A. No, that was not possible, neither in a geographical nor in a command respect. That can only be an error that I am being charged with anything in this document. I am not even mentioned in the distribution list.
Q. Destruction of villages and localities evacuations are being designated by the Prosecution as particularly cruel measures. Certain other reports which are contained in the documents might give a similar impression, as for instance Exhibit 422, contained in Document Book 17 of the Prosecution, on page 120 of the English text and 87 of the German text.
Would you please turn to that page in the document book, General, and there, under the heading "Counter-Measures" will you please read that paragraph? It says there, in the third paragraph under "C" "arrest of about 2000 patients of the Greek military hospitals in Athens which were forming communist cells. They were transferred to the island of Crete."
What can you tell us about this incident?
A. To the superficial reader that would indicate that in this case the military commander had taken a cruel and ruthless measure directed against the poor wounded Greeks. If one examines the situation, one finds that this report also is merely passing on of a report issued by another agency and has nothing at all to do with the responsibility of the military commander, such as this whole passage has nothing to do with the responsibility of the military commander. I would like to briefly discuss this paragraph "Counter-measures..." because it is a typical example of the fact that the military commander passed on all kinds of things, without the form of this report showing that he himself ordered them. For instance, the first sentence: "Guarding of railroads and telephone lines." The military commander never had this task. Therefore this report cannot concern him. The second report: "Erection of hostage camps in various cities; mainly communists are received there." That is stating a fact because further down on the same page, under XIII, the military commander reports that he was in no po sition to carry out the establishment of hostage camps.
Now, in order to return to the paragraph from which we started---arrests of those poor wounded in the Greek military hospitals--the war diary of the military commander, dated 2 December 1943, clarifies this incident by mentioning that this measure was carried out by the Greek Government with Greek police forces, and that in these hospitals arms, munitions, drugs, foreign currency, and propaganda material were found. Thus we find an explanation for a measure apparently ordered by German military agencies in a quite harmless way.
Q. In this connection I would like to refer to Speidel Document Book 3, Document No. 42, on page 13 of this document book, which are excerpts from the war diary of the Military Commander Greece, which was contained in the documents we received from Washington. On page 13 of this document, which I am offering as Speidel Exhibit No. 23, it states, under date of 13 November 1943: "In the early morning of the 30th of November 1943 the Greek police carried out an operation against communists in the Greek military hospitals in Athens. 1700 inmates, among them 117 women, were arrested on suspicion of communist activities. In the course of this operation one communist was shot, a Greek policeman wounded. Further investigation is being made by the Greek police."
And I further refer to the following entry, dated 2 December 1943, the second paragraph: "The morning press published a statement of the Greek Prime Minister regarding the action against the pseudoinvalids in the Greek military hospitals. The number of persons arrested in the Greek military hospitals has increased to about 2,000. Further, arms, ammunition, narcotics, all kinds of food, and numerous communistic forms and pamphlets were confiscated." Furthermore, I have included in Speidel Document Book 3, as Document Speidel No. 45, on page 28 of the document book: "1c Evening Report dated 30 November 1943". which also was found among the Washington documents. I am offering this document under Speidel Exhibit No. 24, but I shall not read it since its contents are identical with the entry in the war diary.
Q. This brings us back to Athens, and, General, I would like to ask you to give the Tribunal a brief description of the situation in Athens before the end of 1943?
A. General Felmy, during his examination, gave a very clear description of the situation in Athens so that I can be very brief in answering this question. The picture was that murders and raids towards the end of 1943 increased considerably. The whole situation had become very much more acute. The communist movement lead by the EAM had become active and had taken over the leadership over all revolutionary elements. Night after night, in Athens, and above all in the suburbs of Athens, there were shootings. Communist groups attacked those who were of different political attitudes and beat them. Also, members of national units roamed the streets and attacked communists. Therefore, it was an undercover civil war. However, not only at night but even during the day shootings took place--and shootings of a considerable extent.
I remember that one afternoon, about 400 meters away from my office building, shooting started which was so extensive and of such intensity that one could almost be reminded of a large-scale combat action. I was seriously worried lest the long-expected communist insurrection had now actually taken place, and since I could not get any information about these dangerous symptoms I rode slowly through those parts of the town in my car. The shooting had at that time just stopped, but the picture was one of a siege, with barricaded houses, traces of gun shots, and completely deserted streets--not a soul was to be seen.
