I did not like the way in which he did it, but the fact was that it was good and was decided by all parties.
1753a I landed with one of the first planes.
We had flowers instead of arms on our aircraft. We were greeted as never before in our own country. As Goering was deputy for Hitler in the Reich, I was ordered to St. Pol ten and had to make the entry into Vienna with him. My home is in North Germany, and there, there are comparatively quiet people, but what I saw in Austria, in excitement and joy, exceeded everything that I ever experienced in all my life. I don't think that southern people could be more emotional than these people in Vienna and in St. Polten. This event was a normal and natural one for me.
Q May I interrupt you now? When for the first time did you have knowledge of this action?
A Two days before I was on leave I can not recall the date, but perhaps three days before the march into Austria I reported to Goering and said that I wanted to do some skiing, which I did every spring. Without knowing anything himself, he let me go. He would not have allowed me to go if anything about a march into Austria had been a cute. I spent one day in Switzerland, when I was called on the telephone and told that I should return immediately. I returned. My aircraft landed in Berlin in the evening, and I reported at once to Goering. Goering told me that meanwhile difficulties had arisen with Schuschnigg and the Austrian government, and Hitler was extremely indignant. He had mobilized certain troops and unless Schussnigg gave in he would march into the country, but it was hoped that it could be done without that.
Things looked a little calmer the next day. In the evening Goering gave a big party in the Pilot's House, and all the foreign ambassadors and ministers were present. In the course of that party he caught me outside for a moment and told me, "We'll march tomorrow." The next morning we did, and I flew over there.
Q Thank you. Through this method, in the matter of the Sudeten Germans, did you have any doubts concerning the future policy of Hitler?
A Yes, I did, although there, again, Germans were concerned, but the soil on which they lived was a foreign country. It was a new state, created by the Versailles Treaty called Czechoslovakia, and that state as a whole was not filled with the same desire as was Austria to join Germany.
We had many reports in the press and on the wireless that a great many cruelties were committed on the German population in the so-called Sudetenland, and that made the atmosphere in Germany somewhat excited, but the question of the invasion or capture of that country I regarded as unjust. That was a highly dangerous matter.
From the basis of information which I had in foreign countries there diminished and I doubted the main disadvantages of that action. It is true, however, the whole thing took place in the Autumn of 1938 and I had not much time to think because by the end of September, shortly after the event, the Big Powers met at Munich and there an agreement was reached which justified the business. That is to say, with Britain and France and said we will agree. I did not expect that myself but I had no reason to be more critical than the Pope. I was extremely relieved when Hitler said to the Reichstag later: "Now, I have no further territorial demands in Europe." I took his word for it.
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, then in the Spring of 1939 there was the occupying of the rest of Czechoslovakia. Please explain to the Tribunal this matter and your opinion on it and from that moment did you still think that Hitler loved peace?
In 1939 I was lucky or unlucky enough, as you may have it, that I was always on leave when something happened. On 12 March I was in Southern Tyrol in the mountains above the Grafholl. With great difficulty I got a wire within actually 12 hours that I must leave at once. I succeeded on the 13th to catch a train to Munich and from there by aircraft to Berlin. Czechoslovakia was invaded on the 15th. Later I heard how the whole matter was done but I never heard then. In the whole period when the matter was acute I was never present. Before I went to Tyrol on the Grafholl nothing was acute of the whole matter. The whole thing must have been arranged in a very short period of time -- maybe two weeks. The invasion of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement and the march into the Sudentenland after the promises to have no more territorial demands was a flagrant violation and from then outwards I was convinced now this will lead to war and as I know the British will not stand for this and automatically Britain and her former allies will join her again and I expected at that time even that complications would follow. That it did not happen probably then was that because in Britain armament which had been in full swing for years was not quite far advanced enough because otherwise the balloon would have gone up then, I am convinced.
Q Witness, what steps did you take from your viewpoint? What did you do in order to express your peaceful viewpoint and in order to prevent the war? First I spoke with Goering, then with Hitler himself.
