On the twenty-third of May, I visited Goering, and he was at Feldenstein on holiday here at Nurnberg, and I flew across because I had heard some more detailed rumors from some other source in the meantime. And I communicated to him a warning against this eastern campaign, myself. And I requested him to use all his influence with Hitler so that this war on two fronts would not happen to us. I can not recollect my words in detail.
I could not describe you the situation clearly because never before had I been so deeply shattered and shaken with reference to this question. I told him, "Reichsmarshal, now your great hour has come. You must stop this war through your influence with Hitler. There is no other person in the whole German nation, aside from you, who would have the strength to do this." I gathered from his words in that connection that he, too, was very much opposed to it. He shrugged his shoulders and he said to me, "Milch, that is a matter without hope. Everything that could be done has been tried." I said to him, "It couldn't be true that everything has been done." I said, "It has to be avoided at all costs. This means a crime against Germany because this would mean Germany's defeat." He said that he was not seeing it quite as pessimistically as all that, and that, if Hitler had one of his inspirations, then this would only be because he was now going to beat Stalin to the draw. Hitler would have documentary evidence to the effect that Russia would go into the field against us in any case if Germany would be involved in battles in the West. And I declared, I stated to him that we had a pact with Russia which I knew in detail from my time that I was with the Lufthansa. And I knew now difficult it was to get the Russians to sign a pact for anything - but that once Russia had signed a pact, they would, in my opinion, be extremely faithful to such a pact; this having been my experience, and this having been my prediction.
Goering shrugged his shoulders and I went on to tell him that once I must have the permission to visit Hitler. "I will stop him from going into this war." And he told me, "That is out of the question. You can't do that." And I said, "Yes, I can". He said, "If you tell Hitler that, then he is going to have you shot." And I said, "That would be the most decent death which a German soldier could die; to die for this, to die in an attempt to stop this.
1787 (a) affair from going through."
"Well," Georging said, "Your death would be in vain just the same; and, apart from that, I prohibit you to approach Hitler in this question. But, if you do it, then you are subject to the most severe punishment. I do not want that a man of the German Air Forceparticularly in your position - to behave like a defeatist before Hitler."
I told him I wanted to do it just the same. And he said, "You are going by yourself." And I said, "Yes." He said, "I will see to it that you don't get there." Then he gave orders to the effect that I wouldn't be admitted before Hitler.
At that point, I didn't know anything about the date nor about any other intentions in that connection.
Then on 22 June there came an attack, and the first conference was on 14 June in Hitler's office, and on 15 June in Goering's office. I had not been called to the headquarters in connection with this campaign. I remained in Berlin and Goering gave the order to Udet to multiply the airforce. I did not participate in the meeting on 22 June, and Goering gave me the task of advising Udet in connection with this question. During this very conference I repeated my belief that I had previously made and remained right regarding Germany's position at the time. I repeated that early, and I demanded on that occasion that in case German airforce was being multiplied, in connection with that, of course, I am of the opinion, in effect, that the Army had at their disposal, 23 May 1939, the defense of fighter aircraft and night fighters, which should receive much greater priority than they did up to then. The question of the organization, too, was discussed in the conference. I had previously submitted that in writing to Goering in a General Inspectorate report. The arguments which I quoted in that connection were that now, after all, the full airforce must be employed in the East, and that consequently the continuance of the attack with England could no longer take place. Goering contradicted me and said it could run concurrently. I said that was out of the question. I knew as General. Inspectorate approximately the figures, what the figures were as to the production of the British airforce, and I knew that the force was getting from the States, because we had captured France, and was supposed to be supported there. Then I informed him that four-engined bombers would reach Great Britain to a. larger degree, and that they now attacked Germany, and the attacks by the British would increase; that so far as our home country was concerned, there was next to no defense with the anti-aircraft batteries appearing, and that where the Russians merely were to turn upon us an added attack with the antiaircraft it would not take place again; that was after this fighter aircraft was produced for that purpose, and at that time he did not say much about this, but he stated that the program had been laid down by the General Staff, and if they could turn out more, then the German Staff, too, would make higher demands.
