Q But if we are going to examine these principles then a decision must be made justly and that justice must be helped from within, but substantial justice can on the one hand be achieved by revision or by appeal or as it happened in the Austrian law, only over a longer period but by means of ne bis in idem.
JUDGE BRAND: Dr. Schilf, may I interrupt you a moment. I am not suggesting any ruling of the Court because the Presiding Justice would make the ****** of the Court, I am suggesting to you that the practice in cross examination is to ask questions and not to enter into arguments with the witness. And I do suggest that you have been delivering a lecture of your opinions rather than calling for the opinion of the witness.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Your Honor, please, I also wish to object at this time to these questions with reference to the plea of nullification because I do not believe that the facts which are involved in the question are correctly stated. As I understand it, the plea of nullification was not review, it was simply the right to open a case and order it retried if the prosecutor did not like the first verdict. Now that is a far cry from a review or an appeal.
THE PRESIDENT: This is the usual time we have our recess, so at this time we shall have a recess for 15 minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q. Witness, in answer to my question about whether the institution of the nullification plea came from the Austrian law -- that is, before the Anschluss -- you confirmed that. May I give you a further example according to which, by an extraordinary legal remedy or, in my opinion, an extraordinary legal means, a change of decision was possible or is possible, and which is still valid today? I am referring to the Liberation Law of 5 March 1946.
May I put another question to you first, witness? You have previously described that you were occupied with denazification cases. May I ask you, therefore, to tell us whether you have the function of a judge in this respect, or in what connection?
A. No; as presiding judge I have to do with personal data and reports about the officials of the district and their cases of denazification.
Q. But the law should do well known to you, and likewise Article 52 of this law should be known to you. Article 52 contains, if I may say so, a summary of various legal means, among which there are also the extraordinary objection, nullification plea, and cassation as we know it from the French law. It is nullification. It contains the possibility that the minister for special tasks may repeal each decision, that is to say, without any limitation.
May I ask for your opinion as to whether that is correct?
A. Yes.
Q Do you believe that there exist not only parallels between the nullification plea and extraordinary objection, but that this Article 52 goes further, that is to say that it destroys ti a further extent the principle ne bis in idem, against double jeopardy, of which you have said that the extraordinary repeal had done that?
May I ask for your opinion about that?
A. I should like to bring to your attention the extraordinary circumstances of the Denazification Law, which is not in the hands of the Administration of Justice, but which is a special task of the Ministry on the basis of special political circumstances caused by the capitulation and conditions prevailing during the twelve years before. I would not like to bring this into any comparison with the regular administration of justice of the Reich or with the jurisdiction of the Reich. Here we are confronted with an extraordinary and, I hope, unique measure and a law which was male necessary by circumstances which have never occurred before in the course of German history. I, therefore, do not believe that any comparisons should be made between the legislation and the measures for denazification.
Q. May I state my opinion on that? I am of a different opinion. I believe the parallel with the Administration of Justice is obvious. If ever, on the basis of this law, anybody may be sent to a labor camp for ten years, that, in its practical consequences, is identical with punishment in the penitentiary for ten years. And if, therefore, the Administration of Justice has, in your opinion, suffered severely by both there laws concerning extraordinary objection and the nullification plea, then at least one would have to draw the analogy that provision 52 of the Liberation Law -and I would also say to a much larger extent so far as figures are concerned, because not only common criminals are concerned with that but also people who had the wrong political opinion -- has consequences which definitely form a parallel, or can be compared to the Administration of Justice. Would you agree?
A. No. That, of course, is a matter of opinion, and I am of an entirely different opinion. In the denazification procedure, I do not see a procedure in it which is similar to the regular Administration of Justice, but proceeding against people who have brought about the disaster for Germany by which they, according to the degree of their participation in this national disaster, are called upon for restitution, and that, as well as the labor camps, are a very small part of the restitution which, in its fullest extent, is quite impossible for the misery which has been brought about by National Socialism.
I, on my part, do not see in that a parallel to the Administration of Justice, but an application to all these who are responsible for the National Socialist catastrophe, in accordance with their participation in smaller or larger part, and the reconstruction of that which has been destroyed by National Socialism.