Now, we had information to the extent that in Athens itself there were quite considerable forces of the EAM movement stationed there, fully armed. To estimated that strength to be 15,000 to 20,000 men, and this last estimate was not completely wrong, as can be seen from the book of the American Military Attache McNeil, who wrote concerning that particular time that, according to his information, the EAM reserve in Athens was 10,000 to 15,000 men strong. This terror of the EAM move ment, which was shown in a variety of ways, was directed, above all, against the civilians and against those elements in the population which loved peace and order; but, with a dreadful hatred and intensity, this activity and these murderous deeds were directed against the security agencies of the Greek Government, against police, the Gendarmerie, and, above all, against the Government.
Q. General, you just mentioned EAM reserves of considerable strength. Did you, during your official stay in Athens--that is, from October 1943 until May 1944--encounter any partisan units which appeared in Athens in formation, which were under a unified leadership, which wore uniforms, or which had a certain uniform insignia arm bands, things like that, insignia which could be recognized from a considerable distance; and who carried their arms openly?
A. No; of course I never saw any such formations, and it was never reported to me that any such formations were there. I don't think it would have been at all possible.
Q. You further mentioned that the EAR movement in Athens was, above all, directed against the Evzones and the Greek communists.
Who were the Evzones, to make this matter quite clear?
A The Evzones were originally in modern Greek history a very popular National Guard and had a distinct tradition. The best men were members of this guard. This tradition was carried on by the Greek Government in the newly organized Evzones units, the organization of which had been admitted by the occupation forces.
Q To whom were Evzones and Greek police units subordinate?
A Greek police units, gendarmes and Evzones were first of all subordinate to the Greek Government.
Q And who gave them orders for commitment?
A The Higher SS and Police leader, according to the service regulation mentioned here yesterday, was in charge of their organization, their training and committed them in close conjunction with the Greek Government for the purpose of fighting the Communists in Greece.
Q What was the attitude of the Greek Government toward these frequent surprise attacks on Greek policemen and Evzones?
A The Greek Government worked, as I briefly mentioned, in close agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader, and the SS the Minister of the Interior and the security agencies subordinate to them, did this in such a manner that close collaboration was carried out. I don't know how this collaboration was carried out, but I do know the Greek government for its own part insisted particularly that the Higher SS and Police Leader should not only be in a position to give orders to the Evzones, but should also be in charge of protection of the Evzones and Police units. By this I mean the Greek Government demanded that measures were taken to protect the units under them and these measures were expressed in reprisal measures, which the Higher SS and Police carried out in reprisal attacks against the Communists.
Q And who in actual fact carried out these reprisal measures?
A To the best of my information, the Evzones themselves. They were filled with fanatical hatred against the Communists. After all, all the documents which we had seen show again and again that fights, I might almost say battles against the Evzones and Communist troops took place where there were losses on both sides.
It might almost be said that in this regard every Greek had to look out after himself, because particularly in the time of Rallys, the fronts were clearly divided against each other. On one side were the Greek Police and Evzones and on the other side were the Communists.
Q General, you stated just now that the Higher SS and Police Leader ordered reprisal measures, which were then carried out by the Evzones; could the Higher SS and Police Leader act independently in this case and order reprisal measures?
A If the Higher SS and Police Leader had the task to commit the Evzones in fights against the Communists, he also had the right to retaliate for their losses during such fights. This for three reasons, (1) he was in this capacity immediately subordinate to the Reichs Fuehrer SS, (2) he as independent divisional commander in accordance with the authority vested in him, had the right to do this and (3) he carried out these measures not only in agreement, but on express wishes of the Greek Government itself.
Q At this point, I have to ask you again, General, what was the extent to which you were informed by the Higher SS and Police leader about the measures, which he ordered in this connection?
A Through the reports which are contained in the documents and which were then passed on to other agencies.
Q Did he inform you in all cases and did he always give you all the details?
A I don't know that. I can only discuss those cases of which I was informed, although I don't remember them individually, but I learned about them from the documents. Of course I cannot say for certain that I saw them all.
