If we are violating the rule, that will be upon our conscience and the conscience of this Tribunal and two wrongs have never made a right. We will solve that question. It has nothing to do with what the witness has said and his answer to the question in no way would constitute a defense; in no way would it take anything from the validity and the credibility of the answers this witness gave on direct examination.
JUDGE BRANDT: May I ask counsel for the prosecution its view upon this matter? Obviously, the question which Dr. Schilf asked of the witness calls for the witness's conclusion as to the legal effect of the controlling statute under which this Tribunal operates.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: That is correct.
JUDGE BRANDT: Would that or would that not be asking for the opinion of the witness as to the controlling law which is purely a question of law for the court to determine.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: I think it is purely a question of law for the court to determine, and also, as I said, it is not relevant because if that violation is present here, and I do not think it is, I have to assume that it does assume the violation in the Third Reich nor is it pertinent.
DR. SCHILF: Just one more word in this argument. I have just mentioned this principle today only in cross examination because the witness yesterday stated that was one of the typical incidents or elements of Nazi justice, and nay I ask the witness to confirm this. As far as the question itself is concerned, I do not insist on an answer because I believe the prosecutor has given that answer as far as it is possible. Therefore, I do not need to hear your opinion on the question.
Q. Furthermore, as a typical principle of the Nazis you have mentioned the allusion to the sound feelings and sound sentiments of the people, "Gesundes Volksempfinden". I should like to ask you whether, as a general term, these words, their grammatical meaning, the sound sentiment of the people, ere essentially different from the content of paragraph 224 of the Civil Code of the year 1900 where the principle of bona fide is expressed and by which the administration of justice accepts, as a rule, whatever people think who are fair minded.
You probably will make the objection which is close at hand that the application of such general terms is decisive, the way in which they are applied, but what I would like to ask you is whether the term "sound sentiments of the people", as a general term, is in accordance with the contents of Paragraph 224.
A. The contents of Paragraph 224 of the Civil Code, Freu und Glauben, bona fide, are not in accordance, be it grammatical or by their meaning, but the concept of the sound sentiments of the people taken at face value, individual value of the term, is something absolutely reasonable, considerably reasonable. But now we come to the decisive point. On various occasions, and today, I had the opportunity to point out that it was just one of the tricks of phraseology of the Third Reich. They would take terms which are reasonable and sound, quite reasonable, and put them into use for something which they mean in an entirely different way.
We are here confronted with the fact that the sound feelings and sentiments of the people which is or could be about the same as common sense in English, in reality, it was used instead of saying the will of National Socialism, the intention of National Socialism. That is what National Socialism would like to put into the minds of the people; partly with success, it has done so.
Hitler, by his handling of mass psychology, which is usually mastered by neurotics, has done this often. He puts into the minds of a large part of the German people thoughts and feelings which were alien to them. That was the catastrophe of the German nation. In reality and in practive, the sound sentiments and feelings of the people meant the general conviction of people who thought the National Socialist way.
I have already quoted an example. There was race defilement. At the same time there were applications of the provisions concerning public enemies if a death penalty had been rendered and executed and it is stated that the resonable sound feelings and sentiments cf the people could only expect that penalty, the death penalty, as a just penalty for such actions. Then this one example tends to illustrate how that term of sound sentiment of people was utilized for the applications were colored for use of National Socialism. If, indeed, the man on the street were asked and his opinion were heard, he would be horrified about such decisions. A few wild fanatics triumphed. Sound and sane people with sound and sane feelings and emotions were horrified and ashamed with regard to that kind of jurisdiction. This describes the term of sound sentiments of the people, such as in a deceitful way it put before the public and such as it was in reality.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I would like to interrupt, not to bother Dr. Sch but I do wish to point out that the witness is a man 58 years of age. He had been on the stand a pretty long time. We closed yesterday early. I realize don't want to delay, but possibly if Dr. Schilf's questioning, as he antic pates it, will not continue long, we might continue. But I imagine there will be other defense counsels who would like to examine the witness. It seems to me that in fairness to all of us, and I believe I am asking something only for this witness, that it might be well to arise, considering the length of time he has been on the stand.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has made no request for relief and we must have an expeditious trial, so if the witness feels able to go on, the Court feels quite able to go on. I think we can be assured that Dr. Schilf also physically able to go ahead.
