These same children, and. grown-ups, were completely changed. Their cheeks were full and rosy. They had regained their color and. laughed again. I consider this success which Hitler achieved by his system at that 1746(a) Time one of tho greatest achievements which could ever be attained; and it was really no wonder that all of us sincerely believed in this man with all of cur hearts, and that we considered anybody a fool had ho told us at that time that he would lead us into a world war and would not stop until Germany was completely destroyed.
We would have attacked anybody who would have told us that Hitler at any time had ordered and caused cruelties, tortures and murder in concentration camps. We would have considered this the worst propaganda of oar worst enemies, but it was not only myself who thought that way. All of us thought that way, also those amongst us who were tho many little busybodies in the Party, the propagandists, etc. We called them the 120% believers, even though we brushed those people off and would not tolerate that they influence us in our sphere. That was Hitler in those years, I would say up about 1937-1938, or even until 1938.
Q. I shall refer to that later on. Until '37 or '38 did you meet other leaders of the Party? And did you take part in the internal life of the party.
A. No; I had nothing to do with the Party in itself. Naturally, for instance, at these dinners with Hitler, I always met part of the higher authorities of the Party who were excellent people -- besides the others which I just described. But there was no close connection between us; the soldiers kept to themselves.
Q. Which impression, witness, did you gain from the high Party leaders; Goering, Ley, and so on; -- what was their attitude towards Hitler?
A. I gained the impression that they considered him a god who was beyond human criticism, and therefore, they could not contradict him; and every idea of his had to be considered as coming from God. It was a sort of dependence which many of them had to him and the behavior, of course, differed with the various personalities. There wore some who gave hints of their opinions first but then they became silent when they saw that Hitler did not agree with them. Others made previous inquiries through their adjutants as to the wishes of Hitler, and then suggested it to Hitler, himself, and others who magnified all of Hitler's wishes in proportion of one to a hundred thousand.
In the first years, Hitler had a sound feeling for these flatteries, and I gained the impression that he did not listen to them; but internally he actually was amused about these people, in contrast with later on.
Q. Which attitude was there between Goering and Hitler? We are particularly interested in it here.
A. That changed. It only grow into a closer relationship. Perhaps in 1931 or '32. But I know that from other people who were more closely connected with Goering. Then, in '34 or '35 -- about that time -- and in '36, it had weakened, and in '37 it became 1748a stronger again.
And that was going on until the time of the war. And from 1943 onwards, after the fall of Stalingrad, it noticeably weakened month by month.
Q. What was Goering's attitude toward Hitler?
A. He was very soft towards him. He often told me, "Milch, leave that alone. Why do you oppose him? Hitler has the right ideas about this, whether he knows it or not. It is God who gives him these ideas."
1748(b) I did not want to have that true and Goering said that I was not one of Hitler's friends as he, himself, was; which I confirmed.
Q. Witness, did you meet Hindenburg?
A. Yes; often....
Q. What impression, and what connections did you have towards him?
A. I think the greatest disaster for Germany was that the old Field Marshal -- we always called him "The Old Man" - died so early. Hitler had real respect for him, and he was not the man who could be easily persuaded; he could not be cheated either. In spite of his age, he had very clear insight in every way, and I know that he criticized Hitler very often -- as he was very rough with him -- as soon as the old Hindenburg was informed of transgressions of Party members. I know a case there were difficulties with some party members and clericals in Fast Germany. Hindenburg called Hitler and it was only a few minutes, when some counter-measures were taken by Hitler. The old gentleman took great interest in everything -- above all for all questions concerning soldiers, as we had intentions as soon as we could to arm our Air Force, to consider the Luftwaffe as a third part of the Armed Forces -- that is, not under the direction of the Army and the Navy. We wanted to follow the example of England, the old gentleman had this explained by me...he was not interested in questions concerning flying and technical matters. He never listened to them very much and he never had a telephone in his hand. He said, "I don't want this things I don't like this modern stuff."
I asked him when I was entrusted, to explain to him how much time he would give me. And he asked, "What did it actually mean -- independent air force? What is the purpose of it," he said to me. "I give you just fifteen minutes."
"I don't need such a long time," I said. "I will cover everything in seven minutes", and then I reported, "My report is complete." He said, "I understand. I thank you very much for your explanation. These ideas are new to me.
I can see that you know about them; otherwise you could not have explained it in such a short time. With these words I saw that he was very clear in these human questions. He asked me some questions which showed that he really understood the whole problem. And I only can repeat again that the way which Germany took would have been a different one if this great and wise man would have remained in the government; for Germany owes him a tremendous amount. I always considered him far above Hitler, and I think all soldiers thought the same thing.
