Q Were you in touch with ex-European countries too?
A Yes. As I had already mentioned, traffic to South America was one of the most important points. We had three main aims, South America, North America, and the Far East. The Far East would have been easiest. In Russia we had a joint company with the Russians. That is the so-called RussianGerman Aircraft Corporation. There we got as far as Moscow and St. Petersburg. The representative of the German Lufthansa in Russia on the Russian side was the Russian Government, where there were high government officials, commissars, for instance, who were together with us on the board of directors of this corporation. Before we discussed, before we arranged for further flights from Moscow to the East with the Russians, we had come to an arrangement with Chang Kai Chek's Chinese Government and there was a joint company in China called the Eurasia. In that Eurasia company under Chang Kai Chek's arrangement they had two-thirds , where as the German company had onethird of the shares of this company. It was using German aircraft, as well as German personnel, intermingled with Chinese. We also took care of the Chinese pilots and technicians.
Then on the two large sea routes, the technical problems regarding South America were much easier, since distances going over the sea were much shorter, and at that time particularly the aircraft we had could cope with that. It was for that reason that this line was first started, together with the Pan-American Airways in America, with whom we also had close contact. I knew their director, Mr. Tripple, and there, too, we had joint airways, regarding joint routes "from Germany to America and vice versa, to be handled by those two corporations and their joint service. This later service, however, never got beyond the stage of experimental flights after 1933.
Q How did you handle, how did you regard those international collaborations politically speaking?
A The very close friendly collaboration, particularly with the French after four and a half years of war with them was a great event to me. I saw that people were not different from us, that their thoughts were just the same is ours, that from the point of view of the airplane from which we were accustomed to see the world, it was ridiculous when in Europe these small countries were destroying each other for thousands of years, all without any final solution ever being achieved at any time.
During cur conferences we often talked about this, and we were all convinced that in the era of the airplane this nonsense would now at last stop. We were nursing the hope that the countries to which we belonged would come to a similarly good personal relationship between their governments, such amity that has existed between those small modest air companies.
Q You told me once that you considered your collaboration a sort of preparatory step for Pan-Europe.
A Yes, as early as 1925 we were trying to form a company called Europe Union Airways Company, which was in fact brought about, but the fees which the government forced stopped it from a final development. This was a corporation in which all those companies which were willing should have entered, such as, for instance, the Swiss, the Hungarians, the Ukrainians, the Latvians, the Swedes, the Norwegians and various others, the Polish too, and where they jointly were forming a company. I was told, although I understand it perfectly well, at the time that this was something quite new, since no international corporation at that time had been in existence. It was mentioned that it should be put on record with the League of Nations. But all these questions, in spite of the actual function, were never solved, but the thought, the idea remained alive amongst all these aircraft corporations, these airways corporations. Had this company come alive then a Pan-European continent would have existed, at least in the air.
Q Witness, the prosecution in its opening speech assumed that you had used the Lufthansa for the secret preparation for a new war.
A To suppose that is erroneous. The Lufthansa had nothing whatever to do with military or beligerent questions. The difference between civil aircraft for traffic purposes and military aircraft, even during the First World War, was a very clear-cut difference. Certainly shortly afterwards as time went on and its output increased, the performances increased, these elements became more and more outstanding. A further point was that a military air force is a machine of large movements and high figures.
an air force like ours with everything that it needed for trainers and transports amounted to some forty or fifty thousand aircraft which it had to maintain. The German Lufthansa, during its peak period, had one hundred and fifty aircraft all told and just as many pilots, just as many wireless operators, and just as many technicians, or rather fewer aircraft mechanics because some of them were servicing two or three. I think these figures, apart from the technical questions by other experts, should be made clear and ought to be enough to prove that with such means and such machinery a military power or in fact anything military could not be started.
May I also draw your attention to the fact that at least as far as we in Germany were concerned, the military was also high above any civilian authority so that its work and its intentions would never have been entrusted to such a civilian authority. I knew all these gentlemen very well, because we in the Aero club met from time to time, but I also knew the intentions of the German Government of the time, that is before 1933; which was afraid of nothing more than that some prohibitive matter should be detected by the Allies, and military aircraft, of course, were prohibited.
Q Witness, since it was your opinion that the first World War was lost in the military field too, did you think of it at the time, of beginning a new war?
