Q Was Mr. Dorsch a member of the Jaegerstab?
A That is something I can't tell you in detail. Quite certainly the department for buildings had a member on the Jaegerstab; that is, a representative of Dorsch was a member of the Jaegerstab.
Q You know, of course, of the Fuehrer Order which came to Dorsch, which ordered the construction of subterranean factories on a large scale?
A Yes. But in the case of this order given to Dorsch we're not concerned with subterranean factories, but with factories on the ground which were suitably protected.
Q Well, then, in pursuance of the carrying out of this order, did he become a member of the Jaegerstab or did he handle this task separately?
A This would have meant the destruction of the framework of the Jaegerstab, if a department chief from my ministry had received orders or tasks for which he was responsible anyway, if he had to carry out such tasks, with the responsi bilities of the Jaegerstab. I wouldn't have allowed that as a matter of principle, because in that manner the Jaegerstab would have become a ministry. In that way, the situation naturally was that Sauer had a certain amount of ambition in this sector, and that he was always trying to make more of a small ministry out of the Jaegerstab and I had to curtail his ambition quite a lot.
Q Where did the suggestion originate to construct subterranean factories or factories protected by concrete?
A In September or October, 1943, there were the first large scale and daylight attacks of the American Air Fleet. After these attacks, Hitler and Goering too, had given instructions to the effect that the aircraft industry should go below ground, in other words, should be protected from bombing. These instructions of Goering and of Hitler, met with Milch's and my resistance for practical reasons.
We considered that it was too late to go below ground since the realization of such a program would have occupied a total of one and a half to two years; we were there concerned with one million square meters of territory which would have then had to go under the ground, and also, we considered that the tremendous amount of material, such as iron, copper, for cables, etc., would have been uselessly expanded, in our opinion, because, or rather, there was a third point, namely, that in the event of a completion of a subterranean factory, there would have been loss of production during four to six months caused by the move of that factory from its old site to the new. We were quite clear about the fact, and discussed it quite often, that the year of 1944 would have to bring the decision in the war, and that it therefore would be more appropriate towards the end of 1943 and also for the year 1944, a reaping should be used in order to produce as much as possible with existing means, and not under any circumstances develop projects with a distant future, such as one or two years would be. After Goering discovered that these transfers to subterranean sites ordered by him had been carried out with sufficient intensity and energy, he made serious reproaches to Milch towards the end of 1943 and he told the chief of the Air Construction Department, TreiTreiber, independently from Milch, to carry out such transfers into these subterranean locations. I can not now remember exactly whether Treiber was the Chief of the Aircraft Construction Department or the Deputy Chief. There wore two rather excited discussions with Hitler too about this subterranean building program during which I presented my practical point of view, and made it very clear, and during one such discussion between Colonel von Below was present, which incidentally also took place in November, 1943.
It was Hitler's plan to construct large bomb protected factories above the ground, following the sample of the well-known submarine pens on the Atlantic 1159 a Coast, and in spite of my objections, he had given me a strict order in this connection, an order which of course I had to receive, but Milch and I didn't show any great interest in the carrying out of this wasteful plan.
During my illness, Hitler used, shall we say, this opportunity in order to get hold of Mr. Dorsch directly, and to give him the order directly, to build six large fighter factories above the ground, each covering 100,000 square meters. Dorsch promised them in a period of six months, something which he could hardly accomplish. I heard about this during my illness, and I turned against it with all my energy. I needn't repeat the old circumstances since they have come to light during my own trial. At any rate, this letter that Hitler related to me, in which he informed that Dorsch had been given this order by him, Hitler, to construct these six factories, and that I was to supply the materials and equipment needed for this purpose. Labor, incidentally, was not mentioned in this decree. I think the decree, as such, was contained in my document book. The second subject running separately from this first one, was due more to Goering's initiative, and that was subject to the so-called subterranean factories; the grotto construction, and in the case of this grotto construction program, Goering , toward the end of February or the beginning of March, published a decree which had been signed by him, and through which Kammler, from the SS, received the order to employ 100,000 workers from concentration camps for the purpose of constructing grottos, and the reason why I can remember this decree so well is because it was stated there in that Kammler had the right to confiscate material on every building side in Germany in order to carry out this decree, which of course would mean complete cancellation of the applicable order in Germany, the order of the building world, I mean.