Q. Witness, may I turn back to your warning against the Russian campaign? Do you know that Goering later on made a disparaging remark, publically or in other words called you a coward?
A. Yes, I know that. It was when we had Stalingrad I was given the task I should effect a supply line, and I should supply with clothes the troops, and with food, by air, and I heard by air that speech which was made something like that, of course, which pleased me no end.
Q. How did you know that he meant you?
A. It was clear because I was the only one who had tried to contradict it; at least, I do not know of anybody else in the air forces was accused of being a coward.
Q Witness, in order to name an initial series of attacks on the defense, I'll have to ask you: Did you take part in the declaration of an attack on America?
A. No, that was a matter that came as a complete surprise, since the highest leaders did not even know that Japan would suddenly enter into the war. Now, Hitler was demanding from the Japanese that faith that the Allies would demand of us who would also enter into the war.
Q. Witness, your order to insist that Udet gave assistance as to the Luftwaffe, did you have any assistance from him, and what did it consist of and how did you remove it?
A. I did go on record that he was a good fellow, and for many, many years he was one of my best friends, and if there was any one I would have had to come in with me there, I would rather like for him to have it than anybody else. I said, "I think I'll have it that way but only temporarily." Then I had him report to me on the entire organization as it then turned out, and I had learned what had been produced, which kind it was that was produced, what was the expenditure, and just what developments that were shown to me, and I flew from industry to industry in the Luftwaffe, and I made suggestions to him as to how that organization should be changed, and to know exactly what he had which were known as being directly dependent on him alone, and further, it was regarded as a loss for one man to have twenty-four different departments directly under him.
The military organization mentioned four, and the next mentioned were six departments which can be under one man, and that was a leadership which existed in a case, as long as it was all right, and Udet was of a very general character. The entire machinery, I said, should be comprised of three or four departments, so that he would have only three or four departments, and I showed him the kind of an organization necessary, but he did not like to touch upon that problem, because someone in the immediate vicinity informed him to the contrary, and all the time being a man who was afraid of losing his interest; so I took it that as to his work and his assignment, that I could only give him advice, but then I saw to it as to particular supplies, and obtaining particular supplies, that there was considerable work for the year of 1942 to be done in the aircraft with a type that was standard in the war; that the very type which would be the B-bomber type was being discontinued, and a new type of aircraft was to come up with different motors, and the situation was slightly changed to a new type, and this new aircraft, I want to say I discovered the output was not enough to arrive at in 1942, but that would be under the best circumstances in 1944, and I presented that to Udet but he would not believe me, and I asked the representatives of the industries to come and see us, but they said they did not want to argue any questions, and they admitted I was right, and it was then necessary that the old type should once again be put to use. It was a very difficult task to speak of, for once a type becomes obsolete it is more difficult to start to make that type and then to start a new type in its development. So I say again that it took a. long time until I had it where I wanted it, and I wanted to express my objection very clearly. You must realize that they did already reluctantly give the "A" type should once again be produced. In other words, on an engine design, possibly, once an engine is discontinued you cannot start it up again, and then you have to start up with a new engine, whenever it can be made ready.
That of course caused a lot of difficulties afterwards, but it was before my time that the then new engine had become obsolete. Of course, Udet did not like to be told what to do but we did talk it over in its entirety, and any loose angles he might have had given him were removed. Then Goering stepped in, and he was on Udet's side, but he got the impression, or he did give him the impression, that he was ill and he rather gave me the order in Udet's presence I should interfere more strictly, which was something I refused to do. I told him that I only wished to remain in my capacity as Udet's advisor, and Udet would handle the matters coming from him, and Udet then did not want to adopt this new type of organization, and it was forgotten then, but Goering would not forget it then, and one day he gave the order, and. he complained bitterly. He said, "If I was right from the beginning you know the Fuehrer would have given you the same order a long time ago." It was to me, it was a question if this machinery could be controlled, there is no doubt but what you people would have been so glad you might have the best will but some of you people have not that desire, they are too lazy. So very late this new organization was created, and this was on 4 October 1941, during the time when the conversion of the new types of aircrafts were taking place, which was achieved the first cf September. Udet was sick at the time. He was in a. sanitarium, and I saw him, for on that occasion I secured his support by getting a certain amount of pressure, and if he had not got it by September 1, then in 1942, certainly he would not have produced the bomber, and certainly not the single fighter. If I had not been able to produce more fighters, I would not have been acquainted with the situation, but it would not have helped the fighter situation very much.