DR. SCHILF: I also hope to have finished my cross-examination in a half hour.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q You also mentioned, and I apologize that I am repeating that word you have also mentioned as a typically Nazi institution, the law of the 4th July 1934. That law, according to which the consequences of the Roehm Putsch was called, were considered legal. May I ask you, as far as you're informed about these incidents, to explain to the Tribunal that that was a law promulgated by the Reich Government, but that the Reichstag has appr that law. It would tend to a clarification of this matter to explain the difference between laws of the Reich Government and laws which were passe by the Reichstag and approved by the Reichstag. We find it the same thing the case of a decision of Hitler after his speech of the 26 April 1942, a I put this question only to clarify for the Tribunal the differences which exist.
A I believe that, according to the manner in which the Reichstag existed in the Third Reich, that such a difference in fact does not exist. The Reichstag had to say, "Yes," and had to agree, and was only a chorus for the National Socialist Government.
Q Now, we come to the question which interests me. Is it known to you that the German administration of justice has started criminal procedure for perpetration against or for exceeding the amnesty limits as formulated in the law? Is that known to you that after the law was promulgated, the German administration of justice has started criminal proceedings against prosecutors in order to -- I am referring to the case you mentioned yesterday where a journalist had been murdered who happened to have the same name as political adversary of the regime -- that such cases should be prosecuted?
A I have stated yesterday already, as I mentioned that law, that knew nothing about it as to whether and how far such proceedings were tak up and carried out and led to any convictions.
Q You furthermore have emphasized as typical the so-called proced against Poles, and you called it the violation of a fundamental legal pri ple, and pointed out the possibility of protesting against the judge?
A Yes, among other points, but here we are concerned with Jews, no Poles.
Q That is a later regulation?
A Yes, '43.
Q And there also we see that the challenging is not possible. I as you whether it is known to you that it was recorded into the charter of the International Military Tribunal, and also on the basis of the charter, which is valid for this Tribunal, defendants can neither challenge a judge on these grounds and therefore the conclusion is near that this provision is a typical Nazi provision.
A In that provision concerning Jews, we are confronted particular with the segregation of a certain part of the population and the preference for one part and discrimination against another part.
Q Classifying that other part inferior, I do not think a comparison can be made. Excuse me, witness, I only make this comparison because,among other things, you mentioned the impossibility of challenging,a judge. I do not wish to say that a comparison is possible between the 13th decree. Go forbid! I do not want to do that. I only want to add to your statement, a other things, that there was the impossibility of challenging a juror or a associate judge.
A I still contend that, and I have just stated why, because here there was a definite group of people which was put on an inferior level o pared to the others. Not all were deprived of that privilege, but only Je defendants. So, therefore, I can absolutely stand for what I said.
Q I only said one may draw a conclusion that the defendants here also deprived of that possibility. I just want to point out to you that con clusions, of course, are different and you will grant me that.
A No, not a group of people. We do not have a group of people here who, on the basis of certain characteristics, are considered a separate group. If a group of human beings, according to certain characteristics, a segregated, say the Jews or the Poles, then it makes a great difference. Again, we are talking about two different things.
Q Now I come to the last group of questions concerning the field which you have emphasized -- of relations between administration of justi a whole, and the Gestapo, and all police organizations of the Third Reich You have repeatedly pointed out that the judges, in particular, were under certain amount of pressure. Is it known to you that between the administr of justice and the police officials -- that is Himmler on the top -- there was a continuous struggle?
A That there was trouble between all departments is very well known to me.
Q No, but generally.
A Yes, about perpetrations of the Gestapo, the SS, and so on.
Q Are you also aware that in the Reich Ministry of Justice, there a special -- I could not call it a division -- but a special section, a special department, which registered the actions If the police, that the perpetration in the treatment of people in protective custody registered these facts?
A I have heard about it.
Q And they were concerned with the prosecution of mistreatments; that the administration of justice has actually established a department order to counteract these perpetrations?
A Yes, I have heard about that.
Q Is it also known to you that just from this point of view, the administration of justice did not want to tolerate mistreatments of priso and that therefore Himmler succeeded with the highest leadership in the Reich to establish a special jurisdiction of the police.
