Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the Matter of the United States of America, Against Wilhelm List, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on December 12, 1947 , 0930, Justice Carter, Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the court room?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all of the defendants are present in the court room with the exception of the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital, and the defendant List, who is sick today.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed with the examination.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued.
WILHEIM SPEIDEL - Resumed.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. We shall continue today with the discussion of the events in the latter months of 1943. The prosecution has charged you with an incident which is contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution, which is Exhibit 418 on page 88 of the English text and page 66 of the German text.
What can you tell us about this incident, General?
A. This is a report of the 68th Corps dated the 15th of December, 1943, which has been mentioned the other day during General Felmy's examination. It is stated here that in the area of Levadia which is in Boeotia, Police Regiment 18, after contact with the enemy, burned down the village Evangelistra. This then is a locality and a combat action in the combat area of the Higher SS and Police Leader, namely in Boeotia, and I would like to recall here that as of approximately the beginning of November, 1943, the Higher SS and Police Leader had been given the authority of waging independent actions in this combat area.
He had received this assignment by Army Group E. The Military CommanderGreece, had, therefore, nothing to do with this particular action.
Q. Now, would you please turn in Document Book 18 to Exhibit 437 of the prosecution on page 53 of the English text and 56 of the German text? Is this document concerned with the same incident, General?
A. This is a report of the Military Commander-Greece dated the same day as the previous report and it reports about the same incident. It is, therefore, the same report. It was passed on to the Military CommanderSouth-East.
Q. I have found one further report in Document Book 19 of the prosecution, Exhibit 449, on page 76 of the English text and page 102 of the German text. Would you please look at this report also and tell us whether this is the same incident?
A. This is a report of the 68th Corps dated the same day and dealing with the same incident. In this connection, it is sent to the Commander-in-Chief, South-East by the high command of Army Group E. This is the third document concerning the same case.
Q. You mentioned that Levadia was located in the combat area of the Higher SS and Police Leader, namely in Boeotia, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader took actions in this area independently on the basis of orders he received from the Reichsfuehrer SS.
A. Those are the actual facts, but let me correct you. The place in question is Evangelistra.
Q. Yes, and Evangelistra is located in the combat area Boeotia.
We have a report from the Military Commander-Greece addressed to the Military Commander, South-East, dating from this same time, contained in Document Book 18 of the prosecution in Exhibit 437 on page 52 of the English text and page 55 of the German text. Will you please look at this report, General? 52, Document Book 18. What can you tell us about it?
A. It is a report by the Military Commander, Greece, dated the 16th of December, dealing with the well known incident in Kalavrita.
Q. Should one not conclude from the fact of this report that the Military Commander, Greece, carried out this military action and that he ordered the reprisal measures mentioned here? It is evident that it is a report of the Military Commander, Greece, dated 16 December, and addressed to the Military Commander, South-East.
A. No, that conclusion would be erroneous. As I testified yesterday, the Military Commander, Greece, had nothing to do with the band combatting and the reprisal measures arising from the combatting of the bands, but all reports available concerning events in the total area, events concerning the combatting of bands, were passed on by the Military Commander to his superior agency, which was the Military Commander, South-East, in Belgrade, so that he would be, at all times, in a position to gain a picture of the situation in the Greek area. These current reports about the events were simultaneously passed on to Army Group E for information.
Q. In other documents with which you are charged by the prosecution, we find a large number of reports of the Military Commander, Greece, addressed to the Military Commander, South-East, concerning combat and reprisal measures. On the basis of your statements just now, I would like to ask you what the situation was concerning responsibility for such combat and reprisal measures? Were you responsible?
A. Of course, I had no responsibility where reports were concerned which purely served informational purposes, which is the bulk of the reports, I can state that these informational reports were not reports about execution of actions.
Q. It seems to me that in the interest of clarifying the channels of reporting that you tell this Tribunal briefly the aspects of the channels through which reports went where your agency was concerned.
DR. WEISGERBER: If it please the Tribunal, to simplify the relating of this channel of command I have included in document book Speidel 2, a survey of these aspects and this is document Speidel 20 on page 20 of document book Speidel 2 which I shall offer as Speidel exhibit 22. I would like to briefly present the most important part of this document on page 20.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber cont'd) Before I do this, I would like to ask you, General, you compiled this document?