Q. Witness, I do not like to argue with you, but -
MR. LAFOLLETTE (Interposing): If Your Honor please, I can't anticipate the next question, but the last one was exactly of the type to which I would like to object. If counsel wants to introduce the Denazification Law in defense and to argue to this Court on the question of whether or not there is quilt involved out of the question of double jeopardy, I think it is a substantive matter and not one which should be argued with this witness. I don't see the parallel, nor do I believe that it is a correct type of cross-examination.
The answers have all been intelligent. I don't object to the answers, but, as a matter of fact, I am glad we are getting the question because I am happy with the answers. However, I do think that we would proceed again if my very good friend Dr. Schilf would reserve this discussion with me at the end of the trial.
DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, may I make a principal statement with this? In my opinion, this question which I have just put to the witness has an immediate connection to tic direct examination by the prosecution. The witness was asked yesterday to speak about the development of law and legislation during the so-called Third Reich, and hoe has quoted and described several fundamental problems. He saidand I just want to quote one example -- "The introduction of laws providing for extraordinary objection, or means of extraordinary objection, and the nullification plea, are definite Nazi laws." Therefore, in my opinion, I should not be prevented from shaking that opinion of the witness by putting to him laws which were promulgated after the collapse of the Third Reich, and which now, in the same way, violate that principle as the Third Reich is alleged to have violated it. And if I pick out very typical examples, which probably are somewhat delicate today, I should not be deprived of the privilege of pointing out to the witness that what he has said yesterday, consequently, would have to apply also, or he would have to say the same thing as to laws which are now valid in Germany.
If I may, I ask for the decision of the Tribunal concerning the objection of the prosecutor, and to put this decision on that basis.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion, in the first place, that defense counsel is expressing his own opinions more than he is drawing opinions from the witness and is probably subject to criticism that he is going too far into a subject that was not opened by the Prosecution counsel. It is true that the Prosecution counsel went pretty far afield, but I don't recall that the Prosecution counsel made any comparisons between the denazification law and any law of the Third Reich. Am I wrong about that? Assuming that I am right about that, this character of examination probably would not be competent at all. But in accordance with our rule that we will permit a very great breadth of cross examination, we will let everything stand that has so far been asked, but we think that it has gone far enough along that line. We again admonish counsel to be a little cautious about arguing the case at this time by too free an expression of his own opinion, rather than drawing the opinion of the witness.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q May I therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue my cross examination? I will try my best to heed the decision of the Tribunal. Witness, yesterday you mentioned the concept of undermining legal principles, and in that connection you mentioned the establishment of the People's Court; that is correct, isn't it?
A Yes.
Q In this connection you stated that it is true that the trial of the Reichstag Building fire was the cause?
A Yes, I did that.
Q Are you aware of the official cause mentioned to promulgate the law about the People's Court?
A Not at this moment.
Q The official reason and justification, which is convincing, states explicitly that the Reichstag fire trial had no inference, but I should like to add some more to that. I want to ask you, the competence of the People's Court was before in the hands of the Supreme Court of the Reich-Reichsgericht, and as a typical measure of the Nazis you have mentioned the establishing of the People's Court, because the lay element in contrast to the supreme court, that is the Reichsgericht, was found in the majority there.
May I ask you as a matter of principle whether you consider the establishment of a court where the lay element is in the majority, whether you consider that a Nazi institution, and therefore judge accordingly.
A I have not stated that the overwhelming majority of the lay element was anything typically Nazi, but the overwhelming participation of high officials who were considered absolutely reliable by the Nazi leadership of the state -- personalities from the Party and the armed forces who were in this People's Court. We are here not concerned with the question "lay court" or "not lay court" or "lay judges" but the question of the majority, or the participation in majority of party members.
Q That is clear, witness. That is obvious, but you will permit me that I take another parallel, and again the liberation law. The liberation law contains a provision stating that members of the Spruchkammern have to be reliable anit-Fascists. In other words, a court which has been established along political lines, because if we maintain a principle then we have to adhere to the fact that the question is, who is appointed for this court. That it is at all possible to appoint people for political reasons we don't object to, but that these people are appointed only according to party political principles. May I ask you for your opinion?