A Yes, I have heard about that also.
Q Do you know anything about the reasons -- may I ask you first, this police jurisdiction, is that known to you?
A Yes.
Q The establishment of police and SS courts?
A Yes.
Q And nay I ask you to give to the Tribunal a short explanation of the different fields of competence, if you could do so.
A Special courts, do you mean special courts for the SS?
Q Yes, police courts, police jurisdiction, concerning matters which were taken away from the ordinary jurisdiction of the administration of justice. That is the decree of 17 October, 1939 -
A The Reich Legal Gazette, 2,107, and of 17 April 1940, Reich Gazette Blatt, Volume 1, page 649, special courts were established for certain members of the SS and the police units for special disposal, including ordinary jurisdictional procedure.
Q May I ask you, witness, to proceed; there has been some disturbance.
A I finished.
Q Are you, therefore, in a position to state, to tell us who permitted the formulation of this law; who signed the law?
A No, I could not say that at this moment.
Q Is it fair to draw the conclusion that this law and other laws of this kind were designed to cover maltreatment at the hands of police officials which would have been prosecuted by the administration of justice?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q You have admitted that it came to your attention that not only in connection with the decree of 30 July 1934, prosecutions were carried out; also later that the administration of justice should be deprived of that possibility by these laws?
A Yes, these courts belonged to that total picture of the establishment of special courts for special gr ups of people, or special crimes; in this case for special groups of people.
DR. SCHILF: May it please the Tribunal, I have finished my crossexamination.
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire at this time whether any other defense counsel desire to propound questions on cross-examination? I didn't desire that further cross-examination should proceed now.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: (Attorney for Defendant Rothenberger) I only want to say, or. President, that I should like to question the witness as the next Defense Counsel for the defendant Rothenberger, but that I be permitted not to do so tonight because apparently the witness is tired; I would like to start out freshly tomorrow into the cross-examination.
Therefore, I should like to ask that the Tribunal does not ask me to start the crossexamination now.
THE PRESIDENT: We have no thought of having further cross-examination tonight, but I merely wanted to know what was ahead of us tomorrow; do you think very much time will be consumed. he will, therefore, recess at this time until 0930 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 March 1947, at 0930 hours)
DR. BERGOLD: I have a request, that we may finish tomorrow, I ask permission to call the witnesses Vorwald and Reinecke tomorrow at eleven to be heard in the matter of these G. L. meetings, and Reinecke to be heard in the matter whether the defendant ever either directly or indirectly spoke with him in connection with the treatment of French prisoners.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr you want these witnesses at eleven o'clock whether you have finished or not with your redirect examination of the defendant?
DR. BERGOLD: I believe that I shall be through with my redirect examination at eleven. Perhaps first of all only the witness Vorwald should be called.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better wait until you have finished your examination of the defendant, and then we will have them brought to the courtroom. It may be in by eleven. We will wait until you have finished.
DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal is in recess until 0930 hours tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 20 March 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Josef Altstotter, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 20 March 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Marshall presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable Judges of Military Tribunal III. Military Tribunal III is now in session. God save the United Statas of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, please ascertain that the defendants are present.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendants Rothaug and Engert, who are absent due to illness.
THE PRESIDENT: The proper notation should be made.
Before beginning further cross-examination, first of all, if the defense counsel are able to do so, we should like to have some indication as to the probable length of time to be consumed in further cross-examination.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: Yes, sir. Wandschneider for the defendant Dr. Rothenberger. For questioning this witness in cross-examination, I will need several hours; that is, until the noon recess, I will need several hours. But I hope by condoning my questions, to speed up the cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes at this time to admonish defense counsel that the testimony of this witness so for seems to be of a general nature that applies to all defendants, and that this trial would be unduly prolonged if there was any covering of the ground the second time. We must, therefore, admonish counsel that the ground that has already been covered should not be again covered or repeated.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: May it please Your Honors, may I also ask the Tribunal to inquire whether after Dr. Wandschneider has completed his cross-examination, at this time, if any other defense counsel are able to say whether they are contemplating a cross-examination. That would give us more time or a better understanding of the length of time necessary.