Well, after September, after the first of September everything was in perfect order so far as Udet was concerned - my personal relationship with him was concerned, I mean. Then, the 17th of November, the day before he died, I had arranged a short holiday journey, a journey consisting of three days, but when I came to Luetzen he was dead.
1792.
Q Witness, before you entered into this organization as an advisor, did you have another special task referring to the French factories?
A Yes. On the basis of the Armistice agreement, a joint production between Germany and France had been arranged. General Roerster, who was heard as a witness here, signed it at the time. Together with Udet, I talked about this when I received the order from Goering to the effect that we were going to suggest to the French that the entire production, not only of French types be continued, but also that German types should be constructed by them. Transports and training aircraft should be constructed in France.
Then we jointly had a discussion in France with the industrialists there. We met not only the production leaders but also labor leaders, whom we had invited, and with them we reached complete accord regarding the question of manufacturing.
Production was particularly favorable to French interests. They had only a claim of the sixth aircraft. We were going to get five-to-one but since we did not have enough use for these types of aircraft, the entire production, right to the very end, remained one-to-one; that is to say, when we got an aircraft, the French too received an aircraft.
This was not by any means a forced contract. It was a contract that the French very much liked to make, because it gave them the possibility to retain their aircraft and even to produce now aircraft for themselves, contrary to the Versailles Treaty, where Germany was prohibit ed from doing so.
Q At this conference with the French aircraft industry and the French aircraft workers, there was a speech. Was that yours, or whose was it?
A Yes, I drafted that for Udet. You see, Udet was not an orator.
Q Witness, now I refer to the actual indictment, at the time when you.
acted as GL; when did you become GL?
A This was after Udet's death. It was on the 19th that Goering ordered me to come and see him. He told me that he had nobody, that I would have to take on Udet's work in addition to all the other work I was doing.
JUDGE MUSSMANO: Dr. Bergold, when you refer to a date, please make it a little more specific. The 19th is not quite enough. Give the month and, if you haven't mentioned a year within the few minutes immediately preceding, give the year.
DR, BERGOLD: I was not going to put it to the witness. I thought the witness was going to give me the exact date.
A It was on 19 November 1941, Your Honor, that I was ordered to see Goering, and he told me that I would have to accept this office, in addition to the others, because he didn't have anybody else. I asked him to leave me out. I said that my technical knowledge was not fitted for this task, that for so many years since 1937 I had been outside this technical task, and the brief period of advising Udet, too, had not put me in the picture sufficiently well. He insisted on his request and gave me the order.
Hitler confirmed tho matter on 21 November 1941, and he demanded that I should take on this additional assignment. He had hoard from Goering that I was not willing, but ho stated to me that I would have to do it. He did not have confidence in anybody else to take on this task.
Q Did this commission agree with your thoughts for your utilization in the war?
A No, not at all. Right to the very end I demanded active service in tho war. I asked Udet if I could not be used in the air force I should be transferred to the army, and I told the army that I was willing to take a division or less. I did not insist on leading an army group in my rank of field marshal. I just wanted to go to the front and go outside this paper war, since the outcome of the war was abundantly clear to me and since all this could be suffered so much more easily if you were in charge of troops and fighting with your men.
On a few occasions the army tried to get me. I know that. On several occasions applications were made, and, in fact, I was going to be given more than a division, but Hitler did not allow it. On one occasion Hitler told a general that he could not spare me from the air force, and I had to stay.
Q Witness, yon just mentioned that Goering forbade you to warn Hitler before the Russian campaign. Did you have occasion before of warning him, or shortly after?