A No. I believe that all my statements which I have been able to make up to now show that I myself considered a war in Europe as being something mad, no matter who would win. None of the parties could gain anything, and the period following the first World War, with its extremely difficult economic situation in all European countries, even the rich countries, the England of those days, for instance, showed clearly that the war had destructive values only for everyone, quite apart from the moral and humane angle. So that I considered a war as completely unjustifiable. I only considered it justifiable if the basic rights of a nation were involved; that is to say, the freedom of the people and the utmost necessities of life.
Q Very well, witness. Now, witness, what personalities were you in touch with during those years?
A First of all, I came into contact with the members of our board of directors. There were 64 persons, sometimes 66. Some of them were the outstanding economic leaders in Germany. For instance, from the shipping companies the Hapag Lloyd; then all the big banks had representatives, but there were also the Burgomasters, the Lord Mayors of big cities such as Cologne, Duesseldorf, Hamburg, Bremen and Munich, who were represented on this board. But because of the difficulties which the government had with the Reichstag in 1928 I also came into contact with some deputies in the Reichstag.
The leading parties had one each there who was dealing with the special sector of airways in Parliament, and it was those that we got in touch with or they got into touch with us. It was on this opportunity that I met Goering for the first time, who at that time was a deputy of the National Socialist Party and who was dealing with the question of air traffic, besides other important tasks in the Reichstag.
Q Which leading personalities, Reichstag deputies from other large parties, did you meet on that occasion?
A For the Social Democrat Party there was the Wuerttemberg deputy Keil whom I can remember. Of the German Peoples Party there was Mr. Kraemer. There were two or three other gentlemen whose names I cannot at this moment recollect, since those three were in more frequent touch with us, whereas the others took part in these questions to a lesser degree.
Q Did you, with all these three men; that is to say, Goering, Keil and the third gentleman, Kraemer, have the same amount of contact or did you favor the National Socialist Party?
A We were only interested in being in touch with important people in the Reichstag to such an extent that this reverse, this setback which occurred in 1928 would not be repeated. At that time we, with our international ties, had been unable to do those ties justice. The subsidies were always only granted for one year, but our contracts had to be longer than that. It was economically out of the question to make investments and then only to have security for a period of one year.
Q Thank you, that's enough. What was, at that time, your political attitude both from the point of view of foreign and internal policy?
A From the point of view of foreign policy it was in the same sense as was our collaboration in these air traffic corporations. I had no other connections abroad at the time, except in air circles. In other words, I was interested in neutral shared collaboration with the emphasis on our joint life and our joint work.
From the point of view of internal politics I did not belong to any party. I used to follow the press and the picture of the country as it was going was not particularly clear, at least not to me. I believe at that time there were more than thirty political parties, and each one of them would promise approximately the same as the other, but none of them was strong enough to assert itself. Governments were only being formed by means of compromises between various parties which, however, did not exactly love each other. These compromise parties and connections usually disintegrated rather rapidly, and really, one government used to follow the other without one of them having a chance to warm up properly.
I used to follow this from immediately after the end of the war, and I always thought that I did not have the gift of thinking politically because I did not understand all that. On one hand Germany was in flames at every corner; on tho other hand, as one used to say in Germany, there was a flight about the emperor's beard. I only experienced a few really great moments politically speaking, such as for instance, the signing of the Rapallo treaty which I considered the first ray of daylight politically in Germany, because, after all, Germany, considering its central position would either have to look towards the East or look towards the West, unless it was possible to look to both sides at the same time.
Following that, a little later, I considered that Stresemann's policy showed a large scale promise, but I also saw how Stresemann, with all his work, was terribly impeded by all the other parties in Germany, whereas he, to my mind, was on the way which we were wanting.
It is for that reason that during ail the years when Stresemann was there, during all the elections which were taking place, I voted for the German Peoples Party, not so much because I knew anything very much about this particular party, but because I wanted to support Stresemann's personality. Here is one more thing I want to say, I envied Great Britain and the United States for having two or respectively three parties in their countries which seemed to me to guarantee the welfare of the country politically speaking in the best possible manner, but when you have 32 or 34 parties any such idea is out of tho question.
Q Witness, after the situation in Germany deteriorated more and more, what attitude did you adopt toward politics after that, and when did you cone into closer contact before 1933 with the NSDAP?