The witness is a presiding officer of his own court, and while there is no disposition on the part of the prosecution or the witness to avoid any cross-examination, in order that he may advise the officers of his own court as to his probable return, he would like to know whether he can possibly get out today or tomorrow. His train for Schweinfurt leaves a 3:30. There will be some re-direct examination also, but we would like to know if there are any other defense counsel, after Dr. Wandschneider, who desire to cross-examine this witness. I Would appreciate the Court making that inquiry at this time.
DR. GRUBE: Dr. Grube for the defendant Lautz. I intend also to question the witness by way of cross-examination.
DR. ASCHENAUER: Dr. Aschenauer for the defendant Peterson. I also intend to cross-examine the witness.
DR. HAENSEL: Dr. Haensel for the defendant Joel. I have a few questions about two subjects which have not yet been covered.
DR. DOETZER: Dr. Doetzer for the defendant Nebolung. I also intend to cross-examine the witness at lenght. May I say for my colleage, Brieger, who is counsel for tho defendant Cuhorst, that he also intends to cross-examine the witness.
DR. SCHUBERT: Dr. Schubert for the defendant Oeschey. I also intend to cross--examine the witness, but I have only - few questions about subjects which have not been exhaustively covered before.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Dr. Kubuschok for the defendants Schlegelberger and von Ammon. If the subjects about which I want to put questions have not been covered in the meantime by other defense counsel. I also will cross-examine the witness.
DR. ORTH: (Attorney for Defendant Altstoetter) I also have a few questions to put to the witness, which I will only put to him, if in the meantime, other colleagues have not cleared up the matter.
DR. KOESSL: (Attorney for Defendant Rothaug) I wish to make the same statement which my colleagues before me has made.
THE PRESIDENT:
I think I should observe at this time that the cross examination by Dr. Schilf has been searching and exhaustive, and it certainly applied for the benefit of all defendants. It appears to me to say that Joshua of old once said to his followers: "Choose this day whom you will serve." We will turn that around, I think, where there are so many attorneys desiring to be permitted to cross-examine, that it would not be out of place to ask them to choose who will serve them for the benefit of the others. Manifestly, if each of these attorneys should conduct an examination at only a part of the length as was used by Dr. Schilk, it would be certainly not an expeditious trial.
DR. WANCSCHNEIDER: (Attorney for Defendant Rothenberger) I am convinced that a repetition of questions is not in the interest of the proceedings, neither in the interest of the defendants.
Therefore, I shall try to put only these questions which from the special point of view of my client are necessary, and to bring these questions in a condensed form. I ask the high Tribunal to be permitted to begin my questioning.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: (Attorney for Defendant Rothenberger)
Q Witness, you said concerning your personal circumstances, when you were questioned, that until 1930; let me put it this way: May I ask why, in 1930, with forty-one years you left the civil service, the justice service.
A I left the Justice Administration because the position in the field of art and theater was offered to me in Berlin, and because my other inclinations could be used or combined in this position with the judicial, work, and such sort of activities; it was more to my liking.
Q Witness, then I am not mistaken to assume that you personally are greatly influenced by points of view of art and literature as far as your life and your philosophy are concerned.
A Yes, that is true that I am also interested in the point of view of art as far as my life and my philosophy is concerned, but that would not exclude at the same time I have a point of view of a jurist.
Q I did not come to that conclusion. In September, 1935, on the basis of the revision of the professional civil service ruling, if I remember correctly on the basis of paragraph 6 you had been relieved of your position, a provision which justified your dismissal. You were not dismissed on the basis of paragraph 4 of the law which referred to Nationally irresponsibility?
A That is correct.
Q You said furthermore that you also were a member of the Social Democratic Party and the Republican Judges League.
A Yes.
Q On the basis of your dismissal in 1935, did you receive your full pension during the ten years of your absence?
A. Yes.
Q You personally had no difficulties; therefore you encountered no difficulties because you belonged to the Social Democrat Party and the Republican Judges League, as far as your pension was concerned.
A No.
Q Witness, you said that from 1939 until 1941, you had been asked by Mr. Bredow to remain there; he wanted to hold you, you stated; is that true?
A It was Mr. Volk.