A Unhappily neither Blomberg and von Neurath were still in office at the time, whom I would have seen otherwise. I said to Pohl that our armament was not any where ready for war. I recalled in particular that I said apart from the lack of military leaders we had no bombs. We only had small bombs of 10 kilograms, some 60 kilogram and some 250 kilogram which you could drop in a few minutes. The quantity was very small which later on was proved. In a few days of the Polish War we spent 60 per cent of our bombs with only half our Luftwaffe. Hitler said "We don't need bombs. There will be no war." I said that I differed. That the Munich agreement had been the last word said by the others in a friendly manner. Hitler said "no". "If that had been the case then they would have attacked us already and the others do not wish war nor can they do anything useful with the war." I had to use this opportunity because I could do something for the peace. Later on it would no longer have been possible. I said again that I differed and that the situation had to be faced squarely and as unfortunately the thing had gone that far now I had to do that which was most important for the armaments which as far as this country was concerned, was to manufacture bombs. The capacity of which and the experiments of which could only take place not in five months or five minutes and that could only be done if the manufactured bombs could be given priority. Hitler smiled and said I need not worry at all. His policy would be such as to avoid war. He wouldn't dream to have a war and he reminded me that he had told me that once before -that his policy was to be on good terms with Britain. I expressed my doubts that that was very possible. He told me to be convinced. He knew the British can only be entered through acts and through the acts. I said there was a difference somewhere. In any case he refused to have bombs manufactured. This request I repeated another three times to him as I was very much concerned about it and I said to myself; should war break out tomorrow I could be reproached justifiably that the Luftwaffe and the bombing fleet could take four weeks' leave after the outbreak of the war -- for about five months.
I would not have been in a position to tell the German people that I was not me but Hitler. Hitler had on all occasions again refused and declared: "I don't know what you want. There will be no war. The world has swallowed what he did and now we are very, very strong." Then once more after a conversation in May with Mussolini, who declared once on his own initiative, he said: "Milch, war is inevitable now". Quite different from Hitler. When I returned in May I told Hitler what Mussolini thought. Hitler smiled: "Mussolini is wrong. There will be no war," In July 7 to 11 there was a General Airforce Congress in Brussel. The British Commander-in-Chief and the French Commander-in-Chief was there so I as deputized by Goering, who didn't go to these congresses. After that period I was unable to see Hitler but Goering and I told Goering that the attitude taken by the British delegation made it quite clear to me that Britain was waiting for her moment. The impression I made could not be overlooked. The British Commander--in-Chief of the Airforce Sir Newall, he left no doubt open that things were different from 1937; that patience was now exhausted on the other side. I asked Goering to tell Hitler that and I do not know whether he did so. It was not possible for me in any case to see Hitler,
Q Witness, will you please give us the date of the conference with Mussolini?
A That was on 26 May 1939.
Q Witness, I have now to put to you that on the 26 May 1939 you heard from Mussolini that he was of the opinion that war was now inevitable and you told us here under oath that you saw from that Mussolini had a different viewpoint from Hitler but now on the 23 May 1939 at the Reichskanzlei of Hitler there was this famous conference with the British, the Schmundt Minutes, and from which as far as the whole, you all had gained the impression that Hitler in this speech had talked in favor of war, I now ask you to express to the Tribunal what you think of these conferences of the 23 of May 1939 which, according to self-appearances, there was a contradiction of exclamations given to you and given your opinion of it?
If you want to have the Schmundt Minutes to make your explanation I can hand it to you. May it please the Tribunal, this is Exhibit No. 3, Document No. 79 and the Document Book is 1-A of the prosecution, on the first page.
A The history of this conference was that at the end of March we were told by our intelligence service that -- in a very clear report -that in Poland on the German Frontier matters of mobilization were in full swing. I made a particular note of this in my diary. Shortly before that -- about ten days before that -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia had taken place, Poland bad been a party in this and was given the so-called Teschen area. Poland at once occupied this militarily but Teschen, the territory ceded to Poland by Germany -- far out that led to mutual difficulties and these difficulties, our intelligence service told us, led to the mobilization measures. Thereupon I heard no more at that point. Later on, however, it was stated that Poland would continue with these measures. The conference on 23 Hay was a complete surprise to me. I was in my office in the Reich Air Ministry when a telephone call came through as far as I know by Bodenschatz, that Goering who had just returned from his leave in Italy was unable to be present; that I would have to deputize for him. It was so late that I couldn't even go home in order to change into my official uniform. For instance, that is the Army and the Luftwaffe appeared in boots on occasions. The conference started at 1600 and lasted until 2030. That is to say four hours and a half. Hitler spoke alone as was the rule on occasions of that sort. Field Marshal Goering; did not appear as a participant. I know that not only because I had been ordered to deputize him so suddenly but also Hitler said at the end of the conference that the participants of the meeting must not talk about these matters, even among; themselves. After the conference I went up to him when I took my farewell from him and asked him whether I should inform Goering. Hitler said "no, I shall do that myself."