AApart from frequent meetings with Goering in connection with which I must say that he never talked about politics with me, he spoke about technical questions and the questions of air traffic, and it was usually Goering who would talk, and he was an awfully good story teller, telling a lot of stories about the first World War and about his Richthofen squadron, and telling lots of stories about Sweden, which is the country his wife came from. He never theless never spoke about the politics of his party.
It might have been mentioned on some occasion but never in that sense that he was making a recruiting speech to me or that he would describe to me the advantages of his ideas and so on and so forth.
On two or possibly three occasions he brought me together with Hitler. On one occasion Goering had invited him, when he had also invited me, but it was only when I was there that I discovered it. On another occasion Goering and I together had had a meal at the Hotel Kaiserhof and suddenly Hitler turned up and sat down at our table. On those occasions Hitler talked almost exclusively only to me. I guess it was in 1930 that I met him for the first time, but I won't be absolutely certain about this date. Anyway, Hitler spoke about foreign political questions as well as internal politics, air traffic, technical questions, and I had the impression that he was pretty well informed about all those subjects. What was astonishing was his ability to adapt himself quickly to my sphere of work when I spoke about air traffic, and I spoke to him particularly about international collaboration as a basic point.
During the last conference which took place before 1933 when he formed his government, it wasn't long before that by the way, he told me that as far as air traffic was concerned he would place at our disposal quite different facilities if he were in charge, and in fact, he quoted figures which appeared quite fantastic to me at the time, but which as an annual subsidy represented one-fifth of the monthly expenditure of the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force, during the war so that it is one-sixtieth part of the annual expenditure.
It was quite an astronomical figure for me at the time. I explained him that with such finance one could certainly carry out all ideas regarding rapid modernization of air traffic, using modern material very rapidly, and that the question of every type of development, particularly such as flying in bad weather could be tackled very quickly with such money.
Other personalities who played a part in the party I did not meet at that time. There may have been one or the other that I saw. Hitler did not come alone; he was accompanied by an adjutant; but of the better known people, such as Goebbels and Himmler -- I did not meet one of them before 1933.
Q. Witness, before we come to the events after 1933, there is one question I want to put to you. Did you, before 1933, have any serious accident?
A. Yes; during the war I had an air crash. I had been shot down, and on that occasion I suffered very serious injury to the head, after landing my aircraft since I had to land on bad ground. In 1932, I, myself, flying a JU-52, the first one in existence, participated in competitions in Switzerland, the so-called "Flight Over the Alps." And, upon my return, when flying at an altitude of about two hundred meters, north of Munich near Schleissheim, I collided with a trainer aircraft which flew into my left engine coming from ahead. Both engines cracked up and penetrated the cabin and hit the pilot's seat, and I suffered a very serious head injury. The main artery was penetrated but there were various objects which had penetrated the skull, and, upon landing, incidentally, I had lost a wheel during the collision, something which I didn't know -- the undercarriage, of course, not being retractable, was fixed. We had to land in a corn field. and, on that occasion, I hit the dashboard with full force and suffered a very serious concussion of the brain at the time.
Q. Did you know in 1927 of another serious accident?
A. Yes; I think 1924 or 1927 -- yes, I think it was '27, that, when flying an aircraft in the Bohemian forests I had to land in the woods. We took down about a hundred trees but of course the impact was still very strong. But I don't think that that accident caused me any permanent injuries.
Q. Now, then, when did you first concern yourself closely with the aims of the NSDAP?
A. Let me add this. In 1932 -- I think it was in '32 -- there wore two elections.
As a result of them I voted for the NSDAP for the first time. But, first of all, let me say I knew just as little about that party as I knew about 1716a the German Peoples' Party.
Q. Why did you vote for the NSDAP at the time?
A. Very simple; because the system of more than thirty parties appeared impossible to me and because I adopted the point of view that now one of the larger parties ought to be voted for so that at last there would be a majority in Germany capable of forming a government.
Q. When did you concern yourself closely with the political aims?
A. I never really concerned myself intimately with it. I read through the so-called Party Program which was attached to the membership book of party members. It was comparatively short. I cannot tell you the number of points contained therein and whatever it contained at the time is something which is as far as I was concerned I had no objections to. Approximately, its wording was the same as one heard from other parties -- at least I was told later.