Q Oh, Mr. Volk. Were you then in the service cf the police force, or was it the police service?
A I was in the Department of Police.
Q At the beginning of the war, in 1939, was there a draft legislation, which forced everybody to enter into some branch of the administration?
A One had to register with the office where one last worked.
Q Was that the police office?
A Yes.
Q And on that basis of this fact you wont to the police in 1939?
A Yes.
Q Witness, you mentioned Dr. Jacobi in your examination, whom you have known for many years, and you said furthermore that you knew a book, you had a book by Dr. Jacobi here with you which you studied carefully. May I ask you to answer the question: What kind of an opus, a book, was this, as far as the content was concerned?
A It is a study of the administration of justice in Germany, before an after the advent cf the Third Reich -- before and during the Third Reich.
Q. When did that occur?
A It is not a publication, as such; it is just a study; a manuscript; a study.
Q Could one say that in your statements of the opus, in part statements of an expert, that you based your statements essentially on this unpublished study?
A The details of this study, which I have seen about ten days ago and which I mulled through, I have examined them; I have checked them on the basis of my own notations which I have made; I supplemented them, and the some total of that material was the basis for my statements, after examining the statements contained, the material contained in this study by *r. Jacobi.
Q You have stated that from 1930 on, until 1945, that is fifteen years you were not in the service of the administration of Justice any more. Do you believe that you, having been absent for fifteen years from the justice service, would be qualified to have an opinion or give a judgment about internal affairs of the service?
A I have already answered that question before I stated in detail that the development in that field, justice as well as development in the cultural, was observed by me very carefully; that I had clippings from newspapers; that I read publications of the Reich Legal Gazette; that I had conversations with former colleagues; and that thereby I could gain an impression of the development, that I could gain a, complete picture; I also stated that I gained information from publications, in the Deutsche Justiz, a legal magazine.
If one knows how to read between the lines, one can also gain a correct impression. I am sorry that I have to repeat that today again.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: May it please Your Honors, I believe that I didn't say anything yesterday regarding this question; I believe that I can state accurately that this witness on direct examination was restricted to his observations of the outward manifestations of the acts within the Ministry of Justice, and the decrees and laws which were published. I don't believe the witness has ever testified that he knew what went on between personalities or interdepartmental politics within the Ministry of Justice, and the last question I thought was directed as to why he could testify regarding matters within the ministry. That line of questioning is not correct because he only testified as to things he observed.
JUDGE BRAND: May I make one comment; my suggestion is not directed toward counsel; my suggestion is merely that the witness was in fact only repeating what he said yesterday, and that it was unnecessary for him to fully repeat it again what he said yesterday, and what is in the record.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: May I ask for some ruling on my understanding of his testimony, which would have a bearing upon the character of the cross-examination I don't believe that the witness has ever testified on direct examination that he knew anything about what went on within the Ministry of Justice; it was only as to questions which raised the inference or assumed the fact that I am raising the question.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: Excuse me, Mr. President, could I be permitted to say one more thing. I have finished my questions to this point. I only came to put that question before because I wanted to cover a new aspect which was essential for me to emphasize because the witness had only mentioned so far what he knew from the outside about things going on within the Ministry. As far as my client is concerned, it is most important what internal things went on in the Ministry of Justice, and to find out how far the witness was in a position to judge these, and my question to this point is finished.
MA. LA FOLLETTE: On that ground, I have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: It appears that there is no other questions along this line, and, therefore, there is no objection before the Tribunal.
BY DR. WANDSCHNEIDER:
Q Witness, if I understood you correctly, before 1933 and certainly after 1933 you were a strong political opponent of the National Socialist Party.
A Yes, I always was that.
Q Do you believe that in this political attitude, which is a very good one, and which you have frankly stated, that you would be able to have an unbiased judgment of these questions, or do you think according to the standards which you have applied as a judge, yourself, when you questioned witnesses, do you consider it possible that an objective judgment on your part, by a definite political attitude such as yours, could be impartial?
A. As fay as I can base this myself, and referring to the texts which have been published, I do not believe that my attitude as that of an opponent of National Socialism would change anything and things which can be read quite clearly by everybody; they could not change it subjectively.