Q. Did you meet the War Minister, Blomberg, and what were your relations with him?
A. I very often saw him after we started arming in 1935. He was Goering's superior and he often sent for me, in these years until 1938, when he resigned. I often saw him and saw him more often than I saw Goering. He was a true soldier, a very friendly man, he knew what he wanted. He was the only superior soldier from the army who also had a political feeling, and his influence on Hitler in the first years was very great, especially as long as the Chief of Staff was Reichenau. He also was very clever in dealing with political questions. Hitler esteemed Blomberg very highly, and Blomberg also quite frankly told him his opinion - and Hitler listened to him - at least, on the whole. Only some actions which Hitler took, such as the reconstruction of garrisons in the Rhineland and also, later on, the action in Austria, were done against the advice of Blomberg, and Blomberg had to give in in this matter. But the difficulties which he created were very great for Hitler and Hitler did not want to listen to him later on.
But in the first years, by the faithful loyalty of Blomberg and also by the loyalty of the army and the armed forces through his action, his treatment of Blomberg was not exactly a grateful one. Blomberg was very interested in all questions concerning the Luftwaffe. He stood beyond the Party although he was an army man, and he supported the Luftwaffe in every way possible, which we demanded from him. He was my great help. Always, what he promised he kept, and what he didn't want to promise he refused at once -- and nothing could be done about it later on. He inspected many Luftwaffe troops with me, and until 1938 he knew much better about these units of the Luftwaffe than Goering himself. That is sufficient, I think.
Q. Witness, I think this is sufficient.
A. May I add one more thing? Politically he always managed to be sensible and quiet. I always informed him about my own problems. He always shared them and always presented them to Hitler.
Q. You know that after a not very nice incident, he resigned. Do you consider it correct that Hitler had taken over the supreme command of the Wehrmacht?
A. No, I considered it only a rise to power, forced by necessity, for the next one who should have ta.ken over was Goering, and Hitler was convinced at that time that Goering would not be fit to carry out these duties. But in this we saw an unnecessary burden for the head of the state because then, in the meantime, after the death of Hindenburg, Hitler became chief of state. He was at the same time, Reichs Chancellor and he was the C. in C. That was too much for one man and Hitler also lacked the knowledge for this position. One cannot be a soldier without knowing about it and having been trained in this.
Q. Witness, what was your attitude towards the resignation of Fritsch?
A. I think this incident, which happened in the spring of 1938, was the greatest shock for me. The resignation of Blomberg could be understood from a human point of view, but the resignation of Fritsch was a dirty business. He was an extremely capable Commander in Chief and without blemish. He was not concerned with politics, in contrast to Blomberg. He did not know anything about politics; he was not interested in it at all, but naturally, in the position in which he was then, it was a great pity. But the manner in which he was removed, because one saw his clear and chivalrous attitude, his purely social feelings, and that he did not agree with things. That was a dirty business, and I know on this question that the Army never got away with it. We were only indirectly concerned with it, but I thought about it and what might possibly have been done and how little any of us expected it. And so he was replaced by another man in the same capacity. He was replaced by an equally capable man in the army. This was Field Marshal Brauchitsch.
Q. Witness, were you ever Goering's deputy in this capacity, and how long?
A. Until 1937 I was his deputy, and all offices in the Luftwaffe which were subordinate to him were also subordinate to me. This applied to the execution of orders. From 1937 onwards I was his deputy only in my own sector, and this automatically as Chief of the General Staff in his field, which applies also to the GL. In any case it was within my capacity to deputize for Goering in all matters as I was the second senior officer of the Luftwaffe, and this was done only by way of rank. But Goering reserved the right to appoint a deputy in general, that is, especially always only for the Luftwaffe. This authority he did not confer upon me. Even when he was on leave he kept this right, he retained his command. I agreed with this arrangement personally.
Q. Witness, we now approach the development of Germany up to the time of Austria. Did you ever doubt in anything that Hitler was aiming at war?
A. No. At the discussions which wore taking place he always stressed that he wanted to do everything in a peaceful way. Occasionally he also called the military leaders to tell them also that his armament for which he was keeping up the Wehrmacht had nothing to do with war and that he could not express his political wishes unless Germany was respected and that this could only be done by having a Wehrmacht. He must only have the Wehrmacht from a political aspect. That Was one point of his discussion. The other one was for the Wehrmacht to be faithful toward him and to collaborate with his party, because in all these years rumors were current that the Wehrmacht wanted to make a putsch, which was not true.