As there was no conference of that sort in that period with which I could confuse this conference to myself it is quite clear that Goering was not present. I recall very well to have seen Brauchitsch, Keitel, Halder, Bodenschatz, Schniewindt, Zeschonek, and Below, the Adjutant of the Luftwaffe. I cannot recall the other adjutants, etc.
Q Do you recall Raeder?
A Yes, of course, I can certainly recall Reader being there.
Q fitness, I must speak to you now that Goering has testified before the International military Tribunal -- it is true that he said: "I did not attend this meeting" but later on when it was put to him and a list of attendance and his own remarks which are in the Schmundt Minutes shown to him, he changed his mind and he said ho thought that he was present.
A I am convinced that Goering made a mistake if ho said that. I read that passage that Goering was present. No, he didn't speak there. I am certain Goering never know in these cases whether he was there or not. He had his finger in too many pies for him to recall everything on occasion and actually he wasn't present and above all, if Goering was present he would have at the end of the mooting -- ho would have to say: "My Fuehrer, I will fight with you. We and the higher leaders of the Wehrmacht stand behind you. You give our orders. We follow." He would never have put a special question. It's possible Goering was never informed on that material question and secondly, he was a man of such formality that on occasions when the Chief of State and Chief of the Armed Forces was speaking, he would not have liked to disturb the picture by asking technical questions.
Q Witness, are you absolutely certain?
A I am absolutely convinced he wasn't there because otherwise it would have been nonsense to ask Hitler should I inform Goering.
Q Witness, can it be possible that you didn't see him.
A No, no. The circle was so small and we could see each other so clearly. I said next to Raeder and Brauchitsch right in front. I recall that on my left there was Raeder and on my right Brauchitsch.
I sat on the chair which was meant for Goering. Therefore, I was sitting in the middle and which was not entirely in accordance with the rank but we lost the piece of paper with his name on it and Goering was probably expected.
Q Please go slow, witness. Witness, if Goering had appeared during the meeting would you have surrendered your chair?
A But certainly. Goering would never have taken the second chair.
Q Witness, will you now explain your general impression of this conference of Hitler's of the 23 of May 1939 and especially according to your conception at that time? Whether you believe the former assurance Hitler made to you, the assurance in which he felt there would not be any war and whether be contradicted to these assurances?
THE PRESIDENT: At this time will you inform the Tribunal whether this will take a considerable time?
MR. BERGOLD: Yes, quite some time.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps rather than get it into two sections and not interrupt it we should start at 1:30 and have it without break.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1335 hours, 12 March 1947.)
ERHARD MILCH - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, I ask you now to state have you understood generally the speech of May 23, 1939, especially in connection with the declaration Hitler made to you according to which he was not expecting the war.
A. This conference lasted four and a half hours and was even for a spectator extremely difficult to follow. I asked myself what purpose this conference served and I reached the conclusion that for one thing Hitler, who after all had become C. in C. of the Wehrmacht, wished to tell his C. in C. of the army, navy, and air force about his military ideas. To put it mildly he wanted to make an impression on his military leaders. He wanted to show them militarily, how much he knew about the highest military matters himself, and especially the high officers of the army were not in agreement with the fact he was C. in C. of the army because they considered him unprepared for his task.
Secondly, from 1933 onward I can recall four or five conferences, sometimes among more people, during which Goering told me one was not always certain how loyal the soldiers were, and Hitler by speaking very impressively wished to give these soldiers a feeling of loyalty. Especially after Fritsch's resignation the officer group was not appeased as the soldiers, in contradiction to Hitler's promise, were very severely supervised. An good deal of material regarding remarks against Hitler by soldiers must have been at people's disposal. Hitler frequently expressed the opinion, and that was my thought, that soldiers had pacifist tendencies. He explained that by the fact that the First World War had been lost, and the confined mentality of the 100,000 man army. He believed that this pacifist attitude of the officers must be changed, he had to wake them up, he had to point out how acute the danger of war was or otherwise his soldiers would not do sufficiently in the rearmament program as he wished them to.
The overall situation in May 1939 gave him a welcome opportunity to pursue all these ends. This is what I thought myself insofar as I believe I knew Hitler at the time.