A I can only answer again that the comparison with the denazification law puts the whole matter on a different slant. I have pointed out that in the case of denazification we are confronted with a unique measure made necessary only by the Nazi terror regime, its collapse, and the consequences of its collapse, that only that made it necessary, if you could call it that. The fact that in the Spruchkammer there are lay judges who are to determine the responsibility of national socialists and that certainly among these lay judges there are no national socialists and that one does not call the old fighters or national socialists into these courts to judge, that of course needs no other explanation. In the selection for the People's Court with the pillars of the dictatorial regime one was only concerned with the establishment of a terror regime in criminal jurisdiction.
Q Witness, I was only concerned with the principle of establishing a court and appointing people for this court from party political points of view and that you considered this wrong. My objection should only mean that consequently as consequence of the law of 5 March 1946 you would have to disapprove of that principle also, and in this connection I would like to put a question to you. You have explained that the purpose of the law was an entirely different one. Is it known to you, however, that the jurisdiction, the administration of justice of the Cassationshof as a subsidiary law decided the procedure for the Spruchkemmer and that with the words that if the liberation law should not be complete to cover the procedure that then the criminal code should be applied; are you familiar with that decision?
A Yes, but that does not make the liberation procedure a criminal procedure, but in order to supplement matters of procedure which are not covered, provisions of the criminal code are applied.
Q The principle about which we are arguing -
MR. LaFOLLETTE: I don't think the witness had quite finished answering, and I would like to request that Dr. Schilf permit to give his answer to the question. I am still somewhat objecting to the question, but if the witness started to answer, I do believe he should be permitted to give his full reasons for an answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: It certainly seems that we are still dealing with the denazification law, and I think the Tribunal has pretty thoroughly the views of counsel as well as the witness already.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q Witness, I ask you to excuse me if I interrupted you, although I didn't have the impression that I interrupted you, but my impression may have been wrong. The next point which you mentioned as undermining of justice in the Reich was the foundation of the principle "Nullum crimen sine lege," no crime without law, nothing to be considered a crime unless the law exists. I should like to ask you whether you are familiar with the charter of the International Military Tribunal?
A Yes. The first trial, you mean?
Q Yes.
A Yes.
Q The Control Council Law No. 10, you are also familiar with that?
A Yes.
Q Do you believe that the conclusion is permitted that one could say about those that the principle "Nullum crimen sine lege" -- that there is at least doubt about its application, because Control Council Law No. 10 wants to punish crimes which, according to German criminal law, at the time when they were committed were not considered crimes, were not considered punishable acts? May I ask you to tell us your opinion about that?
MR. LaFOLLETTE: Just a minute, please. I object to this question, Your Honor, for the reason that the legal effect of the charter and Control Council Law No, 10 are legally debatable questions, as to which I would take the position, and will take the position in the argument in this case, that the principle referred to is net violated. With reference to the argument of counsel that they seek to punish crimes which were not crimes under German law in Control Council Law 10, again I must take the position that that argument proceeds from an erroneous premise obvious in its statement, because the crimes which were sought to be punished are crimes under the common international law and were crimes contrary to the universal standards of humanity and the moral code of all civilized nations when committed; that this is an international tribunal administering that law for these crimes; that therefore the issue as to whether or not any crimes committed were crimes under German law is not the issue before this Tribunal, and therefore there is no logical analytical comparison to be made between the jurisdiction asserted in the charter and Law 10 and that about which the witness had been asked.
For that reason the question itself is not a proper question in my opinion because it is based upon an erroneous misconception of the law, and finally it again amounts to arguing with the witness as to the effect of a law. For that reason it is objectionable. I realize that in this case we are going to be confronted with issues of law and differences of opinion between that which I have stated and that which Dr. Schilf has stated. But it seems to me that those are questions which lie in the substantive law of the case. They were not covered by the direct examination. And the question itself, as it is framed, does not present a parallel situation. It is not fair to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: If I have misconceived the question of defense counsel, I would like to be corrected. My understanding of the question that was propounded related to the soundness or unsoundness of the opinion of the International Military Tribunal on the applicability of the maxim, no crime without law. Am I right or wrong about that?