Milch came to see me at that time in the hospital, with reference to the Jaegerstab, and it it was on the same day that, much to my surprise, this decree 1160 a of Goering arrived.
Milch told me at the time that he had nothing of the wording of this decree, and he spoke very seriously about consequences of this decree, which were quite obvious, since the threat, through air attacks, had become so considerable at the time that any inference from a third force regarding a disposition of building material and equipment would impede seriously the speedy construction of damaged factories and make it impossible.
Q. Then what did the Jaegerstab have to do with these two plans ordered partly by Hitler and partly by Goering? -- these construction plans? Did it particularly have to have the right of supervision over them?
A. I must say that I can't give you an answer in too precise a manner, since I myself never presided over a single meeting of Jaegerstab, but I do, very naturally, from the meetings and discussions which Faber had in my office, just what the contents of the activities of the Jaegerstab must have been. In the case of these factories, it was, of course, essential that a plan should be carried out which meant that first of all it had to be ascertained what was being produced in individual factories, and whether the German railway would be capable of bringing up the essential materials necessary for the production period and also it was necessary to decide the firms which would move into these factories. Once this part of work was completed, it was then the individual task of the offices of the Central Planning Board to ascertain together with the management of the construction site, how the entire layout of the factory had to be decided on.
Q. Did I understand you correctly. Did you say that supervision over the individual construction plant did not exist for the Jaegerstab?
A. Supervision regarding construction programs, the carrying out of that particular construction, was of course not in the hands of the Jaegerstab.
Q. Is your answer meant to say, therefore, that it was only the use of these construction sites which the Jaegerstab had to decide about, once they were completed?
A. Well, you can't say it exactly like that. If there was a hollow in the ground, a grotto, then that grotto was marked as far as its size was concerned, arid then one had to find that part of the production program which could be fitted into that space, which of course was the sort of task which had to be dealt with by the Jaegerstab. But I wouldn't even say directly by the Jaegerstab. I would say there was a small planning office in the technical department which was headed by a certain Wegener.
Q. I shall now turn to a number of individual questions. Were these subterranean factories constructed? Were these subterranean factories actually constructed?
A. Of all these subterranean factories only a very small proportion was started. As far as construction was concerned, practically "nothing was finished -- only a few thousand square meters. As far as the buildings, the factories which were built on the ground, four were begun, a few months later two were put out of action because of the general position, and the remainder was not completed either.
Q. I understood you to say that Hitler took advantage of your illness that is to say, that Hitler issued an order regarding the subterranean factories. Do I understand you to say that Hitler feared your opposition and wouldn't make the order while you were still in charge?
A. In this case of the order of Hitler's, we were concerned with the factories on the ground, not subterranean factories. Hitler's order only applied to factories above ground, whereas Goering's order applied to subterranean factories in grottos. If I am to say this quite openly, then the situation was that one of my associates used this opportunity to gain, shall we say, some prestige, a move which I myself would never have made, something, of course, which happens quite often.
These promises, then, gave him a particularly good reputation, which resulted in his acquiring for himself this order, this instruction. I considered this a demonstration of distrust against myself, and after a lot of going to and fro, the trouble was eliminated but the issuing of the order to Mr. Dorsch was not rescinded by Hitler.
Q As far as the Arbeitseinsatz is concerned -- the labor program was the plenipotentiary for labor responsible for that or not?
AAs far as the supplying of labor was concerned, of course, the plenipotentiary for labor was responsible.
Q And is it correct to say that both through a Goering as well as through a Hitler decree, he was designated as the sole responsible force for that?
A Yes. Both decrees are sufficiently well known, I think.
Q Can you speak about these organizations of the Plenipotentiary for Labor which he used for the carrying out of this task of his?
A Not throu ,h any knowledge of my own obtained through the trial period. I can only speak about it from knowledge obtained through the trial here -- during the trial here. I myself, only had contact with Timm and Hildebrandt apart from my contact with Sauckel, of course.
Q Was Sauckel responsible for recruiting foreign workers abroad, or who was responsible for that?
