Q. Witness, but you personally, would you have had a possibility to get out of your order to do military service - to avoid that?
A. That, of course, is quite impossible. After all I was not a fair weather soldier. I had become a soldier to fight in a war should war break out. That was demanded by loyalty to one's own people.
Q. Witness, what was your first war time order in 1939?
A. My orders were shortly before the attack on Poland to go to Goering's headquarters and to be among his military staff. That finished my task in the ministry. The organization had been created before in such a way as to have a chief of air defense under me. This chief of air defense had nothing to do with actual defense; it was merely a highsounding title. In a civilian ministry you would have said deputy state secretary. He, in other words, was my deputy ministerial secretary. This was an officer of high rank who looked after all the ministerial tasks in the ministry independently. That didn't mean I lost my position in the air ministry; I was merely relieved, but I remained inspector general. Throughout the Polish campaign and later on in the campaign of the west I followed Goering's headquarters. I made daily flights with the troops, to the troops, and I was only active as an inspector general for there was no point in just sitting around in the headquarters; I had nothing to do.
Q. Thank you. After the campaign in Poland did you receive a special task?
A. Yes, I did. I said once before that we had no bombs. On 12 October, that was after the Reichstag meeting, and when Hitler failed to come to peace terms; that offer was never answered; Hitler ordered the war goes on; now you must produce bombs. That really should have been the task of the Army Arms Department. I contacted that department, as I did our own departments, and as the man responsible for the whole complex, it was not until the spring of 1940 when it came to an end, and I saw to it that the Luftwaffe received a sufficient number of bombs. I was deeply worried that the war would start in the autumn as Hitler wished it, and it was not possible to produce bombs between the 12th of October and whatever date Hitler had in mind, because after all if all went well, you would have to have a period of four to five months to start.
I began to produce concrete bombs to the tune of one million, which contained sufficient high explosives. The high explosives for these concrete bombs could be produced within a few days. By accident I had seen that type of manufacture in Switzerland, and I thought it a very good idea of producing bombs when I saw the explosive effect, that is to say, on buildings and solid objects which was as good as that of metal, or almost as good as that of metal bombs. We succeeded in a very few weeks to produce a sufficient number of concrete bombs, and in the spring, before we attacked France, we had a sufficient number of bombs.
Q. Witness, did you know anything about the preparations of the Norwegian campaign?
A. No.
Q. When did you hear, for the first time, of the carrying out of the Norwegian campaign and its preparations?
A. On 8 April, from Goering. The occupation took place on the ninth; a few hours so to speak before.
Q. Witness, did you have any part in the preparation of the campaign against Holland and Belgium?
A. On 12th of April I had been promoted Commander of Air Fleet V in Norway. The Luftwaffe there had been under the order of somebody else before. On account of difficulties of service there, moreover, there was only one telephone line which went via Sweden an independent command was to be established there. From the beginning of the war communications had been asked for and we received them to be used at the front. This had been given to me for the time being there. I commanded the Fleet from 12 April until 5 May; then the first operations in Norway had been concluded and connections had been established at the front and Goering insisted that I should return for the campaign in the west. On the 7th of May in the evening I arrived in Berlin, and on 8 May I reported back. That is, I had to report for the first time to the offensive in the the West and it began on the 10th of May.
DR. BERGOLD: Before I ask any more questions, may it please the Tribunal, I think that this is the time when the Tribunal would like to take a recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal 2 is again in session.
DR. BERGOLD: Mr. Denney is missing. May I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Witness, I have to put another question. According to the campaign in the west, you told us that only immediately you knew about that. Did you take part in the preparation for this?
A No, I did not.
Q Witness, after the campaign in the west you received the Iron Cross. What were the reasons for it?
A I received it after the Norway campaign, for my work in the Norway campaign.
Q When did you become Field Marshal?
A 19 July 1940.
Q Can you give us the reasons for that, as far as you know?
A There was the question of how many vacancies of Field Marshals should be allotted to the Air Force. First of all there was talk of just two. In that case I wouldn't have become a Field Marshal.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me announce that any spectators who wish, inside the rail, may sit at this table here.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Please continue.
A In that case there would only have been the two chiefs of fleet who would become Field Marshals, those who had been in active service in the French campaign. Since, however, I was senior in rank, being the only Colonel General in the air force, one did not wish to pass by me, and Hitler decided that I, too, should be promoted to Field Marshal. In that connection he gave credit for the fact that according to my flying logbook I had made about 40 sorties, and also he wanted to recognize my service in Norway, which actually probably wouldn't have been quite enough.