Now I look at the record which I did not see before. There are several points which strike me. It is quite obvious that these few pages, there are altogether twelve pages, represent only a fraction of a conference, of a speech which lasted four hours and a half. Hitler did not speak slowly. If he got excited, which he always did when he spoke, then he spoke very, very quickly. It was extremely difficult to ask spectators to follow him; one, because he was so fast two, because he spoke in Austrian dialect which we north Germans cannot follow quite so quickly. This conference, I know very well he talked to us for one hour on the origins of his political mission. We called that "now he is talking about Adam and Eve." I know that all his other speeches, he addressed the nation over the wireless, crowds over the air, one hour was always "Adam and. Eve" before he went over to something else. He explained to the soldiers, he was convinced, he said, that a soldier did not know anything about foreign politics. He told them what the German situation was within the framework of the world.
In 1939 he had changed a little in comparison to the earlier years. He was much more convinced of his own virtues than he was earlier. I recalled his modesty was not so apparent any more. Then he patted himself on the back on his successes. He talked for a long time about his successes, Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia.
When the latter subject was mentioned,he spoke oh the collaboration of Poland in order to take over the Sudeten area. At that time he became extremely furious because the Poles asked for more than he had arranged with them. He abused the Poles and said on that occasion, "For the rest I have another account to settle with them; the question of the Corridor hasn't been cleared up yet," He said, "Originally my requests wore only concerned with preserving a corridor through the Corridor; that is to say, a German Corridor from the Reich to East Prussia across the Polish area, which reached the Baltic north of Warsaw."
Later on the Free City of Danzig is mentioned. I don't think he referred to Danzig at all because he confined himself particularly to that question. Then he spoke on Britain. He said that he wished to work with Britain, but he said also Britain did not wish that he would clear up the question of the Corridor with Poland. He then abused the British. He said the British wished to have the world to themselves and they wouldn't even let poor little Germany have the Corridor.
From that matter it became quite clear what his opinion was. He became more and more excited, and then he said, "We must think what will happen if, because of the Corridor question and that question I want to settle, if war breaks out because of that, what nations will oppose us; what can these nations do militarily; and what can Germany do against them." And he talked about that a long time. He had no notes with him. He spoke without any notes, and in my opinion he completely abandoned his original subject. I cannot recall that as in the document it says, "Without invading foreign states or attacking foreign territory, this is not possible." He said, "In fifteen or twenty years resettlement will become a matter of necessity to us. No German statesman can avoid that question any longer." He said before, as I recall it, that the German people consisted of eighty million people. He then spoke for a long time how many people there were to the square mile, what agriculture these people needed, and that now just enough material was available, but in twenty years, for instance, the German people would have increased so much more that then the figure of over one hundred million was mentioned.
Then our soil would no longer be sufficient; then we would have to have more soil. Then he spoke for a long time on the question of a nation without space, his favorite expression of the have not and the rich nations and so forth.
"Other successes can no longer be won without shedding blood"; it says here. That was an idea which he did not have at that time and altogether that idea and ether ideas contained herein; I can tell you the various details; all these ideas really come only in a later period. He had these ideas only in the war.
In many speeches he very often used the same phrases and words as everybody knows who has listened to his speeches to the nation. He did not change his style very often. Many of these expressions were only too familiar to us or look very familiar now, but in certain of these expressions here I am of the opinion that it can be proved that he would not use them in 1939.
He said in one case he is expecting to be given colonies. I know that in 1933 and 1934 Hitler said once before a number of people that Bismarck's policy had been wrong in acquiring colonies; that only forced Germany to have a fleet and the German Navy under Wilhelm II had been the reason why there had been war with Britain. And in practice a colony achieved really very little; which would have preserved him from ever acquiring colonies.
In '36 and '37 he had changed his point of view completely. From an economic point of view the necessity to have colonies became urgent; and he always stated that Germany has been deprived of her colonies by the Versailles Treaty and we must get them back. In the same sense I understood his intention to build big battleships; for in '33 and '34 he was not interested at all in a Navy. He frequently said that was only going to lead into trouble with England. "I don't want to have a Navy. I want to work with England." But in '39 he was an enthusiastic colonial politician and pro-Navy. I know that because in '36 and '37 I mentioned it three or four times, and I said that Germany was in no position to build a Navy of big battleships, and when he said, "I need it for colonies if we get them", I recalled his earlier speeches that he did not wish to have any colonies, and that in my opinion colonies were of no necessity.
As the time in which one can have colonies was a limited one, it was hardly worthwhile to acquire colonies now. So, therefore, in that conference he certainly did not refer to colonies.