DR. SCHILF: May I briefly state this. The meaning of my question was slightly different. The witness told us the Third Reich had repeatedly violated the principle, nulla poena sine lege, no crime without law. I only wanted to ask him whether in the Control Council Law Number 10, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, it was justified to say about the two, that here also that principle was not adhered to. I wanted to hear his opinion on that point in comparison to what he had stated yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it appears from what Dr. Schilf has just said that my understanding of the question was not greatly at variance. I remind counsel that Article 10 of our charter, otherwise know as Ordinance Number 7, makes the International Tribunal Law that is absolutely binding upon us so far as they make findings of fact and so far as they found illegality of some of the Nazi organizations.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: Your Honor, may I further point out that the question, clearly, is not relevant to a decision of any issue in the case or any issue involved in direct examination for the reason that if, assuming for the purpose of argument only that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Law 10 of this Tribunal did violate the principle which Dr. Schilf has declared is violated, that does not in any way, in answer to that question, alter the answer given by the witness that under the Third Reich this rule was violated.
If we are violating the rule, that will be upon our conscience and the conscience of this Tribunal and two wrongs have never made a right. We will solve that question. It has nothing to do with what the witness has said and his answer to the question in no way would constitute a defense; in no way would it take anything from the validity and the credibility of the answers this witness gave on direct examination.
JUDGE BRANDT: May I ask counsel for the prosecution its view upon this matter? Obviously, the question which Dr. Schilf asked of the witness calls for the witness's conclusion as to the legal effect of the controlling statute under which this Tribunal operates.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: That is correct.
JUDGE BRANDT: Would that or would that not be asking for the opinion of the witness as to the controlling law which is purely a question of law for the court to determine.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: I think it is purely a question of law for the court to determine, and also, as I said, it is not relevant because if that violation is present here, and I do not think it is, I have to assume that it does assume the violation in the Third Reich nor is it pertinent.
DR. SCHILF: Just one more word in this argument. I have just mentioned this principle today only in cross examination because the witness yesterday stated that was one of the typical incidents or elements of Nazi justice, and nay I ask the witness to confirm this. As far as the question itself is concerned, I do not insist on an answer because I believe the prosecutor has given that answer as far as it is possible. Therefore, I do not need to hear your opinion on the question.
Q. Furthermore, as a typical principle of the Nazis you have mentioned the allusion to the sound feelings and sound sentiments of the people, "Gesundes Volksempfinden". I should like to ask you whether, as a general term, these words, their grammatical meaning, the sound sentiment of the people, ere essentially different from the content of paragraph 224 of the Civil Code of the year 1900 where the principle of bona fide is expressed and by which the administration of justice accepts, as a rule, whatever people think who are fair minded.
You probably will make the objection which is close at hand that the application of such general terms is decisive, the way in which they are applied, but what I would like to ask you is whether the term "sound sentiments of the people", as a general term, is in accordance with the contents of Paragraph 224.
A. The contents of Paragraph 224 of the Civil Code, Freu und Glauben, bona fide, are not in accordance, be it grammatical or by their meaning, but the concept of the sound sentiments of the people taken at face value, individual value of the term, is something absolutely reasonable, considerably reasonable. But now we come to the decisive point. On various occasions, and today, I had the opportunity to point out that it was just one of the tricks of phraseology of the Third Reich. They would take terms which are reasonable and sound, quite reasonable, and put them into use for something which they mean in an entirely different way.
We are here confronted with the fact that the sound feelings and sentiments of the people which is or could be about the same as common sense in English, in reality, it was used instead of saying the will of National Socialism, the intention of National Socialism. That is what National Socialism would like to put into the minds of the people; partly with success, it has done so.
Hitler, by his handling of mass psychology, which is usually mastered by neurotics, has done this often. He puts into the minds of a large part of the German people thoughts and feelings which were alien to them. That was the catastrophe of the German nation. In reality and in practive, the sound sentiments and feelings of the people meant the general conviction of people who thought the National Socialist way.