A That is a debatable question which I, myself, can't give you a verdict on. At the time, Sauckel was very much under the impression to a considerable extent that he, himself, was possibly known and that military commanders had to obey his orders. But there was always an argument against this conception; at any rate, I cannot answer this question here because this might turn into a plea for or against Sauckel, of course.
Q Was Milch responsible for recruiting laborers abroad?
A No.
Q How was this work done by these foreign laborers -- the output, was it good or was it bad?
AAccording to what we heard, it was good.
Q What about the work done by prisoners of war; a, French; and b, the Russian prisoners of war?
A Regarding the output of prisoners of war, we had quite a lot of complaints stating that they were worse; but to make differences between Russians and French would be impossible for me here in detail.
Q The instructions regarding the employment and treatment of foreign workers before your coming into office as a minister, are they known to you?
A No, not from knowledge obtained at that time.
Q Did you have any possibilities to check secret orders of Himmler regarding the treatment of foreign workers or treatment of concentration camp inmates and get to know them?
A No, that was quite out of the question.
Q Was that out of the question for anyone or just for you; in other words, what about Milch?
A Well, it's safe to assume that he had no more possibility to get any facts than I had.
Q Did Rosenberg give you any information regarding the treatment of Eastern workers?
A No.
Q What do you know about the question of what and of how and to what extent the foreign workers came to Germany voluntarily?
A From the Spring until the Autumn of 1942, foreign laborers came to Germany voluntarily, without any doubt. From Autumn till Spring -from Autumn '42 to 1943, we were concerned with a period of transition. During that time, workers did come voluntarily because Germany's military successes were still making a great impression on them and because Germany, during that period, was promising them a better life than their own home country. These were the reasons which we were told about at that particular period. In February and March 1943; there was a distinct change in the attitude of these people which could be attributed to the fact that, to begin with, Stalingrad was considered to be a turning point in the war; and secondly, the air attacks taking place nightly by the RAF-- the Royal Air Force -- were so concentrated that they weren't particularly keen in coming to Germany. So that on February and March 1943 on, and to an ever increasing degree, there was resistance against transfer to Germany by the worker. This led to, in turn, that in the occupied territories there Court No. 2 Take 2 (DJG) was considerable disquiet when Sauckel was calling up particular groups.
It was characteristic for Sauckel to operate with large figures and to compose big programs, and to call up, quite generously in France, anything up to three or four or five age groups. This had the consequence for me that the age groups which had been called up did not comply with the call-up, but their majority disappeared from factories abroad; whereas, Sauckel, on the other hand, was not in any position to lay a hand upon these workers. For this purpose, he would have to have had the help of the police authorities in France, which of course were not particularly interested in catching up with these workers. Through this, in both Milch's and my own opinion, the resistance movements in the different countries were rendered a most tremendous service in this matter. We told Sauckel quite openly that he was only going to get into a meddle with the leaders of the resistance movements abroad, but certainly not with us, and in his excitement, Sauckel actually complained about this remark in the meeting which, I think, was on the first of March 1944 of the Central Planning Board. The results were, in fact, such that the disadvantages which ensued for us in occupied territories in relation to production, with which both Milch and I were concerned with, were greater than the advantages put to use by workers who came to Germany; and thus we drew attention to the workers still available in Germany, which in turn, produced a plan according to which occupied territories would have their production increased. Incidentally, in keeping with the character of the country concerned which needed no groat reorganization of consumer goods mostly, and that with the help of these workers and by means of this transfer to France, Belgium, Holland and Czechoslovakia, German production should be made free -- available -- and that this German production could then be stopped so that in Germany, not only workers, but also factory space should become available; and apart from the factory space, men would be trained as leaders for these factories. Apart from this, power which had become very scarce in Germany at that time and transport possibilities too, could be transferred to the armament program in occupied territories; on the other hand, production, beginning with coal, might be increased by 20 to 30 percent without having reached a peace-time peak figure.
It is perfectly clear that from my own point of view, this was a perfectly sober plan which brought great advantages to Milch and myself; and in order to be able to carry this out, I had the entire production handed ever to me by Funk. A few days later, there was a conference with the French production minister, Michelon , during which this program was agreed upon by means of a handshake. This program produced the so-called blocked industries, Sperrbetriebe, and in every one of these blocked industries, there was a poster displayed which had my signature on it stating that every worker employed in such factories was safe from becoming transferred to Germany, even if the age group concerned was called up by Sauckel.