Q. Had you read Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, at the time?
A. No.
Q. Well, when did you make your first acquaintance with it?
A. I started to read it after 1933 -- I think it was in i934 -but I never got past page twenty at the time. I would attribute this to my being over-burdened with work, of course. It was not so able that anyone who was tired would comprehend it.
Q. Did you make yourself acquainted with the writings of Rosenberg?
A. No, never.
Q. Are you acquainted with Hitler's attitude towards these writings?
A. Yes. Hitler, on one occasion -- possibly in '34 or '35 -when a party was going on in his house -- a big party; I think it was the General's Dinner or some such dinner of that sort which took place twice or once every year, something which had been taken over from Hindenberg -- it was on this party that he stated in a large circle of people that he, as far as Rosenberg's writings were concerned, hadn't read it.
That he started once but found it impossible be read. He said that five thousand pieces had been printed at the beginning but even years afterwards they had still been sitting in the bookshops 1717a and, apart from three, none had ever been sold.
But then, he said, somewhere, some bishop, had started fighting Rosenberg, and it was after that, that those five thousand books had been sold out after two days. I am only giving you a picture of what Hitler said at the time. At any rate, the bookshops now had it reprinted to the extent of fifty thousand. And now the church imposed some ban on this book-it may have been the Bishop of Fulda; it might have been quite a different one. But, anyway, fifty thousands were sold overnight; and now they had printed a few hundred thousand, and then the Pope had imposed his ban. And since that time they had been unable to print the book as quickly as they sold it. But, of course, I can't guarantee the truth of that story.
Q. Witness, when did Goering give you a state position after 1933 for the first time and on what occasion?
A. As early as 1932, during the summer, Goering told me that now a joint government was being formed with the German nationals, or even the German People's party, or who else was there, and that this could be expected for the subsequent day, and that he would now form an aviation ministry, and that he had chosen me as his State Secretary. I told him at the time, "well, let's wait and see." And then, with some friends of mine, I talked about it, with a friend on the Board of Directors, and actually the decision we reached was that I should turn down the offer. In fact, Goering never brought the subject up again because the formation of that government was not realized. On the 28th of January, in the evening, some of my gentlemen friends were there; ladies were visiting me at my house, when quite suddenly, without being announced or being invited, Goering turned up. He asked me to come outside into the other room for a moment where I could be alone with him. And he explained to me, "We have got there at last. During the following day the Government, together with German Nationals already formed. I am taking over the Air Ministry,and you will be my Secretary of State."
I told him that he had said that six months ago; that in that time I had discussed the matter with others, and that, really, it was my opinion that I was not the suitable person for this; to begin with, I liked it very much with the Lufthansa, and I could not think of a better position for a life's work.
1718 a And, secondly, I said I was the sort of nan who did not like to be connected with politics; and, after all, every State position was political.
After that, I suggested to him to choose the Materials Councillor at the head of the Aviation Department in the Ministry for Traffic, whose name was Ministerial Director Brandenburg who was an excellent wartime pilot from the first world war. But Goering turned him down, and said that he was out of the question for him.
I suggested Admiral Laas who was already working the Reich's Union of the Aircraft Industry; but Goering did not want him either. When he continued to insist, I asked him for time to think it over, and told him that I could not decide on the spur of the moment. He told me, all right, and would I be good enough to visit him at the Hotel Kaiserhof on Monday morning, the thirtieth, and communicate to him my final decision? He added that I could rest assured that he would not tolerate a refusal of mine and would not accept it. I laughed and said that, "That, after all, did depend on me, too." Still, that some evening, I had talked to my most intimate collaborator, Baron von Gablenz -- whom I have mentioned repeatedly -- and I also talked to a member of the Board of Directors of the Lufthansa, the president, Herr von Stauss, and a certain Dr. Weigelt who was at the head of a small working committee in our firm. Both gentlemen, incidentally being members of the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank, the German Bank. It was with these three that I went into consultation. Two of those gentlemen explained to me that in the interests of the German Lufthansa I would have to accept the offer. They said they could appreciate that I did not like the idea, but there was no other way since, otherwise Goering would take it out on the Lufthansa. One of these two directors stated that I ought not to go, in spite of this. We made an appointment to meet the following morning, Sunday, and called in several other gentlemen for consultation, and this did, in fact, take place. It was on that occasion that everyone, including the man who had contradicted the others the previous evening, had reached the conclusion that it was in the interests of the Lufthansa, too, that I should accept the position.