He declared that by the Protectorate new food had been supplied to Germany, and above all, a fairly good industrial capacity was available there. He thought in particular of the Skoda Works, which, before the last war, were the true Austrian industry and which he knew very well. To him the Skoda Works meant the same thing as to a German would mean the word Krupp. He also said, "As the Czechs will not be called up as soldiers if there should be a war, there in these big Bohemian industrial works we shall have a first rate armament works which can work for German military requirements."
All his questions about the war were of a hypothetical nature. He took part in certain maneuvers arranged by the Army, and now, in my opinion he himself wished to put hypothetical cases in a military sense-if this happened something else must be done and so forth. Surely all countries do this on the general staff, that they assume a certain situation and then work on that situation accordingly.
"A decision to attack Poland on the first given opportunity," as it says here, I have no recollection at all, but surely I would remember that, because that would have been a considerable step to take. The question there must not be simultaneous war with the West or if, in the course of a German-Polish conflict, war would be excluded, war with the West would not be impossible, then the war would primarily be directed at Britain and France; that has not been said in that form.
Then there is a passage, "Japan is a very grave problem. If, for various reasons, they take a cool attitude towards working with us, it is all the same in Japan's own interest to work to take steps against Russia in good time." I can not recall that the term Japan has been mentioned in this conference at all, but apart from that, that idea contradicts in '39 when Japan did not see Russia as an enemy, but the United States.
The remarks on economic relations with Russia are incorrect in this form here. He said once the political relations are improved, then economic relations will be possible. At that moment there were no negotiations with Russia at all, but they started late in August only. He only abused Russia at that time on 23 May in his old manner which came from certain home political opinions. It is very typical because in August political relations improved, and on the basis of these political relations there was an economic agreement also which guaranteed Germany a fair amount of foodstuff, I believe it was one million tons per year, and also a considerable support for materials necessary for war purposes.
That remark could have been made only after the end of August. Then it says here, "If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia against Germany, Italy, and Japan -- here he still thinks Russia is on the enemy side, -- "I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows." I have to say this about that. A few annihilating blows were never mentioned before the war. The Wehrmacht and also Hitler were convinced that it would be a long and difficult struggle in order to gain a foot-hold in France in the military sense. The experiences of the First World War when those long battles took place on French soil without the possibility of strategic break-through did point out to the Wehrmacht not to take too lighthearted a view of a new war.
When France fell so quickly in 1940 everybody, including Hitler, was tremendously surprised. We couldn't understand it for a long time because otherwise it could not be understood why not immediately after Dunkirk an action against Britain would have been taken by the Wehrmacht, instead of which there were preparations for months, and the Luftwaffe and everybody else remained completely inactive without going into action. If one had counted on a few annihilating blows, then surely there would have been the ships ready to sail to England. That operation was started after Dunkirk; and it took several months until the first ships of the so-called Sea Lion were assembled on the Channel coast. At the time an operation against England was no longer possible. "The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England." He did not doubt it. He always emphasized that he wished to direct his policy in such a manner as to work with Britain; and he always said, "Even if Britain now condemns my action and threatens me, I shall know how to deal with it. There will never be war with Britain, even if I have to give in politically. But the British are very good at bluffing. So am I. We shall see who is better at this game."
I was convinced to the end and am so now that Hitler bluffed, just as in the affair when he occupied the Rhineland, in the case of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudetenland. He did not wish to go to war at that time; and as he was successful in bluffing because of the first operations, he was backed by nothing, and he wanted to bluff again and believed himself to be able to attain the glory of having settled the Corridor of Poland, even if it were only the Corridor across the Corridor.
Because he was very ambitious, he was convinced that he would always be successful. He believed that he had been appointed by Providence, as he called it, and particularly favored by Providence.
Hitler was not a blasphemist. On the contrary, originally he was very pious. He said to me once, "A man who does not believe in God will never be faithful to his people. I do not wish to have anything to do with anybody who has not his God in his heart." He said so in 1934 or 1935. Therefore, all these words concerning Britain are wrong.
About Dutch and Belgian air bases to be occupied militarily, nothing was mentioned at the time. That was an idea which was completely remote at the time. "The opinion to buy one's way out cheaply is dangerous. There is no such possibility." These are ideas which it is true he expressed but always on the hypothetical assumption that there may be war and if there is a war, then it will be a life and death struggle, and then we must burn our boats. Either we win or we shall be dead. This was just a pep talk for his generals.