Q Is it known to you that the French government published a decree dealing with labor service in Germany to men in France?
A Yes, I know that.
Q Now about this calling up by age groups by Sauckel, were they carried out on the strength of that decree or was there another decree applicable?
A That I can't tell you in detail. You'd have to ask Timm.
Q Through what channel did you hear that in the Fall of 1943 workers became reluctant about coming to Germany?
A Well, that I cannot tell you now by memory. That must have come from all sorts of sources.
May I add that in principle, it was through military commanders who were mostly concerned about the consequences of Sauckel's labor policy and opposed it.
Q Did these military commanders have any official contact with you?
A No, and it certainly wasn't directly from these military commanders that I heard it. It was through my outside agencies in France and Belgium who naturally were in contact and collaborated with military commanders.
Q Did you hear through this or any other channel about inhumane 1167A acts in connection with the recruitment and signing up of such foreign workers?
A No, I didn't receive reports. There were always attempts to turn the draft, which was nothing other than a call-up, into an act or force of coercion; but, the carrying through of such attempts was always prevented by military commanders because such actions produced the most tremendous upset in the country concerned. If such apprehension was avoided, then excesses were usually mentioned which had actually happened, but they wore always described as individual cases which had always been stopped.
Q Then I can say, if I understood you correctly, that the drafting of an age group did not mean the call-up -- the unavoidable call-up-for that age group?
A Because the definition of the word "force" or "coercion" is a very difficult one. It was always put to me during interrogations that these workers were brought to Germany against their will, and I found that it was an excellent definition. That settled the question correctly -- the question of draft and call-up. The conception of force, of course goes beyond that quite a bit. I consider that the employment of force means that they were gotten hold of by the police or gotten hold of by the military authorities, and then they would remain behind barbed wires when they got to Germany. That, in my firm opinion, was not the situation in the labor assignment program.
Q Do you know of a statement of Sauckel's, according to which, out of five million workers, only about two hundred thousand came to Germany voluntarily? That is true, isn't it?
A Well, I only heard about it at the trial here because I happened to be present.
Q Considering your knowledge of the situation, are you of the opinion that the statement is true or not?
A The figure of two hundred thousand appears to me to be a very low one; but now the question arises, of course -- or let's put it this way.
It seemed very low to me because up to the Spring of '43, a very large percentage came voluntarily. Naturally one can well imagine that a number of these people who came voluntarily had later returned again to their old territories since their contracts did not run for an indefinite time, but were limited to a certain period; and some of these contracts certainly had ended by March 1944 so that the very portion who had come voluntarily at the beginning had long gone back to their home countries. Naturally, I can't tell you, from my own knowledge, whether the figure is correct or not.
Q. But then, Sauckel went on to say, in this meeting, that never once had there been a labor program carried out in France based on voluntary recruitment. Is that statement correct?
A. I cannot recollect that this was ever mentioned at a meeting.
Q. Unfortunately, I haven't got the document yet. It was only on Saturday that I received records of the 45th Meeting. But I hope that after the lunch break, I will be in a position to put this record before you. Maybe we can put the question aside until then.
A. Well, anyway, I shall not be able to answer the question on the strength of my own knowledge since it is not known to me which contracts were made by Sauckel, individually speaking. The details which would be essential to gain such knowledge are not at my disposal.
Naturally, apart from the draft for labor for individual age groups, there was always the possibility of coming to Germany on a voluntary basis. I had always assumed -- but, of course, this may be only an assumption-- that during the early period until Spring '43 voluntary conclusion of a contract had been used extensively for work in Germany, which I stated previously.
Q. Is it known to you that there had been an agreement -- I have asked you that before -- according to which a prisoner of war could be released if a French worker declared, his willingness to go to Germany?
A. I think I have answered that, haven't I?
Q. I am not quite sure as to whether it has been answered or not.
A. Yes, I have answered it.
Q. Thank you very much.
BY JUDGE MUSMANNO:
Q. Herr Speer, you said that force was not in the labor program. You mean by that that you didn't actually outline a system of force --physical force -- to be employed in the obtaining of these foreigners but do you know whether, as a matter of fact, that force in some instances was employed?