A. Yes.
Q. And you confirm that this document is correctly compiled; you confirm this under oath?
A. Yes, I do.
DR. WEISGERBER: In this connection I would like to stress the following: "The daily reports of the Military Commander Greece had a twofold aim: 1. To give the Military Commander South East, as the superior authority, a general view of the situation, special events and the developement throughout Greece. 2. To inform Army Group E to the same effect, and at the same time to pass on continually the reports of the Higher SS and Police Leader about his mission. 3. Both kinds of report were combined in one report and given to the Military Commander South East with a copy 'for information' to Army Group E. To furnish this report, information which appeared important for a general picture was collected on all sides and evaluated. The principal sources were: 1. Information from the Military Administration Sub-area Headquarters which they collected, for the most part, by telephone from the troop units of their area, from the Higher SS and Police Leader, from the Navy and the Air Force, from the German Embassy, from the Greek Government, from the Counter Intelligence Branch Office, and from other offices. The reports, however, only gave a section at any given time, that is, only what the Military Commander got to know about."
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) Now, I have one question to ask you, General, in this particular connection.
How were you supplied with reports by the Higher SS and Police Leader? Was that done regularly or wasn't it?
A. It was not done regularly but whenever he had anything special to report he passed it on to my office for evaluation in passing on.
Q. You commented on this problem yesterday and stated that your information left much to be desired and that you more or less depended on what the Higher SS and Police Leader wanted to supply you with; is that correct?
A. To say that I was at his mercy in this respect is putting it a bit too strongly, but I could only get to know what he wanted to inform me of and of what he did informe me and that I could pass on. Of course, I have no way of judging about what was not reported to me.
DR. WEISGERBER: I recommend the balance of this document to the notice of the Tribunal.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) From the description of the duty of reporting and the manner in which reports were made, I take it that every individual report had to be examined from the aspect of who was responsible for the execution of a certain report or action, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is, and it is clearly expressed in an affidavit which the Commander of Athens has submitted for this purpose.
DR. WEISGERBER: If it please the Tribunal, this is document Speidel number 52. I shall refer back to this document at a later context when I shall read the whole document and we will discuss some aspects of this later.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) To turn to something else, General, do you remember from the documents which have been submitted by the prosecution the individual events?
A. As a general rule, no, but a small part of them I do remember.
Q. When the word "Feldkommandant of Athens" was translated I don't believe it was made quite clear what function this agency had. It was translated as Commander of Athens. It should be Commander of Sub-area Administration Headquarters Athens. I don't believe that is quite correct.
Could the translation be revised?
Is it correct that the Commander of the Administrative Sub-area at Athens was an agency subordinate to you?
A. The Commander of the Administrative Sub-area Headquarters in Athens was, of course, subordinate to me as I mentioned during the examination yesterday.
Q. General, were the incoming reports submitted to you?
A. The incoming reports were submitted to me in their original version which is nowhere contained in the documents and then only a small part of them. As a general rule the substance of the reports was submitted to me in the scope of the general orientation about the situation by means of the situation map or of some other way however, only to the extent as it was of particular interest and of importance to me and to my task, that is, to give me a picture of the situation.
Q. General, did you see the outgoing reports?
A. I saw the outgoing reports only to a very small extent because, as we have heard repeatedly in the course of this trial, these reports were passed on through the I-a or I-c channel automatically in order to fulfill the demand of superior agencies. Most of these reports were as mentioned of a purely informational nature and were passed on automatically, and they were as a rule of no particular interest to me, where my tasks were concerned.
Q. General, you mentioned just now the I-a and I-c channel. Will you quite briefly explain to us what you mean by these terms?
A. There were two channels of reports, the I-a channel and the I-c channel. In the reports contained amongst the documents here, they are sometimes I-a and at other times I-c reports. I myself did not quite see from what point of view this particular selection of reports were made. In comparing the reports one can see that mainly reports from band combat areas, that is, reports of a tactical nature, also concerning reprisal measures which took place in the scope of a tactical operation, were passed on through the I-a channels and other reports, the balance of them, on the I-c channel. Exactly how this was handled in the staff I cannot tell you. There might have been some internal agreements between the members that, for instance, the I-a of the Military Commander or of the Army Group phone and said, "It takes too long for me to get the I-c reports.
I want direct reports." Thus it can be explained that both agencies, both departments, passed on the reports.
Q. Can you perhaps remember individual cases or cases of particular importance, cases which have been submitted here by the prosecution?
