Q Is it, however, correct that you first made efforts toward this with Hitler, or is that correct?
A That is quite correct. I was because of the same situation as there was in England between Beaverbrook and Bevins at the same time. Here again, the Minister for Production asked that he have the right to give orders to the labor Minister. And in that case, as in my case, this right was refused him. There were various border spheres which were regulated by common decrees, signed by Sauckel and myself. These decrees are available but do not touch the basic problem cf the right to issue orders.
Q Witness, can you state, the reasons why the employment of foreign laborers was undertaken?
A I don't understand the question.
Q I was trying to be careful so that the prosecution should have no cause to blame me. What reasons led to the employment of foreign labor?
A Why, simply because there was not enough manpower there.
Q What brought it about in Germany that there were too few workers available?
A In Milch's and my opinion this was caused by an insufficient exploitation of German work reserves. In our estimation there were in Germany at least reserve manpower forces of at least three million men and women who could be employed if simply the same standards were applied to them as are applied in England and America. The precise numbers can be found in a communication of March 1944 from me to Sauckel, after I ascertained the percentage of women employed in England through reading it in the newspapers. Further, the same reserve, or the same statistics can be found if you study the minutes of a meeting that took place in June 1939 under the chairmanship of Goering, and during which Syrup of the Work Ministry gave precise statistics on the available reserve of German women who could be used in war production. Also, in this calculation of Syrup's at that time, and after and in comparison with Status of women employment in March 1944, it could be seen that we did really have at that time a reserve cf three million in Germany.
The reason why these German female workers were not employed lay both with Hitler and with Sauckel, who were both of the opinion that the birth rate could decline seriously as a result of employing females. There were a few other curious notions on the part of Hitler regarding the employment of females, which are to be found in a document of Sauckel's which is to be found in my document book.
Q. If I have understood you correctly you say that the use of foreign workers could be attributed to the failure to use German reserves and to the war conditions?
A. Could you please repeat that question?
Q. Did I rightly understand you if I summarize your previous rather long statement that the use of foreign workers was brought about by the failure to use three million German women and because of war conditions?
A. That is, in general, true. It is of course difficult to answer or to take such a problem from the entire context of industry. In this matter of dispute with Sauckel it was question of my embracing the point of view that these workers in Germany should be utilized and the foreign workers in the occupied territories should. be used to increase German production.
Q. Do you know whether, from the very beginning of the war, there was a plan for using a great number of foreign forced labor?
A. I do not know that from my own experience. From what I heard in the first trials that is, --
MR DENNEY: Just a minute, until we have the end of the answer.
A. (Con't) I do not know this of my own experience, since in my own trial, I heard of such things.
Q. In other words, you did not know of such a plan personally beforehand, before taking up your office?
A. No.
Q. Do you know whether Milch wished to use foreign workers in the air industry, or whether he was against that?
A. Milch had a very important reason for employing German workers in the air industry, for the airplanes are more susceptible to sabotage than any other product of the entire industry as a whole. For this reason, Milch continually pointed out that, in America for instance, a great part of the air industry was carried out by women. Pictures that appeared in English and American magazines were collected by us and used as an argument. These were propaganda pictures which appeared in these magazines.
Q. Did you know or did you not know that even before you became Armaments Minister, French factories worked for the air industry in France----the time previous to 1942 is the time I am speaking of?
A. That is not known to me personally, what program the Luftwaffe had before 1942 in France. Knowledge of the programs of the Luftwaffe in the occupied territories I received about summer or autumn of 1943 when I interested myself in the priority plants and the whole production in the occupied territories.
Q. Was there a production program already under way at that time in France?
A. You mean an air production?
Q. Yes; that's what I mean.
A. So far as I recall, the air industry had in France only production of JU-52, Junkers 52, in other words, were the only machines produced in France. This was a slow transport plane, of a speed of about 190 kilometers per hour. It was impractical to send either to France or to allocate to France or any occupied territories the production of airplanes or any other armaments because in a technical war the changes in these modern types follow so closely one on the other, that, as a matter of fact, it can only be carried out in one country.
