c) so far no evidence has been found whatsoever that a written or oral order for the shooting of ship wrecked persons has been issued." The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but it also occur to the personnel serving on the ships at the front. a conversation it. Commander Witt had with Admiral Doenitz. The actual conversant took place in June of 1943 and it is dealt with an affidavit made by Lt Command Witt. After discussing the story of an attack made by British Fliers on shipwrec German submarines the thought was then expressed, that as reprisals the order she be issued to shoot on survivors of enemy ships as well.
The affidavit also orders in its third paragraph:
"The Commander declined the idea sharply of attacking the enemy after having made him defenseless in combat, they were incompatible with our way of warfare." document of my own connected with it, which deals with the question of terror at tacks, It is an extract from Document GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be found on page 91. ships, there should be the duty of rescuing the crews. gency situation which is involved, and the same document contains a report accor ding to which British warships have had certain instructions to permit further scuttling of German ships. is to take rescue action if he endangers a valuable ship, is justified. of the Document Book. It is an affidavit of Vice Admiral, retired, Rogge, and he reports that in November 1941 -
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 258. It is in the fourth volume of the document books. at a great distance by a British cruiser and that the survivors had taken to the boats. This was towed away by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few days later, was sunk at a long distance by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the boats and to the floats. The affidavit closes with the words:
"At both sinkings no attempt was made, possibly due to danger involved for British cruiser, to save even individual drew members." personnel is expressed in the classical clear conception in the British Admiralty Order, which I have already submitted as document 67 and the extract is printed on page 96. There it says:
"No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats."
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Document Book volume 2, page 96.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No British cean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats, Small coastal ships, fishing steamers and other small ships with little draught should give all possible aid."
The next document I am submitting is Doenitz 44, which is on page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch, who based on a decision by the Tribunal was interrogated as a British prisoner of war. From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the chief, the officer in charge of submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for the submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. regarding the killing of survivors and the way he instructed his commanders was by saying that rescuing measures must not endanger the safety of their own shi Reich Government and in that connection I should like to ask the Tribunal to to judicial notice of the German Armed Forces Law of 1939 which can be found on page 105 of volume 3 of my document books.
Paragraph three will show that there was only one minister for the German ArmedForces and that was the Reich Minister for War.
had the right to issue legislative orders. Tribunal as 1915-PS and in which decree, dated the 4th of February, 1938, the post of the Reich Minister for War is abolished and the tasks of his ministry are transferred to the supremecommander of the OKW, the head of the OKW. No new ministry for the army or the navy is being established. the Nazi Party, The first document to prove this statement, which is dated the 17th of Decanter, 1943, is GB 185, Considering the time factor I shall refrai from reading a few sentences from it which will show that anything that Admire Doenitz mayhave said about political questions was said from the point of view of the untty and strength of his soldiers. May I ask the Tribunal to take Judicial notice of this document, which is on page 103 and 104?
THE PRESIDENT: Volume 2?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Volume 2, Its, sir, page 103 and 104. On page 104 what deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the Ministryof Rearmament, a matter which was arranged in the autumn of 1943. It is an important question, important for the responsibility regarding the use of labor in the shipyards. Something which has been accused upon repeatedly in this Court root This tendency towards unity becomes clear from yet another document of the Prosecutions from which I propose to read one sentence, It is GB 186. In the British trial brief it is on page 7, I shall only read the second and third sentences.
"As officers we have the duty to be guardians of the unity of our people. Every disunity would also affect our troops." The following sentence deals with the same thought at length.
THE PRESIDENT: British trial brief page 7? Mine has only five pages. You mean the document book?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It is the British document book, not the trial brief the document book, second and third sentences on page 7 Mr. President.
but that on the contrary he fought against a political influence exercised upon the armed forces by the Party is shown in my following document, which is document number 91.