A. I could remember quite well, not including details of course, that two reprisal measures in retaliation of sabotage on ship about which I testified here yesterday. These two cases I remember very well, of course, because I was deeply concerned about them at the time. I can also remember the surprise attack mentioned yesterday directed against parts of police regiment 18 near Aratuka because I remember the heavy losses which were suffered during that attack. I remembered looking at the documents, immediate the threat of reprisal measures in the Karisen incident, a case about which I testified yesterday and where I stated particularly that this was only a threat.
Then the Kalavrita incident I remembered very clearly indeed because at that time the Greek Prime Minister approached me. He told me about combat actions in and near Kalavrita and asked me for information. In this particular case, however, he knew more than I did because I had heard nothing yet about Kalavrita. I then gathered information in order to be able to inform him. Other than that I do not remember any events that occurred at that time.
Q. Could you perhaps explain to us this gap in your memory, General
A. There are, above all, those reasons which apply to all of us who are here, for one, the consequence of what the War meant to us, the work during the War and then our activity which did not serve to improve our mental faculties. In my particular case there are perhaps some other mitigating circumstances, if I may call them that, and I could explain my partly really depressing loss of memory through the following facts. During the first World War I was wounded twice in the head. Between the two Wars I had three concussions and once I damaged my skull. During the War, as I have stated, I suffered from malaria, and I suffered from the consequences of this illness during the whole of my stay in Greece. Thus in March, 1943, I was once in a hospital in Athens because of overwork, and later on in January, 1944, I was forced also owing to exhaustion to go to Germany and stay in a hospital there for two months. All these factors together might have contributed to make my memory as uncertain as it is, but I can state that I would attach particular importance to having a memory free of gaps and being able to overlook the whole of my period of Greece.
Q. I believe during the translation it was not mentioned that you had a skull fracture which can partially explain the gaps in your memory.
A. I said that during the War I had three times concussion of the brain and one skull fracture caused by accidents in airplanes and through an accident on a horse.
Q. In the preparation of your case did you have anything to support your memory such as notes, diaries, etc.?
A. No, I don't have a single piece of paper concerning those days. All my property which I had was taken from me during my captivity.
Q. This will bring me back to the starting point, and that is the case Kalavrita. Did you have anything to do with the incident Kalavrita which was a combat and reprisal measure on the Peloponnes?
A. No. It was merely a concern of the 117th Division. At this point, however, I have to add that this fact does not only apply to the Kalavrita incident but also to a number of incidents in the Peloponnes. On the Peloponnes where reprisal measures were concerned, there was a special arrangement which had been reached quite early in November, 1943. This arrangement created a clear limitation of the tasks and rights of the troops and the tasks and the rights of the Administrative Subarea Headquarters there
Q. General, I believe you are here talking about the activity report of the 117th Light Infantry Division covering the period of time from the 1st to the 30th of November, 1943, which is contained in Document Book 20 of the Prosecution as Exhibit 474 on page 94 of the English text and page 66 of the German text.
A. Yes, that is the one.
Q. Document Book 20, page 94 of the English document book and page 66 of the German text. We are concerned here with the first page and the entry under the 5th of November, paragraph 5. Would you please give the Tribunal your comments on this particular part?
A. To the regulation provided here I have to say the following. The troops in combat take their own reprisal measures, as I stated yesterday. On the Peloponnes, as we have heard from statements made by General Felmy, the troops found themselves constantly in combat actions. Furthermore, they had the means to carry out reprisal measures. The Administrative Area Headquarters on the Peloponnes did not have these means. It would have needed the support from the troops. Furthermore, they would learn of all these combat incidents much too late. As a consequence of the further development of the fighting situation, everything was a tactical measure of the troops. In order to create a clear sphere of responsibility and to separate the authorities from each other as well as to avoid double measures in the sphere of reprisal measures this arrangement was made.
Thus rights and duties in this sphere had been clearly invested in the command of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Q. You say then, General, that this excludes every responsibility where you are concerned?
A. Yes.
Q. We discussed just before the cases Evangelistra and Kalavrita. In these reports the destruction of localities is mentioned, and on this I base the following questions. Have you ever given an order to destroy localities or houses?
A. No.
Q. Is it known to you that in tho area of your responsibility there was ever a case of reprisal measures concerning the burning down of houses and villages where you saw the need for an investigation and examination?
A. No. I know not a single such case. Destructions of what type formed a part of the reprisal measures which were taken in connection with the combatting of bands and the reprisal measures of troops. I personally had nothing to do with these.