He was sufficiently well-informed not to say that "Britain in the last war could feed herself without importing, which is no longer possible today." Britain didn't feed herself in the First World War without imports, which Hitler knew very well. He says here that meager supplies may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise. It is quite clear that he meant the 11th of January 1940 when an aircraft which was to have received an order had to make a crash landing in Belgium; and secret orders regarding our aggressive intentions against Holland, Belgium and France were carried there. Hitler never counted on such things.
THE TRIBUNAL (JUDGE LUSMANNO): I'm confused as to the dates. These are notes of a conference or of a lecture on May 23, 1939; and I understand the witness refers to an episode of January 1940.
Perhaps I didn't catch that correctly.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Court, the situation is this; and the witness will explain it in advance that in his conviction this record in this form was written only in 1940. That was the reason why Neurath, Raeder, and Schmieling were interrogated by me; and that is why this case is current now.
THE TRIBUNAL (JUDGE MUSMANNO): When he said he was referring to the episode of January 1940, he meant Schmundt was referring to the episode of 1940 and not Hitler?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, that is so, Your Honor.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Will you please continue?
A When this silly accident occurred on the 11th of January 1940, I know that Hitler always referred to this episode as a "Silly accident". I never heard him use that term before or otherwise. Then there's Point 4, why a surprise may not come off, Weather conditions. That point comes from the time after the Polish war. Hitler immediately after Poland wished to attack the West; but it demanded a period of six consecutive days of fine weather because at that time he was still convinced that he could attack only with the help of the Luftwaffe; and the Luftwaffe needed fine weather. There were so many weather conferences at that time as I had never seen them in my thirty-five years and more of flyers' life. Every single day and every day in Hitler's presence the weather exports would foregather. We said, "He'll talk to them until they will really provide fine weather." There was a man even engaged who was supposed to produce. it. He alleged that he could influence the weather. He had a funny name which I can't recall; but his name sounded suspiciously like "Deceiver". So we said, "We needn't give him a nickname because he's got one already."
In 1939, in May, Hitler didn't bother about the weather conditions, I am not sure even that he knew we had a weather service in the Luftwaffe, nor can I recall that in this context he spoke about the justice or the injustice of treaties.
It's also very illogical that he should say here that an annihilating blow could only be dealt if and when one did not slide into a war afterward or during the war with Poland. This is the correct statement. He does not wish to be involved in war with England. He would regard that as a great political blunder if he became involved. He does wish to settle the Corridor question of Poland but does not wish to risk war with Britain on that score. The idea that the army will have to hold positions and so forth is an idea which he also only conceived in the war with France.
Then there is the sentence about the army in cooperation with the navy and the Luftwaffe, and once the army has taken the most important positions, the industrial production no longer flows into the military matters but will be for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and the navy. To that I have to say that this is such a typical idea which was conceived only after the war with France. That Hitler should have spoken about the Danaides, which is an old mythological comparison, is quite impossible because such expressions are completely unknown to him. He didn't learn that in his school days.
To the question that the industrial production should be for the benefit of the Luftwaffe, I could provide evidence of that; that after the war in France, as late as the spring of 1941, I should say perhaps April or May, very short of the Russian campaign, there indeed Hitler calls together a conference and said, "Now I no longer need the armament for the army. Now a lot, or a large part of the factories that should work for the Army should be switched over for the Luftwaffe, and, also take part of it for the Navy." He stated that fact in that manner. He said then he could not sleep, that he had a new idea. Now he could give the Luftwaffe what it had always demanded. That was in 1941. I am convinced that this record was not written before 1941. He never said that the British Navy had a defense installation against the Luftwaffe at that time; that may have been the case in 1940 or 1941. It is not true, because the defensive installation of the British Navy was in existence in 1939. I got this as one of the reasons why he actually had this war in 1939, but that is the reason given about the events afterwards.
Then there are the other two very clear points which enlarged only after the war had commenced; The correct estimate of the effectiveness, for instance, of the aircraft, the battleships, and the aircraft carriers, and, which is the more effective on little occasions, and it was considered as a whole the aircraft carrier is a better protection for a convoy, and, (b), is an air attack on a factory more important than on a battleship, where the battleship protection is any protection for a convoy. The question of aircraft carriers, battleships and convoys arose only in 1940, then the new ones were built for convoys.
The question of aircraft attack on factories, or on battleships, was discussed by Hitler for the first time after the campaign in France, roughly, in August 1940. He maintained that you could sink a battleship by bombs, but he was speaking only of cruisers and smaller battleships for sometime thereafter.