AAt that tine, before the Russian campaign, I had no opportunity to talk with Hitler. I went to see him on one occasion, but that was previously, when I was not in the picture. It was on 23 April, before I was B.L. and I only went to see him for a brief period. I had been sent off to see Rommel in Africa, and I was to report to Goering and Hitler on the fighting conditions in Africa. I had been there for just a few days, and I had just come back from there, but this report to Hitler was interrupted because Hitler did not have the time. He was going to send for me again, but this never happened.
Q Did you as the GL give up your former duties, as General Inspector and Secretary of the State, or did you continue with these activities?
A No, I continued with them all, just as I continued the training of all troops, the flying training, and so on and so forth. Therefore, I retained all the other assignments. I did say that it was too much, but it was demanded from me. I must say that the work as GL went to the foreground, as far as time was concerned, from then on. I had to devote most of my time to that assignment, but I was very much overburdened with work. I had certainly worked a lot before during my lifetime, but never as long as I did during that period.
Q Witness, before I refer to your time working in the GL, I would like to put one more question to you. What did you think when on 22 December 1941 Hitler took over the chief command of the Wehrmacht?
A I thought that that was a most regrettable fact. The head of a state ought to confine himself to that work, for such a position is not a question of the hours of work he puts in; it is a question of quality, so you have to have peace of mind and tine for thought, and it entails being free of any subordinate responsibility for any special purposes. The leadership of any army is a very comprehensive task, which will take up the entire tine of even the best man. It is not something you can deal with nonchalantly on the side, particularly if you have not learned the business. I thought it an impossibility, considering Hitler's personality, and I thought it was unfortunate as far as the army was concerned and even more unfortunate for the German nation, which, after all, could demand a fully capable supreme commander for every branch of the armed forces, because after all, the war was serious enough at that point.
Q Did you express your doubts on that to anybody?
A I talked to Goering and my comrades about this question quite often, and there was only one opinion. They all thought that it was wrong, but we did not have the possibility, of course, of stopping it.
Q Fitness, what was the position at the beginning when you took over the duties of GL? What measures did you take, and what was your aim?
A I can be brief in this connection, at least in regard to the first point. General Vorwald yesterday spoke at length about it. No development in the immediate future took place that was useful. No bomber aircraft of a new type was in existence, and in mass production we stood, as I previously described it to you.
Painstakingly we had reorganized on I September, and it was only because of the extreme devotion of our industry and because of the faithful service rendered by cur German workers and those who helped them that it was possible to, shall we say, bring about a miracle.
The number of bombers was achieved one more in the shortest of time in the spring of 1942. There was not a single individual instance where our program as we had made it for ourselves was not kept, but this is something extraordinary. In the case of fighters, there was a good type of fighter aircraft, or even two; namely, the Focke-Wulf and the Messerschmitt, but there were no engines for those fighters. We had to use incomplete engines to equip these aircraft, and on the strength of my experience collected in my capacity as director of the Lufthansa, I had to have tests carried out. My testing department in Rechlin was excellently staffed, the commander being an excellent pilot and technician, and it was due to their devotion that in a few months we managed to get even these new engines ready, although, according to hi.nan estimate, we could not expect it. It was more through luck than intelligence that we got that.
Now that was the situation as I found it. The now organization, of course, had not been started up, and I had to collect a few new, extremely good experts. The men who were working there independently were rather downhearted for a long time. As experts they had lost any doubt in the outcome of the war, and they did not believe that it would be possible once again to start up our armament program.
The total number of aircraft in production was something in the neighborhood of 800. That included trainer aircraft, transports, liaison aircraft, such as the Storch; it even included towing aircraft which were to be used for parachutists. As far as fighters were concerned, production of those, when it was removed from under my care, had increased by only about ten per cent, although '37, '38, '39, '40, '41--four years--five years-had elapsed.
The saddest fact was that in those 800 there were only 200 fighter aircraft, although both on tho British front and in the East, fighter planes were necessary. The Russians had at their disposal a very large number of bombers, and even if they were an elderly type, after all, we did have to have fighters to keep them in check, and since the transport extended from the North to the South over 2,000 kilometers, a large number of fighter units had to be used in that campaign. This army could not be supported with 200 fighters. We needed more.