Q. Since we are just talking about destructions, General, I would like to deal with one further document in this connection, and that will be Prosecution Exhibit 381 contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution on page 55 of the English text and 104 of the German text. The Prosecution charges you with an order of the Second Panzer Army concerning the evacuation of the islands and of the coast in the Adriatic Ocean in the event of an enemy landing. Were you in any way connected with or did you participate in these events?
A. No, that was not possible, neither in a geographical nor in a command respect. That can only be an error that I am being charged with anything in this document. I am not even mentioned in the distribution list.
Q. Destruction of villages and localities evacuations are being designated by the Prosecution as particularly cruel measures. Certain other reports which are contained in the documents might give a similar impression, as for instance Exhibit 422, contained in Document Book 17 of the Prosecution, on page 120 of the English text and 87 of the German text.
Would you please turn to that page in the document book, General, and there, under the heading "Counter-Measures" will you please read that paragraph? It says there, in the third paragraph under "C" "arrest of about 2000 patients of the Greek military hospitals in Athens which were forming communist cells. They were transferred to the island of Crete."
What can you tell us about this incident?
A. To the superficial reader that would indicate that in this case the military commander had taken a cruel and ruthless measure directed against the poor wounded Greeks. If one examines the situation, one finds that this report also is merely passing on of a report issued by another agency and has nothing at all to do with the responsibility of the military commander, such as this whole passage has nothing to do with the responsibility of the military commander. I would like to briefly discuss this paragraph "Counter-measures..." because it is a typical example of the fact that the military commander passed on all kinds of things, without the form of this report showing that he himself ordered them. For instance, the first sentence: "Guarding of railroads and telephone lines." The military commander never had this task. Therefore this report cannot concern him. The second report: "Erection of hostage camps in various cities; mainly communists are received there." That is stating a fact because further down on the same page, under XIII, the military commander reports that he was in no po sition to carry out the establishment of hostage camps.
Now, in order to return to the paragraph from which we started---arrests of those poor wounded in the Greek military hospitals--the war diary of the military commander, dated 2 December 1943, clarifies this incident by mentioning that this measure was carried out by the Greek Government with Greek police forces, and that in these hospitals arms, munitions, drugs, foreign currency, and propaganda material were found. Thus we find an explanation for a measure apparently ordered by German military agencies in a quite harmless way.
Q. In this connection I would like to refer to Speidel Document Book 3, Document No. 42, on page 13 of this document book, which are excerpts from the war diary of the Military Commander Greece, which was contained in the documents we received from Washington. On page 13 of this document, which I am offering as Speidel Exhibit No. 23, it states, under date of 13 November 1943: "In the early morning of the 30th of November 1943 the Greek police carried out an operation against communists in the Greek military hospitals in Athens. 1700 inmates, among them 117 women, were arrested on suspicion of communist activities. In the course of this operation one communist was shot, a Greek policeman wounded. Further investigation is being made by the Greek police."
And I further refer to the following entry, dated 2 December 1943, the second paragraph: "The morning press published a statement of the Greek Prime Minister regarding the action against the pseudoinvalids in the Greek military hospitals. The number of persons arrested in the Greek military hospitals has increased to about 2,000. Further, arms, ammunition, narcotics, all kinds of food, and numerous communistic forms and pamphlets were confiscated." Furthermore, I have included in Speidel Document Book 3, as Document Speidel No. 45, on page 28 of the document book: "1c Evening Report dated 30 November 1943". which also was found among the Washington documents. I am offering this document under Speidel Exhibit No. 24, but I shall not read it since its contents are identical with the entry in the war diary.
Q. This brings us back to Athens, and, General, I would like to ask you to give the Tribunal a brief description of the situation in Athens before the end of 1943?
A. General Felmy, during his examination, gave a very clear description of the situation in Athens so that I can be very brief in answering this question. The picture was that murders and raids towards the end of 1943 increased considerably. The whole situation had become very much more acute. The communist movement lead by the EAM had become active and had taken over the leadership over all revolutionary elements. Night after night, in Athens, and above all in the suburbs of Athens, there were shootings. Communist groups attacked those who were of different political attitudes and beat them. Also, members of national units roamed the streets and attacked communists. Therefore, it was an undercover civil war. However, not only at night but even during the day shootings took place--and shootings of a considerable extent.
I remember that one afternoon, about 400 meters away from my office building, shooting started which was so extensive and of such intensity that one could almost be reminded of a large-scale combat action. I was seriously worried lest the long-expected communist insurrection had now actually taken place, and since I could not get any information about these dangerous symptoms I rode slowly through those parts of the town in my car. The shooting had at that time just stopped, but the picture was one of a siege, with barricaded houses, traces of gun shots, and completely deserted streets--not a soul was to be seen.