Q. Thank you, witness. Now, in this connection may I put the supplementary question in your testimony, you are not only concerned with texts themselves but also with your personal attitude and conclusions from the reading of these texts, sand as far as this is concerned, your personal judgment and your personal political attitude could not be quite excluded? May I ask you to answer that?
A. I believe any one who was not a definite adversary, everybody who was not a definite opponent of the Nazi could draw the same conclusion, and would have to draw the same conclusion from these texts as I drew.
Q. You said, witness, that the development, the training of the judges, the jurists and the system of justice after 1933 was definitely going in the opposite direction in which it went before 1933. My first question is the following: German legal development before 1933, starting from 1871 over a period which has been discussed here - was that development a continual one?
A. As far as essential principles are concerned, I would say yes. If one wants to compare it with developments which started after 1933, then, yes.
Q. You answered the question about the uniformity of legal authority before 1933, however, is it so that these legal principles and legal conceptions - isn't it so that they were changed by fundamental changes in the political conditions after the first world war * were they not touched by that? Therefore, if I may add they were touched particularly by the elements which tended to make questionable any continuous development of law or legal authority; that is, first by the contrast of the individual provinces, states of Germany - I remind you of the opposition between authority between North and Southern Germany after the first world.
war by a factor unknown to Anglo-Saxon law; that is, the many political parties which were more than 30, and as a consequence of that, the extraordinary destructive political conditions in the country. Is that correct? And, this is my question. Is it correct that by all these circumstances that in contrast to the general continuous development of law and legal authority until 1918, that in some parts there was a crisis as far as legal conditions were concerned, before 1933, which had to do with the confidence in justice - already before 1933?
A. It is accurate to say that after 1918, by various tendencies, by the individual states, individual states had governments which were carried by different parties; then the government of the Reich thereby had a certain crisis which arose. However, the principles stimulated by the Weimar Constitution, those parties and individual tendencies may have tried to scrap these principles, still in fact, these principles were not disturbed. The independence of the judges was maintained and guaranteed. Essential changes of legal thought such as, for instance, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code, and paragraph 170-A, during this time it never became active. One nay say that a considerable discussion, a heated discussion, and in parts also from the party could be seen to influence jurisdiction and the administration of justice, but at the same time there was a great deal of opposition against that, which after the seizure of power by the National Socialists was slackened more and more. Without a doubt there are problems, for instance, problems of administration of justice, which were discussed in a violent manner. I might remind you of the discussion of the death penalty. I, myself, by way of publication have maintained that I was against the death penalty. Much has been said about improving the Penal Code, that went back and forth, this discussion went back and forth. A draft made by Dr. Ebermaier, the former Reich prosecution, was debated but the basic principles of legal authority remained the same.
Q. I take it, witness, that you consider one of the essential principles of the constitution, the independence of the judges. I have just introduced to other points of my questioning; that is, the points of equality before the law, and security.
Is it true that those also stem from the authority of the constitutional state? That these two points are the basic conditions which you have described, were thoughts which, first, in 1933 were regarded as a difference of jurisdiction from the political points of view, that is, the Social Democrat or National Socialism; that these authorities would be discontinued in 1933? Is it true that many people at that time, even jurists, may have thought that from the point of view of equality and security before the law, National Socialist point of thought, could be the right one?
A. Whoever became acquainted with the thoughts of Hitler and his writing could have no doubt that National Socialist regime would have to come to inequality to establish equality before the law on the basis of their racial dogmatic theories.
Q. You believe, then, that this point of view of legal equality alone by the racial question had to be answered? That is in a negative way?
A. Yes, by this question alone.
Q. Witness, you said furthermore, when you were questioned, that the younger people among the jurists with whom you have come in touch by way of denazification procedures, that they stated that the majority of them had entered the Party under duress, under pressure, to be assured that they would not lose their livelihood. And, you said that many judges have told you the same or similar things. Do you believe on the basis of your human experience or do you not believe that statements of that kind, today in many cases, should be met with considerable criticism, considerable doubt because they ere statements of protection for rehabilitation?
A. I here again must repeat that I have also answered this question on the occasion when I said that in some of these cases it is only a statement for protection; it was the motive. However, in my experience and according to the conversations which I had with these people, that one could not say that of a large number of the cases.