SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I see. Then, My Lord, that merely goes to credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we can go on ad infinitum.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal will allow this question to be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to the admissibility of such questions.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you very much Mr. President. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: with the witness. affidavit rested A he told me the following personally:
At the interrogation he had been told that Oberleutnant Hoffman or Kapitaenleutnant Eck had testified that at that time he had listened to the speech by Doenitz at Erlhaven in the autumn of 1942, and that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivor of shipwrecks Heisig had been told "If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save not only Eck and Hoffmann, but two others who would have been sentenced as well. You will save then from death, and you will prevent judicial proceeding against the Captain from being instituted. against Grand Admiral Doenitz is of such tremendous weight that his life has been played away anyway." sion of the speech by the Grand Admiral, he had been in a stress of spiritual conflict. He had been at Luebeck, and there he had seen the terrific consequence of an air attack. He had lived through this attack and he had seen the consequences-- well, perhaps he had not lived through it, but he had seen the terrific consequences. He was for revenge against those total measures, and he considered it possible that these happenings might have been influenced by Doenitz' speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, we can on consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal for the permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody,
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich, Your Honor, he can be very easily reached.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: and what were your tasks in that capacity? the following: Doenitz counted on a much more critical situation in the war. He believed that one day he night be forced to separate himself from the Navy and its command, and that he night have to be at the Fuehrer headquarters for a longer period of time in order to stay abreast of the development of the entire war situation, or that there night be a transfer of the Naval Command -- that is, a change from Berlin-because of the continued heavy air attacks. For this purpose the Grand Admiral wanted on alder and experienced naval officer in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well versed in the problem of sea warfare and who knew about the entire problem of naval war.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, of the SKL and the other officers and departments, commanders-in-chief, for the duration of the separation of the Grand Admiral from the High Command.
Q. Did you accompany the Grand Admiral regularly on his visits to the headquarters?
A. Yes; from the period of time mentioned I was present regularly.
Q. Now I shall submit to you a list of these visits, which has been submitted by the prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in the document book of the prosecution on page 56. are correct.
A. The dates are correct, but, mostly at the end, the list does not seem to be complete. There are some gaps. Pertaining to the period from the 10th of April until the 21st of April, 1945 -- at that time the Grand Admiral participated for the last time at the briefing sessions in the Fuehrer's headquarters. Beyond that, it seems to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I do not know with just what view or with just what idea in mind this list was compiled.
Q. Look at the list of people given. Has Admiral Doenitz present and was he with these people constantly on these dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons were at the Fuehrer headquarters together with him? Can you still recall these points?
A. Yes. If these people participated in the military briefings, then Doenitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high positions were frequently at the Fuehrer headquarters who did not participate in the briefing sessions, and these people the Grand Admiral did not see during these visits.
Q. For what reason did Admiral Doenitz -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is saying that any one of these minutes is incorrect, I should be very grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German minutes here and and confirm the affidavit.
Mr Lord, the witness has said that he thinks these are incorrect. They are summaries of the minutes, and if he wants to say that any one is wrong. I shall he very glad to pet the minutes and compare it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe the witness said only that additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just what he has to say. Perhaps the prosecution will deal with that matter in cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if he can. He wanted him to specify, if he could.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Admiral, can you tell me more exactly, as to any one of these dates, whether these present are correctly names, or whether there were other people present, or whether Doenitz was not present?
A. I can only tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it did not ever occur that not either Field Marshal Keitel or Colonel-General Jodl were present at the headquarters. For example, on 4/3/45, neither one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6/3 or 8/3. Therefore, I conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other wpots, however, the name of Jodl is seen; for example, on the 18th of March, 1945.
and was present in the Fuehrer headquarters on all of these days. Can you confirm that point? am of the opinion that the list is correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the Grand Admiral corresponds with the things set down in this list, and spot checks show me that the dates are correct. headquarters? What were his reasons? frequent toward the end of the war, was the intention to keep abreast of the development of the general war situation so that he, Doenitz, could carry on the leadership of the Navy and the Navy war in accordance with the general situation; and among that, mostly, or frequently, points were to be regarded or to be discussed which the Grand Admiral out of his own authority could not decide for himself but because of their importance he wanted to report on then personally for points which he wanted to discuss with the representatives of the OKW and of the General Staff, and wished to discuss them personally. Admiral to the Fuehrer?
A The matter was as follows: Most of the problems for the Fuehrer took place when the general Naval matter was discussed. This matter was taken care of then. he was at the headquarters?