A. Surely, and certainly, attempted force must have been in existence, force against such laborers who did not report to the authorities because of the draft law, so that in individual cases, quite certainly force must have been employed; but it is unknown to me just what percentage has been recruited by means of such coercion or force because the agencies which were available for this purpose -- in other words, their own police -- no doubt failed to carry out such force. It didn't carry out the orders to employ such force -- orders which came from the French Government. I don't know whether this would answer your question, sir.
A. Yes, that answers my question.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, do you know that force was employed? Did you know that then or had you only learned that later or now?
A. In this sense, as I have just stated now, I must say that I knew it then. Only the examples which are being mentioned here so often: the surrounding 1170-A of the cinema, for instance; raids of churches, and all that sort of thing -- those are matters which have only become known to me to that extent right here.
From the point of view of production, of course, this was absolutely nonsensical, because if one had extended that system, laborers would have been gotten who would have been incapable of producing any considerable production. And apart from the positive outcome, that matter would have served the resistance movement once again.
Q. Witness, do you know of an order by Hitler dated 1941 or '42, according to which, upon the evacuation of certain territories in Russia, male population between their 15th and 60th year should have been taken tack by military authorities?
A. No, I do not know of any such order. No doubt, Hitler often made such statements saying that sort of thing was necessary, but anyone who knew about our retreats knew that such a plan could not have been carried out since the troops were happy if they could manage to come back alive. Not even Russian prisoners of war could be brought back; not even for that did we have time and possibilities.
Q. Witness, previously you stated that you consider Sauckel's statements of figures incorrect. What was the opinion about these figures?
A. We shared the opinion that they were considerably exaggerated. If I may add as a detail, let me say that, for instance, according to Sauckel's report he said that during nine months 60 or 75 percent of all workers in the army rearmament program had been replaced by him, which was an impossibility in practice. There wasn't the capacity to train even a fraction of these people. It would have meant an absolute catastrophe to the rearmament program if I had had more than 50 percent of new workers, but such a report had to be passed on to Sauckel and, of course, we didn't exactly fall in love with it.
Q. Can you tell me what the air armament situation was? I wish to withdraw a question. That is the wrong question. Do you know if Milch encountered difficulties when he tried to carry out suitable air armament programs from Goering or any other people concerned in such a matter?
A. I know an awful lot about that. I think I could make a speech lasting for several hours about that.
Q. I just want to know one or two details. What were the leading difficulties which he ran into?
A. Well, in the main, the reason was that Milch, from the summer of 1942 onwards, desired reorganization of the entire air construction program in favor of the fighters, whereas Hitler, Goering, and also the Chief of the General Staff were interested in bomber aircraft and adhered to that plan. This argument continued until March 1944. And even as late as March '44 we had a mixed program for bombers and fighters which, considering the situation, could not by any means be justified; and it was only during the meeting at the Obersalzberg when Sauer and Milch were present that Hitler recognized the fact that fighters should have priority over bombers and that the bomber production should be stopped, but even that only lasted for a brief period. Six or eight weeks later, in June or July 1944, Goering and Hitler were once again so optimistic that they withdrew their decision -- this earlier decision -- and once again ordered bomber production to come into effect.
Q. So that it would be right to say that Milch objected to too large a bomber force during the entire period when you collaborated with him?
A. That is obvious. It's the result of the general decision which in turn was due to the superior strength of the foreign aircraft production.
Q. In one of the records -- in one of the minutes of the meetings -- Milch is suggesting that foreign workers should be given a premium of one mark a day if they made particularly great efforts. For the economic situation in Germany at that time was that a lot or was it a little?
A. That certainly wasn't very much - one mark a day - but it was a temptation for a worker. But as far as I can remember, there was something connected with this action; namely, that workers, together with this bonus, should be enabled to actually buy something in the canteens at their work, and that was an important point because the situation,even at that time, was such that everyone had enough money which one couldn't transfer into goods.
Q.Did any instructions originating from Milch become known to you Court No. 2 - Take 2 (GES) -- instructions given to subordinates of his or given to the industry, according to which he advocated murder or hanging or shooting or cruelties against foreign workers or prisoners of war?