Now, we had information to the extent that in Athens itself there were quite considerable forces of the EAM movement stationed there, fully armed. To estimated that strength to be 15,000 to 20,000 men, and this last estimate was not completely wrong, as can be seen from the book of the American Military Attache McNeil, who wrote concerning that particular time that, according to his information, the EAM reserve in Athens was 10,000 to 15,000 men strong. This terror of the EAM move ment, which was shown in a variety of ways, was directed, above all, against the civilians and against those elements in the population which loved peace and order; but, with a dreadful hatred and intensity, this activity and these murderous deeds were directed against the security agencies of the Greek Government, against police, the Gendarmerie, and, above all, against the Government.
Q. General, you just mentioned EAM reserves of considerable strength. Did you, during your official stay in Athens--that is, from October 1943 until May 1944--encounter any partisan units which appeared in Athens in formation, which were under a unified leadership, which wore uniforms, or which had a certain uniform insignia arm bands, things like that, insignia which could be recognized from a considerable distance; and who carried their arms openly?
A. No; of course I never saw any such formations, and it was never reported to me that any such formations were there. I don't think it would have been at all possible.
Q. You further mentioned that the EAR movement in Athens was, above all, directed against the Evzones and the Greek communists.
Who were the Evzones, to make this matter quite clear?
A The Evzones were originally in modern Greek history a very popular National Guard and had a distinct tradition. The best men were members of this guard. This tradition was carried on by the Greek Government in the newly organized Evzones units, the organization of which had been admitted by the occupation forces.
Q To whom were Evzones and Greek police units subordinate?
A Greek police units, gendarmes and Evzones were first of all subordinate to the Greek Government.
Q And who gave them orders for commitment?
A The Higher SS and Police leader, according to the service regulation mentioned here yesterday, was in charge of their organization, their training and committed them in close conjunction with the Greek Government for the purpose of fighting the Communists in Greece.
Q What was the attitude of the Greek Government toward these frequent surprise attacks on Greek policemen and Evzones?
A The Greek Government worked, as I briefly mentioned, in close agreement with the Higher SS and Police Leader, and the SS the Minister of the Interior and the security agencies subordinate to them, did this in such a manner that close collaboration was carried out. I don't know how this collaboration was carried out, but I do know the Greek government for its own part insisted particularly that the Higher SS and Police Leader should not only be in a position to give orders to the Evzones, but should also be in charge of protection of the Evzones and Police units. By this I mean the Greek Government demanded that measures were taken to protect the units under them and these measures were expressed in reprisal measures, which the Higher SS and Police carried out in reprisal attacks against the Communists.
Q And who in actual fact carried out these reprisal measures?
A To the best of my information, the Evzones themselves. They were filled with fanatical hatred against the Communists. After all, all the documents which we had seen show again and again that fights, I might almost say battles against the Evzones and Communist troops took place where there were losses on both sides.
It might almost be said that in this regard every Greek had to look out after himself, because particularly in the time of Rallys, the fronts were clearly divided against each other. On one side were the Greek Police and Evzones and on the other side were the Communists.
Q General, you stated just now that the Higher SS and Police Leader ordered reprisal measures, which were then carried out by the Evzones; could the Higher SS and Police Leader act independently in this case and order reprisal measures?
A If the Higher SS and Police Leader had the task to commit the Evzones in fights against the Communists, he also had the right to retaliate for their losses during such fights. This for three reasons, (1) he was in this capacity immediately subordinate to the Reichs Fuehrer SS, (2) he as independent divisional commander in accordance with the authority vested in him, had the right to do this and (3) he carried out these measures not only in agreement, but on express wishes of the Greek Government itself.
Q At this point, I have to ask you again, General, what was the extent to which you were informed by the Higher SS and Police leader about the measures, which he ordered in this connection?
A Through the reports which are contained in the documents and which were then passed on to other agencies.
Q Did he inform you in all cases and did he always give you all the details?
A I don't know that. I can only discuss those cases of which I was informed, although I don't remember them individually, but I learned about them from the documents. Of course I cannot say for certain that I saw them all.
Q To what extent did you have the possibility of watching the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A To the extent to which he was subordinate to me, which was as I testified yesterday, mainly and roughly during the first two months when the XVIII Police Regiment was subordinate to me.