In the case of Austria I did not have any doubts about it. If I may make a comparison before this Tribunal, Austria and Germany, like North and South America, belonged to each other for hundreds of years, then in 1866 there was a short war, and here in Europe we were not so intelligent; we had too much tradition and we had too many different opinions, and those two German parts, the North and the South, were fighting each other, just as happened in North and South America at that time. Those two parts did not find a way, because the monarchy in both countries did not allow that. Who was to reign, the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns? When the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs were not there anymore, there was no reason at all that these two purely German parts should not join together again, and this wish was expressed by both of them mutually. That there were people in both countries interested in not to give in, was evident. Consequently I saw in Austria a natural procedure but the Republican leaders had the same as the Monarchy.
I did not consider the methods as beneficial. Hater on I heard that a quite incapable man represented the interests of the Party in Germany and Austria. When I saw this man later on, I had my first doubt about the personal judgment of Hitler.
I did not like the way in which he did it, but the fact was that it was good and was decided by all parties.
1753a I landed with one of the first planes.
We had flowers instead of arms on our aircraft. We were greeted as never before in our own country. As Goering was deputy for Hitler in the Reich, I was ordered to St. Pol ten and had to make the entry into Vienna with him. My home is in North Germany, and there, there are comparatively quiet people, but what I saw in Austria, in excitement and joy, exceeded everything that I ever experienced in all my life. I don't think that southern people could be more emotional than these people in Vienna and in St. Polten. This event was a normal and natural one for me.
Q May I interrupt you now? When for the first time did you have knowledge of this action?
A Two days before I was on leave I can not recall the date, but perhaps three days before the march into Austria I reported to Goering and said that I wanted to do some skiing, which I did every spring. Without knowing anything himself, he let me go. He would not have allowed me to go if anything about a march into Austria had been a cute. I spent one day in Switzerland, when I was called on the telephone and told that I should return immediately. I returned. My aircraft landed in Berlin in the evening, and I reported at once to Goering. Goering told me that meanwhile difficulties had arisen with Schuschnigg and the Austrian government, and Hitler was extremely indignant. He had mobilized certain troops and unless Schussnigg gave in he would march into the country, but it was hoped that it could be done without that.
Things looked a little calmer the next day. In the evening Goering gave a big party in the Pilot's House, and all the foreign ambassadors and ministers were present. In the course of that party he caught me outside for a moment and told me, "We'll march tomorrow." The next morning we did, and I flew over there.
Q Thank you. Through this method, in the matter of the Sudeten Germans, did you have any doubts concerning the future policy of Hitler?
A Yes, I did, although there, again, Germans were concerned, but the soil on which they lived was a foreign country. It was a new state, created by the Versailles Treaty called Czechoslovakia, and that state as a whole was not filled with the same desire as was Austria to join Germany.
We had many reports in the press and on the wireless that a great many cruelties were committed on the German population in the so-called Sudetenland, and that made the atmosphere in Germany somewhat excited, but the question of the invasion or capture of that country I regarded as unjust. That was a highly dangerous matter.
From the basis of information which I had in foreign countries there diminished and I doubted the main disadvantages of that action. It is true, however, the whole thing took place in the Autumn of 1938 and I had not much time to think because by the end of September, shortly after the event, the Big Powers met at Munich and there an agreement was reached which justified the business. That is to say, with Britain and France and said we will agree. I did not expect that myself but I had no reason to be more critical than the Pope. I was extremely relieved when Hitler said to the Reichstag later: "Now, I have no further territorial demands in Europe." I took his word for it.
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, then in the Spring of 1939 there was the occupying of the rest of Czechoslovakia. Please explain to the Tribunal this matter and your opinion on it and from that moment did you still think that Hitler loved peace?
In 1939 I was lucky or unlucky enough, as you may have it, that I was always on leave when something happened. On 12 March I was in Southern Tyrol in the mountains above the Grafholl. With great difficulty I got a wire within actually 12 hours that I must leave at once. I succeeded on the 13th to catch a train to Munich and from there by aircraft to Berlin. Czechoslovakia was invaded on the 15th. Later I heard how the whole matter was done but I never heard then. In the whole period when the matter was acute I was never present. Before I went to Tyrol on the Grafholl nothing was acute of the whole matter. The whole thing must have been arranged in a very short period of time -- maybe two weeks. The invasion of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement and the march into the Sudentenland after the promises to have no more territorial demands was a flagrant violation and from then outwards I was convinced now this will lead to war and as I know the British will not stand for this and automatically Britain and her former allies will join her again and I expected at that time even that complications would follow. That it did not happen probably then was that because in Britain armament which had been in full swing for years was not quite far advanced enough because otherwise the balloon would have gone up then, I am convinced.