It is on page 26* of the document book number four. It is an affidavit from thechief of the legal department in the Command Staff of the Navy, Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution have already used this document during their cross-examination. summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt through the ReichMinister of Justice to deprive the armed forces courts of their jurisdiction in certain matters. They were to be transferred to the peoples' court and special courts. The attempt, however, failed. It failed due to a report which Admiral Doenitz made verbally to the Fuehrer on this subject and during which he contradicted the opinion and intentions of the Party violently. After the attempt of the 20th of July Bormann renewed his attempt. Again Admiral Doenitz intervened but this time without success. A decree was issued on the 20th of September, 1944 which deprived the armed forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-called political perpetrations. This decree was signed by Adolf Hitler and by special request of the supreme commander of the Navy was not applied to the Navy, as such I shall read the last, but one, paragraph of the affidavit, which ways:
"This attitude of the C. in C. of the Navy made it possible for the Navy as the only branch of the Armed Forces until the end of the war not to have to transfer to the People's Court or to a Special Court any criminal procedures political coloring." GB 211, a document of the prosecution, and this is an application of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, addressed to the Fuehrer, asking for supplies for the construction of new merchant ships. During the examination, interrogation and cross examination of Admiral Doenitz this document has already been referred to. I should merely like to point out that this is a memorandum containing more than twenty pages and the prosecution had taken up two points conatined therein. page 117 and the following pages. This is an affidavit from the officer who ha drafted this memorandum. I can summarize the contents. The memorandum is concerned with measures which didn't actually come within the sphere of the C.I.C. of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a discussion which took place between all persons interested in the construction and repair of war and merchant Navy vessels. All these measures are being summarized, in this memorandum The point objected to in particular by the prosecution is a suggestion regarding certain measures in shipyards where sabotage had occurred, which appears o page 119 and is dealt with in detail. I should like to point out particularly that at that time seven out of eight ships under construction were destroyed by sabotage, when reprisal measures were considered, not terror measures were thought of but the deprivation of certain advantages and, if necessary, concentration of workers in camps adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut them off from any sabotage agents. renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I submit Doenitz No. 48, which is on page 122 and the following pages. It will show the excellent treatment afford.
Allied prisoners of war in the only prisoner of war camp which was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Doenitz as the Supreme Commander of the Navy. To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two officers who dealt with prisoner of war affairs in the Supreme Command of the Navy, and which state that all the suggestions of the International Red Cross regarding these camps were always followed. Captain Rogge, and I should like to read the second paragraph from that report "In the camp Westertinke there were housed at my time about 5500 - 7000, at the end 8000 prisoners of war and internees of different nations, mainly members of the British Navy. The camp had a good reputation as was generally known, it was the best in Germany. This was expressly stated at a congress of British and other prisoners of war physicians of all German camps, which took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the Villa Goebbels in December 1944. This statement was confirmed by the British Chief Camp-Physician in Westertinke, Major Dr. Harvey, British Royal Army, whom I am naming as a witness," I shall also read the last paragraph on pare 126: "As I was Deputy Commander I stayed at the camp up to the capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British troops, which were very satisfied with the transfer Squadron-Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming the latter. I enclose a photostat of this letter." This photostat copy appears on the following page and it says: "Korvettenkapitan W. Rogge was for ten months Chief Lager Officer at the Marlag Camp at Westertinke. Without exception all the prisoner of war in that camp have reported that he treated them with fairness and consideration." Then follows an affidavit from the Intelligence Officer in that campt. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February of 1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any terror measures.
I shall read from page 129, the third and last paragraph: "No pressure of any type was applied. If a man was lying then he was sent back to his bunk?? and he wasn't hired again until two or three days later. I think I can say that during the entire time nobody was hit in that camp."
defendant according to which he is "a fanatical Nazi", supposed to have prolonged an unnecessary way. I submit for this purpose Document No. 50, which contains statements made by Admiral Darien, Mr. Chanberlain and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be found on page 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that the aforementioned persons did also consider it right that in a critical situation a nation should be called upon to render the utmost resistance, partly, incidentally, with success and partly without. During his examination Admiral Doenitz has quoted as the reason for his views that he wanted to save German Nationals in the East. As evidence I draw your attention to document GB-212, which can be found on page 73 of the British document book. It is a decree of the 11th of April, 1945, and I shall read two sentences under Figure 1: "Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by the Allies along the lines of the partition discussed by them at Yalta. It means, therefore, also the cession to Russia of further considerable parts of Germany west of the River Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces at the beginning of war with Russia for our sake? In this respect, therefore, the idea is wrong, Let the Angle-Saxons in the country; then at least the Russians will not come."
document Book of the Prosecution. It is an order to the German Armed Forces, dated the 1st of May, 1945. I shall quote the second paragraph:
"The Fuehrer has designated me to be his successor as Head of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolshevists until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from slavery and destruction This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence.
Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Captain Roesig and the other of Captain Burren, Furthermore -- and this is something I particularly regret -- the interrogatory from the American Chief Admiral, Nimitz, has still not yet been received, I will submit these documents as soon as I have received them. witness. Admiral Wagner.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, while the witness is being brought in, I would like to raise one matter with the Tribunal, On Saturday I understand the Questio of when the witness Hewel would be called was raised before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left for Counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called before the Raeder case comes on or after that case. before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under which he has been held by the French in French territory; and secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the Funk case is very anxious -- for compelling personal reasons -- to return to the United States and of course he will not be able to do so until we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take very long in my judgment to hear this witness. He is only here for cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he could come on at the conclusion of the Doenitz case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought on for cross-examination after the Doenitz case.
(The witness, Gerhard Wagner, came to the witness-stand.)
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth, and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.) BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Admiral, when did you join the German Navy? at what time? the operations department of the Supreme Command. I was Lieutenant Captain and then a Captain.
In 1937, from January until September I had the same position. From April, 1939, until June 1941, I was the head of the operations group and I was also the head of Department 1, and operational department of the Naval Command Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Not quite so fast.
A (Continuing) From June, 1941, until June 1944, I was the chief of the operations department of the Naval Command Staff. From June, 1944, until Kay, 1945, I was Admiral for special tasks attached to the Supreme Commander of the Navy. Naval Command Staff? of the coast, and also protection of our own merchant ships.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. One moment. Will you make a slight pause after the question has been asked, between the question and the answer?
A. Very well. naval warfare, both at sea and the defense of the coasts, and also the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Command Staff did not have any such tasks at home, nor in occupied territories.
Q. Was the Naval Command Staff part of the OKW -- please, will you make a pause between my question and your answer?
A. The Naval Command Staff was part of the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q. What were the conditions between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the Naval Command Staff?
A. The OKW passed Hitler's orders, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, his orders and his instructions regarding the conduct of the war, on to the Supreme Command of the Navy; and as far as naval warfare was concerned, they were usually dealt with in accordance with the suggestions of the Naval Command Staff. General questions of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations with members of the Navy Command Staff.
Q. In which manner were the preparations of the Supreme Command of the Navy for the war carried out?
A. Generally speaking, they were general preparations, tactical training, strategic considerations for the event of a possible conflict.
Q. Did the Naval Command Staff during your time receive an order to prepare for a certain type and possibility of war?
A. The first instance was the order for Fall Weiss -- "Case White" -the war against Poland. Before that, only measures of safeguarding were given us as tasks.
Q. When any plans prepared for the naval war against England?
A. A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before the beginning, the outbreak of the war. Such a war appeared to us to be outside any possibilities to be considered.
Considering the superiority of the British fleet, which can't even be expressed in figures, and considering the domination of the strategy of the seas by England, such a war appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which Britian, considering her general superiority, could have been damaged, was by submarine warfare; but even the submarine weapon as such was by no means being given preferential treatment or accelerated treatment. It was merely dealt with considering the general picture of our fleet. to sea, of which -- as far as I can remember -- only fifty percent could have been used in the Atlantic. That is in comparison with the far-reaching naval means at the disposal of Great Britain, practically nothing at all. As a comparison I should like to cite the fact that both the British and the French Navy, different at the same time, have more than 100 submarines each.
Q. Captain Doenitz -- as he was at the time -- did he as the head of the submarines have anything to do with the planning of the war?
A. Captain Doenitz at that time was a subordinate commander, a subordinate front commander, under the command of the Chief of the Fleet, and he had the task of developing the young submarine commanders, train them and lead them in practice based on his experience of warfare.
Q. Did he in turn have any suggestions to make recording the plans of the war ?
A. No, these preparations and this planning, in particular for the Case White -- were exclusively the task of the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q. Did Doenitz at any previous time hear about the intentions for preparations of the war?