This led to the fact that, both in the Army and in the Air 1152(a) Armaments no serious efforts were made to take up such production in the occupied territories.
Q. Witness, there are verbatim meetings of the Central Planning; were they checked on by any responsible person after they were expedited?
A. No, we had no time for his, nor was it necessary for these verbatim minutes were available only to Stephans so that he could draw up his summary report of the meetings.
Q. Did Milch, after the first meetings of the Central Planning, tell you once that he had checked through the minutes, and did he tell you what he had found out in so doing?
A. No, I cannot recall that he did. I know only that in the case of the minutes of these verbatim meetings, he discussed them with us and did not consider them to be reliable. It was the custom in the Four-Year Plan also, and it originated with Goering and was carried out by the stenographer Stettler, and carried over by him into the Central Planning. It was, namely, the custom of taking verbatim minutes on the meetings.
Q. Did you know that in 1943 Russian prisoners of war were to be used in antiaircraft artillery?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you know who originated this notion?
A. That was Goering's idea. He gave the necessary orders to General Foerster.
Q. Was this measure agreeable to Milch?
A. Neither Milch nor I approved of this measure, because in this was 19,000 Russian prisoners of war were to be withdrawn from war production, who were experts, and who had been trained as skilled workers. The harm that would thus be done to production, we considered not to be tolerable.
Q. Did Milch also have or state his misgivings or doubts about the fact that these Russians were thus being obliged to fight against their allies?
A. I don't recall that he did.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: I think we'll have a little break now.
(A recess was taken)
BY DR. BERGOLD:
1153(a)
Q. Witness, I shall now submit to you the record of the 33rd meeting of the Central Planning Board as it is contained in Document Book 3A of the prosecution (submitting document). From this record you will see that Milch at that time had said, "We have ordered that Russian prisoners of war should work in anit-aircraft artillery." Previously, you have testified that Milch had been against the employment of such workers for that purpose. How does this expression "We" come about?
A. That is something which I cannot explain exactly either. Particularly since General Foerster had previously been made an independent agency by Goering. This is something I know quite certainly since Milch was most disgusted about this fact. As for the interpretation, what Milch might have meant, "We", is something I can't say anything about.
Q. Is it correct that quite frequently, when Milch was making severe criticism regarding the program, the stenographers of the record were asked either to omit it or to somewhat change it?
A. That did happen quite often. Milch used to make severe remarks about our allies and encehe allowed such remark to slip out, he would tell the stenographer afterwards not to include such a remark in the record. I can remember, for instance, that I too, on several occasions, told the stenographer of the record, in the interest of Milch, to omit such remarks from the record.
Q. Did it also happen that it was said that the stenographer should alter things a little?
A. No, I cannot remember any such case or detail.
Q. Thank you. Is it known to you that in the Central Planning Board the so-called dodger's work was discussed?
A. Yes.
Q. And did Central Planning do anything about these shirkers in connection with these conferences we are talking about?
A. I only know about a remark made by me in a Central Planning Board meeting when I said that some of these slackers should be taken to a concentration camp. Following this remark, nothing particular was undertaken, which becomes apparent from the wording of the record of Central Planning.
Q. And now I shall turn to the Jaegerstab. What were the reasons leading to it; that the Jaegerstab was formed?
A. In February 1944 there were concentrated air attacks by the American Air Force on the fighter aircraft works in Germany. Generally, these attacks were considered to be a preparation for an invasion. According to those officially concerned in the Central Planning Board, from the Air Ministry, March, April, May 1944, would only produce enough parts - 60% compared with the previous months. Considering this catastrophic situation, Milch defied it to visit me in the hospital and we discussed the necessity of creating an organization by means of which my ministry organization would be closely connected with the reconstruction program of these fighter factories and would be included in a responsible manner. Milch's efforts to transfer such armament works to my ministry were not approved of by Goering, and consequently, the form the Jaegerstab was chosen. Although Goering was even opposed to this decree signed by me and objected to it - perhaps "objection" isn't Quite the right word - shall we say, he turned against this decree.
