected to in particular by the prosecution is a suggestion regarding certain measures in shipyards where sabotage had occurred, which appears o page 119 and is dealt with in detail. I should like to point out particularly that at that time seven out of eight ships under construction were destroyed by sabotage, when reprisal measures were considered, not terror measures were thought of but the deprivation of certain advantages and, if necessary, concentration of workers in camps adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut them off from any sabotage agents.
Following the document GB-209 of the prosecution, which deals with the renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I submit Doenitz No. 48, which is on page 122 and the following pages. It will show the excellent treatment afford.
Allied prisoners of war in the only prisoner of war camp which was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Doenitz as the Supreme Commander of the Navy.
To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two officers who dealt with prisoner of war affairs in the Supreme Command of the Navy, and which state that all the suggestions of the International Red Cross regarding these camps were always followed.
The next extract is the report from the last Commandant of that camp, Captain Rogge, and I should like to read the second paragraph from that report "In the camp Westertinke there were housed at my time about 5500 - 7000, at the end 8000 prisoners of war and internees of different nations, mainly members of the British Navy. The camp had a good reputation as was generally known, it was the best in Germany. This was expressly stated at a congress of British and other prisoners of war physicians of all German camps, which took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the Villa Goebbels in December 1944. This statement was confirmed by the British Chief Camp-Physician in Westertinke, Major Dr. Harvey, British Royal Army, whom I am naming as a witness," I shall also read the last paragraph on pare 126: "As I was Deputy Commander I stayed at the camp up to the capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British troops, which were very satisfied with the transfer Squadron-Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming the latter. I enclose a photostat of this letter." This photostat copy appears on the following page and it says: "Korvettenkapitan W. Rogge was for ten months Chief Lager Officer at the Marlag Camp at Westertinke. Without exception all the prisoner of war in that camp have reported that he treated them with fairness and consideration." Then follows an affidavit from the Intelligence Officer in that campt. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February of 1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any terror measures.
I shall read from page 129, the third and last paragraph: "No pressure of any type was applied. If a man was lying then he was sent back to his bunk?? and he wasn't hired again until two or three days later. I think I can say that during the entire time nobody was hit in that camp."
I should now like to briefly refer to the accusation raised against the defendant according to which he is "a fanatical Nazi", supposed to have prolonged an unnecessary way.
I submit for this purpose Document No. 50, which contains statements made by Admiral Darien, Mr. Chanberlain and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be found on page 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that the aforementioned persons did also consider it right that in a critical situation a nation should be called upon to render the utmost resistance, partly, incidentally, with success and partly without. During his examination Admiral Doenitz has quoted as the reason for his views that he wanted to save German Nationals in the East. As evidence I draw your attention to document GB-212, which can be found on page 73 of the British document book. It is a decree of the 11th of April, 1945, and I shall read two sentences under Figure 1: "Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by the Allies along the lines of the partition discussed by them at Yalta. It means, therefore, also the cession to Russia of further considerable parts of Germany west of the River Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces at the beginning of war with Russia for our sake? In this respect, therefore, the idea is wrong, Let the Angle-Saxons in the country; then at least the Russians will not come."
I shall also quote from the document, GB-188, which is on page 11 of the document Book of the Prosecution.
It is an order to the German Armed Forces, dated the 1st of May, 1945. I shall quote the second paragraph:
"The Fuehrer has designated me to be his successor as Head of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolshevists until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from slavery and destruction This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence.
Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Captain Roesig and the other of Captain Burren, Furthermore -- and this is something I particularly regret -- the interrogatory from the American Chief Admiral, Nimitz, has still not yet been received, I will submit these documents as soon as I have received them.
And now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my witness. Admiral Wagner.
MR. DODD:Mr. President, while the witness is being brought in, I would like to raise one matter with the Tribunal, On Saturday I understand the Questio of when the witness Hewel would be called was raised before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left for Counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called before the Raeder case comes on or after that case.
I should like to say that we have some reasons for asking that he be called before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under which he has been held by the French in French territory; and secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the Funk case is very anxious -- for compelling personal reasons -- to return to the United States and of course he will not be able to do so until we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take very long in my judgment to hear this witness. He is only here for cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he could come on at the conclusion of the Doenitz case.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought on for cross-examination after the Doenitz case.
- - - -
(The witness, Gerhard Wagner, came to the witness-stand.)
BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name please?
AGerhard Wagner.
QWill you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth, and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
QAdmiral, when did you join the German Navy?
AOn the 4th of July, 1916.
QWhich positions did you hold in the Supreme Command of the Navy, and at what time?
AFrom summer, 1933, until the summer of 1935 I was dealing with work in the operations department of the Supreme Command. I was Lieutenant Captain and then a Captain.
In 1937, from January until September I had the same position. From April, 1939, until June 1941, I was the head of the operations group and I was also the head of Department 1, and operational department of the Naval Command Staff.
From June, 1941 -
THE PRESIDENT:Not quite so fast.
A (Continuing) From June, 1941, until June 1944, I was the chief of the operations department of the Naval Command Staff. From June, 1944, until Kay, 1945, I was Admiral for special tasks attached to the Supreme Commander of the Navy.
QIn practice, therefore, during the entire war you were a member of the Naval Command Staff?
AYes, sir.
QWhich were the general tasks of the Naval Command Staff -
ATasks of the Command Staff both at sea as well as regarding the defense of the coast, and also protection of our own merchant ships.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q.One moment. Will you make a slight pause after the question has been asked, between the question and the answer?
A.Very well.
The tasks of the Naval Command Staff were all those tasks of attending to naval warfare, both at sea and the defense of the coasts, and also the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Command Staff did not have any such tasks at home, nor in occupied territories.
Q.Was the Naval Command Staff part of the OKW -- please, will you make a pause between my question and your answer?
A.The Naval Command Staff was part of the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q.What were the conditions between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Naval Command Staff?
A.The OKW passed Hitler's orders, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, his orders and his instructions regarding the conduct of the war, on to the Supreme Command of the Navy; and as far as naval warfare was concerned, they were usually dealt with in accordance with the suggestions of the Naval Command Staff. General questions of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations with members of the Navy Command Staff.
Q.In which manner were the preparations of the Supreme Command of the Navy for the war carried out?
A.Generally speaking, they were general preparations, tactical training, strategic considerations for the event of a possible conflict.
Q.Did the Naval Command Staff during your time receive an order to prepare for a certain type and possibility of war?
A.The first instance was the order for Fall Weiss -- "Case White" -the war against Poland. Before that, only measures of safeguarding were given us as tasks.
Q.When any plans prepared for the naval war against England?
A.A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before the beginning, the outbreak of the war. Such a war appeared to us to be outside any possibilities to be considered.