A. No.
Q. Did he have any orders to carry out his orders -
A. I am afraid I didn't understand the last part of your question.
Q. Did Admiral Doenitz hear of the military intentions of the Navy Command Staff at an earlier time that it was necessary for the carrying out of the order; which he had been given?
A No, he received his information by means of the orders which he was given by the Naval Command Staff.
submarine warfare? Did the Naval Command Staff draw any conclusions from the record of that agreement for their preparation for a war, in particular, a merchant navy war?
A Yes. The orders still existing from the last war/were reconsidered and they were coordinated with the protocol of London. For that purpose a committee was formed in which sat representatives from the Supreme Command of the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Justice, and scientific experts. before the war or was it communicated to them just when it was published just before the war? for the navy and it was available for the purpose of training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the fleet in 1938 a number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of instructing the officer corps in this new regulation and make them acquainted with it. I, myself, at that time -
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new prize regulations you are referring to?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: We are talking about the regulations published on the 26th of August, 1939, and which are contained in my document book. They are on page 137, in the third volume of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon: the date is not the 26th, but the 28th of August, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said that the exercises were carried out?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q We were talking about 1938. Which conceptions did the Naval Command Staff nave after the beginning of the war, regarding the development of the naval war, the war at sea against Britain?
where, at the end of the first World War, she had stopped. That meant that there would he a blockade against Germany, a control of neutral countries as far as their merchandise was concerned, introduction of a system of control, the arming of merchant navy vessels, and the disintegration of certain concentration territories.
shown to you. It is Doenitz document No. 55. It can be found on page 139, in volume 3 of the document book. You will see from that that, to begin with, submarines, like other arms, had orders to adhere to this prize ordinance. And then, at the end of it, you will find an order which I propose to read to you. This is on page 140, a prepared order for the war against armed merchant ships of the enemy.
"First, troop and merchant navy vessels of the enemy are armed. Resistance must be expected. Submarines and merchant ships shall only be stopped if own vessels can't be endangered. Clearly recognizable whips can be let pass. If necessary, use of guns by merchant ships when stopping them." whether it was improvised at the last moment? we were issuing because there wasn't time to prepare them thoroughly,
Q Did this order become operative at all?
Q Why not? strictly adhere to the London agreement until we had clear-out evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. We recognized the power of the enemy propaganda from the last war and we did not under any circumstances want to give them cause once more to speak about us in the worse possible way. clear to the Naval Command Staff? few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and enemy merchant navy ships which werearmed. At least one or probably several boats were lost by us. One British steamer was, around about that tiie, praised public ly by the British Admiralty for its successes in combating submarines.
Q The Tribunal already has knowledge of the order of the 4th of October, allowing attacks against all armed merchant navy ships of the enemy, and also the order of October the 17th, allowing attacks on all enemy merchant navy ships with certain exceptions.
Were these orders the result of experiences made by the Naval Command Staff regarding enemy merchant navy ships?
A Yes. exclusively.
Q. These orders are containing certain exceptions regarding passenger ships. They weren't even to be attacked when they were members of an enemy convoy. To what are these exceptions due ?
A They were due to an order from the Fuehrer. At the beginning of the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that during the war at sea, too, any incidents should be avoided during which women and children might lose their lives. Consequently, even the stopping of any passenger ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly, where passenger ships were travelling in enemy convoys. Later on, and step by step, this order was reduced and, when there was no longer any peaceful passenger traffic at all, after we knew that enemy passenger ships were particularly privileged; that is to say, particularly strongly armed, and where passenger ships, as long as they were still travelling, were more and more used as auxiliary cruisers and troop transport ships.
Q. The orders of the German Naval Command regarding the fights against armed enemy ships, were they made known to the British Admiralty?
A. The announcement of war measures of that type was not know on either side during the war and it didn't take place for that reason. But, in October, the German press left no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk by us. Later on it was equally well known that the entire enemy merchant navy was regarded by us as being under military direction and in military use. British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I think this was in October, Admiral Raeder gave an interview to the press which had a similar train.