Q. Witness, did you have anything to do with the air attacks on England, the so-called Blitzkrieg?
A. No.
Q. When did you know about it the first time of the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, and did you take part in the preparation?
A. No, I did not take part in the preparations. The attack took place on the sixth of April. That is, the attack against Yugoslavia and Greece. Both came to the General Government as a surprise, since previously there had been a mutual agreement between us and the Yugoslavs. When the government was removed - I think the prime minister was called Stojadinowicz, and, likewise, the regent, the Prince -- and from that moment onwards the Yugoslavs were at war with us. Greece too, through Italy's defeat, became a prerequisite since it was impossible for us to let down the Italians who were our allies. I myself only heard about the whole affair immediately before the attack, or rather, after it had already taken place. May I just confirm that briefly. It was on the previous day - that is, the 5th of April - in the afternoon, that I landed in Vienna and then I drove out to visit Goering at Semmering in the evening of the fifth day that I learned that the following morning something was afoot. Previously I had been on anti-aircraft precaution inspections through Germany which was under my jurisdiction, and I was responsible for protection of German cities in the West and North, and I had taken care of the necessary shelters there. It was about as I had material and labor for that purpose at the time.
Q. Witness, when did you know that an attack on Russia was imminent? From whom?
A. It was on the fourteenth of June, 1941, when I was with Hitler. The orders were given out to the Navy, Air Force, and the Army. On the other hand, previously I had already heard that Hitler was afraid of an attack by the Russians.
For instance, Goering told me so on the 13th of January. I was surprised and I just couldn't believe it. In fact I told Goering, "I think that is out of the question. We have considerable 1784 (a) supply contracts - mutual supply contracts - with the Russians.
There was development work of the German Air Force which was planned, and which had been sold by order of Hitler. For instance, we sold them our latest fighter plane; likewise the most modern and newest instruments, such as ... All these things where we had opposition in connection with these sales because I said these are all things we haven't got ourselves. They have only just been developed. But it was said the Russians wanted these things and we have got to supply them with something in exchange for the large-scale supplies which we got from them. Thus, I did not believe in an attack.
But then, at some future time - and I think it was towards end of April - the chief of the anti-aircraft system came and visited me - whom I have already mentioned - who came together with the chief of the Administers' Department, who was in charge of clothing, and he told me that he wanted to have my opinion; whether I believed that, in a Russian campaign, there would not be any necessity for winter clothing. I jumped up from my chair and put my hand down, "Surely I didn't understand you correctly. What did you say?" And he said, "In the Russian campaign, you know." I said, "What Russian campaign?" And he looked up and said, "I beg your pardon, Field Marshal. Don't you know anything about it?" And I said, "About what?" And he said, "I beg your pardon. According to Fuehrer Order Number One you, too, must be told." And I said, "Look here.
Now the world is coming to an end. You know something, and I - your immediate superior - know nothing about it". And he said, "I am terribly sorry, but I can't say another thing."
Now, of course, I was hit by the idea, although it wasn't a clear one, and I said to him; "I am now giving you the formal order for the Air Force; that winter clothing should be obtained to the greatest possible degree." And, I, myself, ordered that every man should at least have four woolen shirts and four woolen drawers, and that everybody should have high fur boots and a fur coat.
And he followed up by saying, "These instructions of yours are in direct contradiction of an order of Hitler's." I said, "Well, now, will you please at least tell me what is going on?" And he said, "Well, what is really going on - that is something I don't know. We have only got an order to the effect that troops should be equipped with clothing for a Russian campaign. Now, whether that is going to be originated by the Russians or us - that is something I don't know. But it has been said that this campaign would not last through the winter." So I went on to say, "Well, you know, these people have gone crazy. We have already had one war with Russia and we needed three winters for that. And this time we are going to need clothing for three winters, at least, also." And he said to me that he was of the same opinion that if I signed the thing, then he would immediately proceed with the matter; that he, himself, couldn't infringe Hitler's order.
So I gave him this written order he wanted to the effect that he should obtain this winter clothing. It was obtained and the Air Force could give some of it to the Army afterwards. This was the second point when I had heard it, but it wasn't clear.
Q. Just a moment, witness. Is it correct that at this occasion that this man said the clothing was not necessary for the reason because the campaign against Russia would be finished before the winter?