I should like to emphasize that my refusal had nothing whatever to do with any political aspect or any hostile feelings I might have nurtured as to Goering at the time. But that was merely a personal question regarding my own career, my life. I loved my work, and although I wasn't too old to reconvert my life, I could not imagine any details of any new position which could tempt me so much. External, outside honors of this type didn't mean anything to me.
So I myself decided that I would leave the matter to Hitler's final decision since I did not know whether Goering might not make a proposition on his own initiative. Thus, on Monday the 30th I went to the Hotel Kaiser Hof with Goering. It was approximately 11 or 12 o'clock. I visited Goering and was in a hurry. Together with him quite some time later -- the time I can't tell you exactly -- I went to Hitler. I think Hitler had just come back with his appointment from the Reich President.
When he saw me, he told me right away: "It's a good thing that you're here. Goering has already told me that you are going to be his state secretary." Whereupon, I told him, "Mr. Hitler, that hasn't been decided. I've just come to discuss this matter with you." He then said, "Look here, I've only known you for a short time, but you're a man who knows his business.
"We talked about it and came to the conclusion that we don't have a man in the Party who knows as much about aviation as you do. That's why we have chosen you. You've got to accept. This isn't a question of the Party calling you; it's a question of Germany. Germany wants you for that position." And so I accepted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, will you have the witness explain what he means by saying that Hitler had just come back with his appointment?
DR. BERGOLD: This means that he came back, having been nominated Reich Chancellor by the Reich President von Hindenburg.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, all right.
Q. Witness, did you have any financial advantages from the acceptance of that office?
A. To the contrary, I did not. The Lufthansa brought me an income of more than 50,000 marks per annum; and as secretary of state, even later as colonel and general, I had an income of approximately 21,000 marks. I think once it had been 24,000; but in the emergence of regulations, something came about leading to the deduction of about 3,000 marks. I can't tell you for certain. At any rate, I've never received my salary myself. I've left it to my office; and they gave me what I need and then sent to my family what my wife needed. So there was a question of dividing the salary in part; but this wasn't a question which came into it at the time. This did not come into the decision for me to accept the position or not.
Q. Witness, did you at that time make any conditions to Hitler or Goering regarding the taking of that office?
A. Yes. I made the condition that I would remain on the board of directors of the German Lufthansa in the future even if I became an employee of the Reich when I became secretary of state. In fact, I did that with a particular intention. I had hoped that I would not be granted this condition and that I could consequently say, "Well, I'm awfully sorry but I can't come." But Hitler immediately complied with that condition, so subsequently in my honorary capacity, of course, I remained on the board of directors of the German Lufthansa.
Q. Did you make a condition to Goering, too?
A, Yes. I told Goering that there was a personal habit of Goering's which was the reason for me not to join them; but he had sworn to me that he was no longer indulging in that vice.
Q. Witness, what was your position in the Third Reich in 1933?
A. At that the, first of all, it wasn't called ministry. It was called the Reich Commissar's Office because normal measures for the formation of a ministry had to be considered both with the Reich President as well as the Reichstag. First of all, Goering was Reich Commissar and I was Deputy Reich Commissar for Aviation. I think it was in March that the Reich Ministry was formed, and at that moment I became state secretary.
Q. What were your tasks as secretary of state?
A. In such a ministry the state secretary had two deputies for the minister; that is to say, since originally each ministry had only one state secretary, he had jurisdiction of everything as a Number 2. It is for that reason that he signed his letters "I.V.", "In Vertretung", or as deputy of the ministry, but others could only sign "I.A.", on behalf of or by order of the minister.
Now, the question was which pert of the business would the minister deal with himself and which would be handled through the state secretary. Since Goering was simultaneously Minister for the Interior in Prussia and since it was this task that interested him and occupied him most, he could hardly ever be seen in our office. But particularly at a later stage he was at the head since he defined the aims of our work. I considered myself as his executive organ for the carrying out of such work. For the efforts during the initial period the organization was on civilian lines. It was only later when rearmament began that it was completely militarized; and the civilian apparatus then only existed in one of the departments, the department LD. Then all other sources were militarized.