Q. A memorandum was created in the middle of October, a memorandum of the Naval Command Staff, dealing with the possibilities to intensify the war against merchant shipping. I am point to have this memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. Please, after locking at this memorandum, will you tell me what its purposes were and what the memorandum contains.
Mr. President, some extracts can be found on pace 199, in volume 4 of the document book.
A. The situation to which this memorandum was due was this: With the beginning of the war on the 3rd of September, 1939, Britain had begun a total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally, that was not directed only against the fighting men, but against all non-fighting members, including women, children, and aged people in Germany. It meant that Britain would block all food rations and all luxury goods and clothing, just as all raw materials would be declared to be contraband; and there a strict control of shipping would, be introduced which would cut the neutral countries off from Germany, in practice at least, as far as it would have to go through waters controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a growing political pressure upon the European neighbors of Germany, trying to have them stop any exchange of merchandise with Germany. That intention of the total hunger blockade had been expressed by the chief of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain, during the speech before the House of Commons at the end of September.
This was emphatically confirmed by him. He described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it wasn't customary that beleaguered forts should have any type of freedom. That expression of the beleaguered fort was taken up by the French press. October -- according to this memorandum it was on the 12th of October -- that in this war Britain would utilize her entire strength for the destruction of Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, also after the experiences of the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under some pretext or other.
something which had no doubt been prepared for a long time during peace, we now had to try and catch up. We, of course, had not prepared the war against Great Britain. and we examined the possibilities at our disposal by which we might cut off Britain's supplies, That was the aim and purpose of that memorandum. regarding means for countering the British measures with corresponding German measures, doesn't it? according to which the Naval Command Staff would remain within the limits of International Law as laid down in Geneva, but that measures would even have to be introduced to which the existing International Law could be applied. Did this mean that International Law was to be disregarded by the Naval Command Staff, or what is its meaning? discussed at great length at that time. I should like to point out that on page 2 of the memorandum, in the first paragraph, the thought is being expressed that the orders regarding decent warfare must be applied to all measures of the war at sea. That would prevent any outrages right from the beginning. We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare.
Q Which technical developments do you mean?
A In the first place, I am thinking of two points: conditions; even at the beginning of the war, that an opponent who could not be seen could be found and fought against. even though they do create new laws at sea. Did any such measures really arise?
A No --at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on the 4th of November, the United States of North America declared the so-called American fighting zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual battles, actual belligerent actions, would make the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement some of the considerations of that memorandum were put out of date, and in practice we remained within the limits of such measures as had been employed by both parties during the First World War. zones? submarines were permitted to attack without warning in certain territories at sea. The date is beginning with January 1940. The attack was to be carried out, if possible, on sight, and if possible the ficticious story should be kept up that there were mines.
ware affected by it? I shall have a map handed to you for that purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Doenitz 93.
A In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The large sea which is visible on the edge shows the mentioned battle zone, the battles zone I have mentioned, declared by the united States. The shaded parts of the sea near the British coast are these parts which were ordered to be German submarine operational zones. In accordance with the time when they were introduced, they were given letters from A to F.
Q Can you tell us up to which depth these German operational zones went?
Q Does this depth allow favorable use of mines? any difficulty.
Q In these operational zones, certain dates have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on these dates particularly, and in that sequence, these territories were made operational zones? a bunching up of enemy traffic and where there was a concentration of the enemy defense, and of course, in consideration of the forces which we were using against it. In other words, wherever there were central points of fighting. British mined zones, those which had been declared to be on the British East Coast, and apart from that, the Channel. You can see, therefore, zone a is the territory of Scotland. There is the date January 6, the same -- no, I beg your pardon. In the Bristol Channel there is the date January 12, and eventually, at the southern end of this forbidden zone, there is the date of January 24. Later on, considering the actual development of the fight, further territories around the British Isles and off the French Coast were declared to be similar.
Q Up to what date did this development continue?
Q Had neutrals been warned against entering these zones?
signify?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:and the declaration of August?
difference in practice. This fact had been stated by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons at the time.
However, the difference which did exist focussing point of all belligerent action.
battle zone?
A It was nearly exactly the same as the USA battle zone. There were
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another map, Doenitz No. 92.
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off (a recess was taken.)