Q And what is the chief session? day and lasted several hours. This I am referring to as the chief session; but beyond, this and perhaps for months sometimes in just an exceptional case there was an evening session at whichthe Grand Admiral participated only when it was to be expected that certain measures were to be discussed which applied to his Navy and were especially Important for him. And that is what I meant.
put to the Fuehrer, were taken care of at the main briefing. Were there personal reports? very seldom. Personal discussions with the OKW and the other military departments at the headquarters, that was something which took place daily. so-called Lagebesprechungen, the briefing session. The prosecution seems to consider this briefing session as sort of a fourth Cabinet at which, for instand Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer about questions of production. Himmler about security questions. Is this a correct picture? who participated regularly and who came in just once in a while? following: The permanent participants from the OKW, Fieldmarshal Keitel, Colonel General Jodl, General Buhle, Captain At Sea Assmann, Buechs, and a few ethers. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or two aides generally; also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force -the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with one or two aides. General Bodenschatz, until the 20th of July, 1944; Vice Admiral Foss, who was the permanent Deputy of the Grand/Admiral; Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, Colonel Deputy Hewel; Sonnleitner, permanent Deputy of the Foreign Ministry; Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. Frequently the following participated: Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; quite frequently Himmler; in addition to those there was a varying participation on the part of special officers from the General Staff of the Army and from those who were just present first, Commanders in Chief of the Army and of the Air Force. increasing measure Reichsminister Speer, in his capacity as Armament Minister, and in other very seldom cases the Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.
And they were there as listeners.
Q Who reported at these briefing sessions and what was reported on? situation, the war situation, and to tell him through the General Staff of the Army about the Eastern situation through the OKW, about the situation on all other theaters of war, and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The situation report took place as follows: situation; then Colonel General Jodl reported on the situation in all other theaters of war on land. Then Captain Assmann of the OKW reported on the situation on the sea; then the last, Major Buechs from the OKW, reported on the air situation; and in between frequently conversations took place which dealt with military specific problems, sometimes for aircraft, aerial problems. And when the aerial problems were dealt with the situation was cleared up, the meeting was concluded, we left the room. And I saw frequently the Ambassador Hewel had a batch of reports from the Foreign Office, brought them to Hitler, reported on them without the rest of us knowing just what did take place. consultation, or who gave the orders? and frequently decided on a military basis by the Fuehrer, that is, that no further preparations for decision were called for. present? at these briefing sessions and I cannot remember that he participated or uttered any statement during the entire session. He was there for his own information and participated at this situation report.
Q How about Minister Speer, What was he doing there? seldom had a word during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were discussed between Hitler and Speer but they were dealt with in special discussions and conversations.
But there may be some exceptions to this in this case. discussing questions of security, or what was his mission?
A No. During the military briefing session security problems were net mentioned at all. Himmler and his deputy appeared, they appeared very frequently, in connection with the Waffen SS, and Fegelein had to give permanent reports about the deployment of the SS divisions. At this time the SS divisions in my opinion played an especially large part, for, ostensibly, they were a part of the strategic part of the Army and therefore had to be dealt with.
Q I have a record which was given by you. It has the number GB 209 and it says in the third paragraph -- I will read one sentence to you -- in the document of the Prosecution, GB 209, Mr. President -- it is not found in any document book and I am just reading one sentence. It says there the Deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS at the Fuehrer headquarters SS Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein brought about the question of the Reichsfuehrer when the Panzer -- that is, when the tanks, could be counted on.
Is that a typical mission of SS Fegelein?
A Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with as a matter of course at every one of these sessions. did he speak or report?
A I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner's part during one of these military briefing sessions.
Q What role did Admiral Doenitz play at these session discussions? reported by the deputy from the OKW, Assmann, but the Grand Admiral used the occasion of the naval war problems in connection with the individual theaters of war; or at the end, he reported on those questions and discussed these questions which he had wanted to present. As far as question of the war by air or by land was concerned, it had no connection with the naval war. The Grand Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion. In his statements he strictly confined himself to the sphere of the war Navy, and very energetically objected if someone else during the situation discussion tried to interfere in his sphere of influence.
DR. KRANZBUEHIER: Mr. President, I have now concluded this series of questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order to sit in closed session. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: between Admiral Doenitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this due to the fact that Admiral Doenitz was particularly willing to obey the Fuehrer's wishes?
A No, not at all. Admiral Doenitz's activities as Supreme Commander of the Navy began with a very strong controversy between him and Hitler, It was Hitler's intention that the large ships of the navy, that is to say, the remaining bat leships and cruisers, were to be dismantled. Grand Admiral Raeder had already turned down that plan.
Q That story is already known. You need not go into it in detail.