Q To what extent did you have the possibility of watching the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A To the extent to which he was subordinate to me, which was as I testified yesterday, mainly and roughly during the first two months when the XVIII Police Regiment was subordinate to me.
This supervision was actually carried out by me. I did not actually let things go and I can give you two examples to prove how I supervised the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Police Regiment XVIII during the time when I was responsible for these units.
One case was the following, the police in a larger suburb of Athens, carried out a large scale raid with my agreement, or rather at my order, because in those areas Communists would be seized and this we knew as far as this operation went. Without the Higher SS and Police leader knowing it, I sent out an official of my staff as an observer, who might afterwards report to me that the operation was carried out according to plan.
Now, I will give you my second observation for that period of time when I was still responsible for this supervision of the units. In the north of Athens it had become necessary to mop up a certain territory, a certain adjacent part of the mountains in order to seize Communist bands and depots. This operation was carried out by the XVIII Police Regiment. I personally participated in the whole operation on foot, climbed through the mountains and I personally convinced myself that this operation was carried out according to order and plans. Of course when I no longer had the responsibility for these units, I did not longer concern myself with their commitments and with the organization for these commitments.
Q It was your opinion then that after the subordination no longer existed you did not have to concern yourself with the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A Well, there was clear division and after all there has to be a great dividing line and I always concerned myself with great dividing lines in organization spheres.
Q When you mentioned the XVIII Police Regiment and that period of time when the Regiment was subordinate to you. You said that that time was the end of August until the end of October, 1943 or the beginning of November, 1943?
A That is correct.
Q I believe yesterday in a different context, perhaps merely by the way, you made comments on whether even during that period of time the XVIII Police Regiment was completely subordinate to you?
A I believe I described yesterday in detail that at all times only parts of this regiment were subordinate to me, because Army Group E disposed in various ways of other parts.
Q That also falls into that period of time from the end of August until the end of October, or beginning of November of 1943. During that time Army Group E disposed over larger or smaller parts of Police Regiment 18 and gave them other assignments and thus you would no longer be responsible for those units.
A That is correct.
Q I would like to return for a moment to the problem of the Evzones. You mentioned that the Higher SS and Police Leader was independent in his organization of Greek police units which he organized according to orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS. One might possibly say that in the organizing of these Greek police units a danger for the German armed forces was contained.
A That idea is a natural one and also a correct one. If this unit--I would like to call it a Greek national unit--became too strong and if its leadership fell into the hands of the wrong man, it could present a danger for the security of the German armed forces. There can be no doubt about that. In order to avoid that possibility, I had reserved for myself the basic consent concerning the size of these units because it could not be all the same to me, in the interests of the security of the German armed forces, whether companies or battalions or divisions were established, whether they were to be armed with pistols or heavy guns. All that represented a question of German security, and I reserved for myself the right to give the permission for the actual extent of these organizations. That is the extent to which I intervened because it concerned the security of the German armed forces.
Q General, what were your intentions when you enlarged Greek police troops? You must have had certain intentions when you did that.
A My ideas were the following. The Greek national troops, as I mentioned, could not be allowed to become strong enough to present a danger for German security, but on the other hand, they were to be strong enough to be a decisive force in the hands of the Greek government. This for the following reasons.
I anticipated very clearly that the German armed forces would not remain in Greece very much longer. Sooner or later, it would evacuate that country or would have to evacuate that country, and that was connected with my general opinion about the situation.
Q General, had it become known to you that the Italians had disarmed the Greek police units, and that the Germans compensated them for this?
A That was well known to me. The Italians out of fear had tried to prevent every armed power of the Greek but I pursued a contrasting policy. I wanted to strengthen the Greek power.
Q You then judged the situation at the time that it was possible that one fine day the Allies land in Greece and would establish themselves there and you wanted the Greek government to be in a position during the internal, that is during the time when the German forces had evacuated the country and during the time when the Allies arrived, would at that time be in a position to maintain law and order in the country, and that was the purpose of the Greek police units?
A That was the conclusion. Primarily, this idea was connected with my opinion of the situation; after the Allies would have established themselves on Greek soil, it was my opinion that further military occupation by us in Greece would become senseless. The Allies had in Italy those air bases which they needed against Southeastern Europe. We did not let Greece fall into their hands so that they would not have such bases there. Seen from a point of view of air force strategy, Greece had become meaningless because the focal point had been transferred to Italy, and so, seen from a higher perspective, any further occupation of Greece was merely a measure of prestige. And prestige questions were decisive questions where the Third Reich was concerned.