A. Hitler had given the order that no winter clothing should be obtained since the war in the East would be completed before the winter. But, of course, considering that I went on to think during the night, it was quite clear what we were concerned with. It was my fear that we would now come to a war. I can't tell you the day when it actually happened. It may have been 1786 (a) the beginning of May.
On the twenty-third of May, I visited Goering, and he was at Feldenstein on holiday here at Nurnberg, and I flew across because I had heard some more detailed rumors from some other source in the meantime. And I communicated to him a warning against this eastern campaign, myself. And I requested him to use all his influence with Hitler so that this war on two fronts would not happen to us. I can not recollect my words in detail.
I could not describe you the situation clearly because never before had I been so deeply shattered and shaken with reference to this question. I told him, "Reichsmarshal, now your great hour has come. You must stop this war through your influence with Hitler. There is no other person in the whole German nation, aside from you, who would have the strength to do this." I gathered from his words in that connection that he, too, was very much opposed to it. He shrugged his shoulders and he said to me, "Milch, that is a matter without hope. Everything that could be done has been tried." I said to him, "It couldn't be true that everything has been done." I said, "It has to be avoided at all costs. This means a crime against Germany because this would mean Germany's defeat." He said that he was not seeing it quite as pessimistically as all that, and that, if Hitler had one of his inspirations, then this would only be because he was now going to beat Stalin to the draw. Hitler would have documentary evidence to the effect that Russia would go into the field against us in any case if Germany would be involved in battles in the West. And I declared, I stated to him that we had a pact with Russia which I knew in detail from my time that I was with the Lufthansa. And I knew now difficult it was to get the Russians to sign a pact for anything - but that once Russia had signed a pact, they would, in my opinion, be extremely faithful to such a pact; this having been my experience, and this having been my prediction.
Goering shrugged his shoulders and I went on to tell him that once I must have the permission to visit Hitler. "I will stop him from going into this war." And he told me, "That is out of the question. You can't do that." And I said, "Yes, I can". He said, "If you tell Hitler that, then he is going to have you shot." And I said, "That would be the most decent death which a German soldier could die; to die for this, to die in an attempt to stop this.
1787 (a) affair from going through."
"Well," Georging said, "Your death would be in vain just the same; and, apart from that, I prohibit you to approach Hitler in this question. But, if you do it, then you are subject to the most severe punishment. I do not want that a man of the German Air Forceparticularly in your position - to behave like a defeatist before Hitler."
I told him I wanted to do it just the same. And he said, "You are going by yourself." And I said, "Yes." He said, "I will see to it that you don't get there." Then he gave orders to the effect that I wouldn't be admitted before Hitler.
At that point, I didn't know anything about the date nor about any other intentions in that connection.
Then on 22 June there came an attack, and the first conference was on 14 June in Hitler's office, and on 15 June in Goering's office. I had not been called to the headquarters in connection with this campaign. I remained in Berlin and Goering gave the order to Udet to multiply the airforce. I did not participate in the meeting on 22 June, and Goering gave me the task of advising Udet in connection with this question. During this very conference I repeated my belief that I had previously made and remained right regarding Germany's position at the time. I repeated that early, and I demanded on that occasion that in case German airforce was being multiplied, in connection with that, of course, I am of the opinion, in effect, that the Army had at their disposal, 23 May 1939, the defense of fighter aircraft and night fighters, which should receive much greater priority than they did up to then. The question of the organization, too, was discussed in the conference. I had previously submitted that in writing to Goering in a General Inspectorate report. The arguments which I quoted in that connection were that now, after all, the full airforce must be employed in the East, and that consequently the continuance of the attack with England could no longer take place. Goering contradicted me and said it could run concurrently. I said that was out of the question. I knew as General. Inspectorate approximately the figures, what the figures were as to the production of the British airforce, and I knew that the force was getting from the States, because we had captured France, and was supposed to be supported there. Then I informed him that four-engined bombers would reach Great Britain to a. larger degree, and that they now attacked Germany, and the attacks by the British would increase; that so far as our home country was concerned, there was next to no defense with the anti-aircraft batteries appearing, and that where the Russians merely were to turn upon us an added attack with the antiaircraft it would not take place again; that was after this fighter aircraft was produced for that purpose, and at that time he did not say much about this, but he stated that the program had been laid down by the General Staff, and if they could turn out more, then the German Staff, too, would make higher demands.
Q. Witness, may I turn back to your warning against the Russian campaign? Do you know that Goering later on made a disparaging remark, publically or in other words called you a coward?