The demand which I found from the General Staff, which of course made all demands and had them confirmed by Goering, amounted to a total of 360 fighters which were to be obtained in 1942. It was said yesterday that immediately I ordered a considerable increase. Several figures have been mentioned by various witnesses. Actually, these increases were not decided upon in one day. To begin with, it was to be doubled and a few days later I said, "Let's make it 1000; that's a round number," and later, in fact, there were 3,000 and later even we planned 5,000. We knew about that time just what we had to expect from our enemies. We knew the types they had.
A (Cont'd.) America, in the initial period, still published their production figures correctly subdivided according to types, and we also had an excellent intelligence, and from analyzing aircraft that had been shot down and from the numbers which were coded, and which could be deciphered by an expert right away, we could discover right to the very last number what they had produced. That was production that had been actually carried out, and the figures found in the United States weren't fictitious. Industry, although with a certain amount of reticence and difficulty, but certainly afterwards quite clearly fulfilled these figures. I still know exactly that the plan ran to about 8,000 aircraft, and was achieved, and that figure included four-engine bombers. Production by Britain's rearmaments too was learned in detail, and I remember at the time Great Britain was either already producing 800 fourengine bombers a month or was just about to produce that number.
You could calculate from that the number, the quantity of bombs which could be brought to Germany, and regarding the function and size of the bombs, of course we knew about that too. This was, of course, the reason that previously as general inspector we demanded that the entire force should be built to defend our home country, this being the fundamental principle of warfare, since without armaments and life at home battles at the front were unthinkable. I shall later have to come to this question in more detail because I am probably the man who remembers this most accurately, and as long as I am still about I would like to state this clearly once again, because this is one of the most important questions which probably existed in every war. This was the biggest struggle that went on, and as I look back on it today I am surprised that I did not despair over that struggle myself.
Q Witness, those measures taken by you which you planned, were they enforced, but thought that after this starting of the campaign against Russia the situation in Germany would be desperate?
AAs I said earlier, the fight on two fronts was the stab in the back of this war as far as I was concerned, that I thought excluded victory once and for all, and the only remaining question now was just how badly fleeced we might escape from this whole affair.
It was no longer possible in my mind to end this war with arms in your hand. It was only possible by means of arms to attain a somewhat satisfactory final position on the strength of which political and diplomatic steps would have to takeplace. In order to achieve such a final position it was necessary in the first place that Germany should be protected against destruction, because once the war potential was destroyed it was immaterial whether the fronts collapsed a little earlier or a little later. They couldn't be held any longer. This thought, unfortunately, was not understood by our leaders, or respectively they did not agree with it and turned it down and just didn't come to it. The end did not come until there was hardly one stone left intact.
Q Witness, in this connection I should like to ask you to prove of the directness of your present report and the truth, which you already mentioned before, and to submit this to the Tribunal, which remark you had made in your diary when the Russian campaign started.
A I wrote in it, "The attack against Russia, the first day 1,800 aircraft destroyed mostly on the ground. The Russians left them there. He didn't expect that we would attack. He overestimated our intelligence."
Q What did you want to say by these words, "He overestimated our intelligence?"
A Well, the Russians could have thought that no opponent would be so dumb and so stupid to attack him now and create the war on two fronts.
Q Witness, the leadership of the air fleet, was it connected with your plans, or did they agree to your work in the G.L.?
A They were agreeable to one affair, that is that I succeed in increasing production very rapidly. In spite of the smaller allocation figures of most materials and the questions of the reduction of our laborers all the time, as I said we had a total of 800 aircraft at the time when I took over, including 200 fighters. One year later, just over one year later in February, 1943, that is to say one year and two months or three months after my taking over we were producing 2,400 new aircraft.