I personally was of the opinion that Greece would have to be evacuated sooner or later.
Q Did you make these ideas which I might almost call oppositional ideas be known to higher agencies?
A I discussed these ideas with higher agencies but of course I was very strongly reprimanded.
Q In this connection, I would like to refer to two passages of documents contained in Speidel Document Book No. II. One is an affidavit executed by one Hermann Boedecker which I have already offered as Speidel Exhibit 12 which is Document Speidel No. 22 and the passages which would like to quote here is on page 30 of Document Bock II. This is a passage towards the middle of the page and I would like to read it here.
"During the war the German Reich had an embassy in Athens, consequently General SIEIDEL, in this field too, was unable to exert a decisive influence. It is true that he would have never been able to make his opinion prevail against the Nazi bosses for, General SPEIDEL, as I have always noticed, was of the opinion that it would be advantageous if one could come to an agreement with the resistance movement in order to reinforce their units, after this had been accomplished, and use then for security measures in the Greek area. He was even considering the view that then the German Wehrmacht would be gradually withdraw completely from the Greek territory. For this reason he was in favor of agreements with the troop commander of that time and at present Minister of Security, ZERVAS. For the same point of view he favored a reinforcement of the Evzone-units."
The second passage of a document is one contained in an affidavit executed by one Dr. Ernst Kirsten which is in Speidel Document Book II and Document No. 23. This document can be found on page 35 of the Speidel Document Book II. This affidavit of Dr. Kirsten will be offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 25. Dr. Kirsten is a lecturer at the Philosophical Faculty of the Goettingen University and during the time when General Speidel was in Greece the affiant was also in Greece. He had occasion to get to know General Speidel close, since as a scientist, he frequently accompanied him on his military trips when he visited culturally important places of the country. Concerning the question of the country.
Concerning the question of importance here, Dr. Kirsten says on page 37 of this document, these are the six last lines on page 37-
"Members of his staff, therefore, considered his sudden transfer from Athens as a disciplinary action by his superiors for his criticism of the occupation policy. It was also known that Speidel had long pointed out that it was impossible to hold the German positions in Greece, obviously without being heeded, and that he had initiated the mediation of Archbishop Lamaskonos, whose dignity as a person and official he emphasized towards the anti religion national socialist opposition and whom he respected. Speidel always openly voiced his doubts in the possibility of a German victory, wherever that was possible.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Pardon me, the Tribunal will take its morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY DR. WEISSGERBER:
Q. General, up until now we have discussed the fundamental problems in rather great detail: the organization, the chains of command and questions of competencies, especially with regard to the Higher SS and Police Leader, evaluation reports, development of the situation and, in individual questions, those cases which you in the year 1943 are charged with in Document Book XVII of the prosecution so that 1943 is now mainly concluded and we have now arrived at 1944.
Here at the beginning I must discuss two basic orders which reached you at the beginning of 1944. The first is the service regulation of the Military commander Greece as contained in Document Book XVII of the prosecution. It is Exhibit No. 423 on page 124 in the English and page 89 in the German.
Would you please comment quite briefly about this service regulation?
A. This service regulation came in a certain sense post festum, five months after the creation of the post of military commander Greece. Until then there had been no service regulations for him but I worked on the basis of individual directives which mostly came to me by teletype from time to time. The service regulation is dated the 21st of December, 1943 but actually it could only have reached me during January 1944 because under paragraph 2 there is a supplement dealt with according to which the OKW had only worked it out on the 1st of January 1944. Therefore, this service regulation could not have reached me before the 1st of January 1944.
The reason for this delay in the drawing up and issuing of this service regulation can I think be found in the struggles which took place behind the scenes in the supreme leadership about the position of the military commander Greece.
I myself only heard about this fighting from hearsay. Anyway, it didn't worry me very much but the documents themselves are a confirmation and also, through an exhibit which is also charged against me by the prosecution and that is why I must mention this exhibit here. It is contained in Document Book XVIII, exhibit for the prosecution No. 431, German page 13 and please, Dr. Weissgerber, would you give us the English page?