A. Yes, I know that. It was when we had Stalingrad I was given the task I should effect a supply line, and I should supply with clothes the troops, and with food, by air, and I heard by air that speech which was made something like that, of course, which pleased me no end.
Q. How did you know that he meant you?
A. It was clear because I was the only one who had tried to contradict it; at least, I do not know of anybody else in the air forces was accused of being a coward.
Q Witness, in order to name an initial series of attacks on the defense, I'll have to ask you: Did you take part in the declaration of an attack on America?
A. No, that was a matter that came as a complete surprise, since the highest leaders did not even know that Japan would suddenly enter into the war. Now, Hitler was demanding from the Japanese that faith that the Allies would demand of us who would also enter into the war.
Q. Witness, your order to insist that Udet gave assistance as to the Luftwaffe, did you have any assistance from him, and what did it consist of and how did you remove it?
A. I did go on record that he was a good fellow, and for many, many years he was one of my best friends, and if there was any one I would have had to come in with me there, I would rather like for him to have it than anybody else. I said, "I think I'll have it that way but only temporarily." Then I had him report to me on the entire organization as it then turned out, and I had learned what had been produced, which kind it was that was produced, what was the expenditure, and just what developments that were shown to me, and I flew from industry to industry in the Luftwaffe, and I made suggestions to him as to how that organization should be changed, and to know exactly what he had which were known as being directly dependent on him alone, and further, it was regarded as a loss for one man to have twenty-four different departments directly under him.
The military organization mentioned four, and the next mentioned were six departments which can be under one man, and that was a leadership which existed in a case, as long as it was all right, and Udet was of a very general character. The entire machinery, I said, should be comprised of three or four departments, so that he would have only three or four departments, and I showed him the kind of an organization necessary, but he did not like to touch upon that problem, because someone in the immediate vicinity informed him to the contrary, and all the time being a man who was afraid of losing his interest; so I took it that as to his work and his assignment, that I could only give him advice, but then I saw to it as to particular supplies, and obtaining particular supplies, that there was considerable work for the year of 1942 to be done in the aircraft with a type that was standard in the war; that the very type which would be the B-bomber type was being discontinued, and a new type of aircraft was to come up with different motors, and the situation was slightly changed to a new type, and this new aircraft, I want to say I discovered the output was not enough to arrive at in 1942, but that would be under the best circumstances in 1944, and I presented that to Udet but he would not believe me, and I asked the representatives of the industries to come and see us, but they said they did not want to argue any questions, and they admitted I was right, and it was then necessary that the old type should once again be put to use. It was a very difficult task to speak of, for once a type becomes obsolete it is more difficult to start to make that type and then to start a new type in its development. So I say again that it took a. long time until I had it where I wanted it, and I wanted to express my objection very clearly. You must realize that they did already reluctantly give the "A" type should once again be produced. In other words, on an engine design, possibly, once an engine is discontinued you cannot start it up again, and then you have to start up with a new engine, whenever it can be made ready.
That of course caused a lot of difficulties afterwards, but it was before my time that the then new engine had become obsolete. Of course, Udet did not like to be told what to do but we did talk it over in its entirety, and any loose angles he might have had given him were removed. Then Goering stepped in, and he was on Udet's side, but he got the impression, or he did give him the impression, that he was ill and he rather gave me the order in Udet's presence I should interfere more strictly, which was something I refused to do. I told him that I only wished to remain in my capacity as Udet's advisor, and Udet would handle the matters coming from him, and Udet then did not want to adopt this new type of organization, and it was forgotten then, but Goering would not forget it then, and one day he gave the order, and. he complained bitterly. He said, "If I was right from the beginning you know the Fuehrer would have given you the same order a long time ago." It was to me, it was a question if this machinery could be controlled, there is no doubt but what you people would have been so glad you might have the best will but some of you people have not that desire, they are too lazy. So very late this new organization was created, and this was on 4 October 1941, during the time when the conversion of the new types of aircrafts were taking place, which was achieved the first cf September. Udet was sick at the time. He was in a. sanitarium, and I saw him, for on that occasion I secured his support by getting a certain amount of pressure, and if he had not got it by September 1, then in 1942, certainly he would not have produced the bomber, and certainly not the single fighter. If I had not been able to produce more fighters, I would not have been acquainted with the situation, but it would not have helped the fighter situation very much.