Q Witness, what steps did you take from your viewpoint? What did you do in order to express your peaceful viewpoint and in order to prevent the war? First I spoke with Goering, then with Hitler himself.
A Unhappily neither Blomberg and von Neurath were still in office at the time, whom I would have seen otherwise. I said to Pohl that our armament was not any where ready for war. I recalled in particular that I said apart from the lack of military leaders we had no bombs. We only had small bombs of 10 kilograms, some 60 kilogram and some 250 kilogram which you could drop in a few minutes. The quantity was very small which later on was proved. In a few days of the Polish War we spent 60 per cent of our bombs with only half our Luftwaffe. Hitler said "We don't need bombs. There will be no war." I said that I differed. That the Munich agreement had been the last word said by the others in a friendly manner. Hitler said "no". "If that had been the case then they would have attacked us already and the others do not wish war nor can they do anything useful with the war." I had to use this opportunity because I could do something for the peace. Later on it would no longer have been possible. I said again that I differed and that the situation had to be faced squarely and as unfortunately the thing had gone that far now I had to do that which was most important for the armaments which as far as this country was concerned, was to manufacture bombs. The capacity of which and the experiments of which could only take place not in five months or five minutes and that could only be done if the manufactured bombs could be given priority. Hitler smiled and said I need not worry at all. His policy would be such as to avoid war. He wouldn't dream to have a war and he reminded me that he had told me that once before -that his policy was to be on good terms with Britain. I expressed my doubts that that was very possible. He told me to be convinced. He knew the British can only be entered through acts and through the acts. I said there was a difference somewhere. In any case he refused to have bombs manufactured. This request I repeated another three times to him as I was very much concerned about it and I said to myself; should war break out tomorrow I could be reproached justifiably that the Luftwaffe and the bombing fleet could take four weeks' leave after the outbreak of the war -- for about five months.
I would not have been in a position to tell the German people that I was not me but Hitler. Hitler had on all occasions again refused and declared: "I don't know what you want. There will be no war. The world has swallowed what he did and now we are very, very strong." Then once more after a conversation in May with Mussolini, who declared once on his own initiative, he said: "Milch, war is inevitable now". Quite different from Hitler. When I returned in May I told Hitler what Mussolini thought. Hitler smiled: "Mussolini is wrong. There will be no war," In July 7 to 11 there was a General Airforce Congress in Brussel. The British Commander-in-Chief and the French Commander-in-Chief was there so I as deputized by Goering, who didn't go to these congresses. After that period I was unable to see Hitler but Goering and I told Goering that the attitude taken by the British delegation made it quite clear to me that Britain was waiting for her moment. The impression I made could not be overlooked. The British Commander--in-Chief of the Airforce Sir Newall, he left no doubt open that things were different from 1937; that patience was now exhausted on the other side. I asked Goering to tell Hitler that and I do not know whether he did so. It was not possible for me in any case to see Hitler,
Q Witness, will you please give us the date of the conference with Mussolini?
A That was on 26 May 1939.
Q Witness, I have now to put to you that on the 26 May 1939 you heard from Mussolini that he was of the opinion that war was now inevitable and you told us here under oath that you saw from that Mussolini had a different viewpoint from Hitler but now on the 23 May 1939 at the Reichskanzlei of Hitler there was this famous conference with the British, the Schmundt Minutes, and from which as far as the whole, you all had gained the impression that Hitler in this speech had talked in favor of war, I now ask you to express to the Tribunal what you think of these conferences of the 23 of May 1939 which, according to self-appearances, there was a contradiction of exclamations given to you and given your opinion of it?
If you want to have the Schmundt Minutes to make your explanation I can hand it to you. May it please the Tribunal, this is Exhibit No. 3, Document No. 79 and the Document Book is 1-A of the prosecution, on the first page.
A The history of this conference was that at the end of March we were told by our intelligence service that -- in a very clear report -that in Poland on the German Frontier matters of mobilization were in full swing. I made a particular note of this in my diary. Shortly before that -- about ten days before that -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia had taken place, Poland bad been a party in this and was given the so-called Teschen area. Poland at once occupied this militarily but Teschen, the territory ceded to Poland by Germany -- far out that led to mutual difficulties and these difficulties, our intelligence service told us, led to the mobilization measures. Thereupon I heard no more at that point. Later on, however, it was stated that Poland would continue with these measures. The conference on 23 Hay was a complete surprise to me. I was in my office in the Reich Air Ministry when a telephone call came through as far as I know by Bodenschatz, that Goering who had just returned from his leave in Italy was unable to be present; that I would have to deputize for him. It was so late that I couldn't even go home in order to change into my official uniform. For instance, that is the Army and the Luftwaffe appeared in boots on occasions. The conference started at 1600 and lasted until 2030. That is to say four hours and a half. Hitler spoke alone as was the rule on occasions of that sort. Field Marshal Goering; did not appear as a participant. I know that not only because I had been ordered to deputize him so suddenly but also Hitler said at the end of the conference that the participants of the meeting must not talk about these matters, even among; themselves. After the conference I went up to him when I took my farewell from him and asked him whether I should inform Goering. Hitler said "no, I shall do that myself."