Q. The English page is page 10 in prosecution Book XVIII, Exhibit No. 431, page 10 in the English.
A. This teletype reproduced there was a dispute about the subordination and that now the OKW, if I remember correctly, on the 8th of January 1944, decided that the subordination asked for by Army Group F of the military commander of Greece would not come under Army Group E.
Therefore, the subordination remained as before. I mention this episode because it seems to me to be the reason for the late issue of the service regulation and in the meantime several points of this service regulation had been overtaken by events. For instance, paragraph 4 which talks about security tasks, a problem which in the meantime had been cleared up; and, therefore, the service regulations had a basis which no longer existed in fact.
The service regulation talks about things which are well and clear and the subordination under the military commander southeast was set down and in this first paragraph there is contained the following sentence which explained why I made reports which I discussed before. Here it states that military commander southeast and also Army Group E, be continuously informed concerning all essential affairs and measures within his sphere of command: that is Greece.
With regard to the other paragraphs, I need only say the following. Paragraph 6 shows the organization of the staff and here the Higher SS and Police Leader is personally included but in practice that was never effective because he was and remained in the outside office and in the same way as the military economic staff which also received its orders from a quite different agency -- namely, directly from Belgrade and Berlin.
Just a short word about paragraph 7. Here it states with reference to the Administrative Area Headquarters 395 in Salonika that this was subordinate to me to carry out my tasks but at the same time it was available to Army Group E to carry out combat duties. Therefore, we have the double subordination which I mentioned yesterday of this office Salonika-Aegean whose appearance I described with the term, the head of Janus.
And finally with reference to the fortress of Crete, it states that the Commandant of the fortress Crete is subordinate to me only in matters concerning the military administration. As far as basic affairs are concerned which require a coordinated ruling for the entire Greek area -- that is, economic measures, questions of currencey, soldiers' pay, et cetera -- this had to be regulated in a standard manner for all the troops in Greece. Otherwise, I had nothing to do with Crete and since it was in no way subordinate to me I never visited it which I would have liked to do very much, rather less for official reasons than for historical and archeological reasons.
To summarize these Service Regulations they sanctioned a condition which was already existing and gave individual points about events which had already become out-of-date.
Q. General, I would like to discuss briefly paragraph D in figure 7, where it mentions troop units, supply and security troops, and other units which were subordinate to you by special orders. What troop units were under you?
A. As I stated yesterday, the Security Battalion 596.
Q. Otherwise no troop units?
A. No.
Q. About the same time -- that is, the beginning of 1944 -- the so-called Loehr order, dated the 22nd of December 1943, must also have reached you. This is prosecution Exhibit No. 379, contained in Document Book No. XVI, page 47 of the English, and page 98 of the German text.
A. This so-called Loehr Order has already been discussed so often here that I need only give one very short comment on it because it must be known. The most important thing was that it rescinded all reprisal ratios existing up till then and put the reprisal measures on a new basis. With this also, the Felber Order, which I mentioned yesterday, was also rescinded -- which had been valid for about two months. The order also regulated the differentiation between troop reprisal measures and other reprisal measures, and, finally, the organization of the Military Commander was included in the reprisal measures insofar as the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters were to participate through the troops. The order probably arrived around about the turn of the year. Probably it was the beginning of January. It also arrived in my office at that time. This can be seen from various other documents, but I am honest enough to admit that I personally haven't the slightest remembrance of this order. As a result, I also cannot say what additional things were ordered It may be that it has some connection with the fact that exactly at that time I was sick, and for a time I was in bed -rather ill -- until I was sent to a hospital in Germany.
Up to that time, of course, I had the complete responsibility, even if I had not yet given up the command. So that is how I explain how it is that I personally do not remember this order.
Q. You were talking about an illness. Could you state when you were taken ill and how long this illness lasted?
A. I don't know the exact time, but it was the end of December 1943, or the beginning of January 1944, and it was a condition of exhaustion influenced by the climate. I was in bed with a high temperature, and it was a very unpleasant condition. Finally, in spite of everything, I could not conjure up any energy; so the doctor sent me to a hospital in Germany -- and this was done with some force.