Q. Did the foundation of the Jaegerstab have any particular purpose with reference to Milch's person?
A. No. No; you can't call it that, at that particular stage. You can't say that there was a particular purpose. It was merely Milch's and my own aim to bring about a solution which would serve the necessities arising from the general position and which would also, on the other hand, take care of Goering's prestige.
Q. Is it correct that even as early as Autumn, 1943, Milch was trying to be relieved of the work of the GL?
A. Milch and I - we were both of the opinion much earlier, as early in fact as the end of 1942, that a sharing up of production among the various branches of the armed forces was a perfectly impossible solution from the point of view of organization, and that output that supplies all branches of the armed forces would be much higher if a joint armament program would exist such as was the case with the other warfaring nations. I cannot remember that Milch put the state of his health into the foreground when we talked I can only remember that his health had suffered somewhat.
After he had a serious car accident near Rostow,in January or February, 1943. he said there had been a collision between his car and a locomotive.
Q. Witness, I am having a flan submitted to you, a plan of the Jaegerstab submitted by the prosecution, which has been compiled by Mr. Sauer. Do you consider this plan to be correct?
A. To certify the correctness of such a plan would mean some hours of work. All channels which exist are entered in it.
Q. Are you concerned with one particular part?
A. Yes; This plan contains Himmler's name as being a member of the Jaegerstab.
Q. And there is mention of a Mr. Kammler. Was Himmler in that capacity or was his agency a member of the Jaegerstab?
A Naturally, Himmler was not a member of the Jaegerstab. Just as all other ministers who entered in this plan, with the exception of myself, were not members of the Jaegerstab. As far as the question of Kammler's activities is concerned, I shall have to speak most generally, and I think we'll have to subdivide it in individual questions.
Q Well, but first of all, I should want to know whether Kammler was a member of the Jaegerstab at all?
A I can't tell you that on the basis of the knowledge I have whether Kammler was a member of the Jaegerstab or not. As far as I'm concerned, I called to the Jaegerstab one representative of each of my departments, totaling eight, so that there were eight representatives of those departments, working as members of the Jaegerstab. These representatives of mine had instructions at ways to give the essential instructions when there had been air attacks. Sauer, as chief of this staff, had some sort of jurisdiction, to give instructions to these representatives of my department. That was of course the initial purpose of the Jaegerstab when it was founded, I mean, a sort of agency should be created whore all the departments of my ministry, namely, buildings, transportation, etc., should be assured of supplies, of spare parts, and small parts, of raw materials, and that they should be at the disposal of those agencies who needed this potential. Naturally, it was the custom with us that the meetings, not only of the Jaegerstab, but at all other meetings there should be representatives of from other ministries in attendance. I, myself could not appoint a member of another ministry as a member of the Jaegerstab. I would quite certainly, quite definitely know if another ministry had ordered such a wish, because the matter would have had to come before me for my approval, and that is not the situation.
Q Was Mr. Dorsch a member of the Jaegerstab?
A That is something I can't tell you in detail. Quite certainly the department for buildings had a member on the Jaegerstab; that is, a representative of Dorsch was a member of the Jaegerstab.
Q You know, of course, of the Fuehrer Order which came to Dorsch, which ordered the construction of subterranean factories on a large scale?
A Yes. But in the case of this order given to Dorsch we're not concerned with subterranean factories, but with factories on the ground which were suitably protected.
Q Well, then, in pursuance of the carrying out of this order, did he become a member of the Jaegerstab or did he handle this task separately?
A This would have meant the destruction of the framework of the Jaegerstab, if a department chief from my ministry had received orders or tasks for which he was responsible anyway, if he had to carry out such tasks, with the responsi bilities of the Jaegerstab. I wouldn't have allowed that as a matter of principle, because in that manner the Jaegerstab would have become a ministry. In that way, the situation naturally was that Sauer had a certain amount of ambition in this sector, and that he was always trying to make more of a small ministry out of the Jaegerstab and I had to curtail his ambition quite a lot.