Well, after September, after the first of September everything was in perfect order so far as Udet was concerned - my personal relationship with him was concerned, I mean. Then, the 17th of November, the day before he died, I had arranged a short holiday journey, a journey consisting of three days, but when I came to Luetzen he was dead.
1792.
Q Witness, before you entered into this organization as an advisor, did you have another special task referring to the French factories?
A Yes. On the basis of the Armistice agreement, a joint production between Germany and France had been arranged. General Roerster, who was heard as a witness here, signed it at the time. Together with Udet, I talked about this when I received the order from Goering to the effect that we were going to suggest to the French that the entire production, not only of French types be continued, but also that German types should be constructed by them. Transports and training aircraft should be constructed in France.
Then we jointly had a discussion in France with the industrialists there. We met not only the production leaders but also labor leaders, whom we had invited, and with them we reached complete accord regarding the question of manufacturing.
Production was particularly favorable to French interests. They had only a claim of the sixth aircraft. We were going to get five-to-one but since we did not have enough use for these types of aircraft, the entire production, right to the very end, remained one-to-one; that is to say, when we got an aircraft, the French too received an aircraft.
This was not by any means a forced contract. It was a contract that the French very much liked to make, because it gave them the possibility to retain their aircraft and even to produce now aircraft for themselves, contrary to the Versailles Treaty, where Germany was prohibit ed from doing so.
Q At this conference with the French aircraft industry and the French aircraft workers, there was a speech. Was that yours, or whose was it?
A Yes, I drafted that for Udet. You see, Udet was not an orator.
Q Witness, now I refer to the actual indictment, at the time when you.
acted as GL; when did you become GL?
A This was after Udet's death. It was on the 19th that Goering ordered me to come and see him. He told me that he had nobody, that I would have to take on Udet's work in addition to all the other work I was doing.
JUDGE MUSSMANO: Dr. Bergold, when you refer to a date, please make it a little more specific. The 19th is not quite enough. Give the month and, if you haven't mentioned a year within the few minutes immediately preceding, give the year.
DR, BERGOLD: I was not going to put it to the witness. I thought the witness was going to give me the exact date.
A It was on 19 November 1941, Your Honor, that I was ordered to see Goering, and he told me that I would have to accept this office, in addition to the others, because he didn't have anybody else. I asked him to leave me out. I said that my technical knowledge was not fitted for this task, that for so many years since 1937 I had been outside this technical task, and the brief period of advising Udet, too, had not put me in the picture sufficiently well. He insisted on his request and gave me the order.
Hitler confirmed tho matter on 21 November 1941, and he demanded that I should take on this additional assignment. He had hoard from Goering that I was not willing, but ho stated to me that I would have to do it. He did not have confidence in anybody else to take on this task.
Q Did this commission agree with your thoughts for your utilization in the war?
A No, not at all. Right to the very end I demanded active service in tho war. I asked Udet if I could not be used in the air force I should be transferred to the army, and I told the army that I was willing to take a division or less. I did not insist on leading an army group in my rank of field marshal. I just wanted to go to the front and go outside this paper war, since the outcome of the war was abundantly clear to me and since all this could be suffered so much more easily if you were in charge of troops and fighting with your men.
On a few occasions the army tried to get me. I know that. On several occasions applications were made, and, in fact, I was going to be given more than a division, but Hitler did not allow it. On one occasion Hitler told a general that he could not spare me from the air force, and I had to stay.
Q Witness, yon just mentioned that Goering forbade you to warn Hitler before the Russian campaign. Did you have occasion before of warning him, or shortly after?
AAt that tine, before the Russian campaign, I had no opportunity to talk with Hitler. I went to see him on one occasion, but that was previously, when I was not in the picture. It was on 23 April, before I was B.L. and I only went to see him for a brief period. I had been sent off to see Rommel in Africa, and I was to report to Goering and Hitler on the fighting conditions in Africa. I had been there for just a few days, and I had just come back from there, but this report to Hitler was interrupted because Hitler did not have the time. He was going to send for me again, but this never happened.
Q Did you as the GL give up your former duties, as General Inspector and Secretary of the State, or did you continue with these activities?
A No, I continued with them all, just as I continued the training of all troops, the flying training, and so on and so forth. Therefore, I retained all the other assignments. I did say that it was too much, but it was demanded from me. I must say that the work as GL went to the foreground, as far as time was concerned, from then on. I had to devote most of my time to that assignment, but I was very much overburdened with work. I had certainly worked a lot before during my lifetime, but never as long as I did during that period.