As there was no conference of that sort in that period with which I could confuse this conference to myself it is quite clear that Goering was not present. I recall very well to have seen Brauchitsch, Keitel, Halder, Bodenschatz, Schniewindt, Zeschonek, and Below, the Adjutant of the Luftwaffe. I cannot recall the other adjutants, etc.
Q Do you recall Raeder?
A Yes, of course, I can certainly recall Reader being there.
Q fitness, I must speak to you now that Goering has testified before the International military Tribunal -- it is true that he said: "I did not attend this meeting" but later on when it was put to him and a list of attendance and his own remarks which are in the Schmundt Minutes shown to him, he changed his mind and he said ho thought that he was present.
A I am convinced that Goering made a mistake if ho said that. I read that passage that Goering was present. No, he didn't speak there. I am certain Goering never know in these cases whether he was there or not. He had his finger in too many pies for him to recall everything on occasion and actually he wasn't present and above all, if Goering was present he would have at the end of the mooting -- ho would have to say: "My Fuehrer, I will fight with you. We and the higher leaders of the Wehrmacht stand behind you. You give our orders. We follow." He would never have put a special question. It's possible Goering was never informed on that material question and secondly, he was a man of such formality that on occasions when the Chief of State and Chief of the Armed Forces was speaking, he would not have liked to disturb the picture by asking technical questions.
Q Witness, are you absolutely certain?
A I am absolutely convinced he wasn't there because otherwise it would have been nonsense to ask Hitler should I inform Goering.
Q Witness, can it be possible that you didn't see him.
A No, no. The circle was so small and we could see each other so clearly. I said next to Raeder and Brauchitsch right in front. I recall that on my left there was Raeder and on my right Brauchitsch.
I sat on the chair which was meant for Goering. Therefore, I was sitting in the middle and which was not entirely in accordance with the rank but we lost the piece of paper with his name on it and Goering was probably expected.
Q Please go slow, witness. Witness, if Goering had appeared during the meeting would you have surrendered your chair?
A But certainly. Goering would never have taken the second chair.
Q Witness, will you now explain your general impression of this conference of Hitler's of the 23 of May 1939 and especially according to your conception at that time? Whether you believe the former assurance Hitler made to you, the assurance in which he felt there would not be any war and whether be contradicted to these assurances?
THE PRESIDENT: At this time will you inform the Tribunal whether this will take a considerable time?
MR. BERGOLD: Yes, quite some time.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps rather than get it into two sections and not interrupt it we should start at 1:30 and have it without break.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1335 hours, 12 March 1947.)
ERHARD MILCH - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, I ask you now to state have you understood generally the speech of May 23, 1939, especially in connection with the declaration Hitler made to you according to which he was not expecting the war.
A. This conference lasted four and a half hours and was even for a spectator extremely difficult to follow. I asked myself what purpose this conference served and I reached the conclusion that for one thing Hitler, who after all had become C. in C. of the Wehrmacht, wished to tell his C. in C. of the army, navy, and air force about his military ideas. To put it mildly he wanted to make an impression on his military leaders. He wanted to show them militarily, how much he knew about the highest military matters himself, and especially the high officers of the army were not in agreement with the fact he was C. in C. of the army because they considered him unprepared for his task.
Secondly, from 1933 onward I can recall four or five conferences, sometimes among more people, during which Goering told me one was not always certain how loyal the soldiers were, and Hitler by speaking very impressively wished to give these soldiers a feeling of loyalty. Especially after Fritsch's resignation the officer group was not appeased as the soldiers, in contradiction to Hitler's promise, were very severely supervised. An good deal of material regarding remarks against Hitler by soldiers must have been at people's disposal. Hitler frequently expressed the opinion, and that was my thought, that soldiers had pacifist tendencies. He explained that by the fact that the First World War had been lost, and the confined mentality of the 100,000 man army. He believed that this pacifist attitude of the officers must be changed, he had to wake them up, he had to point out how acute the danger of war was or otherwise his soldiers would not do sufficiently in the rearmament program as he wished them to.