Q Where did the suggestion originate to construct subterranean factories or factories protected by concrete?
A In September or October, 1943, there were the first large scale and daylight attacks of the American Air Fleet. After these attacks, Hitler and Goering too, had given instructions to the effect that the aircraft industry should go below ground, in other words, should be protected from bombing. These instructions of Goering and of Hitler, met with Milch's and my resistance for practical reasons.
We considered that it was too late to go below ground since the realization of such a program would have occupied a total of one and a half to two years; we were there concerned with one million square meters of territory which would have then had to go under the ground, and also, we considered that the tremendous amount of material, such as iron, copper, for cables, etc., would have been uselessly expanded, in our opinion, because, or rather, there was a third point, namely, that in the event of a completion of a subterranean factory, there would have been loss of production during four to six months caused by the move of that factory from its old site to the new. We were quite clear about the fact, and discussed it quite often, that the year of 1944 would have to bring the decision in the war, and that it therefore would be more appropriate towards the end of 1943 and also for the year 1944, a reaping should be used in order to produce as much as possible with existing means, and not under any circumstances develop projects with a distant future, such as one or two years would be. After Goering discovered that these transfers to subterranean sites ordered by him had been carried out with sufficient intensity and energy, he made serious reproaches to Milch towards the end of 1943 and he told the chief of the Air Construction Department, TreiTreiber, independently from Milch, to carry out such transfers into these subterranean locations. I can not now remember exactly whether Treiber was the Chief of the Aircraft Construction Department or the Deputy Chief. There wore two rather excited discussions with Hitler too about this subterranean building program during which I presented my practical point of view, and made it very clear, and during one such discussion between Colonel von Below was present, which incidentally also took place in November, 1943.
It was Hitler's plan to construct large bomb protected factories above the ground, following the sample of the well-known submarine pens on the Atlantic 1159 a Coast, and in spite of my objections, he had given me a strict order in this connection, an order which of course I had to receive, but Milch and I didn't show any great interest in the carrying out of this wasteful plan.
During my illness, Hitler used, shall we say, this opportunity in order to get hold of Mr. Dorsch directly, and to give him the order directly, to build six large fighter factories above the ground, each covering 100,000 square meters. Dorsch promised them in a period of six months, something which he could hardly accomplish. I heard about this during my illness, and I turned against it with all my energy. I needn't repeat the old circumstances since they have come to light during my own trial. At any rate, this letter that Hitler related to me, in which he informed that Dorsch had been given this order by him, Hitler, to construct these six factories, and that I was to supply the materials and equipment needed for this purpose. Labor, incidentally, was not mentioned in this decree. I think the decree, as such, was contained in my document book. The second subject running separately from this first one, was due more to Goering's initiative, and that was subject to the so-called subterranean factories; the grotto construction, and in the case of this grotto construction program, Goering , toward the end of February or the beginning of March, published a decree which had been signed by him, and through which Kammler, from the SS, received the order to employ 100,000 workers from concentration camps for the purpose of constructing grottos, and the reason why I can remember this decree so well is because it was stated there in that Kammler had the right to confiscate material on every building side in Germany in order to carry out this decree, which of course would mean complete cancellation of the applicable order in Germany, the order of the building world, I mean.
Milch came to see me at that time in the hospital, with reference to the Jaegerstab, and it it was on the same day that, much to my surprise, this decree 1160 a of Goering arrived.
Milch told me at the time that he had nothing of the wording of this decree, and he spoke very seriously about consequences of this decree, which were quite obvious, since the threat, through air attacks, had become so considerable at the time that any inference from a third force regarding a disposition of building material and equipment would impede seriously the speedy construction of damaged factories and make it impossible.
Q. Then what did the Jaegerstab have to do with these two plans ordered partly by Hitler and partly by Goering? -- these construction plans? Did it particularly have to have the right of supervision over them?