A Very well. Apart from that, Hitler's respect for Doenitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Grand Admiral made was absolutely reliable, absolutely honest. The Grand Admiral attributed particular importance to the fact that, particularly, unfavorable developments, failures and such, were to be reported at Headquarters without fail, clearly and without excuses. me the order -
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. Surely, the general statement is sufficient. obey the Fuehrer's political wishes or these of the Party?
A No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of churches, which happened during the time of Grand Admiral Raeder, and I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the navy grew.
The second request made by the Party was that, according to the Russian example, political commissars should be appointed within the armed forces.
In that case, Grand Admiral Doenitz went to Hitler and prevented that intention. so-called N.S.F.O. -- the National Socialist Leader Officers -- were appointed amongst the armed forces, this did not happen in accordance with the Party's wishes or by appointing political commissars. It was merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of commanding officers and who could not in any way interfere with the discipline or the leading of the troops. political proceedings should be taken away from the armed forces.
You prepared the records regarding the visits at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, is that correct? Courtroom. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what the purpose of keeping these records of all visitors to the Fuehrer's Headquarters was? Armaments Department, as well as the Chief of the General Navy Department -that is to say, the three leading men in the Supreme Command of the Navy -were to be informed by means of these records of all events which took place in the presence of the Grand Admiral, as far as they were of any significance or interest for the navy. That was part of my task.
Q You have just said "informed about events which took place in the presence of the Grand Admiral". Does that mean that he must have heard everything himself that has been put down in these records?
A Not absolutely necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during situation reports, when they took place in large rooms, and particularly during subjects which did not interest him so much, the Grand Admiral would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of his own to discuss navy questions with offer participants in the meeting.
It was perfectly possible that on such occasions I heard things and put then down in the record which the Grand Admiral did not hear himself, but, of course, he would hear of then not later than when he "saw my record.
Q I an going to have one of your own records shown to you. It deals with a conference on 20 February 1945. It is Number GB 209, and it is contained in the document book of the Prosecution on page 68. This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. Will you please descri how all this happened? other words, on or about 17 or 13 of February 1945 -- Admiral Foss called me from the Headquarters, which at that time was situated in Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda regarding the going over of on troops in the West, Hitler had situated his intention to leave in the Geneva Pac
Q What was the aim of itsgoing to be? was obviously to express to the troops and the German people that captivity would no longer bring any advantage. I immediately telephoned the Naval Command Staff, since I considered the intention to be quite wrong, and I asked then to give me their military and international law comments on that subject. On the 1st, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once more referred to this question, but this tine not in connection with matters of the Western front but in connection with the air attacks by the Western enemies on open German towns, attacks on places like Dresdren and Weimar, which had just taken place.
results and the effects of leaving the Geneva Convention from the point of view of the naval expert. I don't think an immediate answer was expected and it wasn't given. Colonel General Jodl was also quite strongly opposed to these intentions and he was seeking the Grand Admiral's support for his views. Consequently, a conference was agreed on, and that is the conference the record of which I prepared and to which I referred under Figure 2.
Q That is the conference of February the 20th, isn't it
Q Who participated in that conference? Hewel and myself.
Q What was the subject?
A Its subject was the Fuehrer's intention of renouncing the Geneva Convention and we were of the agreed opinion, all of us, that such a step would be a mistake. Apart from milita considerations there was that particular reason that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the armed forces and the German people would lose some of its confidence in their leaders, since the Geneva Convention was considered the loading feature in international law.
Q In your notes there is a sentence: "It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs 'to save face' with the outer world." What is the significance of that sentence? there be any wild actions; that if the leaders at the head considered it necessary to introduce measures against air attacks on German towns or against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one ought to stay within the limits which would be applicable to any such countermeasures; the renuncia tion of all the Geneva pacts was not to put us in the wrong before the world and our own people and no measures ought to be announced which would be well beyond the limits of the applicable law and order.
tion or were any such measures even thought of?
A No. I can remember very well that no measures, in detail, were discussed during the various discussions. We were merely concerned with the legal situation which would arise if the Geneva convention was renounced. on Adolf Hitler's part to sheet ten thousand prisoners of war as a reprisal for the attack on Dresden, the air attack?
Q The expression "to save face", doesn't that mean some secret goings on? Does it mean that the true facts were to be kept secret? thought of in any case and that neither reprisal measures against air attacks nor intimidating actions against the desertion to the enemy was considered; that they wouldn't help if one had kept then secret.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the transmission came through to me, Prosecution's Document Book, page 68. Is that right or not?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. Page 59 it should be I am told. Oh, I do beg your pardon. It is probably entered wrongly in my book. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: have taken down in this connection? talking about?