I have already quoted an example. There was race defilement. At the same time there were applications of the provisions concerning public enemies if a death penalty had been rendered and executed and it is stated that the resonable sound feelings and sentiments cf the people could only expect that penalty, the death penalty, as a just penalty for such actions. Then this one example tends to illustrate how that term of sound sentiment of people was utilized for the applications were colored for use of National Socialism. If, indeed, the man on the street were asked and his opinion were heard, he would be horrified about such decisions. A few wild fanatics triumphed. Sound and sane people with sound and sane feelings and emotions were horrified and ashamed with regard to that kind of jurisdiction. This describes the term of sound sentiments of the people, such as in a deceitful way it put before the public and such as it was in reality.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I would like to interrupt, not to bother Dr. Sch but I do wish to point out that the witness is a man 58 years of age. He had been on the stand a pretty long time. We closed yesterday early. I realize don't want to delay, but possibly if Dr. Schilf's questioning, as he antic pates it, will not continue long, we might continue. But I imagine there will be other defense counsels who would like to examine the witness. It seems to me that in fairness to all of us, and I believe I am asking something only for this witness, that it might be well to arise, considering the length of time he has been on the stand.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has made no request for relief and we must have an expeditious trial, so if the witness feels able to go on, the Court feels quite able to go on. I think we can be assured that Dr. Schilf also physically able to go ahead.
DR. SCHILF: I also hope to have finished my cross-examination in a half hour.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q You also mentioned, and I apologize that I am repeating that word you have also mentioned as a typically Nazi institution, the law of the 4th July 1934. That law, according to which the consequences of the Roehm Putsch was called, were considered legal. May I ask you, as far as you're informed about these incidents, to explain to the Tribunal that that was a law promulgated by the Reich Government, but that the Reichstag has appr that law. It would tend to a clarification of this matter to explain the difference between laws of the Reich Government and laws which were passe by the Reichstag and approved by the Reichstag. We find it the same thing the case of a decision of Hitler after his speech of the 26 April 1942, a I put this question only to clarify for the Tribunal the differences which exist.
A I believe that, according to the manner in which the Reichstag existed in the Third Reich, that such a difference in fact does not exist. The Reichstag had to say, "Yes," and had to agree, and was only a chorus for the National Socialist Government.
Q Now, we come to the question which interests me. Is it known to you that the German administration of justice has started criminal procedure for perpetration against or for exceeding the amnesty limits as formulated in the law? Is that known to you that after the law was promulgated, the German administration of justice has started criminal proceedings against prosecutors in order to -- I am referring to the case you mentioned yesterday where a journalist had been murdered who happened to have the same name as political adversary of the regime -- that such cases should be prosecuted?
A I have stated yesterday already, as I mentioned that law, that knew nothing about it as to whether and how far such proceedings were tak up and carried out and led to any convictions.
Q You furthermore have emphasized as typical the so-called proced against Poles, and you called it the violation of a fundamental legal pri ple, and pointed out the possibility of protesting against the judge?
A Yes, among other points, but here we are concerned with Jews, no Poles.
Q That is a later regulation?
A Yes, '43.
Q And there also we see that the challenging is not possible. I as you whether it is known to you that it was recorded into the charter of the International Military Tribunal, and also on the basis of the charter, which is valid for this Tribunal, defendants can neither challenge a judge on these grounds and therefore the conclusion is near that this provision is a typical Nazi provision.
A In that provision concerning Jews, we are confronted particular with the segregation of a certain part of the population and the preference for one part and discrimination against another part.
Q Classifying that other part inferior, I do not think a comparison can be made. Excuse me, witness, I only make this comparison because,among other things, you mentioned the impossibility of challenging,a judge. I do not wish to say that a comparison is possible between the 13th decree. Go forbid! I do not want to do that. I only want to add to your statement, a other things, that there was the impossibility of challenging a juror or a associate judge.
A I still contend that, and I have just stated why, because here there was a definite group of people which was put on an inferior level o pared to the others. Not all were deprived of that privilege, but only Je defendants. So, therefore, I can absolutely stand for what I said.
Q I only said one may draw a conclusion that the defendants here also deprived of that possibility. I just want to point out to you that con clusions, of course, are different and you will grant me that.