This supervision was actually carried out by me. I did not actually let things go and I can give you two examples to prove how I supervised the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Police Regiment XVIII during the time when I was responsible for these units.
One case was the following, the police in a larger suburb of Athens, carried out a large scale raid with my agreement, or rather at my order, because in those areas Communists would be seized and this we knew as far as this operation went. Without the Higher SS and Police leader knowing it, I sent out an official of my staff as an observer, who might afterwards report to me that the operation was carried out according to plan.
Now, I will give you my second observation for that period of time when I was still responsible for this supervision of the units. In the north of Athens it had become necessary to mop up a certain territory, a certain adjacent part of the mountains in order to seize Communist bands and depots. This operation was carried out by the XVIII Police Regiment. I personally participated in the whole operation on foot, climbed through the mountains and I personally convinced myself that this operation was carried out according to order and plans. Of course when I no longer had the responsibility for these units, I did not longer concern myself with their commitments and with the organization for these commitments.
Q It was your opinion then that after the subordination no longer existed you did not have to concern yourself with the activities of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A Well, there was clear division and after all there has to be a great dividing line and I always concerned myself with great dividing lines in organization spheres.
Q When you mentioned the XVIII Police Regiment and that period of time when the Regiment was subordinate to you. You said that that time was the end of August until the end of October, 1943 or the beginning of November, 1943?
A That is correct.
Q I believe yesterday in a different context, perhaps merely by the way, you made comments on whether even during that period of time the XVIII Police Regiment was completely subordinate to you?
A I believe I described yesterday in detail that at all times only parts of this regiment were subordinate to me, because Army Group E disposed in various ways of other parts.
Q That also falls into that period of time from the end of August until the end of October, or beginning of November of 1943. During that time Army Group E disposed over larger or smaller parts of Police Regiment 18 and gave them other assignments and thus you would no longer be responsible for those units.
A That is correct.
Q I would like to return for a moment to the problem of the Evzones. You mentioned that the Higher SS and Police Leader was independent in his organization of Greek police units which he organized according to orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS. One might possibly say that in the organizing of these Greek police units a danger for the German armed forces was contained.
A That idea is a natural one and also a correct one. If this unit--I would like to call it a Greek national unit--became too strong and if its leadership fell into the hands of the wrong man, it could present a danger for the security of the German armed forces. There can be no doubt about that. In order to avoid that possibility, I had reserved for myself the basic consent concerning the size of these units because it could not be all the same to me, in the interests of the security of the German armed forces, whether companies or battalions or divisions were established, whether they were to be armed with pistols or heavy guns. All that represented a question of German security, and I reserved for myself the right to give the permission for the actual extent of these organizations. That is the extent to which I intervened because it concerned the security of the German armed forces.
Q General, what were your intentions when you enlarged Greek police troops? You must have had certain intentions when you did that.
A My ideas were the following. The Greek national troops, as I mentioned, could not be allowed to become strong enough to present a danger for German security, but on the other hand, they were to be strong enough to be a decisive force in the hands of the Greek government. This for the following reasons.
I anticipated very clearly that the German armed forces would not remain in Greece very much longer. Sooner or later, it would evacuate that country or would have to evacuate that country, and that was connected with my general opinion about the situation.
Q General, had it become known to you that the Italians had disarmed the Greek police units, and that the Germans compensated them for this?
A That was well known to me. The Italians out of fear had tried to prevent every armed power of the Greek but I pursued a contrasting policy. I wanted to strengthen the Greek power.
Q You then judged the situation at the time that it was possible that one fine day the Allies land in Greece and would establish themselves there and you wanted the Greek government to be in a position during the internal, that is during the time when the German forces had evacuated the country and during the time when the Allies arrived, would at that time be in a position to maintain law and order in the country, and that was the purpose of the Greek police units?
A That was the conclusion. Primarily, this idea was connected with my opinion of the situation; after the Allies would have established themselves on Greek soil, it was my opinion that further military occupation by us in Greece would become senseless. The Allies had in Italy those air bases which they needed against Southeastern Europe. We did not let Greece fall into their hands so that they would not have such bases there. Seen from a point of view of air force strategy, Greece had become meaningless because the focal point had been transferred to Italy, and so, seen from a higher perspective, any further occupation of Greece was merely a measure of prestige. And prestige questions were decisive questions where the Third Reich was concerned.
I personally was of the opinion that Greece would have to be evacuated sooner or later.
Q Did you make these ideas which I might almost call oppositional ideas be known to higher agencies?