February which contains the sentences which I have just read to you? hour. deal, isn't it? Fuehrer? that. One became convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Grand Admiral, could gather from the Grand Admiral's expression and the attitude expressed by all the others that his intentions were being objected to by everybody.
We passed our views on to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Froces in writing and heard no more about the whole matter.
Q I am now going to show you another record. It is GB-210 and it can be found on the next page of the Document Book of the Prosecution. It refers to a conference at the Fuehrer's headquarters of the 29th of June, 1944. You will find an entry under the date of the 1st of July which says that regarding the general strike in Capenhagen the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Was this statement made during a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Doenitz or when did it take place?
A. This is a statement made by Hitler during a discussion which was neither addressed to Admiral Doenitz nor to the Navy at all.
Q. Well, if it wasn't addressed to the Navy, then why did you include it in your record?
A. I included everything that was said in my record, everything that was of any interest or could, be of any interest to the Navy. The Supreme Command of the Navy did, of course, find itself interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were being repaired in Copenhagen, and apart from that it was a base, Copenhagen was a base.
Q. And to whom was this record passed on by you?
A. According to the distribution list on page 4, it only went to the Supreme Commander and Department 1 of the Naval Command staff.
Q. Did the Naval Command staff have anything to do with treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?
A. No, nothing at all. Shipyards, after 1943, were entirely under the jurisdiction of the Armament Minister.
Q. The prosecution considers this sentence, this statement and its passin on to the OKW and the Supreme Command an invitation for bad treatment of all inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the meaning of this record?
A. You can't possibly say that. The only purpose of this record was to inform the departments and the Supreme Command.
Q. I am now going to have another document shown to you. Its number is US-544. It is contained in the Document Book of the prosecution on pages 64 and 65. It is a notice of the International Law Expert in the Naval Command Staff regarding the treatment of saboteurs. Do you know this document?
A. Yes, I have signed it. I have initialed it on the first page.
Q. At the end of that notice you will find the sentence that for the Navy it is to be ascertained whether the event can not be used to ascertain that members of command on troops and their treatment should be completely clarified in all the departments concerned. Admiral Doenitz had been Supreme Commander of the Navy at that time for ten days. Did he actually receive the report?
A. No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head of it will show.
Q. Please, will you explain that?
suggestion through the head of Department 1-A. This went to me and then to the chief of the Operations Staff. The head of the 1-A in a handwritten notice at the side of his initials wrote down that the subordinate commanders have been informed. That means that he had objected to the suggestions of the international law expert and he considered that an explanation of the orders within the Navy were superfluous. I investigated this matter and I made a decision which was that the operations officer was right.
I sent for the International law expert, Dr. Eckhardt, and informed him orally of my decision and returned this document to him. This means that the suggestion made in this connection regarding the report was not actually carried out. report on this matter regarding this command order? been submitted to you. This is contained in the British document book on page 66 and 67. Have you ever heard about this story before this trial?
A No. I head about it for the first time on the occasion of interrogations in connection with these proceedings. submitted during cross-examination by the Prosecution have indicated to me that before the shooting of the crew of that torpedo boat there had been two telephone calls. They took place between the chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo and between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a call from the SD at Osll arrived at your office or at an office in your department? any ether officer in my department or the supreme command. touch with the supreme command of the Navy?
A No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo wants to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then it would have to be his own superior department in Berlin and that is the RSHA.
Q I now put to you another document; it is GB 312 and it appears on page 75 of the document book of the Prosecution. An example is mentioned there where the chief or the commandant of the German prisoner of war camp is concerned and it says he had communists removed quietly from the camp; he had them removed and killed if they became noticeable in the camp. Do you know of this story, as such?
A Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received a report from a prisoner of war who had been severely injured and who had been exchanged. It was said that the German commandant of a prisoner of war camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser "Cormorau" were detained, had secretely had a man of his crew killed because he had been active as a spy and traitor.
Q But this order does not mention the word "spy." It says "communist." What is the explanation?
THE PRESIDENT: It does not say "communist." It says "communists" in the plural.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, yes, "communists."
A (continued) In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from getting held of the story and making difficulties for the man in question. Thus, a different version was chosen. plan regarding the silent removal of communists. Can you tell us anything, knowing the origin of these orders, whether such a plan existed? which were responsible for chasing young non-commissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven personnel departments of that type. Over and above that I can only say that of course -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into all this detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making away with people of this sort or was there not -- not all the details, but how the order came to be made.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In that case I shall put the question this way.