A No, not a group of people. We do not have a group of people here who, on the basis of certain characteristics, are considered a separate group. If a group of human beings, according to certain characteristics, a segregated, say the Jews or the Poles, then it makes a great difference. Again, we are talking about two different things.
Q Now I come to the last group of questions concerning the field which you have emphasized -- of relations between administration of justi a whole, and the Gestapo, and all police organizations of the Third Reich You have repeatedly pointed out that the judges, in particular, were under certain amount of pressure. Is it known to you that between the administr of justice and the police officials -- that is Himmler on the top -- there was a continuous struggle?
A That there was trouble between all departments is very well known to me.
Q No, but generally.
A Yes, about perpetrations of the Gestapo, the SS, and so on.
Q Are you also aware that in the Reich Ministry of Justice, there a special -- I could not call it a division -- but a special section, a special department, which registered the actions If the police, that the perpetration in the treatment of people in protective custody registered these facts?
A I have heard about it.
Q And they were concerned with the prosecution of mistreatments; that the administration of justice has actually established a department order to counteract these perpetrations?
A Yes, I have heard about that.
Q Is it also known to you that just from this point of view, the administration of justice did not want to tolerate mistreatments of priso and that therefore Himmler succeeded with the highest leadership in the Reich to establish a special jurisdiction of the police.
A Yes, I have heard about that also.
Q Do you know anything about the reasons -- may I ask you first, this police jurisdiction, is that known to you?
A Yes.
Q The establishment of police and SS courts?
A Yes.
Q And nay I ask you to give to the Tribunal a short explanation of the different fields of competence, if you could do so.
A Special courts, do you mean special courts for the SS?
Q Yes, police courts, police jurisdiction, concerning matters which were taken away from the ordinary jurisdiction of the administration of justice. That is the decree of 17 October, 1939 -
A The Reich Legal Gazette, 2,107, and of 17 April 1940, Reich Gazette Blatt, Volume 1, page 649, special courts were established for certain members of the SS and the police units for special disposal, including ordinary jurisdictional procedure.
Q May I ask you, witness, to proceed; there has been some disturbance.
A I finished.
Q Are you, therefore, in a position to state, to tell us who permitted the formulation of this law; who signed the law?
A No, I could not say that at this moment.
Q Is it fair to draw the conclusion that this law and other laws of this kind were designed to cover maltreatment at the hands of police officials which would have been prosecuted by the administration of justice?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q You have admitted that it came to your attention that not only in connection with the decree of 30 July 1934, prosecutions were carried out; also later that the administration of justice should be deprived of that possibility by these laws?
A Yes, these courts belonged to that total picture of the establishment of special courts for special gr ups of people, or special crimes; in this case for special groups of people.
DR. SCHILF: May it please the Tribunal, I have finished my crossexamination.
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire at this time whether any other defense counsel desire to propound questions on cross-examination? I didn't desire that further cross-examination should proceed now.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: (Attorney for Defendant Rothenberger) I only want to say, or. President, that I should like to question the witness as the next Defense Counsel for the defendant Rothenberger, but that I be permitted not to do so tonight because apparently the witness is tired; I would like to start out freshly tomorrow into the cross-examination.
Therefore, I should like to ask that the Tribunal does not ask me to start the crossexamination now.
THE PRESIDENT: We have no thought of having further cross-examination tonight, but I merely wanted to know what was ahead of us tomorrow; do you think very much time will be consumed. he will, therefore, recess at this time until 0930 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 March 1947, at 0930 hours)
DR. BERGOLD: I have a request, that we may finish tomorrow, I ask permission to call the witnesses Vorwald and Reinecke tomorrow at eleven to be heard in the matter of these G. L. meetings, and Reinecke to be heard in the matter whether the defendant ever either directly or indirectly spoke with him in connection with the treatment of French prisoners.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr you want these witnesses at eleven o'clock whether you have finished or not with your redirect examination of the defendant?
DR. BERGOLD: I believe that I shall be through with my redirect examination at eleven. Perhaps first of all only the witness Vorwald should be called.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better wait until you have finished your examination of the defendant, and then we will have them brought to the courtroom. It may be in by eleven. We will wait until you have finished.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal is in recess until 0930 hours tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 March 1947, at 0930 hours.)