But February has only twenty-eight days. If it had more days than that then we would have produced 150 or 250 aircraft more, if we had thirty-one days, I mean. I recall that in July I only took down the number of fighters? but we produced 1,050 modern fighter aircraft. That, of course, had been accurately planned in tho program. We were in that program, but it meant that the increase from November, was 200, to July went up to 1,050 which meant that under normal circumstances three months later would obtain 2,000, and two months after that we would get 3,000 fighters per month. Since preparations and the production of a now fighter takes five to six months, at about that time there were two months which contained more than 2,000 fighters already.
The question whether those fighters would be used for the home defense or not is something which I shall have to answer at a later stage.
Q You said at tho time, at this point, the leadership of the Luftwaffe was agreeable?
A Yes, quite. Of course, the figures demanded by Hitler included bombers and transport aircraft, which were always his main demands, and we pushed that too, but anything that we could possibly use and we could possibly got was used for fighter production. We also had bomber factories. Bomber factories were subdivided in ours, as well as any other country, some only making fighters, others only making bombers. These bomber factories were also used by mo to build fighter aircraft. As that applies to the factory at the Junker works, it was making scats for tho fighters, for instance. Others were producing fusilagos, so in addition to tho actual fighter factories we were actually producing higher factory figures.
Q All right, Witness, soon after you had taken over your duties as G.L. in connection with Speer, did you work with him together, how did you know him and how did you assume collaboration?
A I know Speer as inspector general for the reconstruction of the capitol, Berlin. On one occasion he showed me all his plans and models for Berlin. Those, of course, I was interested in. Then, in addition, I know that after the beginning of the war he was guiding some industrial construction work for Udet. Earlier this had been handled by private 1801a firms and arranged between tho factories and private enterprise, but, of course everything was somehow controlled in one department and restricted so that smaller private firms and bigger private firms could no longer act on their own initiative.
It had all been drawn together, either Todt's or Speer's offices, both offices running side by side, and Speer was responsible for this construction for the air force program for the army. That is how I knew him, although comparatively slightly, but I always had a very excellent expression of him, and I hold him in a high esteem as a man, inasmuch as I could at the time. Speer came after Todt's death, Todt having boon on ammunition and armament since the beginning of the war and was working for rearmament, on the 8th of February, 1942 Todt died in an accident, and on tho twelfth of February Spoor, on Hitler's orders now, took over tho rearmament ministry with a simultaneous task going both those assignments.
Todt felt that the head of the entire armament should be chosen. After that time air force rearmament had a curtain amount of greater independence. For instance, they had direct contacts with tool industries, with cast iron works, with firms making crankshafts for aircraft engines and all that sort of thing, and this entire affair now came under Speer's jurisdiction, particularly during the previous days, because no clearcut leadership existed in our sphere; that is to say, the Chief of the Ordnance Department and the man from the Navy and I, following a suggestion of mine, we all had met a few times in order to create such a head position in the armament program.
I wasn't going to put any particular person into the program. There was going to be a joint program on a voluntary basis for the three of us. We had not informed Todt. We intended to have him faced with the fair accomplishment. Unfortunately, it was at that time that his death occurred. When Speer arrived on the scene we had just formed this joint committee and we had just asked Funk of the Economy Ministry to come along because he still held coal and iron production in his hands at that point.
Speer had also been invited, and he now stated that this type of leadership had been ordered for him by Hitler, and since the others had previously asked me that I should be the head I got up and told Speer that God had sent him to us because we had just been looking for the leading man to take on this task and that we were happy and very pleased for him to take it, and ho did, and during all these years we collaborated with him excellently.
Gradually Speer took over more and more tasks in order to round off his armament program, not so much because he was looking for extra work, because he was overburdened considerably, but it was easier for him to have all these questions put under his own jurisdiction than to have to sit in the ante chambers of others. Thus, before ho took over air armament he had the entire armament program for the Army under him, Navy rearmament, all semi-manufactured parts, all raw materials, every part of the construction program, and all current and energy supplies.
1803a Thus and to myself it was particularly a natter of course that we should see him through thick and thin, and in ay air armament program I suffered fewer restrictions than I would have under someone also, because Speer collaborated with me loyally.