There was a command department which later on called itself general staff; and there was a technical department which was then headed by a soldier, having previously been headed by a civilian. I've already mentioned the department for aviation. Then there was an administrative department which dealt with all questions of clothing, billeting, and food and such like; in other words, the budget, financial question. Then in addition to that there was a personnel department, which dealt with personnel questions. This was the organization, of course, after the militarization, such as developed gradually on the military side.
Q. When did this occur, approximately?
A. Rearmament began at the beginning of 1935, and it was then that the matter was developed in such a manner.
Q. So that until then it had been civilian?
A. Yes, but on the other hand we did have a few officers who had retired, however, whom we had taken over and who were responsible for administrative questions for which we needed an expert whom we didn't have. This, incidentally, was later Field Marshal Kesselring, who was considered an administrative expert at the time he retired joined us.
Q. When did you join the Party?
A. In the Spring, I think; in May 1933 I put my name down.
Q. For what reason?
A. It was suggested to me that since I was carrying out state functions on a high level and since Goering was an important member of the Party I too should join the Party.
Q. Did you go through the usual education for the Party?
A. No. Pretty quickly and outside normal channels I was given my membership. I've never joined such an educational meeting or whatever they had of the Party.
Q. When did you once again become a soldier?
A. In September 1933. It was at that time that the Reich President promoted me colonel.
Q. Why was this done? Was it done for the purpose of rearmament or why?
A. In the aviational field the anti-aircraft artillery had already been handed over. This had become a part of the troops. Since I was the superior of the man who was the inspector in our ministry, the Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, who always informed himself very accurately about such questions and took care of soldierly conduct in such a way, ordered that this was not possible and that Goering and I would have to be given military rank. At that time Goering was going to be major general, but he didn't agree to that and so they gave him the rank of a commanding general right away. That is to say, he was made a three star general from the American point of view. I became a colonel. Since there wasn't yet an air force, we both were given army uniforms.
Q. Witness, this anti-aircraft organization which existed in Germany, was that permissible at the time or was it in violation of the Versailles Treaty?
A. No, it was permissible. I think there were special agreements at Geneva which were extended to that extent. First of all, there was fortification and the aircraft artillery, but later on mobile and aircraft was also granted. I can't remember the details, you see, because this took place before my time.
Q. So that you want to assert that the fact that you became a soldier had nothing to do with the rearmament activities within your position as secretary of state?
A. No. Particularly as far as the anti-aircraft weapon was concerned, we had a peculiar picture. It appears that Hindenburg learned on some occasion. On the occasion of a journey by aircraft, when I was accompanied by the anti-aircraft inspector, he suddenly took him along. We wanted something quite different, but anyway he showed him such a fortification at the anti-aircraft battery and he asked me to take him around. I was to take the parade. I was in civilian clothes, wearing a gray hat. Now, from the German point of view, it is out of the question that I should appear in such raiment on such an occasion. I told the inspector that he could shoot me if he wanted to but I wouldn't do anything like that. So he in his turn communicated this fact to Blomberg, and Blomberg talked it over with Hindenburg. That's the way this happened.
Q. Witness, after you became a soldier, did you remain a member of the Party?
A. No. You couldn't when you were a soldier. Membership in the Party was in a suspended state, In other words, you were no longer an active member of the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall stop at this point.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal will be in recess until 0930 hours tomorrow.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 12 March 1947, 0930. Justice Toms presiding.
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom please take your seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Witness, I shall continue the direct examination. Yesterday we stopped at the question whether after you had become again a soldier, you remained a member of the Nazi Party. We now slowly come to the main part, will you please explain to this Tribunal how it came about of the building up of the Luftwaffe and when this took place?
A In 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich. In Geneva at the League of Nations the disarmament conference took place. One of the rights of Germany existing in the Versailles Treaty decided that disarmament should be called for all countries. The conferences were taking place for several years so far as I recall. From all countries soldiers had been sent there, and it was not to be wondered at that they sawed off the branch that they were sitting on. I can recall that one of the prohibitions which, was announced there was the poison of the South American Indians, which was called Gurare. Hitler ordered his delegates into Geneva so far as I can remember in order to accelerate negotiations. He demanded either to have equal disarmament of all countries, or rearmament of Germany.