A. I must say that I can't give you an answer in too precise a manner, since I myself never presided over a single meeting of Jaegerstab, but I do, very naturally, from the meetings and discussions which Faber had in my office, just what the contents of the activities of the Jaegerstab must have been. In the case of these factories, it was, of course, essential that a plan should be carried out which meant that first of all it had to be ascertained what was being produced in individual factories, and whether the German railway would be capable of bringing up the essential materials necessary for the production period and also it was necessary to decide the firms which would move into these factories. Once this part of work was completed, it was then the individual task of the offices of the Central Planning Board to ascertain together with the management of the construction site, how the entire layout of the factory had to be decided on.
Q. Did I understand you correctly. Did you say that supervision over the individual construction plant did not exist for the Jaegerstab?
A. Supervision regarding construction programs, the carrying out of that particular construction, was of course not in the hands of the Jaegerstab.
Q. Is your answer meant to say, therefore, that it was only the use of these construction sites which the Jaegerstab had to decide about, once they were completed?
A. Well, you can't say it exactly like that. If there was a hollow in the ground, a grotto, then that grotto was marked as far as its size was concerned, arid then one had to find that part of the production program which could be fitted into that space, which of course was the sort of task which had to be dealt with by the Jaegerstab. But I wouldn't even say directly by the Jaegerstab. I would say there was a small planning office in the technical department which was headed by a certain Wegener.
Q. I shall now turn to a number of individual questions. Were these subterranean factories constructed? Were these subterranean factories actually constructed?
A. Of all these subterranean factories only a very small proportion was started. As far as construction was concerned, practically "nothing was finished -- only a few thousand square meters. As far as the buildings, the factories which were built on the ground, four were begun, a few months later two were put out of action because of the general position, and the remainder was not completed either.
Q. I understood you to say that Hitler took advantage of your illness that is to say, that Hitler issued an order regarding the subterranean factories. Do I understand you to say that Hitler feared your opposition and wouldn't make the order while you were still in charge?
A. In this case of the order of Hitler's, we were concerned with the factories on the ground, not subterranean factories. Hitler's order only applied to factories above ground, whereas Goering's order applied to subterranean factories in grottos. If I am to say this quite openly, then the situation was that one of my associates used this opportunity to gain, shall we say, some prestige, a move which I myself would never have made, something, of course, which happens quite often.
These promises, then, gave him a particularly good reputation, which resulted in his acquiring for himself this order, this instruction. I considered this a demonstration of distrust against myself, and after a lot of going to and fro, the trouble was eliminated but the issuing of the order to Mr. Dorsch was not rescinded by Hitler.
Q As far as the Arbeitseinsatz is concerned -- the labor program was the plenipotentiary for labor responsible for that or not?
AAs far as the supplying of labor was concerned, of course, the plenipotentiary for labor was responsible.
Q And is it correct to say that both through a Goering as well as through a Hitler decree, he was designated as the sole responsible force for that?
A Yes. Both decrees are sufficiently well known, I think.
Q Can you speak about these organizations of the Plenipotentiary for Labor which he used for the carrying out of this task of his?
A Not throu ,h any knowledge of my own obtained through the trial period. I can only speak about it from knowledge obtained through the trial here -- during the trial here. I myself, only had contact with Timm and Hildebrandt apart from my contact with Sauckel, of course.
Q Was Sauckel responsible for recruiting foreign workers abroad, or who was responsible for that?
A That is a debatable question which I, myself, can't give you a verdict on. At the time, Sauckel was very much under the impression to a considerable extent that he, himself, was possibly known and that military commanders had to obey his orders. But there was always an argument against this conception; at any rate, I cannot answer this question here because this might turn into a plea for or against Sauckel, of course.
Q Was Milch responsible for recruiting laborers abroad?
A No.
Q How was this work done by these foreign laborers -- the output, was it good or was it bad?
AAccording to what we heard, it was good.
Q What about the work done by prisoners of war; a, French; and b, the Russian prisoners of war?
A Regarding the output of prisoners of war, we had quite a lot of complaints stating that they were worse; but to make differences between Russians and French would be impossible for me here in detail.