Q. And when did you arrive at the hospital?
A. I don't know the exact date, but from the War Diary I saw that on the 23rd of January 1944, I left for Germany.
Q. I now return to the War Diary of the Military Commander Greece, which I have already offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 23, and which is contained in Speidel Document Book III, on page 18, Speidel Document No. 42. There, under the 23rd of January 1944 there is the following entry: "The Military Commander Greece, General of the Air Force Speidel, went on leave on 23 January 1944 for several weeks, for medical treatment and recovery."
Well, then, how long were you absent from Greece, or when did you take up your duties again?
A. According to the same document, the War Diary, on the 17th of March I returned, and on the 18th of March 1944 I took up my duties again.
Q. This is also shown in the War Diary of the Military Commander Greece, It is in the same document, Speidel Document No. 42, Speidel Exhibit No. 23, on page 18. It is a report of the 17th of March 1944, and I quote: "Military Commander Greece, General of the Air Forces Speidel, returned on 17 March 1944 from his leave for medical treatment and recovery."
During your absence who deputized for you?
A. As can be seen from the same War Diary and document, the highest-ranking officer of my area command deputized for me. That was the Commandant of the Main Administrative Headquarters, General Pflugradt.
Q. This is also shown in the War Diary of the MilitaryCommander, from which I have just quoted. This is under the 23rd of January 1944. Therefore, from the 23rd of January until the 18th of March 1944 you bore no responsibility?
A. No.
Q. I now turn to the discussion of the individual cases for 1944. Here I would like to add that already in my Opening Statement I pointed out that in the cases of the reports which came from the office of the Military Commander Greece to the superior offices, that, first of all, one cannot tell which of these reports are charged against you personally by the Prosecution. You have already stated that the overwhelming majority of the reports was about events and measures of other agencies. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct. I repeat once again what I have already said -- that all events and incidents and facts and statements, which occurred in the Greek area and which in some way or other came to my knowledge, I sent on, according to orders, to the Military Commander Southeast in Belgrade. In the same way, I also sent these reports to Army Group E for information. One must imagine this as taking place quite automatically. I would like to stress this again, too, because 99% of the cases were just the informative passing on of those reports from other agencies.
Q. Now, we will turn to Count 1 of the Indictment, paragraph 5q, which is charged against you. This is the event as it is contained in Prosecution Exhibit No. 432, Prosecution Document Book No. XVIII, page 12 of the English, and page 15 of the German text. This is a report of the Military Commander Southeast to Army Group F, dated the 19th of January 1944. Under the heading "Military Commander Greece," it states: "Fifty Communists shot as reprisal measure for murdering two German police."
Would you please explain this point?
A. First of all, this brief report does not show where this event took place and who carried it out. Nor does it show what the connection was for the reprisal measures and who was responsible for them, because this report here is only a passing on by the Military Commander Southeast to his superior offices. That is, it is not an original report; so from this very brief report, as in so many reports in these documents, one can see nothing at all unless other reports give some explanation about it. In this case the explanation is possible, through another report, which was probably the basis for this report here. This basic report is contained in the same document book -- Document Book XVIII, Prosecution Exhibit No. 437, page 49 in the English text and page 54 in the German text. There it is stated in a Daily Report of the Military Commander Greece, dated the same day -- the 19th of January. This report gives the explanation, The heading is "SS Police Regiment No. 18," and the text of the report is: "Operation 'Zifas' Mountains -- up to now 5 arrests; one armed bandit shot to death. As reprisal for murder of two policemen in Wrasdamites." I am spelling it: W-R-A-S-D-A-M-I-T-E-S -Wrasdamites. "Fifty hostages shot to death."
This report can be explained in this way: The Zifas Mountains, Chalkis, and as well as Wrasdamites, are situated in the band fighting area, which belonged to the Higher SS and Police Leader. This area was Boetia. In addition in this report the Regiment 18 is expressly mentioned. In this connection I would like to recall what I said yesterday -that the Higher SS and Police leader in the band area Boetia, which was given to him by Army Group E, carried out his war against the bandits independently. This report, therefore, is merely the automatic passing on of a report about a particular event from a combat area to the superior office for its information. Whether I personally saw the report at that time I don't know. Probably I did not see it because the reports went quite automatically onwards; so that is the explanation of this case.